Disinformation diplomacy: How malign actors are seeking to undermine democracy

Status / emerging findings

• Russia operates an industrial-scale disinformation ecosystem (€1.5 billion annual budget in 2024) deploying deepfakes, AI-generated content, bot networks, and information laundering; Doppelgänger is one of the most prolific attacks on UK/Europe, with Meta removing hundreds of assets across 300+ platforms.
• AI-generated content amplifying false narratives has surged dramatically: posts falsely portraying London as lawless increased from 874 in 2008 to 258,000 in 2024 despite falling violent crime; Russia deliberately 'grooms' large language models with propaganda to skew their outputs.
• Social media platforms (TikTok, Meta, X) respond reactively in hours-to-days, but this is insufficient—disinformation spreads faster than removal timescales allow, and dormant accounts activated during crises evade detection. X acknowledged significant accountability gaps in locating UK representation.
• FCDO Hybrid Threats Directorate is underfunded relative to the scale of threat; committee welcomed £33m additional BBC World Service funding but flagged insufficient resources to meet National Security Strategy ambitions and NATO 3.5% GDP defence spending commitment by 2035.
• UK legal frameworks lag emerging threats: deepfakes lack specific legal protections; cryptocurrency financing circumvents safeguards; international cooperation on illicit electoral financing is hampered by fragmented legal norms; government lacks a unified national counter-disinformation centre.

Why it matters

Malign state actors are using weaponised disinformation at unprecedented scale and sophistication to erode trust in UK democratic institutions and influence elections; without increased funding, coordinated government response, and stronger platform accountability, the UK and its allies will continue losing the information war.

Tone arc

Started procedurally focused on foreign actors' architecture and techniques (Russia, China, Iran); shifted to increasingly critical after evidence from Moldova (January 2026) exposed scale of real-world electoral interference and UK resilience gaps; final platform sessions (March 2026) revealed accountability deficits in tech enforcement timescales.

Key witnesses

Ciaran Martin CB (former GCHQ NCSC chief), Ana Revenco (Moldovan Centre for Strategic Communication), Nina Jankowicz (American Sunlight Project), Stephen Doughty MP (Minister), Jonny Hall CMG OBE (FCDO Hybrid Threats Directorate Director), David Agranovich, Ali Law, Wifredo Fernández (Meta, TikTok, X representatives), Roberta Braga (Digital Democracy Institute of the Americas), Jon Bateman (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)