I call to order today’s House of Commons Defence Committee evidence session. This is the first hearing of our new inquiry into defence in the High North. I am very pleased that we have an esteemed expert panel with us today. A very warm welcome back to Professor Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, a professor of war studies at Loughborough University; I am very glad that you are back in front of the Committee, Professor. We are also pleased to welcome Dr Marc De Vore, a senior lecturer at the school of international relations at the University of St Andrews. It is always great to have back with us Mr Ed Arnold, who is a senior research fellow for European security at the Royal United Services Institute for defence studies.

Good morning, Professor, and thank you for coming in. Is the High North becoming more strategically important, or is it that it has always been strategically important and we are just waking up to it?

I am a creature of the cold war; I believe that the Arctic has always been important. While the Soviet Union existed, that was where it plied its nuclear trade and threatened a variety of interests. It has become increasingly important because it is melting, climate change is taking its toll and new sea routes are opening up: they are not all open yet, but they are opening up. The Arctic is also home to rare earth minerals, oil and gas, which makes it not the wild west, but perhaps the wild north, as non-Arctic states begin to demonstrate considerable interest. It has always been important—particularly, I would argue, in defence terms—but it is increasingly accessible. Russia is the predominant Arctic state: 53% of the Arctic coastline is Russian, and it has begun to remilitarise the Arctic and display aggressive tendencies in the High North. Bearing in mind the Chair’s words before we started about being succinct, let me sum up: it is climate, it is Russia and, of course, we are all keenly aware of the eccentricities of President Trump in his attitude towards Greenland and other parts of the Arctic. I will throw into the mix China, which is a non-Arctic state but a near-Arctic state, according to its own propaganda. It has an increasingly solid alliance with Russia, enabling both Russia and China to contest western interests in the Arctic.

Do you think that as a nation we know where the British interest is in the High North?

I think we know, but I do not think we articulate it very well. Certainly, looking at the British Isles—we are an island people—I believe that our strategic interests lie in the High North. We have obligations around the world, of course, but if we look at our critical infrastructure, our fuel, our energy and our fish, there is no doubt that we need to preserve and protect the approaches to the United Kingdom and our future scientific interests in the High North. The UK is profoundly affected by climate change, and we need to study that to understand how to mitigate its impacts.

On Caroline’s point about a UK perspective, there was no mention of the Arctic in the 2010 SDR, and there was one paragraph on it in 2015. There are now three Arctic policy frameworks, as well as a document from 2022, “The UK’s Defence Contribution in the High North”. The Arctic and the High North are the only sub-regions that the UK has specific policy documents for. It is quite interesting that no one has really driven that over the last 15 years from a UK position. It seems to be natural. That is not just this Committee; it is other Committees as well, and it is not just on the policy side. It is certainly a natural fit. The focus on such an area is unusual when you do not have someone from the centre of Government driving it. It has also continued through multiple changes of Government.

I support everything that my esteemed colleagues have said. I would put heavy emphasis on the fact that when we speak about the Russian threat, much of that is localised in the Kola peninsula. That means that its proximate threat to us is coming down through the Barents sea, the Norwegian sea and into the north Atlantic. Today, at sea, is the Russian spy ship the Yantar and the BS-64 nuclear-powered mothership for, essentially, sabotaging our underwater critical infrastructure. The Russians have also been investing very heavily in the cruise missile-carrying submarines, the Yasens. To some degree, when we think of Russia as the pacing threat that the United Kingdom, a big part of the puzzle that we have to face, more directly than our allies and counterparts, is the part that is coming from the High North.

So a major chunk of the grey zone is actually white—that is what we are saying.

Ed, I want to pick up on something that you said about Government responsibilities, which harks back to something I read from you in the press recently about the High North and Scotland. You were talking about how although in the UK defence is led by the Government, resilience is devolved. You talked about how Lossiemouth is a UK MOD site, but its resilience to sabotage, below the military threshold, is devolved to Scotland. How concerned are you about resilience being held not nationally by the MOD, but by Cabinet and then devolved down?

I think it is a machinery of government issue. It was highlighted during covid as well: when you had slightly different guidelines and times for changing tiers in Scotland, England and Wales, for example. The issue is that defence is not a devolved competency, so it is done from Westminster and the MOD. Resilience is something that we always talk about, but it does not fit very neatly within the machinery of government. If you look at the two principal Departments that would be looking at that from a Scottish point of view, they are the Scottish national health service and Police Scotland, both for protecting sites north of the border and dealing with any casualties, military or civilian, because that was the vector of attack, as Marc alluded to. Those things really do need to be ironed out ahead of a crisis. I would assess the main threat to Lossiemouth as sabotage, because that is the easiest way for the Russians to achieve their aims. They do not have to destroy every P-8 maritime patrol aircraft; they just need to damage them to a point that they are inoperable. They would then be taking out quite a large portion of NATO maritime patrol capability. Look at what happened with Brize Norton and Palestine Action: it was some paint and some engines, which then made those frames inoperable. Something similar, on that level—not a kinetic strike—could take out a large portion, and it would give freedom of manoeuvre for Russian submarines. In terms of threat and location, I would say that Lossiemouth is certainly high up on the high-value priority list from a Russian perspective.

I do not want to get into other people’s questions; I just wanted to pick up on the point about resilience being devolved.

Now that we have set the scene, we will look in more detail at the threats that we face. Derek Twigg will start us off.

Part of this has been covered in your answers already, but I want to delve deeper into Russia and its capabilities, and the potential military scenarios that may or may not occur.

Marc was talking about the Russian submarine capability. As they did in the cold war, they need access to the north Atlantic, so that is the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap, and also the Bear gap further north. The main difference is that Kalibr cruise missiles are now almost the standard. There is a lot of refitting going on in Russian maritime capability, so actually the Russians do not have to come as far out into the north Atlantic to threaten the east coast of the US. NATO and member states under article 3 therefore need to push that threat further north to keep it at bay. I also see this within the context of NATO transatlantic reinforcement. In the strategic concept in 2022, getting American forces over to Europe was assessed as absolutely critical to the alliance. From a Russian perspective, you are not going to wait for the Americans to meet up with all their kit and equipment in the Baltic states; you are going to target them when they are most vulnerable, which is when they are crossing the north Atlantic, either by air or sea.

It certainly makes the UK vulnerable, because it is that much closer to the UK. There are people in this country who think that the Ukrainian front—the eastern front—is way up there. Actually, coming down from the north, it is much closer to home, isn’t it?

Absolutely. The world does not look like we were taught, with a Mercator projection map with the UK in the middle. If you go on Google Earth, look at it from the top and spin the globe around, you start to get a much clearer picture of the threat vectors to the UK.

What do you think the potential military scenarios are? Where could the clash be? Where could the spark be for the High North and the Arctic?

The spark that I am quite concerned about is that we have a lot of intelligence assessments saying when individual states and NATO think that they may be at war with Russia, and it may happen by miscalculation or accident. There have already been a couple of near misses in the past four years. I assess that if there is miscalculation, it will be in the Arctic and High North, because of the amount of operational activity. Also, that operational activity is above the surface and below the surface. It is manoeuvring, and it also has a nuclear dimension.

Could you remind the Committee what those near misses were?

