Committee publication · Report · 27 March 2026 · HC 703

4th Report - Disinformation diplomacy: How malign actors are seeking to undermine democracy

From: Foreign Affairs Committee

Inquiry: Disinformation diplomacy: How malign actors are seeking to undermine democracy

Government response deadline: 27 May 2026

Summary

The Foreign Affairs Committee's fourth report assesses foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) as an existential threat to democracy. It examines FIMI operations by Russia, China, Iran, and non-state actors, evaluates UK government responses through the FCDO's Hybrid Threats Directorate, and recommends increased funding, a centralized counter-disinformation centre, algorithmic transparency requirements for social media, and legislative review of foreign interference offences.

Key findings

  • Russia plans to spend €1.5 billion annually on state propaganda, conducting coordinated campaigns like Doppelgänger (228 domains, 25,000 inauthentic accounts across nine languages) targeting Ukraine, Europe and the US to undermine democratic support.
  • China's institutionalized FIMI approach uses the United Front Work Department to control 40-60 million overseas Chinese and employs campaigns like Spamouflage to amplify pro-Chinese messaging and target democratic opponents.
  • The FCDO's Hybrid Threats Directorate is constrained by insufficient funding despite the Government's stated commitment to information warfare as a ministerial priority.
  • UK domestic resilience to FIMI is fragmented across Whitehall; the committee calls for a centralized National Counter Disinformation Centre modelled on Sweden's, Ukraine's, and France's approaches.
  • Social media companies lack transparency on algorithmic systems exploitable by malign actors; current legislation creates a high bar for proving foreign interference, leaving the UK information space exposed.

Recommendations

  • Increase FCDO Hybrid Threats Directorate funding and enhance coordination with European allies, particularly around the Black Sea Region and Western Balkans, to counter Russian influence and protect election integrity.
  • Provide BBC World Service with increased funding drawn in part from the defence budget to plan and deliver services effectively; the additional £33 million over three years is likely a flat settlement due to inflation.
  • Establish a centralized National Counter Disinformation Centre to improve cross-Whitehall coordination, complementing international models from Sweden, Ukraine, and France.
  • Amend the Online Safety Act 2023 to require social media companies to provide algorithmic transparency and safeguard against manipulation by malign actors.
  • Conduct an urgent review of legislation criminalizing foreign interference to lower the bar for establishing that FIMI on social media was conducted at a foreign power's behest, enabling faster platform and authority action.
  • Prioritize funding for civil society organizations and independent media to enhance resilience across Europe, especially the Black Sea Region and Western Balkans, stemming Russian influence.
  • Ensure China is treated as any other state; outline transparent strategy for engagement with clear red lines for countering Chinese state influence, including cyber-attacks and disinformation.
  • The FCDO Hybrid Threats Directorate should develop programming to counter Iranian FIMI campaigns by drawing on regional teams' capabilities within the Department.

Tone

Critical

Topics

disinformationforeign-interferencecybersecurityhybrid-warfareinternational-relations

Key actors

Emily Thornberry, Stephen Doughty MP, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Russian state under Vladimir Putin, Chinese Communist Party, Iranian regime, Meta, BBC World Service

Notable line

… is that of a state at war against the West, and this will not change whilst Putin is in power.

Key Quotes

… this year Russia alone plans to spend €30 million weekly on state propaganda—its own budget proposals admit that—and that is a total of €1.5 billion
Stephen Doughty MP, Minister of State for Europe, North America and Overseas Territories · on Russia's funding for disinformation campaigns
… these actors very much try to hide their tracks. Establishing that they are linked to a given state, or a given set of interests, let us say, is often very difficult, because they deliberately try to conceal that.
Dr Jon Roozenbeek, King's College London · on the obfuscation of state and non-state actor attribution
They are monitoring and scanning our media systems, and they are pulling economic trend reports and public opinion data. With that material they are trying to identify the pain points [ … ] the issues where they think they can get traction.
Professor Martin Innes, Cardiff University · describing how Russia's Social Design Agency conducts research to tailor Doppelgänger campaigns
Russia presents a clear and present threat to the UK, its overseas interests, and Euro-Atlantic security. The depth and intensity of hostile activity orchestrated by Russia across the West leaves us with no ambiguity.
Foreign Affairs Committee · conclusion on Russia's FIMI threat
"40 million to 60 million overseas Chinese" through "neutralising any opposition there might be to Chinese Communist party rule." 40 The UK-China Transparency …
Andrew Yeh, Executive Director, China Strategic Risks Institute · on the United Front Work Department's influence over diaspora populations
… we welcome the additional £33 million funding being provided to the BBC World Service over the next three years, due to inflation it is likely to be a flat settlement.
Foreign Affairs Committee · on insufficient funding for the BBC World Service
We therefore call on the Government to enhance its public communications and establish a centralised National Counter Disinformation Centre to improve coordination and response.
Foreign Affairs Committee · on domestic UK resilience to disinformation
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Source · parliament.uk record ↗