I call to order today’s Defence Committee evidence session. This is our last session on our High North inquiry, and it is a ministerial session. I am very pleased that we have with us, for her second outing in front of the Committee after the women in the armed forces session, Louise Sandher-Jones MP. She is the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State and Minister for the Armed Forces. We also have Brigadier Jeremy Lamb with us again; he is the head of Euro-Atlantic security at the Ministry of Defence. For the first time, we have Mr Chris Keay in front of the Committee; he is the deputy director of Euro-Atlantic security at the Ministry of Defence. Without further ado, let us get straight into the questioning. Minister, you will be aware that we have been taking a deep dive into defence in the High North. I think that I know the answer to this, but to set the scene, can you explain to us why, given the rising tensions across various parts of the globe and particularly the whole of Europe, the UK should focus on the defence and security of the High North?

Thank you very much for inviting me to come here today. I think that this is a really important topic, and there is lots we need to get into. To help set the scene—this will not be news to people here—the role that the High North plays is fundamental to our homeland security and European security and, indeed, across the globe. It is important to look at how that is applicable in four different ways. One is how the High North interacts with homeland security. For example, making sure that we are able to maintain our sea lines of communication and that we look at how we can operate with our allies—our interoperability. There is the resilience of our country and wider Europe when we talk about things like subsea infrastructure. There is also how we talk about deterrence—the role the High North has in supporting our deterrence, both in terms of continuous at-sea deterrence but also wider deterrence of other actors and the activity that we can do there. The High North plays therefore a really critical enabling role in security, whether we are talking about security in eastern Europe, the middle east or wider. The capabilities and deterrence we are able to provide send crucial messages in a more competitive and contested world, to make sure that the UK is able to influence geopolitical affairs as we would wish in defence of our interests. It is important to be clear-eyed about the challenges that we face in the High North. Some of those challenges are very well known, such as the threats from Russia. Russia is obviously an arctic nation; it has significant capability up there. It is also important to recognise that, as the High North and the arctic region in general become more accessible, there will be increasing economic interests there, and we will see other actors, such as China, increasingly contest and compete in that space. It is really interesting to look at how we expect the relevance of it to change over the coming decades. I think we can all point to the risks and threats that we face today, but we know that they will change significantly over the next few decades. It is important to situate ourselves and understand what we are doing today but, crucially, what we will do in the future.

Is there anything you would like to add to that introduction?

From my area specifically, I would like to point out that the deterrent effect that the Minister touched on is part of our NATO framework. We deter across NATO, and the High North is a critical element within that. It presents a flank that we must retain control of in order to build that deterrence across the Euro-Atlantic area.

If you were doing this inquiry a few years back, this might have been a point of debate—is it really that important to NATO security as a whole? But as you implied at the beginning, Chair, that is now quite well understood right across the NATO alliance, and I know that your Committee had some good expert witnesses in previous sessions explaining that. It is our observation that it is no longer required for the UK to make the case for the importance of the High North; that is now a widely understood point.

Minister, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe has told NATO members to “step up” and increase the number of aircraft, drones and ships available in a crisis, to make up for reduced US military capability in Europe. According to recent reports in The New York Times, if they are to be believed, the US plans to cut the number of F-16 and F-15E fighter jets from roughly 150 to 100, to reduce the maritime reconnaissance aircraft from 26 to 15 and to remove all eight aerial refuelling tanker jets that it previously made available to Europe. Given that European security is no longer a focus, it seems, for the US Administration, what does that mean for European security generally and, specifically, for the role of the UK in the High North?

I think it is clear that the US is prioritising activity in a way that we have not seen previously, and it is rightly making demands on Europe to step up. The UK has always been a leader within Europe, the north Atlantic and the High North in playing our role, but it is clear that we need to increase that. We can all see the growing threats that we are facing, and it is right that we step up. There are a number of things that we need to do as part of that. If we look across domains, we need to make sure that we have a land capability that is credible. I know the Royal Marines have been training for over 50 years in Norway, as people in this Committee will know very well, but it is about making sure that we are transforming them for the future and making sure they have the uncrewed systems they need. I think we are also doubling the presence there in the north as well. When we are looking at sea, NATO has always been based on working in coalition, so where one partner nation may dial up or down their capabilities, other partner nations may wish to step in and change what they are providing. It is really important to note that we have an aircraft carrier currently conducting exercises in the north, as you will be well aware, with Firecrest. It was a really key priority for the flagship exercise that it undertakes this year to be in the High North. There is some significant capability there to demonstrate what we are capable of. Regarding our presence in the air, we have significant air assets supporting that exercise. We have P-8s, obviously. It is about stepping up and saying what we are recognising from the threat and making sure that we are rising to meet that.

It is good that you said that the UK is stepping up but I referred earlier to the New York Times report and there have been other such reports. Can you confirm the validity of those recent reports, which suggest that NATO members have been told by the US to step up and to expect less military support from it?

I think it is really well known that the US is publicly calling on European allies to do more, whether we are talking about targets or capabilities. Chris, do you want to come in with a specific comment on capabilities?

Maybe a couple of comments. Members will all have been tracking the successful NATO summit last week, where there was quite a strong sense of unity around the article 5 commitment and the need for a more European NATO. On the specifics that you are talking about, published in The New York Times, it is the case that the US has begun to start explaining which specific capabilities it is looking to prioritise for different regions. It is for the US to say exactly how accurate the New York Times report is, but we recognise a good chunk of that. As you know the UK already commits most of its force structure to NATO, so the growth of the commitment of the UK and other allies will take time but there are a couple of areas where the UK has been able to find a little more that can contribute, which is connected to the US review. But the other thing I would say in relation to the High North specifically is that the US national defence strategy, which it published a few months back, talks about Russian capabilities that are able to threaten the US homeland. Of course, many of those Russian capabilities are based in the High North, so it is clear that the US will retain a very strong interest in deterrents and defence in the High North.

Minister, regarding the situation in the event of any crisis in Europe, can you confirm whether the Americans have said that they will be reducing the availability of their assets?

You will forgive me for not wanting to comment too specifically on operational decisions, and I hope you appreciate why.

NATO has already responded to that matter, Chair, by conducting a force sourcing conference. Those are routine meetings but they obviously relate to the situation of the moment. As the situation changes based on individual nations’ commitments, other nations are asked to contribute to fill gaps as they appear. That process has already taken place. I cannot go into any details, but I can assure you that Air Chief Marshal Sir Johnny Stringer, as the deputy SACEUR, led that process and it has addressed the immediate declaration from the Americans on the assets that they are removing. What they are talking about, though, is basing; it is not necessarily what they will make available to the two SACEUR in a crisis. There is an ongoing process of which this is just a part—it is another iteration. It is just more public because of the scale.