On 8 October 2022, I think it was, the RC-135 Rivet Joint was shot at over the Black sea. That was almost a double failure, because the Russian pilot thought he had been ordered to fire and the missile also missed. There is a high probability of that type of activity happening in the Arctic or High North; I do not think that you would get that same risk in the Baltics, for example, because you have largely static forces. For intelligence purposes, you know where they are and you would understand whether the Russians were going to make a move, for example. I think that the threat to northern Europe from miscalculation is severe.

Are there any other scenarios that might occur?

There is hybrid activity. This is one of the issues that Caroline mentioned. The Arctic ice is melting; scientific assessments say that that will happen between 2040 and 2050. From a policymaking position, we might think that that is a future threat and we do not have to consider it, but actually, with a lot of the issues that we have seen with critical underwater infrastructure in the Baltic, those ships have originated from the Indo-Pacific and have used the northern sea routes. From a security vector, we are already seeing this now; from a security point of view, you have to do something about it, sooner rather than later.

One potential flashpoint is the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard, where the Russians have a foothold. There has been a noticeable uptick in activities. The Russians have a legitimate presence there under the Svalbard treaty, but there has been hybrid activity, and the Russians have pushed very firmly on their interpretation of the Svalbard treaty. Aligned to that is the fact that because of the accession of Sweden and Finland into the NATO alliance, the Russians have, in my view, been dispersing some of their assets away from Kola. That means that the Russians are looking keenly at where else to push interest; Svalbard is certainly one place, and that would be below the threshold, but Bear island has become increasingly important, as has the north Barents. I would also say that the Russians, because of the alliance with China, look at the joint military patrols and where they are taking place. We tend to lose sight of the fact that there is a Pacific Arctic as well as a European Arctic.

I join Caroline in emphasising the importance of Svalbard and the Bear Island gap. Perhaps we ought to think about that, rather than the GIUK gap, as the forward line of where British interests lie in the High North. On top of that, I would like to add two other scenarios. The Russians care deeply about eastern Europe—grabbing territory in Ukraine, potentially absorbing Belarus and doing things in Transnistria, Moldova and Baltic states. Under those scenarios, Russia’s interest in the High North and north Atlantic is putting us in a position where we cannot react and where we cannot support our eastern European allies. From a Russian perspective, the reason why ships like Yantar and BS-64 are going into the north Atlantic is that they would like to lay surprises by our critical underwater infrastructure. Before a crisis, the Russians would like to inject cruise missile-launching submarines into the north Atlantic. That way, when a crisis evolves in eastern Europe, they are then in a position where our policymakers do not know where there might be a submarine that could launch cruise missiles hitting Lossiemouth or Faslane, and they do not know when transatlantic underwater cables might be cut. In some ways, what the Russians are trying to develop via the High North is leverage that they can parlay into territorial gains in central Europe. Beyond that, at some point we should also discuss the Russian efforts to territorialise the northern sea route and turn that into a de facto Suez canal, where they control access and can charge tolls for its use.

I seem to remember that about 10 years ago there was a flurry of interest in the world of anti-submarine warfare. People were saying, “The ability to make the seas translucent is just around the corner, so we will always know where all submarines are.” I don’t think that was Tom Clancy; I think it was real science, or a real hope for real science. Can any of you shed any light on making the subsea viewable? Has anything like that come up in the past 10 years?

That is the direction of travel, but the technology has not yet reached that maturity. We see that in the fact that we struggle to surveil infrastructure at the moment, and there is a lot of effort going into that. It is an area where there are pretty good public-private partnerships, because a lot of the undersea infrastructure is actually privately owned. I would also say that it is the hope of concepts such as Atlantic Bastion that, when you do not have the surface vessels that you would like, you are pushed to the other option, which is effectively to try to use technology to surveil as much as possible. Having said that, there are always going to be blind spots. One of the issues with looking at the Arctic and the High North is that there are vast areas that you need to surveil. It is not just about surveillance, either: yes, you want to track what is happening and where there is potentially nefarious activity, but you still need a direct action approach to have an intervention, whether it is potential kinetic action or further sabotage. Being able to do that in such a vast geography is very difficult.

It is interesting with climate change, because there is a difference between older ice and younger ice, and where you can hide. If you go back further than 10 years, the Russians have historically taken to hiding in the Sargasso sea, for example. All of this is about climate change, the melting of ice and where surveillance is possible. It will become more possible in certain parts of the Arctic, but not, for example, when you look at where the thick ice actually is.

Thank you. Let us now concentrate on China and the High North.

Marc, you talked about Russian capabilities and how they are developing. Can you or another member of the panel, give us a sense of the parallel position in relation to China? We see rapidly increasing industrialisation of defence capability in that country, and it would be interesting to know how that extends into naval and subsea, and into the High North or the quasi-High North, however defined. Talk about the capabilities first, then what the implications of that are.

That is a great question. As you mention, China’s military capabilities, including the relevant ones for the High North, are growing quite rapidly. Probably that development has accelerated in the past couple of years as, with Russia more beholden to China for support in Ukraine, we have some indications that Russia is sharing nuclear submarine technology with China, which is one of the few areas where Russian defence production was still qualitatively superior to that of the Chinese. If I had to guess, I would guess that we will probably see a Chinese naval carrier group arriving in the High North circa 2040. Already, Chinese coastguard vessels have patrolled into the High North. I suspect that we will see a regular and persistent Chinese military presence in the High North. That said, I still think that when it comes to the High North and its militarisation, Russia is the pacing threat. By all indications, China does not intend to have its ballistic missile submarines patrol in the High North; the South China sea and the waters around Hainan island are where the Chinese are building up the subsea surveillance network, the bases and the standard operating procedures. China has an economic interest in access to the High North. That will be backed up by military displays of force, but it does not have the same operational military objectives in the High North that the Russians do.

I think that Marc is entirely correct. If you look at the 20-year ambition of the Russian shipbuilding programme, it is very ambitious in envisaging 1,900 additional vessels, some of them civilian; but the Chinese also have a massive shipbuilding programme, in particular in terms of polar capabilities and building ships capable of operating in both the Arctic and Antarctica. Then we come to Chinese dual-purpose vessels, which again are increasing in number at both poles. The Russians are ahead at the moment in building, but the Chinese are rapidly catching up. Again, I point to the importance of the Chinese relationships with the Russians circumventing the sanctions regime to address shortages of parts. I see it as not merely a pragmatic alliance, but a deeply entrenched alliance now.

I mentioned the northern sea route and the cable damage in the Baltic sea, particularly involving the Newnew Polar Bear and the Yi Peng 3, there is almost certainly some form of collusion with Russia, which I think is really about China leveraging the political optics. For example, the Yi Peng 3 effectively pushed off to the coast of Denmark, and I think we—the UK and NATO—should have probably given Denmark a little more support at the time. For the Danes, the question was effectively, “Do we board a Hong Kong-flagged vessel?” The decision was no, and the Yi Peng 3 left the Baltic, whereas at the moment there is more appetite to do it for Russian-flagged or aligned shadow-fleet vessels. China is able to use that for diplomatic cover and to say that it can possibly do things in the Baltic sea and other areas within the High North without too much risk of being boarded by European powers.

