Written questions by Barclay.

Pursuant to the Answer of 20 April 2026 to Question 124580 on Defence: Small Businesses, by what date he expects to have in place the wider range of indicators to measure his Department’s success in attracting new suppliers.

Subsequent to the establishment of the Defence Office for Small Business Growth in January, the Department is currently working to deliver full operating capability by the end of this year. This activity is being aided by engagement with a pathfinder group of SMEs to ensure we are addressing the needs of smaller and non-traditional suppliers. As part of this work, we will develop a range of metrics to measure the impact of the Office.

With reference to his Department's press release entitled Ministry of Defence small and medium-sized enterprise engagement published on 24 March 2026, whether his Department plans to publish the (a) the SME action plan and (b) a direct spending target on the same day as the Defence Investment Plan.

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is committed to publishing an annual SME Action Plan as a key element of Defence’s work to improve opportunities for SMEs. On current plans, the MOD’s full annual SME action plan, including direct spending target will not be published concurrently with the Defence Investment Plan. The action plan which will include a spending target are currently forecast to be published in the second quarter of 2026.

When he plans to answer question 115383, tabled on 24 February 2026.

I will respond to the right hon. Member shortly.

The (a) number and (b) value of Defence Innovation Loans made in each round since 4 July 2024.

The number and value of Defence Innovation Loans made since 4 July 2024, by financial year (FY), are as follows: DIL Round Number ValueDefence Innovation Loan FY2023-24 Cycle 4 1 £881,570Defence Innovation Loan FY2023-24 Cycle 7 1 £1,247,513Defence Innovation Loan FY2024-25 Cycle 2 1 £750,000Defence Innovation Loan FY2024-25 Cycle 5 1 £451,600TOTAL 4 £3,330,683 Defence Innovation Loans are considered to be “made” when funding is agreed at the end of the two-stage decision process, finalised by the Innovate UK Credit Committee, which can sit several months after the initial DASA/F&G decision conference. This is why two projects appear in this list despite their DIL Cycle being prior to the date stated in the PQ.

The average time taken for an SME to obtain security clearance to (a) bid for and (b) deliver a defence contract.

In most instances, it is not necessary for a company or individual to hold security clearance prior to commencing the bidding process for a government contract. Should access to sensitive information or assets be required either during the bidding phase or for the delivery of the contract, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) project team is responsible for initiating the vetting procedure. Security vetting is conducted by United Kingdom Security Vetting (UKSV), which operates under the Cabinet Office. The duration of the security vetting process can differ on a case-by-case basis, due to the multiple checks conducted by various agencies. As a result, there is no standard timeframe applicable to all cases. United Kingdom Security Vetting (UKSV) continues to meet its agreed Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) across each product type. UKSV KPIs are set and regularly reviewed in consultation with customer groups, governed by ministerial oversight, to ensure demand is balanced whilst maintaining assurance in national security safeguards. In line with the practice followed by successive administrations, the Government does not otherwise comment on security matters.

Which key performance indicators he will use to judge the success of his Department's SME Commercial Pathway.

The Pathway will be a contributor to the primary measure of success, which is achieving the Ministry of Defence’s target of spending £7.5 billion annually with SMEs, both directly and through the supply-chain, by 2028. The Department is exploring a wider range of indicators to measure the success of our policies in attracting new and smaller suppliers into the defence supply-base, including for example the speed of our procurement and the value of inward investment.

How many one star military officers and above does he plan to have in place by the end of this Parliament.

Defence’s workforce structure is regularly reviewed and adjusted according to the threat and capability requirements. This includes the number of senior officers. The future workforce structure and associated workforce plans will be reviewed in conjunction with the Defence Investment Plan.

With reference to Q134 of the oral evidence given by his Department's Permanent Secretary to the Defence Committee on 17 March 2026, HC 1779, if he will publish the metrics used for tracking the reduction in civil service workforce costs and the related data from July 2024 onwards.

The Ministry of Defence publishes metrics to report total Civil Service headcount, and changes over time biannually and are available on gov.uk. (https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/mod-biannual-civilian-personnel-report-october-2025) The next edition has a provisional release date of 14 May 2026 and will present MOD Civil Service statistics as at 1 April 2026. The Defence Reform and Efficiency plan, which will be published alongside the Defensive Investment Plan, will also set out the Department's plans in relation to workforce and wider efficiencies.