Brigadier, I appreciate that you and the Minister do not want to comment on this, but you can appreciate that it is a cause of huge concern for many of us, and indeed for many people of the European nations. If there is a crisis, will our American friends stand with us? But anyway, you cannot shed further light on that. I am assuming that, in due course, we will have clarification from our US friends.

Minister, you mentioned the Royal Marines training up in Norway and the aspiration to double the number doing that. When we were there, we heard that the infrastructure for doing that is creaking at the seams and that there is a political problem with it because of Norway’s position on permanent basing. Are the British Government trying to convince the Norwegian Government to lift that prohibition in the case of the Royal Marines’ contribution to the High North?

As you will be aware, we have a really close partnership with Norway in a number of different areas, and that has only deepened following Lunna House. We are having ongoing discussions with Norway about how we can improve our training and support to deliver the capabilities we are trying to, and I know the Norwegians will be happy to work with us on that. I hope you will forgive me for not having the exact details on specific parts of infrastructure, but Norway and the UK have been working together very closely, and that will definitely continue as we go forwards.

Minister, could you enlighten the Committee on the main focus of the joint expeditionary force, given that the Baltics are involved as well? What do you believe is that main focus?

Thematically, geographically or both?

Both, basically.

It brings together a coalition of countries that have shared interests in deepening our co-operation, capability development, training and interoperability. As you know, it was formed in response to the events of 2014, so it has a clear European focus. As I set out at the beginning, we recognise that the High North is crucial for security much more widely than that, so it is fair to say that the High North is an important focus of the JEF, but that is absolutely complementary to and not in competition with security in the Baltics and across Europe. In my opinion, I do not necessarily see a contradiction there.

Does having that other focus on the Baltics affect our focus on the complex anti-submarine operations in the High North?

I don’t think so. The JEF can cover a range of different types of operations, and it enhance some of the ASW activities that we do—we work closely with a lot of JEF nations on such activities, so it supports that. The JEF is about bringing these nations together, but we are obviously able to pursue different lines at the same time. Also, the scrutiny of the Baltics cannot be divorced from the scrutiny of the High North.

So we should not worry about there being any diminution of focus on the complex anti-submarine operations? That is absolutely top notch, is it?

I do not believe that the JEF is taking away from anti-submarine warfare operations. We would always like to be able to do more, for certain, but I do not think that the JEF is pulling resources or focus away from that.

So you are saying that there are no problems with that at the moment.

With anti-submarine warfare in general?

In terms of our focus on it.

We are in a period of transition for the Royal Navy. We are looking at getting new capabilities in—obviously, we have announced some of the ones we will get—and it is quite clear that we have significant capability focused on that already. As I am sure you are aware, there are challenges with the availability of some equipment, where we would prefer it to be better than it is.

What equipment is that?

We talk about some where we would like to have some platforms, perhaps—I hope you will appreciate why I will not comment individually on which ones should be where. This is a really important aspect of homeland defence and deterrence, and we are sending a strong message about the importance of the High North.

There is a worry that we are being a jack of all trades, and that we are not doing everything as well as we could do because we are trying to do too much. Do you not have that worry?

No, not in terms of the High North versus Baltic.

Clearly, as we know, the UK remains the framework nation of the JEF, and in September, we will lead NATO’s Joint Force Command Norfolk. Will we use that as an opportunity to assess whether there are any apparent overlaps between the two organisations?

I think the JEF is primarily focused on interoperability, training and coalition building. Although in a crisis it might have an operational focus, and I understand that we would perhaps look at how it would work together, it very much focuses on pre-crisis preparation. JFC is one of the operational-level commands that is focused on current operations—whether that is deterrence or protecting sea lines of communication—and it very much deals with what we are operationally doing now. While they are similarly focused on the Atlantic High North, I do not believe there is an overlap in their main businesses that is taking away from the effect that they are able to have.

I follow exactly what the Minister has said. The JEF is primarily focused on pre-crisis. It deals with supporting individual nations with article 3 commitments to their own homeland defence. The JEF response options are largely built around a hybrid threat, or a pre-article 5-type threat, which do not require, as a rule, the same capabilities that are required for high-end anti-submarine warfare. Therefore, those two tasks tend not to come into competition for capability. Equally, to answer your second question on JFC Norfolk, it is responsible for day-to-day deterrence, as well as warfighting in the north-western area of operations. Once we transition into crisis, the chances are that the JEF will, in some way, fold into the regional plan north-west anyway. There is not a competition between the two; they are entirely complementary, and one supports the other. There is also the issue of the JEF requiring only two nations to agree to act for it to take action. As an option available pre-crisis, it is available much more quickly than a full NATO response, which would require the consensus of all 32 nations.

Can I ask one last question? When I last visited Norfolk—I think it was about two months ago now, but I cannot remember exactly—we were told that a lot of posts had not been filled. Now that we are leading it, will you be looking to ensure that the posts are filled at Norfolk, and that it is fully staffed? Is that something that will be looked at as part of our lead remit now? When we went there, the message that my colleagues and I were given was that there were quite a lot of vacancies.

Was that specifically for UK posts?

No, generally, but we are going to lead it.

Understood. NATO aligns all of its posts to nations, and it is then their responsibility to fill those posts. Clearly, we would hope that NATO nations would fulfil their commitments, and we lobby to achieve that through our delegation in Brussels.

Does the UK fully meet its commitments?

We meet them to the best of our abilities.

That is a different answer, isn’t it?

NATO posts are a priority within the UK armed forces posting cycle, but I am not going to say here that we fill all our posts.

Do you know how many we have not filled, so far?

I would have to come back to you with a percentage.

Okay, thank you.

I want to speak about the deterrence implications. The consequences of a continued shift in US priorities from Europe to the Indo-Pacific region have profound implications for deterrence, as adversaries may see a weakening of the US commitment to Europe as eroding NATO’s ability to deter. A credible, collective deterrence posture underpins any effective security in the High North. What steps are needed to achieve and sustain that deterrence in the High North?

You are absolutely right that deterrence is fundamental, and never more so than when we talk about the High North and the Arctic. The foundation of the UK’s deterrence is, of course, our independent UK nuclear deterrent, and we are the only European country to assign it to the defence of NATO. We are well placed to show the level of commitment and capability that NATO has in Europe. Of course, we have to step up, take on our share and recognise the changing threat landscape. We are doing that with investments into our submarine programme and with our orders for F-35As. We are also looking at how we can improve our interoperability with our allies, so we are working more closely with France, for example—the other nuclear power in Europe—and our other allies, be that Norway or Germany, to show that we in Europe are united, determined and steadfast, and that we have considerable capability at our disposal.

Does anybody have anything to add to that?