To draw out some interesting points that you—all of you—made, the first is that the dual-use trope is likely to be one that we will continue to see for reasons of hybrid or grey zone-type warfare. The second is that the industrial and defence co-operation is likely much closer in China, given the structure of the economy, and in Russia than it would necessarily be here, so there is more potential read-across, if I understood what you said. If I were taking a 20-year view backward and forward, I would say that China is quietly converting Russia into a client state. Nuclear energy is one of the very few areas in defence where Russia retains a sovereign capability that China is genuinely interested in in the longer term. Therefore, from a Chinese standpoint, if it can provoke Russian semi-aggressive exercises and challenges to the west in the Atlantic and the High North and preserve the opportunity to use the High North as a Suez transit point to the benefit of Chinese commerce, that is a pretty optimal outcome. Is that roughly your view?

Yes. We have mentioned Tom Clancy. It is certainly something that we misjudged five or three years ago when we did not see very clearly the Chinese construction of an alternative rules-based order, or dis-rules based order, to the west’s. China is keenly aware of the frailties and deficiencies of Russia and the Russian Federation, particularly in Siberia.

They are keenly aware of the fragility?

Yes.

I agree.

For example, China is aware of the fragility of the infrastructure on the Arctic coast in Siberia and of Russia’s demographics and its failure to invest in equipment. Russia is rich in rare earth minerals, but it is only with the Chinese that they have begun to be able to mine lithium, for example.

Very interesting. That leads to this question: if we fail to respond to actual Russian and potential Chinese assertiveness in the High North, what will be the consequences of that and what are the long-term implications for us?

I would say that the consequences will be quite dire if we do not respond at pace.

It feels like we are not. It feels like we are getting quite a lot of challenge from Russia at the moment in different forms. We are talking about putting a carrier strike group out in the north, which is the first meaningful attempt at forward deterrence I have seen for a while. Is other stuff going on that the Committee should be aware of? Are we massively missing a wider picture of the UK and the US aggressively contesting the High North in the face of these challenges and it is not being caught by commentators and media?

I would say that we have begun to respond, but our response is fragmented and a bit behind the curve when we compare it to the pace of what our adversaries are doing in the High North. To go back to the original question about the costs of inaction, I would like to break down Russia backed up by China into three distinct domains, and drill down into the costs. If we, alongside our allies, fail to have a naval posture capable of detecting and following Russian vessels, particularly submarines, as they come down from Kola into the north Atlantic, we will be deeply weakened the next time we have to face Russia in a crisis, whether that is in central Europe or elsewhere. It could also be a challenge for us in responding to a crisis involving China if Russia is conducting parallel operations in Europe to prevent Europe, and perhaps distract the United States, from responding to something that China might be doing, as you suggested. If we do not act to contest Russia’s illegal efforts to territorialise the northern sea route—these are their laws of 2012, 2018 and 2022— we will find after 2030, when the northern sea route becomes navigable all year long, that the Russians have set up a de facto monopoly on transit. They will make money off that, but they could also use it as a form of leverage—for example, if they do not like the level of support that Denmark is providing to Ukraine, they can cut off Maersk ships from sailing the northern sea route. Failing to contest that through freedom of navigation operations will give Russia a tremendous amount of both wealth and geopolitical leverage. Finally, getting to Caroline’s earlier point, if we do not pay attention to Svalbard and Bear Island archipelagos, we will face a situation where our allies are investing their defence efforts in securing bits of their territory that they view as at risk, as opposed to investing in a common JEF or NATO posture in the High North. When I was in Svalbard last year, I found it remarkable that there were Norwegian warships sitting off the Svalbard coast every single day. That is significant when you consider that Norway has four extremely high-grade warships, so that is an extremely high percentage of their deployable capacity sitting there to deter Russia, as opposed to participating in other, broader NATO endeavours. A fragmented alliance, a wealthier and empowered Russia, and constraints on our own decision making would be the effects of inaction.

That is very helpful. Ed?

I have two points. NATO has been handed an opportunity on a plate through the failure of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, particularly with Finland and Sweden joining, which has completely transformed the alliance. NATO was very slow to catch on to Russian remilitarisation in the Arctic, and essentially, the Russians invested Arctic capabilities into Ukraine—the 200th and the 64th motor rifle brigades—plus a lot of air defence that is usually in the north. I always use it an example when we say that NATO is a defensive alliance. Putin knows that, because he effectively left the Kola peninsula, which is the source of strategic and political power for the Russians, militarily undefended. There is one highway—the E105—that goes from St Petersburg to Murmansk, and that is now in fire control range of Finland. It is a huge opportunity for NATO to continue the overmatch that we now have. That opportunity must be taken.

And they have lost the Baltic.

Yes. Secondly, I will highlight a point that colleagues Sid Kaushal and Ed Black made in a recent paper on Atlantic Bastion. From the Russian naval position, in terms of the northern fleet, they do not have to destroy or defeat NATO maritime activity in the Arctic, the High North or the Atlantic; they need to disrupt and buy time for the land operation in Europe to succeed, so they are looking differently at potential operations in the north.

That is very helpful and interesting. Caroline, did you want to come in?

To add to what colleagues have said about the sense of the High North for Russia, 20% of Russia is in the Arctic. It is a place that cannot be relinquished. Putin believes it holds the key to future prosperity, and it will be defended and contested. Marc is quite right that the northern sea route is the lifeblood for Russia, and poses a series of opportunities and constraints. The Russians have been pushing for legal recognition much further into the Arctic. The Russian question is, how does it behave militarily, hybrid, grey, propaganda, using the tools at its disposal? Remember that it is not simply Russia and China now; it is BRICS. The Russians have a series of alliances with other powers interested in the Arctic. They will not give up Bear island—the Barents—and we have pressed them very hard in the Baltic. That is why I think we will see a dispersal of Russian forces and interests into other parts of the Arctic. The remilitarisation of the islands is extremely telling. None the less, Ed is right that there are opportunities here. The Russians have caused a lot of internal domestic concern with their attitude towards the indigenous people, who have suffered disproportionately in terms of conscription into Ukraine. That creates opportunities for leverage, and again, the Chinese have stepped in. Russia is not harmonious. Russia is subject to a series of conflicting trends, but that does not lessen its ambitions. The key question concerns the fact that a contained Russia will see its opportunities coming in the next few years, before there is serious rearmament in the west.

The three of you have given a very sobering assessment of the threat but also a very interesting review of the opportunity. Thank you.

Let us now move on from China to NATO and the US.

We talked a bit already about NATO. I would like to pick up on something, Professor Kennedy-Pipe. As Ed set out, there is clear potential for NATO policies on land, with that route up to Murmansk and Finland now a part of NATO. How clear is NATO’s operating model and policy for joint maritime operations across NATO countries? Clearly the UK and France are European NATO’s leading countries in terms of submarines. To what extent are those countries operating together under NATO versus unilaterally? Perhaps the UK operates more bilaterally with the US. Could you give us an idea of how joined up that is?