What proportion of applicants to the UK's Active Reserve forces successfully joined in the last year for which figures are available.

The UK’s Reserve Forces are a vital component of Defence, providing critical capability, specialist skills and a strong connection to wider society, while offering a flexible and cost‑effective means of meeting operational demand. Reserves underpin the Armed Forces’ ability to respond to threats at home and overseas, and the Strategic Defence Review has reinforced their importance, including our ambition to grow the Active Reserve by at least 20 per cent. In Financial Year 2024-25, the proportion of people who applied to join the Armed Forces Reserves and who subsequently became untrained entrants was as follows: Royal Navy 7%, British Army 4%, Royal Air Force 5%, in line with a long-standing trend. Between the point of application and becoming an untrained entrant, a variety of checks and tests are conducted to ensure that any applicant entering training is suitable for military service and that it is credible that the applicant will complete training. This ensures that the standards of the Armed Forces are maintained and that public funds and resources are not wasted. There are a number of reasons for an applicant not being successful, including medical scrutiny. Reserve applications, when compared to Regulars, also reflects an older profile of applicants together with a need to balance service with civilian work and family life. In addition, historically these tests and checks in the recruiting process have involved multiple stages and appointments, which can lengthen timelines and increase drop‑out before entry. The Department has taken urgent and targeted action since November 2024 to improve throughput which has been low historically. The Services have already streamlined recruiting processes by reducing the number of appointments, increasing automation and using digital tools to speed up decision‑making, which has improved conversion in some areas. Reserves‑specific national and local marketing campaigns are being used to better target likely candidates and set clearer expectations from the outset. From next year, Reserve recruiting will also transition to the new Armed Forces Recruiting System, which will use modern technology and industry expertise to deliver a faster, more effective and more consistent recruiting experience across Defence.

With reference to the partnership between KLM Royal Dutch Airlines and the Dutch Ministry of Defence to allow airline pilots to serve as reserve F-35 pilots in the Royal Netherlands Air Force, what assessment has been made of adopting such an approach in the UK.

The Royal Air Force (RAF) has assessed options for reservist pilots to bolster our F35 force and concluded that this model is not appropriate for the RAF at this time.The investment in time and money to train a part-time pilot on F35 and keep them sufficiently trained and current to operate the aircraft is similar with that of a full-time pilot. At this stage of growth in the UK F35 Wing, the cost is not justified by the amount of service a part-time pilot could offer compared with a full time regular.

Pursuant to National Audit Office Report HC 989 on The UK’s F-35 capability, when he expects the UK F-35 fleet to meet the MoD’s target mission capable rate.

The Ministry of Defence is committed to achieving the target mission capable rate for the UK's F-35 fleet. To meet workforce requirements, the Department is increasing the number of aircraft engineers. In parallel, the UK is actively supporting the US-led F-35 Joint Programme Office in efforts to enhance the Global Support Solution, focusing on improving spares availability and overall performance. Additionally, further investments are being made in technical infrastructure at RAF Marham and other supporting enablers to boost fleet availability.

Pursuant to the answer of 9 February 2026 to question number 110769, if he will confirm whether any minister in his Department was made aware of the report prior to the appointment of the new Permanent Secretary.

As previously advised, the appointment followed an external competition and was approved by the Prime Minister.

In each of the last three years for which figures are available, how many members of the UK’s Active Reserve forces were qualified at the level of (i) UK Cyber Security Council Principal Cyber Security Professional, and (ii) UK Cyber Security Council Chartered Cyber Security Professional, or equivalent.

The accreditations in question, whilst aligned to the Defence cyber skillsets, are not formal Ministry of Defence qualifications. The information is not therefore held centrally and could only be provided at disproportionate cost.

In each of the last three years for which figures are available, how many members of the UK’s Active Reserve forces were qualified and current as a light gun operator.

For reasons of operational security, the Ministry of Defence does not disclose detailed information on internal force structures or strengths.

In each of the last three years for which figures are available, how many members of the UK’s Active Reserve forces were qualified and current as a Foxhound driver.

For reasons of operational security, the Ministry of Defence does not disclose detailed information on internal force structures or strengths.

In each of the last three years for which figures are available, how many members of the UK’s Active Reserve forces were qualified and current as a Jackal driver.