Maybe this is an opportunity to draw the distinction between US commitments and US capabilities. It is on the level of capabilities that the discussion is ongoing in NATO, with the remarks that the Chair pointed towards in terms of particular capabilities. That is part of the overall NATO capability planning process. As you will know, NATO sets capability requirements for each ally; those capability requirements are based on the plans, so what SACEUR needs to conduct the mission. That is a cyclical process, and we are part-way through a cycle. It is in that context that the Americans are making it known to NATO, “Here are the capabilities we intend not to offer in the future.” That is what we think a more European NATO looks like: it is for the Europeans to—

Is that to enable them to meet article 5 requirements?

Correct. It is not a wholesale change; it is a gradual change, but that gives the rest of the allies, including the UK, the basis to move towards a more European NATO with a heavier European capability commitment, but not an exclusively European capability commitment. These NATO processes and the growth in defence budgets will help us align the capabilities delivered with the requirements for article 5.

The UK strategic nuclear deterrence remains committed to NATO. Regarding the High North, how does it help deter aggression? What role will the new sub-strategic capability play, and will the UK practice forward-deploying these nuclear-capable aircraft into the region, as has been mentioned in the DIP with the F-35s?

We do not consider the High North to be a deterrence region in its own right. I touched on this before, but we see all of NATO and its area delivering a contiguous deterrence effect against Russia. We would not necessarily deter Russia specifically through the High North; we would do it through NATO across the entire area of operations. In terms of the employment of, for instance, dual-capable aircraft and so on, we would do that within a NATO framework where NATO considered it most appropriate, at the time, to deliver training effect, interoperability effect or deterrence effect. You may be able to do all three in one activity. That may be in the High North, but it will come down to where SACEUR, at the time, based on his assessment, feels that it is most appropriate. That would be my response to, “Is the High North the specific area we wish to deter in?”. It is part of a much bigger picture.

Minister, you mentioned that Norway has recently become the ninth European country to sign up to French nuclear protection. What implications, if any, does Norway’s deal with France have for the UK’s own contribution to NATO’s deterrence in the High North?

Do you mean specifically nuclear, or conventional as well?

Nuclear.

If our deterrence is based on capability and our alliances—the strength of how we can work with other countries and interoperate with them—it sends another powerful message that shows how NATO is working together. That co-operation is obviously going to take lots of different forms. It will involve various different NATO nations. Sometimes it will be bilateral; sometimes it will be a larger grouping, such as the JEF, for example. It is a really clear signal of intent about our commitment to European security and to the importance of a nuclear element to that.

What do the panel believe to be the main priorities of the JEF? When we were out in the High North, we heard from the CHOD in Norway, who said that it is neither under the command of NATO, nor does it answer to NATO. What do you see as the JEF’s role going forward?

The JEF is focused on the coalition element. That is interoperability training, working together and focusing on specific interests within Europe that we have a shared focus on. We can see that from the activity that is conducted as part of the JEF—for example, training exercises—that that is really useful and valuable work. It is important to bear in mind the distinctions between the JEF and JFC or wider NATO. We have repeatedly stated that we have a NATO-first approach. JFC is an operational-level headquarters. There are commitments that NATO members have made to one another. The JEF is about supporting that and helping to improve capability. The angle of saying that it is not fitted into the ORBAT is not really the question to ask when you consider the focus of the JEF. If we needed to step up operations as part of NATO, we have a very clear operational structure to be able to do that. We would be all the better for it because of the work that the JEF is currently undertaking.

Do you think that Canada should be part of the JEF?

The JEF already has good links with Canada. They participated in Exercise Tarassis. That is really helpful and useful. It is important to remember that it is for JEF nations to decide where they would want to take the focus forward, and how that could work with nations like Canada or if other nations were interested. It is important that we are doing that joint training at the moment, but the question of whether they should join is for nations to discuss and decide together.

In March, the Defence Secretary convened JEF partners to essentially launch an initiative against the Russian shadow fleet. Why has Britain stopped only one Russian shadow fleet ship?

We have supported operations on other ships. It would be very helpful if I could explain to you the operational conditions and decision-making processes as to why we target one ship as opposed to another.

Well, one ship as opposed to 199 others, actually.

But I hope you appreciate that it would not be appropriate for me to go into that level of detail on the decision making. I can assure you that we remain very committed to intercepting the shadow fleet vessels. I hope you will understand that it is not through lack of commitment that we have done this. I hope you will appreciate that I cannot go into the details as to exactly the conditions that need to be met.

All of those platforms will have varying levels of readiness, and every platform will need to go through a cycle of deployment, maintenance, deeper maintenance and, of course, training and preparation and exercises like that. All of them have to go through those processes. When I point to what we have deployed at the moment, we have Op Firecrest going on, so we have the carrier strike group that is currently deployed, and we obviously always have our continuous at-sea deterrent. We have other ships deployed around the world; we are in, for example, the middle east. We have significant capability deployed at this time.

One carrier is deployed; it is in the High North, and it is conducting operations on behalf of NATO. It is transferred to NATO and has delivered, for example, air policing from afloat. The second carrier is at readiness. The point I would bring out here is that our commitments to NATO are graduated, and therefore we hold our capabilities at different readiness depending on the capability they are required to meet for NATO. There are, largely, three bands of capability. While I wouldn’t wish to go into the operational deployments of each of our capabilities, because we consider that beyond the classification of this meeting, those capabilities sit within the bands that we offer to NATO at varying readiness as required by SACEUR for his warfighting plans.

Yes, because it would offer advantage to an adversary to understand our available capabilities right now.

I was just going to say, for example, that the second carrier is about to be increased in readiness for a different task, so I wouldn’t necessarily agree with the reporting that you are describing in the plainest sense of, “It is not available.” They are all available at one readiness level or another. Not all of them are necessarily where we would choose them to be, but they are all on a graduated scale of readiness for defence.

We are very happy to offer a private briefing.

Thank you.

But for the avoidance of doubt, we have significant layers of support to our continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent; I think it is very important to state that. When I look at what we currently have in support of the security of the High North and the Arctic, we have the carrier strike group conducting exercises there at the moment and what has been achieved by other elements. I can see that we are clearly looking at how we can step up the effects that we have there. As I am sure you will appreciate, that will be an ongoing process. I understand that you are speaking to the fleet commander later; I am sure he will be able to go into more detail. But I hope that you can appreciate how seriously we are taking the situation in the High North. We are making sure that we are orientating, where we need to, to face that.

To meet the threat of today, we have significant, multi-layered and different types of capability there.

And I am not trying to be difficult in not giving a simple answer.