Looking at NATO, we are all aware of the shocks to the system that President Trump has inflicted. In terms of opportunities, however, I return to what Mr Norman said. In terms of growing alignment and of Norway, Denmark and increasingly Iceland—I am sure that we will come on to JEF—we must think of a UK-led, European type of response in the Arctic, because we simply cannot know what the Americans will commit to. We have the First Sea Lord’s vision, and I would urge very strongly a serious convergence, which has already taken place with Norway and is increasingly happening with Denmark and Iceland, for the European component, and also with the Canadians. There is a concern over the Canadians because of the north-west passage and the fact that President Trump’s disagreements with the Canadians on that transit through the Canadian archipelago also offers avenues for China. Therefore, at the moment, it is precarious and a concerted European effort is needed in maritime defence.

Thank you. Marc?

I agree vociferously with everything that Caroline said, but I would add that even beyond the High North, no alliance of 32 countries has ever flexibly and agilely responded to crises—and that is sort of NATO’s problem. NATO is large, it depends on consensus, and besides the United States, which sometimes now has Arctic ambitions that are deeply threatening to Denmark and Canada, it has Slovakia and Hungary—countries that are sometimes confused about what team they are on when it comes to containing Russia—as well as Greece and Turkey, which oftentimes like tilting at one another as opposed to engaging in transatlantic policy making. While NATO’s article 5 and NATO First may be very good foundations for overall UK existential security, NATO is not fit for purpose when it comes to creating policy for very swiftly changing environments such as the High North. For the High North, the format that I would favour would be a sort of Joint Expeditionary Force-plus format. The 10 Nordic, Baltic and North sea countries of the Joint Expeditionary Force include all of NATO’s Arctic countries, save the United States and Canada. The JEF is also quite flexible when it comes to staging exercises and developing policy responses.

We are going to come on to JEF in a bit. Sorry to cut you off, but I totally recognise what you are saying. While I have the mic, I want to ask you something else, Dr Marc. I know that you have done a lot of work on military innovation. Obviously, NATO has DIANA, the NATO Innovation Fund and a whole innovation team that sometimes struggles to get technologies to be adopted by NATO. To what extent are the technologies that we see rapidly evolve through innovation at war in Ukraine—be they on land, sea or air—applicable to any potential fighting in the High North, and to what extent should NATO lean into that?

That is a great question. First, the technologies are absolutely applicable, but not in the exact state they were used in the Black sea or in the Russia-Ukraine war. A UK, Norwegian, JEF, NATO posture vis-à-vis Russia in the Bear Island gap 10 years from now should definitely involve unmanned surface vessels, unmanned underwater vessels, persistent drones providing ISR, and underwater cheap acoustic sensors, which are all things that have been proven in Ukraine. However, as I am sure Caroline will describe in greater detail, the operating environment in the High North is, environmentally, much more challenging. So those systems need to be gotten up there, tested and proofed in that particular environment in order to translate those lessons to the High North. Probably, the same would be the case if one tried to think how to apply the one-way attack drone, combined with more exquisite systems, in the way that the Ukrainians have. They have established strike wrappers and packages that are capable of penetrating most Russian air defences. One would need to tweak that and develop specific weatherproofed versions of the technology and exercise them alongside our allies before one could adequately translate the lessons of Russia-Ukraine to a more efficient military posture in the High North.

It also depends which part of the Russian Arctic you are talking about. The recent drone attacks north of Irkutsk were very successful, but you have to think in a more agile way about how you deliver uncrewed systems. Marc is quite right that you can look at some of the coldest places in the world, in Siberia, and see what will work and what will not, but when looking at the use of certain types of uncrewed systems in the Arctic, you also have a problem with acoustics and how the systems will actually operate. The agility and the innovation are interesting, but you are going down to minus 30 or minus 35. It depends where you are targeting in the Russian Arctic; it does not have to be the central Arctic ocean and those places that are still remotely frozen. Russia has—I come back to the word again—a great deal of fragility in its infrastructure, and we have seen that it can be hurt.

For sure. This is the last question from me. Ed, your colleagues on the panel have been clear about the need for collaboration and leadership in the High North outside of NATO constructs. What is your view? Does NATO have clear policies for security and defence in the High North?

It has clear policies and, at a macro level, it is assuring transatlantic reinforcement. Certainly, a couple of years ago you could summarise any national defence plan under article 3 from the Nordic and Baltic states as, effectively, “Fight until the Americans come.” There is no real change there; there are just more question marks, politically, around whether the Americans will come, in terms of that transatlantic reinforcement. For that transatlantic reinforcement, in terms of the NATO regional plans, the north-west plan is the most important. The recent changes in NATO’s command structure—principally the UK gaining command of Norfolk in Virginia, which is for the north, and the US moving to command MARCOM so as to have all the theatre component commands under it—creates an element of opportunity. The way that NATO is looking at defence now is that the base layer is national defence plans under article 3. Then there are a variety of the unilaterals and bilaterals—principally JEF and NORDEFCO in the north, which are for coherence—and sitting on top of that are the regional plans. It is absolutely critical for Europeans that you can run that regional plan in the north-west with little to no US support, and now it effectively gives us that opportunity, if we resource it. I think the former military members of the Committee will understand that we always say, “headquarters”, “command” and so on, but there is a lot that goes underneath that that will have to be resourced from, for example, staff officers surging into Norfolk and making sure that, whichever plan we are using, there is a seamless change in command. You can now do that because Finland and Sweden are in NATO, and that means that all JEF members are in NATO.

But these are dangerous times. The transfer of US personnel out is an opportunity, but it also might signal something more portentous for the future, and that has to be taken into account.

Let’s now move on to the US, with Emma Lewell.

It is interesting. The Committee does not need me to tell it how bizarre it seems that President Trump would like to purchase Greenland, particularly because the indigenous people of Greenland do not believe in ownership and found it really rather odd that they are caught in this position. The intriguing issue, of course, is President Trump’s view that Greenland is indispensable to the protection of the east coast of the United States, even though under the 1951 treaty, the United States have the wherewithal to do as they wish on Greenland, and that is quite clear. The second issue is the disregard for the Kingdom of Denmark, which is a key NATO ally. I am sure we were all dismayed by the derogatory comments made about the Danes in places like Afghanistan. I think that is troublesome. If we look at US Arctic strategy, the US was not interested in the Arctic for many years—it neglected the Arctic and its capabilities there. Under President Trump, we have begun to see a keener awareness of Alaska, Chinese incursions offshore of Alaska, and what that might mean for the American position, as well as, as I mentioned earlier, the ongoing dispute with Canada over the north-west passage, which is serious as it opens up. Looking ahead, I think that what was on the table between President Trump and Putin was what I call a sphere of influence. Putin stayed out of Greenland for a very long time, saying it was not Russian business, but the quid pro quo would be an enhanced interest in Svalbard, sitting across from eastern Greenland. Until very recently—let’s say last night, and Iran—I think the Russians and Americans had conceived of an Arctic that was quite clearly divided. That has been thrown into disarray, if I can extend into the Russian relationship with Iran, but nevertheless the Americans are quite clear. This is where there are opportunities and constraints for NATO. Denmark is an ally of the United Kingdom and promises much in terms of defence interchangeability through our alliance structure. In 20 years’ time—crystal ball gazing—I think the United States will find itself seriously disadvantaged in the Arctic relative to China. I agree that Russia is not the threat, but China certainly has ambitions both in the Pacific and the European Arctic. The Americans need to be careful. We understand the tilt towards the Indo-Pacific in terms of trade and America’s own threat assessment, but the east coast will be extremely vulnerable to Chinese and Russian attacks in 20 years’ time. As the Arctic melts, and 20 years is a long time in the Arctic—and 20 years is a long time in the Arctic—we will see issues with the northern sea route and north-west passage, and more trade and more actors, such as South Korea and Japan. The Arctic 8 will begin to lose their grip on Arctic politics. The circumpolar Arctic, as we know it, will become unrecognisable with climate change. This is an opportunity for the Europeans to really—“carve out” is a terrible phrase—begin to influence the direction of traffic with our Arctic allies. However, we cannot count on the United States—that is entirely clear. Without wanting to step outside our remit, I think that the PM’s prudence and abiding by international law sets a very interesting precedent for the Arctic. Once international law is ignored on trade routes—and remember that the Arctic exists under article 234, which protects the rights of transit and the rights of Arctic ice—then, in 20 years’ time, we are beginning to move into a very permissive environment. I would also add that those riches on the seabed and in places such as Greenland are indispensable to modern economies.