For reasons of operational security, the Ministry of Defence does not disclose detailed information on internal force structures or strengths.

Whether he was made aware of conclusion 1 in the Sixty-second Report of the Committee of Public Accounts entitled Faulty energy efficiency installations, HC 1229, prior to the decision to appoint a new Permanent Secretary in his Department.

The Ministry of Defence Permanent Secretary was appointed following an external competition and approval from the Prime Minister.The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero will respond to the Public Accounts Committee report (HC 1229) in the usual way.

With reference to his Department's letter to the Rt hon. Member for North East Cambridgeshire, reference: PQW/24-25/2025/16500/16507/16511/16512/16514/16521, dated 20 August 2025, and the oral contribution of the Minister for the Armed Force during the Second Reading of the Armed Forces Bill on 26 January 2026, Official Report, column 706, how much was the total reserve spending for each of the last five years, including the main categories of spending beyond pay and and bounty payments; and if he will set out the expected total reserve spending for the remaining years of this Parliament.

The Government has committed to spending 2.6% of GDP on defence from 2027, and we have set the ambition to reach 3% in the next Parliament, subject to economic and fiscal conditions. Over this Spending Review period, this Government will invest over £270 billion in cash terms in defence. This is the largest sustained increase in spending since the Cold War. The Strategic Defence Review outlined an ambition to increase the number of Active Reserves by 20% when funding allows, enhancing surge capacity and demonstrating the UK's readiness to defend itself. Total spending on Reserve Forces between 2023-24 and 2024-25 is not managed centrally, with each Service determining expenditure based on its specific operational requirements. In relation to spending plans in 2025-26, we do not routinely place figures relating to planned expenditure in the public domain as they are subject to change.

If he will make an assessment of the compatibility of (a) comments made in the SDSR on funding for a 20 per cent increase the reserves with (b) comments made by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at col.705 in Hansard volume 779 on 26 January 2026 on funding for the reserves.

I am grateful for the contribution of our Reserve Forces, who help the UK Armed Forces meet the threats we face at home and abroad, with the scale, skills, agility and connection to society that we need in a cost‑effective way. The diversity of knowledge, skills and experience that Reserves bring from their civilian and military careers is an invaluable strength. The Strategic Defence Review set out a clear mandate to strengthen the UK’s Reserve Forces as an integral part of the Whole Force. Building on this, the Government is taking decisive action through the Armed Forces Bill to strengthen the UK’s Strategic Reserve – former Service personnel with an ex‑Regular and Recall Reserve liability – ensuring Defence can draw on their valuable skills and experience in times of crisis. The Bill introduces measures that will strengthen readiness and resilience, including changes to recall liability across the Regular and Volunteer Reserves. These measures will increase the maximum age for recall, align recall liability across all three Services, and provide greater flexibility to recall personnel for warlike preparations, in addition to circumstances of national danger or emergency. Alongside these legislative measures, Defence has increased funding for the Reserve Forces, reflecting their growing importance to our national security and our commitment to ensuring they can be used more effectively. Taken together, these reforms will re‑energise our connection with the Strategic Reserve, increase the Active Reserve, and ensure Defence can rapidly mobilise a broad pool of experienced personnel with critical skills – including in cyber, intelligence, medicine and communications – during periods of heightened threat or transition to war. This approach complements our highly capable Volunteer Reserves and aligns with the steps many NATO allies are taking to strengthen their own resilience.

How much his Department has spent on the reserves in 2024-25 and 2023-24, broken down by RDEL, CDEL and TDEL; and how much it plans to spend in 2025-26, broken down by RDEL, CDEL and TDEL.

The Government has committed to spending 2.6% of GDP on defence from 2027, and we have set the ambition to reach 3% in the next Parliament, subject to economic and fiscal conditions. Over this Spending Review period, this Government will invest over £270 billion in cash terms in defence. This is the largest sustained increase in spending since the Cold War. The Strategic Defence Review outlined an ambition to increase the number of Active Reserves by 20% when funding allows, enhancing surge capacity and demonstrating the UK's readiness to defend itself. Total spending on Reserve Forces between 2023-24 and 2024-25 is not managed centrally, with each Service determining expenditure based on its specific operational requirements. In relation to spending plans in 2025-26, we do not routinely place figures relating to planned expenditure in the public domain as they are subject to change.