I am someone who always wants to challenge and to push further, and this case is no different. I also recognise that where we do want to increase or uplift capability, we have to reprioritise from elsewhere. I will say that there is considerable activity going on in the High North, which I am happy with.

It is quite difficult, and probably not wise, to focus on the specific details of what we should or should not have there. If we were sat here having a discussion about how we didn’t feel like the High North is relevant, or if I could not sit here and tell you about the activity we are doing there, I think there would quite rightly be challenge.

I am sure you are aware that there are rumours online, specifically on Reddit, that when our nuclear bomber boat went out recently, there was not a UK Astute-class submarine available to “delouse” the bomber and get it out to sea without being detected. Is that true?

I cannot comment on operations to do with our nuclear deterrent.

Thank you—as expected.

Brigadier Lamb, I completely appreciate and understand why you would not want to give us a commentary on the readiness of individual ships, but you did say there are different levels of readiness. Could you tell us what they are?

I do not know if they are classified by NATO off the top of my head, I am afraid. I will try to find out and let you know.

I am not asking for specific ships; I am asking what the levels are.

I understand that, but it is a NATO plan. It is not owned by the UK. I think, off the top of my head, it is held at “NATO Secret”, and therefore I cannot describe it in open forum.

So does the UK not have its own readiness criteria?

Yes, we do, but—

What is our readiness criteria? What levels are there? Are they different from the NATO ones?

No, we align our capabilities to NATO.

Right. So we took a decision to align that.

If NATO has asked us to hold a capability at, for example, 10 days’ notice, we will hold that capability at 10 days’ notice, but it is on a case-by-case basis depending on the demand from NATO. We clearly have our own—

I assume that could be discussed in the briefing that is taking place later.

Yes. We will make sure he is aware. Can I just come back on post-filling in NATO?

You have some information for us?

I have. We fill our NATO posts at over 90%. It is about 92% at the moment.

How many posts are there?

Off the top of my head, about 300, but I will come back to you on that as well.

That is still a fair gap, but go on—sorry.

One of the issues with JFC Norfolk is that it is a relatively young organisation, and therefore a lot of nations have not met their initial commitment to it. It is not that people are filling posts that they have filled in the past; they have just never filled them because the organisation is new. We are lobbying to achieve that.

I want to ask about the United Kingdom and our allies, and in particular about our sister nation, Canada. That relationship is incredibly important. It is the only nation with which we share a NATO relationship, a Commonwealth relationship and a Five Eyes relationship, so it is right up there from my perspective in terms of allied relationships. Mark Carney recently talked about “a rupture, not a transition” in international relations, and set out an ambition where middle powers’ “collective investments…are cheaper than everyone building their own fortresses”. Minister, do we see ourselves as a middle power?

I think we have always recognised that we in the UK play a significant role around the globe. We are well respected. Our military has a huge range of capabilities, from the nuclear deterrent right down to our specialist infantry. But we have always been made more impactful through the work that we do with our allies. We have seen that in particular as part of NATO and as part of operations that I and others have deployed on. I certainly recognise the call to make sure that we are working closely with our allies to improve interoperability and to look at where we can work together on capability that goes beyond a shared platform, for example.

How radical can and should the UK be when it comes to working with allies in the region?

For me, we need to recognise the change in the threat picture that we are facing, which is nothing like I have experienced in my lifetime. We are seeing hugely disruptive changes, be they in technology or in certain geopolitical realignments. These are significant, century-defining changes that we are facing, and we need to be very clear-eyed on what needs to be done to meet those challenges. I feel very strongly that that should not look similar to what we had in the 20th century. We should be asking ourselves whether we are making deliberate decisions when we continue activity or saying, “Right, what could be a more impactful way of delivering this same effect?” With today’s incredibly interconnected world, it is no longer true to say that we have the luxury of just focusing on the near abroad. We know how intertwined our interests are around the globe. To be able to meet that, we will have to work very closely with allies all around the globe, and Canada is of course a long-standing, very important ally.

I look at what happens in defence and it seems that we do the same thing over and over again. Sometimes we need to do radical and different things, and prove that we can do things differently. What does that look like, and what could it look like in the context of our work with an ally such as Canada in the High North?

It is about making the case for what military capability needs to be in the future. I am really reassured when I look at, for example, the vision for the hybrid Navy. That is a really ambitious vision has been set out about combining crewed and uncrewed and autonomous drone systems. I look at that and at other measures that we are taking, such as the uncrewed systems taskforce and the uncrewed systems centre that we recently set up. Part of the reason why that is so important is that there is a chance here for the UK to really be a leader in NATO on these capabilities. I know that every country is watching how war is developing in eastern Ukraine and seeing the technological challenges that they are rising to meet. It is really fundamental that the UK is able to lead that transition when we are talking about our relationships with Canada and so on. We can point to some really quite big muscle moves that are being made, which will be hugely impactful on interoperability and coalition-building.

What does this look like in terms of the landscape of intelligence? The Five Eyes relationship is so important. We would like to start sharing some of that intelligence—it may be helpful for our European partners to be able to have access to some of it—but how will that play out with the US? What are the sorts of radical things that you could do from an intelligence perspective with allies like Canada that would allow greater access to some of the information that might help us, as Europe, to get this right?

As a former intelligencer, I know how closely we worked with Canada in the Five Eyes; I know how fundamental that relationship is to our intelligence and our security architecture. We have to be very careful in looking at whether we would expand that. Outside of that, when we look at intelligence sharing—I am conscious that I have to stay within the classification of the room here—we have always worked with non-Five Eyes partners, and within NATO, there is always the balance between maintaining our own security of our own capabilities and using intelligence to its best effect. I am a big believer in making sure that we are balancing those capabilities and that we are not just saying: “Computer says no.” On the other hand, I think we have to recognise the really big challenges if we were to significantly change the agreements that we have at the moment.

Canada has been doing a lot of pioneering work on the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank. I have been campaigning for the UK to be a member of that bank. It is something that Canada cares deeply about. I have been talking to Canadians and there has been frustration that we have not been on the same page. It was good to see an acknowledgement by the Chancellor at Ankara that MDM and DSRB are different things. Do you recognise the bumpiness of how we have dealt with things like MDM versus DSRB? What are the implications for our wider relationship, and things like the High North, if we do not get this right?

Anybody who has worked with allies knows that you will not agree on everything all the time, and this is one area where there have been discussions and a difference of view. It is important that we keep discussing and keep abreast of what each other is doing, so that we can recognise, where there is a path that we have taken, if there is a complementary capability that we need to look at; that is for sure. It is important that we can have these discussions and these points of difference, rather than feeling that we all need to be cookie-cutter. But I recognise your frustrations on this issue.