I am not sure that I would have raised my hand, but now that you have called on me—

Even beyond Trump, and his particular idiosyncratic aspects, we cannot count on the United States returning to the European Arctic as the security partner and ally that we previously counted on. Part of the reason is what you described: the rise of China in the Indo-Pacific area. I spent much of December in Taiwan, where the Americans view the window for maximum likelihood of a war kicking off in east Asia as 2027 to 2035, although perhaps pushing that back as far as 2049 when they think that Xi Jinping has set an objective that Taiwan must be forcibly reunified with China by that date. Even if the next US President was a dyed in the wool Atlanticist—Eisenhower 2.0 or something—the US would not have the capacity to pivot back to playing the role it did in Europe and its High North. At Davos, a fair number of Republicans and Democrats showed up this past year, and very few articulated the traditional American policy of engagement with Europe and in the High North. One had varieties of isolationism and the various varieties of parlaying American grand power—military power—into economic benefit. But there was nothing that signalled that we could hope that the next US President—or the President after that—will have the bandwidth and interest to come back and play the role that the US played here in the 1980s and 1990s.

If President Trump is serious that Greenland is indispensable to the defence perimeter, then the US already has Pituffik air base. They used to have 51 bases around Greenland, some of which were left in considerable disarray. There is nothing to stop them. But if one believes that, as we have seen in Ukraine and other parts of the world, that it is the rare earth minerals that might be of more interest to President Trump, that would be a different type of engagement entirely on Greenland. This idea of Greenland being indispensable is a bit of a red herring. The Americans and Danes have been quite clear that they would not prohibit American militarisation on Greenland. So the puzzle is: what does President Trump really want? It is, I think, control of those rare earth minerals. If you look at America and the globe—forgive me, I should have brought a map—from 1946 on, when President Truman tried to buy the island, it was always named as indispensable to the American hemisphere and its control. So we have got a mix of things going on with Greenland. To come back to the indigenous people, they must surely have a right and a say in their own future, and also in the richness of the earth that lies beneath. So, yes, I think it is rare earth minerals that are driving President Trump’s interest in that part of the world, rather than defence. To come back to what I said earlier, if there is a threat to the east coast of the United States, it does not have to come across Greenland; it can go around the other pole. That brings into play the Falklands, which I think it also of interest.

Let us now come on to UK policy.

I have been trying to keep pace with the different groupings as you have been speaking. I have got Sweden, Finland and Denmark; Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Iceland. The SDR makes a reference to minilateral groupings and their importance in the defence of the High North. Clearly JEF is a significant one of those groupings that faces to the north, but we have also spoken about the significance of both Finland and Sweden entering NATO. Should the UK have a leadership role in the High North, and under which grouping should that be?

I think we already have a leadership role in the High North, and the First Sea Lord articulated a vision of deterrence for the UK which would include friends and partners. For many of us, the JEF is an obvious vehicle that has been proven and that, unlike many other European structures, has actually been deployed, which is good. It is flexible and does not require unanimous voting, as NATO does, and it proves that agility, particularly under the threshold. So I would see JEF, but also with some framework nations adding, as something that the UK can lead on. I am sure we will come back to the issue of funding, but it has proven itself to be a very distinct pillar of how to deal with these threats in the High North.

I do not think the UK has a choice now, particularly with gaining command of Norfolk. If you are looking at it through a NATO First prism, that is absolutely essential. Then, if you bring it back down to the UK’s article 3 outlook, we have all mentioned that the threat comes from the north. I think it is absolutely clear. I have said in an answer previously that it feels natural; the UK feels like the natural partner of choice particularly to Nordic countries, which for a variety of reasons have chosen previously to keep Arctic issues—particularly around hard security—to themselves. Looking at article 3, they are now wanting more enhanced partnerships due to the fluctuating US position. The JEF absolutely has benefits, but I feel that we are not making best use of them. I have written a lot on the JEF and effectively said, “Well, these are strengths, but if you don’t use them, you will lose them.” If you look at Baltic Sentry, which was established after critical national infrastructure attacks in the Baltic sea, actually the JEF did not react, despite that being in its core area of interest and it at the time prioritising critical underwater infrastructure. There was a variety of reasons behind that, but principally it was the fact that Poland and Germany—particularly with Germany now hosting NATO’s maritime component command in the Baltic—are not members of JEF. Previously, a lot of people said that the JEF can act while the NATO does the thinking, but that was not the case. Suddenly, you are like, “Well, hang on, what is the JEF for?” The JEF has also done activity that has supported Baltic Sentry. Why is the JEF supporting NATO activity when the JEF is already fully composed of NATO? Where I think the JEF could make a real difference is not in a complete change but in a refocus, with JEF activity focusing more on the Arctic and High North, particularly where our command and control and military capabilities would be best served. You provide the protection to the Baltic states that are members as well by effectively screening the Danish straits. You are preventing the sources of potential nefarious activity from even getting into the Baltic. There is obviously an element of diplomacy here, but at the moment—in theory—article 3, the minilateral level, and the NATO layer all align in terms of command, and the UK is sitting on top of that pyramid.

Let me come to you, Marc, just to qualify this. If JEF is valid and somewhere we should be showing leadership, is there then a pacing threat, in that to demonstrate leadership we have to meet or exceed the pace of the expenditure and contributions of the other members of that grouping?

I vehemently agree with you. Our allies in the JEF are looking to us for leadership. If you go to Oslo or Copenhagen, they are asking for more. They are asking for more of a coherent function. They are asking for more of a strategic vision. But in order to provide that leadership, we have to be fully coherent in what we are doing as well. To make a Pinocchio allusion, part of that means making the JEF a real boy. Right now, the JEF mostly consists of annual head of Government and Head of State meetings, with a lot of informal work on the side. If we are serious about making the JEF a policy tool that is fit for purpose for cohering action in this area, it should have a real headquarters. It should have a small secretariat—not necessarily something as bloated as what NATO has, but a small professional secretariat—and a small permanent military planning headquarters. We should also put it somewhere central within the JEF region. It should not be sitting over here on UK soil; we should put it in Copenhagen or Oslo, or some place that looks more geographically central. The UK is the only JEF member that can provide the policy expertise and has the bandwidth to help cohere that. Caroline has mentioned on several occasions the First Sea Lord’s vision. We have taken a number of measures that show that we are moving in the right direction—that we have reprioritised the north Atlantic and the High North. The Atlantic Bastion was in the SDR. Atlantic Strike and Atlantic Shield were both mentioned in the First Sea Lord’s speech at the Sea Power Conference. Operation Firecrest is sending the carrier battle group up to the High North. The Royal Marines regularly deploy to northern Norway and Camp Viking. We have outlined a lot of activity that goes in the right direction, but there is a real say/do gap. Probably at the current level of resourcing, properly executing those initiatives at the same time as following through on the Royal Navy’s procurement of frigates—the Royal Navy has become quite run down—is going to cost something like £4 billion extra over the next three years, above and beyond what is likely in the defence equipment programme, which none of us has seen. So I think that there is a say/do gap. There is also something of a gap in living up to our rhetoric when it comes to our policy decisions. I was at the French Atlantic fleet’s headquarters a couple of weeks ago. Whenever I want to learn things about the British Navy, I tend to speak to the French. There, I got chided about the fact that we have one Astute-class submarine at sea, and it is heading for Australia. The French admiral said, “You talk such a good game when it comes to the High North, and we agree with your prioritisation there, but you only have one submarine at sea and it is heading towards the other part of the world to deter an adversary that your country is not willing to call out as a foreign policy threat.” Our allies are looking for leadership. On paper, a lot of what we are doing is in the right direction. But there is a real challenge when it comes to coherence and putting our money where our mouth is.

I can see your face, so I am going to bring you in, Ed.

There are a couple of data points that support Marc. When you look at percentage spend of GDP on defence through the JEF members, the UK was the only one to meet 2% in 2014. We are now ninth, and Iceland, without a military, is 10th—so it could be worse. All of my analysis on the JEF was that it worked because there was a framework nation that everyone could get around at that point. Anecdotally, the former ambassador of a JEF member said to me two years ago, “In 2014, the UK sold the JEF to us; in 2024, we’re selling the JEF to you.” So there is more that the UK can do. There are a variety of things that have been written by the Nordic-Baltic eight. There was an opinion piece written fairly recently on it by some friends of mine that did not mention the UK once. If the JEF is not going to step up, and the UK is not going to make the point that Marc just made, there are other options. Again, it is sort of lose it or use it. It is also worth understanding that we get obsessed with command-and-control arrangements and with which group is doing what—the badges on our arms. Russia doesn’t. Russia doesn’t care if it is JEF or NATO. It probably doesn’t even realise and generally thinks all of the activity in the area is US anyway. So when we get transfixed by this, it does not matter to our enemy; they just see it as activity and do not make that distinction.

Russia never mentions the JEF.

Very rarely, yes.

That is very sobering and a clear indication that we need to step up our spending. It was a very apposite comparison of where we sit within that bloc, Ed. Marc, you started to talk about the Atlantic Bastion as a clear and achievable policy for the UK. Can you elaborate or expand on that, particularly on some of its constituent programmes, such as Shield, Strike and the Net?

The Atlantic Bastion, Shield and Strike are a nexus of programmes. Thus far, in terms of what has been published, the Atlantic Shield and Strike are about bumper-sticker deep, in that they represent a good concept without as much detail on what follow-through is. Big picture, Atlantic Bastion is using a variety of sensors, unmanned vessels, and underwater sensors to monitor traffic through the north Atlantic. That means being able to identify Russian submarines as they try to transit towards the north Atlantic to areas where they could be a threat to us or our sealines of communication. In that sense, it builds on the back of Project CABOT and previous Royal Navy research. It represents a judicious application of emerging technology to our security challenges. What are the problems with this? I believe it was Caroline who mentioned that the Russians increasingly recognise that they might be identified coming through the north Atlantic. Their plan is essentially for their submarines to lose the NATO vessels trailing them in the Sargasso sea, and then double back to whatever their intended target set is. Where we may have a problem with the Atlantic Bastion is whether we have enough frigates or attack submarines of our own that are capable of following Russian submarines as they have been identified, so that the track is not lost. Our general assumption is that the Russians will try to surge their submarines into the Atlantic before a war breaks out. If they are surging through the Atlantic Bastion while it is still peacetime, we cannot sink them. We therefore have to essentially remain in contact with them until the balloon goes up. The issue is whether we have enough vessels capable of pursuing them. Following through on our frigate purchases is not an either/or with the Atlantic Bastion, but it becomes useless if you cannot pursue afterwards. That is also where allies become important, because they have the escorts that can help pursue once the Bastion locates a submarine.

That is quite clear in RUSI’s report. When RUSI discusses it, I would not say it is damning, but it exposes that there are other challenges. One part that sticks in my mind is COCONO—contractor-owned, contractor-operated naval oversight. Is that a useful vehicle for incentivising industry in this regard?

Tentatively, I would say yes. We have seen in Ukraine and elsewhere that the pace of technological change is such that standard military organisations have trouble absorbing it at pace. Coming up with a vehicle that involves contractors more directly on the frontline and more directly in provision is a good adaptation that reflects what we see states doing that we might want to benchmark ourselves against. As with so many clever procurement waves in the United Kingdom, the devil is often in the detail and the implementation.

Would it surprise you that, for some bizarre reason, we are expecting those contractors to work on a one-plus-one-plus-four contracting method, where they would have to front-load everything in year 1? Is that not making a bit of a nonsense of incentivising companies to come in, placing all the risk on a one-year contract?

Yes, I have misgivings about that. One of my major misgivings is that if our objective is to lure in new tech companies and build a better defence industrial ecosystem, by the time you have forced that front-loading of investment, you have essentially ruled out many small and medium-sized enterprises. Who can absorb those sunk costs? It is your BAEs and Babcocks, not your small and medium-sized emerging tech firms.

Before we move forward—Caroline, Ed, both of you are nodding—are there any other contributions?

On the future technology side, the issue for the UK and NATO is that we have so few surface combatants. I am an ex-infanteer, so I will not reel off naval numbers, but it is about availability of airframes and vessels. That is the real issue. That is what drives a lot of bilateral and trilateral co-operation, such as maritime patrol in the north Atlantic between the UK, the US and Norway. When the Germans come online under Trinity House, they can operate through Lossiemouth. That rotation between training, maintenance and operations gives you more availability. The problem is that when you look at new technology and also want to support home-grown start-ups, you start to do things at a national rather than a multinational level. Looking at how allies can support Atlantic Bastion and all those concepts, now is the time to go, “What do we need?” and design it with allies in mind. There is always a difficulty with integrating two different systems in the future. We can avoid that. There are a lot of examples where that has not gone very well in European security.

Dr De Vore, I want to ask you about the growth agenda that could come from our work in the High North. The Government are talking a lot about defence growth, and dangling the opportunities of export deals to industry. What are the opportunities that you think can come from a growth perspective from our High North work?