Minister, can we talk about Type 26 frigates? We are due to build eight for ourselves and at least five for the Norwegians. As I understand it from when we visited there, it is not like we are going to do our eight and then they can have their five. Essentially, we have denuded ourselves of sovereign capability; we will take some out of our own pipeline and those will be redirected towards Norway. All of a sudden, it does not sound like quite the deal of the century that it was. Is it sensible when we need sovereign frigate anti-submarine warfare capability to fire off the stuff that we are making for ourselves to other people?

First, it is a really important deal to have those frigates being built and I really welcome it. Obviously, we are working very closely with Norway. We face the same threats and among those threats, anti-submarine warfare operation has always been multinational. I do not think it is quite right to suggest that, if there is a Norwegian ship before there is a British ship, somehow the threat is not being met. They are very interoperable; how we work with the Norwegians is designed to be almost interchangeable.

But a Norwegian ship will not go down to the Falklands, will it?

There will always be differences in non-NATO deployments. We have interests all around the globe, in the Indo-Pacific, the south Atlantic and the Caribbean—although we are not ASW-focused there—so there will always be other activity that we need to focus on. We are getting these eight new ships, and Norway is getting at least five. I think that is a really powerful capability, which will be at sea, in defence of NATO, focused on anti-submarine operations.

It will be by 2035, but the Prime Minister has said that he anticipates potential Russian conflict in 2030. I am just asking you the question: do you think it is sensible to steal from our own pipeline for sovereign capability and send it to our brothers in Norway?

I do not think that working with allies and building capability together is stealing from ourselves, but on the specifics I will hand over to Brigadier Lamb.

The fleet will be entirely interchangeable and will even have mixed crews at times. This is all about alliances; everything about the High North is about working in alliances. Just because a ship comes off the production line and goes to Norway initially, rather than the UK, does not mean that it is lost to UK security or defence. We will maintain a fleet of sufficient size as the Type 26 replaces the Type 23; the Type 23s will not be withdrawn until capacity exists. Equally, under the future Navy vision, a lot of what we are going to do will become autonomous, so we will need fewer ships to deliver greater capability. This is not necessarily a zero-sum game; we are going to have greater capability and a much stronger alliance with Norway as a partner in everything we do. It is worth noting that a Norwegian ship took part in Operation Highmast, the carrier strike group deployment to the far east, so we already have a commitment from Norway, to an extent, to assist with operations that are not necessarily within the area of operations in which they would naturally choose to operate.

While we are on the pooling of capability—sorry if you answered this earlier, but I am still not clear—do you think Canada should be involved in the JEF?

I think the JEF and Canada have exercised together, and I hope they will do so in the future. Whether Canada joins the JEF is something for the JEF as a whole to decide.

But do you want them to?

Do I want Canada to join? Unfortunately, I do not think it is down to what I want. What I recognise is that the JEF’s focus has come about as a European focus on the High North and the Baltic, and it has been very much founded on the principle that these nations are working together to deal with shared threats. I think that principle should continue above all else: it is about these nations working together, and partner nations agreeing on the future direction that the JEF should take.

So when the JEF political leaders get together and decide on this question—“Should Canada join?”—our position will be neutral.

Well, I think we can point to some of the advantages, but equally I can recognise that some of the great effect of the JEF is down to the fact that it has been a tighter group of nations with a tighter focus, and that its exercises and some of the principles behind them have had a specific focus. I do not see it as a binary right-or-wrong answer; it is a much broader question of where the JEF would go in the future.

Would you welcome Canada into GCAP?

It has been really encouraging to see the direction that Canada is taking and the focus that it has had. I do really welcome that. We can talk about individual programmes and individual organisations. Obviously, I would always welcome our working closely with Canada. Does either of you want to come in specifically on where we are with GCAP?

On the GCAP, we have said that we, the Government, are open to others joining, and I think you will have seen Canadian interest. There is a conversation going on with Canada, but there is nothing more that we can say at this stage.

There are reports that Canada is perhaps going to become an associate member of GCAP. That could be very soon—this month. You cannot confirm or deny those reports?

I will just say that there is more diplomacy to be done. That is how I would put it.

Okay. I know there is German interest and so on as well, but I will not delve into that.

Minister, you have spoken a lot about collaboration with other countries and how that might make us stronger and better defend Europe’s northern flank against any adversaries. From a UK point of view—we cannot scrutinise Europe; we scrutinise the MOD—what are the most important capabilities the UK has in the defence of the High North?

There is a multi-layer approach to that. First and foremost is our nuclear deterrent. That is obviously not just focused on the High North, but it none the less has a hugely important deterrence effect. It goes back to what I said at the beginning about what we need to focus on when we come to the High North, and deterrence is a really key part of that. The nuclear deterrent is obviously incredibly important. The second thing is the importance of our undersea infrastructure and the sea lines of communication. The capabilities that help us safeguard those two elements are hugely important, whether that is RFA Proteus or the exercises that the carriers and destroyers are taking part in, for example. When it comes to any activity we might need to conduct against a raised level of threat—either something that could happen relatively soon or something that becomes possible when the Arctic ice melts further—I can say for sure that our ability to work with others will completely underpin everything we do and make what we have greater than the sum of its parts. The capabilities that we contribute to part of that do not fully answer the question, and I would not expect them to, but they none the less play a vital role. I would point to our Royal Marines capability as a classic example. Sweden and Finland have fantastic Arctic warfare capabilities, and you would expect them to. It is certainly much more embedded in their more conventional forces than it is in ours. But we can deploy a respected, trained capability alongside that, and we have set aside plans to transform them and will get them extra equipment; I think that they are getting a future all-terrain vehicle, for example. The fact that we can deploy a serious capability alongside that is hugely important, and it is critical that we retain that.

Our resources are obviously limited as a country, and we have been through the ongoing conversations about the DIP and so on. But if we had all the resource in the world—if we had American levels of funding—what would you quickly acquire as the most useful things to field in the northern flank that we currently cannot afford? We obviously cannot afford everything.

I am quite biased, and I would always say that ISR is hugely important. Any platform you have that can deliver a kinetic effect is much more impactful if you have good ISR.

What kind of ISR?

A range of elements. That would be surveillance platforms, such as more P-8s, but it is not just about the platforms; it is support from space and other radars. Crucially, it is also about how we bring that together in a single intelligence picture.

Can I just take you back to space? The UK and most European operations, as I understand it, rely pretty heavily on US optical earth observation—not SAR, just optical cameras. Do you think there is a place for the UK to have sovereign earth observation satellites? Is that something you endorse?

I would go back to Mark Carney’s comment about the difference between recognising that a capability is hugely important—in my career, both in the military and outside it, I saw the huge importance of space-based platforms, whether it is EO or SAR—and looking at the capability we have access to and what we can do to enhance that. That does not necessarily mean that we should always focus on developing our own sovereign capability. We will always have to work with allies, particularly when it comes to things like space, to make sure that we are able to use our platforms in the way that we would wish.