I actually think that there is quite significant defence export growth opportunity in the High North, provided that we do what my esteemed colleagues and I have said, which is really seize the bull by the horns and take leadership of security in the High North. The Nordics, the Canadians and our other High North allies are countries that feel the Russian threat and China’s increasing in-roads into the area, as well as Donald Trump’s idiosyncratic acquisitiveness, quite keenly. Their defence budgets are all rising quite rapidly and, as Ed mentioned, much faster than our own. These are all countries that are re-equipping quite quickly. There are not many countries that build warships that are even moderately capable of operating in the High North. For the UK, the Type 26 is the first frigate that we have designed for this operating environment. It is not ice-hardened, but you do not need that in the Barents or Norwegian seas. It is at least designed for the extreme weather up north. For our own purposes, we have some products on the market that are appealing there. Some of our natural competitors are also disadvantaged. The Canadians and the Danes, for understandable reasons, are pivoting away from as much defence-industrial dependency on the United States. We are seeing more interest than ever in British weaponry from the High North states. That is reflected in the Norwegian destroyer deal. The Danes are considering acquiring a ship based on the UK Type 31 as the new centrepiece of their navy, and the Canadians are thinking in terms of Type 26s as the base of their new River-class ships. I would see this as the opportunity to redress the UK’s gradual decline as an arms exporter. Twenty years ago, we were No. 3 in the world; right now, we are No. 6.

A lot of the focus has been on the SDR. In the absence of not having a DIP, industry is being pointed to the SDR as the signal setter. How much of an issue is it that our main commitments around the High North have come beyond the SDR?

I think that is an issue. There is also an issue in terms of coherence across Government. The SDR highlights more commitments than we can realistically prioritise, at least under current budgets and current geopolitical circumstances. Also, we are not necessarily always responsive to our allies’ desire for us showing the flag. I was in Greenland this past September as they were doing their Arctic Light military exercises. They quite frankly complained to me that the French had sent four warships up by Greenland within the last year, and the UK had not sent one. Obviously, Nuuk and the Greenlandic coast is not necessarily the most strategic location when one thinks about the geography of the north Atlantic. On the other hand, the Danes are a key ally, and if we want them to view us as their primary security partner, we ought to prioritise showing the flag there.

I have another question, but I think it relates more to the next topic.

Let’s move on to UK defence capabilities.

I was initially going to direct this question to Mr Arnold, but in the light of your comments on the one Astute boat, which is actually in Australia now, I will come to you, Marc. To what extent are the UK armed forces prepared or properly equipped for operations in the High North? If they are not, what further capabilities do you think they require?

I will count on Ed to fill in a lot more, because he has more experience, particularly of being on the ground in the High North. Our capabilities are improving, but we took a long vacation from preparing for operating in the High North environment. Not only did we not procure equipment that is fit for purpose, but we did not exercise, so we do not even know which of our equipment really works up there, and we also lost a lot of the practical human skills. In some ways, I would put more of an emphasis on that, because it is a unique environment. Unless you are up there operating frequently, you lose the ability to deploy and function. We first sent our carrier up into northern waters in the 1980s, and we conducted military exercises alongside our NATO partners in the Norwegian High North every other year—they were quite intensive, two-week-long carrier exercises every other year. Between the 1990s and 2022, we just stopped doing that. When we sent our carrier up for the first time in 2022, they were unable to take off or land aircraft for a substantial amount of time, because they had forgotten how to deal with icing on the bridge and runway. All sorts of other technical issues emerged as electronics and people were confronted with environments they were not used to dealing with. Our helicopter pilots needed the Norwegians to give them polar bear safety briefings, as they were operating over land with polar bears. The same effect is true for issues like sea ice. UK submarines, between the late ’90s and 2018, did not operate under the ice pack, meaning that a lot of the human skills, such as knowing the unique acoustic qualities of operating under ice, had been lost. To my knowledge, we have not operated under ice since 2018, but sometimes that stuff can be quite sensitive. We lost a lot of the skills, and the only way to redevelop them is to go up into the High North on a regular basis. That also means we do not know exactly how well our equipment performs; I do not think we know how well a Type 45 destroyer operates in High North weather. Obviously, as is the case for a lot our fleet currently, Type 23s are beyond the end of their useful life, and we are eagerly awaiting the replacement of Type 26s and Type 31s. We are procuring things, but that also depends on the defence and equipment programme being fully funded.

I think Marc did a very good job, and I would emphasise the human element. It is an unforgiving environment—the environment up there will kill you far quicker than the enemy will. It is also important that even fairly modest training in those environments can have lasting application. That is kind of the approach that we are doing by rotating units—it is probably one of the only benefits of not having lots of units in the British Army, as an example, that they can rotate through. If you have a couple of weeks of training, you can remember that if you then have to do a quick-notice deployment. The priority is effectively getting everyone in the UK military trained in cold weather, even if—

On that subject, we are looking to increase the numbers that we rotate out there. Do you think we are already well equipped to take those numbers? It would appear that we are already running at hotter levels with the numbers up there now, and we are going to increase that by another 1,000. Are we equipped to do so, as we stand?

Yes. If we take Norway, and specifically the Royal Navy and Royal Marines relationship, that has been going for a long time. In terms of what we have done, it is not just about training; it is also about the logistics that sits behind it. The commando helicopter squadron operates up there as well, because the logistics are just as important as the combat capabilities. The UK has also been diversifying. Whereas the Navy holds a relationship predominantly with the Norwegians, our joint activity with Finland has increased dramatically, including with 3 Ranger, and ditto for the Swedish armed forces. Some members of one of the Ranger regiments just got their Jaeger badges, so they are doing a lot of interoperability up there. We also have to look at the broader picture of the UK military. We are on the hook to provide the SACEUR strategic reserve. Wherever that may deploy in the future, it is almost certainly going to be to a Nordic or Baltic nation, so this training is absolutely foundational. We also need to start to move away from exercises and to rehearsals. The difference between them, in military terminology, is, “You’ve been given your orders.” NATO has a regional plan; we have our orders. I think we need to start to do more very specific activity, which is rehearsing the regional plan. If you look at the sort of exercise laid down between NATO, the UK and all the minilaterals, it is very complex. Rationalising that would be important and lead to more of a persistent presence. Again, we put a lot of emphasis on exercises, and they are really important, but when our carrier strike group goes to the High North, if it is deliberate Kremlin policy to go to war, it is not going to do it when the carrier is in the High North; it will probably do it the week after the carrier has come back and everyone is on shore leave. We therefore need to make sure that the presence up there is persistent. We have already covered the anti-submarine warfare capability, in which the UK has significant capabilities as a proportion of NATO, but there is also this element of, probably, strike, if we are moving to combat operations within the region. At the moment, Atlantic Bastion and the associated concepts are all about surveillance—great, because you know where Russian submarine activity is—but if we are then moving to combat operations, you need to have the ability to prosecute that. We have mentioned already the First Sea Lord’s directive—effectively, to fight with what we have, with a planning assumption of 2029—and then we have to have a plan underneath that, of where the gaps are. Again, that—

That is the plan, but do you think we are properly equipped for operations there, as we speak?

It is difficult to assess that on availability, because the issue is that you never have your full strength, whether it be personnel or capabilities. A lot more needs to be done on making sure that all our assets, particularly naval assets, are ready, in the sense not only that the ships can go to sea, but that we have the requisite trained personnel to go on them. The picture does not look good at the moment, particularly with a lot of our sub capacity, where we have had to extend sea patrols and so on. That really needs to be fixed at a foundational level before adding all the additional Type 31s and 26s, which are due to come online only from ’28 to ’35.

We are looking at what capabilities we have now. Are those capabilities specific to the High North, or are they capabilities that we would be able to send out globally?