Is that a no?

For me it is not as simple as a yes or no, because that could cover a whole variety of different nuances. Do we need to have access to capability provided from space? Yes.

Would it be possible to hear from the Brigadier on this?

Yes.

From my perspective, I would love everything. We would want every single capability we could make available to us, but given the scale of the capabilities you are describing, there is no way we are ever going to be able to afford the breadth and depth of capabilities that I and CDS would want if money was no object. However, we do have access to space-based capabilities. They are phenomenally expensive to build from scratch.

I would challenge that: some of them are quite cheap. Some of them are really expensive, but they are getting cheaper year on year. The context for why we are asking about this is that the Committee was in Norway recently. We spoke about Lunna House earlier. As my colleague alluded to, within that there is some scheduling of the actual frigates, but there is also the arrangement where we need to buy back some capabilities from Norway. One of the things we heard about over there was an option to do that with joint procurement of what would then be UK-Norway sovereign satellites for earth observation or a wide-swathe SAR option. It is actually pretty cheap. It is certainly very affordable within the £10 billion of the frigate deal, so I challenge the idea that it is unaffordable. These are choices that can be made. We have seen about £15 billion extra for space within the DIP, so it is going to be spent somewhere.

Sorry, I thought your initial question was about UK-sovereign capabilities. When you are not burden sharing or cost sharing, the cost is far greater.

Fair enough. I guess I meant capabilities independent from America.

I am sure that is a consideration alongside every other capability in terms of prioritisation and where it may fit in future decision making. At the moment, the decision has been made that we have access to US-supplied data and therefore the value for money line has not quite been reached.

I would like to talk about frigates and destroyers. We are phasing out our Type 23 frigates. It was announced today that two of them have gone out of service. We currently have five frigates. The DIP says that all the Type 23s will be out of service by 2033. They will be replaced primarily by Type 26s, which are the anti-submarine frigates. Some are going out of service and some are coming into service, so there will be a shifting number of frigates in service at any one time. How many frigates will we have in service in 2030?

The Royal Navy is going to manage the transition from the older platform to the new one very closely. It is absolutely vital that we get that right because of the capabilities that frigates provide, and that we can meet the threats that we need to face in 2030 or any other year. A significant amount of work has gone into managing this transition, to ensure that our tasks can be met. I am sure you appreciate that, as always, that fits within multiple layers that complement each other, of which the frigate is a hugely important part.

How many frigates will we have in service in 2030?

You can forgive me for not being able to say the exact number that we will have. It is important to recognise that we will make sure we will meet the threat picture with the frigate availability we need to have.

Will you write to the Committee afterwards with a number?

I will write to you with further detail on this topic.

Thank you. On destroyers, we have six Type 45s now. I think most of them are tied up. They are due to go out of service by 2035, according to the DIP. Obviously, destroyers provide air defence, and they are going to be replaced by not one ship—because the Type 83s, which were the like-for-like replacement, have been cancelled in the DIP—but this new hybrid fleet of CCVs, like motherships, which will have people on them, and then fleets of other autonomous vehicles. There are perhaps five classes of ship/autonomous vehicle in that mix. They are due to arrive, as with most of the DIP, between 2030 and 2035. Are you confident that we can deliver five classes of ship, most of which only really exist as PowerPoint slides at the moment? Can we get them to sea in nine years?

Yes, very confident. It is probably fair to say that we have already started the journey. We have Project Beehive, which we are hoping to test in the middle east.

What is that? I am not familiar with it.

Beehive is uncrewed anti-mine capability.

Okay. As I understand it, this fleet will provide the air defence capabilities that the current destroyer fleet provides, and will also provide some anti-submarine options. There are sensor ships, missile ships, above surface and below surface—an autonomous fleet. There is a reason why we are bringing autonomy to the maritime domain last, because that is the most difficult domain. You said earlier that you were very confident that we could get these five classes of ship, give or take, to sea in nine years. Why are you very confident about that?

Because I can see the work that has been done. It is first important to state the importance of having the vision that the First Sea Lord has for the hybrid Navy. I agree with it. A decision has been taken to prioritise what we believe are the technologies of the future, rather than doing a like-for-like replacement. Of course, that brings with it a level of uncomfort, because of what we are used to seeing. It is the same in the land and the air. It is also important to recognise that large parts of what we are trying to deliver already exist and are being trialled. One of the key enablers of the hybrid Navy will be the software architecture that supports it. That is already being used in many different ways—I am sure you have seen how it is being used abroad as well. When I can see the progress that is being made and what is capable, I see a very credible delivery pipeline. Different parts of what these uncrewed vessels have done are in trial, in production or being used around the world. This might feel, in many ways, like a new capability, but it is developing so quickly that what we might have thought impossible five or 10 years ago is almost becoming obsolete because of how quickly we are moving with uncrewed. You are right that maritime will present challenges in a way that the land will not, but again, all of these challenges are currently being met. It is about delivering this at the scale and the interoperability that we require.

I agree with you: we need to make the leap into this new world of autonomy, and there is no time like the present. As I think you touched on, the maritime domain is extremely difficult, particularly the north Atlantic and the High North. Everything breaks at sea all the time, and that is why you need people, because they fix stuff. It is a risk—I think we can agree on that. One way of de-risking it would be to properly fund the programme. In the DIP, only £1.3 billion has been allocated to this hybrid Navy project. The rest of it is beyond 2030 and needs to be confirmed in the next spending review, so effectively, it is unfunded. Do you think £1.3 billion is enough to do the design and development work for five classes of ship?

Yes, and I think it is important to state the significant sums that are going into this and into uncrewed in general, which will have a lot of utility across maritime as well. We know the target that we have to meet—3.5% by 2035—and the spending review will set out the process to get towards 3%. The demands on what we need to spend to meet the threats that we face are really well recognised. In pushing ahead with this and the funding we need at this stage, noting what capabilities already exist, I think we can make really huge strides in delivering what we need to get after in the uncrewed space. It may be that conversations are different in 2030 and 2035.

I have some quickfire questions, but Brigadier, and Mr Keay, do you want to come in on those broad questions I have asked?

The first thing I would set out is that we need to re-characterise what we are talking about in the future. We are not talking about ships as we would necessarily recognise them today; we are talking about uncrewed systems that, because they do not have a crew, can be much, much smaller. They also tend to be more specialised, so they will do one thing rather than a whole range of activities. Therefore, they can be smaller, easier to manufacture, cheaper to manufacture, and so on and so forth.

It still stands that the maritime domain is extremely difficult to operate in.

Yes, but the next point I come to is that you are probably talking about three different types of vessel. You are talking about a crewed vessel that looks largely like something you would recognise today. You are talking about uncrewed, which is still quite a large thing, but it supports a whole collection of autonomous things. There are already in the world autonomous air defence capabilities that are very, very cheap by comparison, because, effectively, they are just a platform that detects and launches, and compared to an actual ship, you are talking about something that is very small. It is accepted that a number of them will be lost, either because they do their job and then run out of ammunition, or their purpose is to go and destroy something in their own right, so they cease to exist.

Are you saying that some of the vessels in this fleet are going to be single-use?

I am talking about autonomy in general. In the air environment, there are one-way attack drones. They still exist, but you do not build a one-way attack drone to be able to fly thousands and thousands of hours; you design it to fly six hours.

I get that.

To a certain extent, the same is true in the maritime environment. If you have a launcher with a single purpose, you are not going to design it to be able to survive for years on end at sea.

One of the advantages of having an uncrewed missile platform at sea is that your magazine depth is much greater because you do not need people, spaces for people, protection and all the rest of it. You can therefore have a much bigger magazine depth. The Type 45s run out of missiles. That means that your maritime logistics have to be much greater because you are going to be resupplying these things much more often. Can you point me to where in the DIP we have funded the RFA to deliver that vastly increased level of logistics to account for the greater magazine depth in the hybrid fleet?

Again, I would say that logistics is less about what we would have recognised in the past, in terms of a fleet of RFAs available to resupply the fleet on an enduring basis. It is much more about a connected network that allows you to get the right piece of equipment to the right place at the right time.

It is still stuff going from here to here, and you push fire and it goes whoosh. Where is the investment to deliver that? I recognise that they might be uncrewed RFA ships, but where is that in the DIP?

There is investment in the RFA and the fleet solid support.

Okay.

May I make two quick comments? On the numbers in the DIP, the £1.3 billion is for the autonomous vessels and the future common combat vessel. There is a separate £7.2 billion for the two frigate types and the fleet solid support ships.

Which period do they fall into? Is it after 2030?

I do not have that information to hand. We can come back to you on that. The other comment I would make is on de-risking. One of the ways that we will de-risk is by working with our allies on this. The JEF chiefs of navy are all talking to each other about the future hybrid navy, and we are also talking to the supreme allied commander transformation at NATO. Lots of allies are going on a similar journey, and we will learn from each other.

It would be great if we could plug and play some of that stuff. I will ask a couple of quick-fire ones, if I may. We have just had these two frigates taken out of service. We spent over £100 million on refitting Iron Duke a small number of years ago. In fact, I think the refit took longer than the payback of service. Can we just go through that? That does not seem like good value for money for the taxpayer. Why was the decision made to refit it and then to take it out of service? How did we end up in such a mess?

I will speak to the decision that we have made about Iron Duke and Richmond. It was not cost-effective to keep those and we had to consider how that fit with the effects that we need to have on our adversaries. We made the decision that those two retire. They have gone significantly beyond their original lifespan. As always with these things, it would have been good if we could have started five years ago, and we would then be five years ahead of where we are now. However, I can only speak to the decision that we have made.

What was the problem? Was it just that the hull was riddled and could not be repaired? Do we know the technical reason why it was taken out of service?

I am afraid I don’t have the specifics.

I am afraid I don’t know.

Okay. Would you be able to write to the Committee about the precise reason? I assume that it was hull strength because they are all well past their dates. Keeping with the same ship, we were going to fit a towed sonar array to Iron Duke as well. That plan was started and then abandoned. Could you tell the Committee how much money was spent on that plan?

I don’t have that figure to hand.

Could you add it to the same letter?

We can add it to the list. It is important to recognise that the decision was made looking at the effect that we need to have. I would not want this to be read as that we were going to have the capability that this provides and now we do not. We have taken a view of what we need to have when working with allies to make sure that we have what we need.

Finally, Minister, earlier on, you were very sure about having the right number of frigates for the threat. We have five frigates at the moment. Can you guarantee categorically that no 23s will be withdrawn from service until there is a Type 26 replacement at sea—that is, until there is a one-for-one swap so that frigate numbers will not go below five? Can you give that guarantee to the Committee?

We would never have a gap in capability. The capability that is provided is so important.

Can you give the guarantee that we will not go below five frigates?

As I am sure you appreciate, it is multilayered. The capabilities that are provided by frigates are complemented by our allies. For me, it is right to be effects-focused rather than platform-focused. We will make sure that we have the capability we need to meet the threats we face.

Okay. I will interpret that as a no, if I may.

I do not think that is fair. I am setting out the approach to the problem.

Sorry to have joined the meeting late. Mr Keay, you talked about the defence investment plan. Bracketing frigates, could you explain how the DIP works in relation to the added capability that you are hoping to deploy in the High North? What additional value does it give us as a nation over time?

I brought up the DIP figures just to clarify one that was mentioned. We have a range of investments planned that will help with the capability required in the High North. I do not have that information immediately to hand, but let me—

If you could add it to the list, that would be brilliant. Brigadier or Minister, is there anything else on the additional capability that we will get as a result of the defence investment plan?

The first thing I would say is that very little of our capability is specifically designed for use in only the High North. We very rarely buy equipment that can be used in one theatre. While a lot of what is in the DIP will be useful in the High North, there is very little in there where you would say, “That piece of capability is usable only in that region.” That is why we are struggling to answer the question, because it is so broad. Almost everything in the DIP could be applied to the High North if required.

Okay. So there is nothing about the High North in terms of the especially bitter or rugged conditions that would create a need for a capability dedicated to that theatre.

There are some specifics. For instance, the Minister mentioned the future all-terrain vehicle that the Royal Marines are in the process of procuring, and there are other things of that style.

That would be ruggedised for use in the Arctic.

I think that is a euphemism for a snowcat or something. That is the kind of thing that is clearly bespoke to the High North. We are trying not to focus all our capability on one region or another, because even under our NATO requirements we are expected to be able to operate across all three areas of operations, which could see us in the far south in a Mediterranean environment or in the High North. We want to make sure that capabilities can operate in the High North, but they will not necessarily be bespoke unless they have to be.

Obviously, the way we have configured our Navy over 100 or more years has partly been a reflection of maritime challenges in the north Atlantic, and increasingly in the High North as it opens up. What change in doctrine is going alongside the fact that we are not deploying destroyers and we have changed to a hybrid Navy? How is your thinking changing alongside the way in which technology is changing? Do you think, for example, that we are unlikely to be deploying carrier strike groups in the High North because we have these additional capabilities coming onstream?

I would almost suggest that the question should be reversed. The recognition that there is a different way to fight had led us to look at different capability options to deliver against how we intend to fight in the future. On your specific question of whether I see us being less likely to deploy the carrier to the High North, no, I don’t think so. I think that sits within the Navy’s concept of crewed, uncrewed and autonomous. That just happens to be a crewed element of it. I can see in future that it will have far more autonomous aircraft aboard but, in principle, I think the carrier is just as useful in the High North in the next 10 years as it is now.

If we think about the way in which the US has changed its defence posture over the past 10 years—it has a massive emphasis on Asia-Pacific, an increasingly tough attitude towards NATO and the defence of Europe, and a more theatre-based view of defence—how do you think that plays out from a British perspective? We cannot prioritise the High North as it opens up and also prioritise everything else. Where do you see the balance of our deployments?

This is where our alliances are so fundamental to everything we do. The geography involved is eye-watering. The distances and volumes of water are phenomenal. There is no way, therefore, that the UK is going to resolve any of those threats in its own right. Our first capability, if you like, is NATO first. It is our commitment to multilateral and bilateral relations with nations that are critical to our defence and security. We therefore never have to make a binary decision between where we carry risk versus where we deploy capability.

That is not quite true, is it? If overseas territories start getting attacked—our ancient possessions and commitments—you seem to be putting us in a position where we cannot say we are unquestionably going to defend those places, yet we cannot at the same time say that there are allies who will necessarily defend them. Is that right?

No, that is not necessarily what I am saying. If you are focusing on Europe, we are part of an alliance—

Sure, but I am talking about wider commitments—our post-imperial commitments, if you like.

I understand. What I was going to get to was this. Therefore, we can take risk on the UK commitment to areas of European defence temporarily, while we manage threats to other parts of our overseas territories and so on. It is absolutely imperative for us to defend those sites, and we will, but by doing so, we may at times have to take risk elsewhere, which is where our alliances would step in.

This is quite a selfish question. In my North Devon constituency, I have the fantastic Commando Logistic Regiment, which deploys to the High North every year for training. Given that the DIP highlights an expansion of the commando force, but expeditionary operations rely on robust logistics, how is the Government investing in the CLR to ensure that it can support the expanded force in demanding environments such as the High North? DIP specifically mentions the High North expanding the commando regiment to, I think, 1,000.

The actual commitment is to double our presence in the High North for training annually, from 1,000 to 2,000. That is just an increase in the number of people who go from the standing force. It is not an increase in the scale of the Royal Marines to deliver against that specific task by 1,000 people. There will clearly be a greater demand on the Commando Logistic Regiment, because they have doubled the number of mouths to feed, if nothing else. I can only assume, therefore, that the Fleet Commander, who is coming to speak to you this afternoon, would be able to explain how he can allocate resource specifically to the Commando Logistic Regiment to achieve that increased burden. I would assume—but it would be a question for him—that the Commando Logistic Regiment is resourced to support and sustain the entire commando force, because that is, after all, its purpose. In theory, it should be setting camp capable of doing that role already. I imagine that a capability uplift may be required alongside it, but in terms of scale, I would imagine that it should already be capable of doing that. But I do not know the specifics, I am afraid.

Minister, given that combat capability is only as effective as the logistics that sustain it, will you commit to visiting the commandos in North Devon, please?

Is that Chivenor?

Yes.

I have fond memories of being at Chivenor, and of the assault course there—perhaps we do not need to do that specific bit were I to visit.

It has changed since you have been there.

Okay, but I bet the water is still as cold, isn’t it? Thanks for highlighting that. I always say that amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics, so you are absolutely right to home in on that aspect. Every single lesson from war that we look at is having the logistics chain, and we touched on that. The logistics burden tends to come from missiles and ammunition for heavier platforms like artillery, so that affects the kind of demands that the commando logistics would expect to face, as being towards the lighter end of forces. I do not know the specifics, but I would imagine that the future all-terrain vehicle would be very welcome to the regiment for the capabilities that it will bring. For me, looking at the vision and the size of the investment we are making in the commando force—we have quite a clear focus for it as well—it has a really fantastic, bright future.

Minister, I have two quickfire questions. If adversaries are to be deterred in the High North, should we enhance the Joint Expeditionary Force so that it can operate across the spectrum of conflict?

Are we talking more cross-domain?

Basically, across the entire spectrum of conflict. This is basically about JEF—should we be enhancing it?

In general, before I throw that to Brigadier Lamb, JEF has been very successful so far in the activity that it has been able to generate and the interoperability that it has gained. I would like to see it continuing to go from strength to strength. It will always have more of that focus on capacity building, rather than specifically the conduct of operations.

The JEF does not have a standing force; it is built for each activity. Nations commit forces to achieve each aim, so this would not be a case of creating more capability for the JEF; it would be sovereign nations’ own capability that is then merged into delivery for the JEF. If the JEF were to start to take on slightly different types of mission, that would probably be an agenda item for the next meeting of either Defence Ministers or leaders in order to determine what, collectively, the organisation feels is appropriate for the JEF to undertake. I think it sits at that level, rather than a question of specifically resourcing the JEF.

Minister, lastly, you will be aware that one of the previous recommendations from the Committee on High North operations in particular, but also more widely, is that hulls need to be hardened on our vessels. For High North operations, do you agree that under-ice operations are not just some “nice to have” niche capability, but are actually essential for all submarines that operate there?

I have to be careful here, before I start touching on the band classifications, but absolutely we need to be able to operate where we need to operate. With the High North, that would include different sea states—I do not know if “sea states” is the technical term—and the different effects that we need to have to be able to operate there, but I do not want to dig in too much to the specifics.

Okay. Brigadier, would you agree that under-ice operations are critical for operations in the High North?

As the Minister mentioned, this gets into very difficult territory very quickly. I would recommend speaking to the fleet commander about this this afternoon. He can give a better assessment based on the threat and his desired mechanism for getting after it.

No doubt we will ask that during our secret briefing this afternoon. Ian Roome wants to come in with a quick supplementary.

Minister, are you satisfied that the DIP meets the requirements of the SDR?

Yes. The DIP is designed to deliver the SDR in full. The SDR set out and recognised both the changing threat picture that we face and the range of activity that we need to do to meet that, in pushing the technological boundaries of uncrewed systems and in recognising some of the big platforms that we need to invest in. We have all said quite clearly that we have a spending review next year, and it is important that Defence is the No. 1 priority in that, so that we can continue to build on the vision of the SDR and how it has been enabled by the DIP.

Thank you very much, Minister, for making yourself available. I know that you only recently took over the role, so it was a very quick turnaround for the request, but that has helped us to conclude our public evidence sessions for the High North inquiry. Thank you for agreeing to my request, and thank you Brigadier Lamb and Mr Keay.