We would be able to send them out globally. I think it is a political prioritisation. Over the last couple of years, we have seen a focus on the Euro-Atlantic, and within that, a particular focus on the Arctic and High North. I would assume that a lot of these capabilities will stay in the Euro-Atlantic area over the coming years. It would be a political decision on whether to move those assets out of that area, probably in consultation with allies.

Finally, what further capabilities do you think we need?

You said something at the beginning. Did you ask whether we were ready or capable? Michelle Scrogham indicated assent.

I suppose I would ask, “Ready for what?” If we are looking at current threats in the High North, we are looking at a lot of below-the-threshold activities, a lot of hybrid, and lot of softening up of communities across the Arctic by the Russians, whether that is Russian-speaking people in Estonia, Finland or further north. We have seen from the Russians in other conflicts—Georgia in 2008 and Crimea—that there is always an initial phase. Coming back to your very provocative question, are we ready to recognise those under-the-threshold activities in the Arctic and where they might lead? Then you said something else really interesting, which comes back to numbers and capability. There is always boots on the ground, but there will be other capabilities that are absolutely indispensable to operations in the Arctic, such as people who can actually navigate vessels across the Arctic. We are short of engineers. You have mountain leaders and Royal Marines—commandos—who will operate. Then you have the issue of numbers behind that and you have what the First Sea Lord said. Are we ready for an all-society approach, as the Finns are, to what we will see? Softening up or, as I call it, mischief-making, will inevitably be the first phase. It is how you react to that first phase, which the Russians also react to. You are entirely right to think about numbers and capabilities, but it is also attitude. Then it is not just boots on the ground, but everybody else who will be the teeth and tail of operations in extremely difficult conditions.

Before we move on to Canada and Norway, we have three quick supplementary questions on this area, starting with Alex Baker.

Dr De Vore, how will Russia interpret our trip to the High North with the carrier strike group?

The Russians probably will interpret this trip to the High North with the carrier strike group the way they did the 2022 deployment to the Norwegian sea, which is basically as political gesticulation. I do not think they are going to read much military threat into that. As was suggested earlier, one UK carrier strike group is not in and of itself a threat to Russia. For the carrier strike group to send a powerful message that can deter Russia—the only messages that will deter Russia are those that frighten Russia to some degree—it would need to co-operate very heavily with Nordic air forces. If we are asking, “How could Atlantic Strike be executed?” then for the foreseeable future, the heavy lifting is not by the Royal Navy but by the excellent Swedish and Norwegian air forces. That could perhaps be supplemented by UK and other allied carriers showing up, and maybe one or two submarines that we could put, hypothetically, in the waters out there that could launch cruise missiles. The vast majority of any form of Atlantic Strike will have to come from land-based Nordic air power, whereas we would be providing command and control and some exquisite enabling capabilities, but those are only valuable in so far as we have practised and integrated with our 10 squadrons of advanced fourth and fifth-generation Nordic aircraft.

What would be the best message it could send? We have an opportunity to do this. What is the best version of this message?

There is the peacetime deterrence message and the wartime posture message. The peacetime deterrence message, I think, is that we and our European allies have the capacity to deploy significant strike assets within range of things the Russians care deeply about, notably their concentration of military capability on the Kola peninsula, and that if Russia engages in a war elsewhere, those assets will be held at risk. The Russians think our policymakers will blink or back down if we view ourselves as held at risk by their cruise missile submarines, which probably reflects the fact that they are uncomfortable making military decisions if we can hold their assets at risk. Once again, one carrier is a good start, but I would love to get other assets up there; I would love the French to send their carrier at the same time. What is the wartime message? It would be to replicate the NATO maritime strategy of the 1980s. In the 1970s, NATO debated how best to prevent Russian submarines from cutting NATO supply chains in the central Atlantic and how to prevent Russian cruise missile submarines from hitting our key assets. Ultimately, in the 1980s, they discovered that the best way to prevent the Russians from holding us at risk was to hold them at risk. If we deploy major surface assets into the Norwegian sea or the Norwegian fjords, the Russians are going to keep more of their Yasen-class submarines and other major assets closer to home to act defensively, as opposed to trying to transit into the north Atlantic to threaten us offensively.

Do you have any thoughts on using this trip as a distraction technique?

A distraction technique from?

All the other things Russia is thinking about at the moment.

Yes, I think it would also play that function. Russia is a hyper-centralised state, so there are significant bandwidth issues at the top. Having a carrier exercising or rehearsing credibly would probably add to that distraction, and I hope that that is part of the purpose. If that is, then the press release on the deployment of the carrier group—was it last week?—was badly bungled. It described the deployment in very fluffy defensive terms, when it should have maintained some ambiguity. It should have said that the Prince of Wales was heading to the Norwegian seas to operate with allies and exercise a range of options. In some ways, we have got into a negative habit over the course of our deployments to east Asia, where our purpose was using carriers as giant diplomatic boats. Our communication strategy is still focused that way, and we are therefore missing a lot of our distraction potential in doing things such as Operation Firecrest.

Reflecting on the capabilities point, I have a personal reflection to balance the things you were saying about the UK divesting itself of its abilities. When I finished Royal Marines training in 2018, my first action after three or four months was being sent, straight off the bat, into Arctic warfare training. That was 2018, and the people training me were extremely experienced sergeants and colour sergeants who had done 20 years of Iraq and Afghanistan. The Marines maintained the ability to soldier and train in the High North, despite relentless deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, so the UK did keep some of its capability—although I note the point you made, Dr Marc, about maybe not testing some of the larger platform equipment. My question, for anyone who wants to take it, is on the perception of that infantry Arctic warfare capability among our European allies. Dr Marc, you have spoken about the French a couple of times, and maybe it would be good to hear about that—I know my colleague Michelle Scrogham was there a couple of weeks ago, visiting with the Armed Forces Parliamentary Scheme. I also know things are changing; when I was training, we were at Bardufoss, but we have now gone to Camp Viking. The numbers are much bigger, but they never tailed off to zero. There was always a regular thought to say, “We’re going to keep being good at this.” What is the perception of the UK’s capability in that ground role among colleagues? It might be interesting to hear about colleagues outside of JEF.

I have a couple of things to say, if I can jump back in. The Arctic is an incredibly performative place, and the law of the sea does apply, so it is very important that our presence is persistently exercised. The Russians take note of the fact that the law of the sea applies, and freedom of navigation must guide us. It is not just about exercises; it is about saying, “We’re here to exercise our rights, and we will transit.” The Russians are terribly impressed with the Arctic capabilities of our Royal Marines special forces, and they comment on that. I remember when there was a political debate in 2018 about our presence, and I know the mountain leaders are a strength at the moment. That capability is something the enemy takes very seriously, and the Russian press has commented on the exercises and permanent positioning in Norway. If you are thinking about deterrents, having those very specialised forces in play will give pause and allow the Russians to think seriously. They have looked very hard at the Norwegian alignment, because the Norwegians have historically trod such a careful line with the Russians by not provoking them, and they see a clear distinction now in what the UK and Norway will do—I think that gives pause. The Russians have been seriously weakened by the war in Ukraine, and they will look at capabilities and what they might face. If it is any indication, the Russian press looks at that.

And among allies?

The Russians admire it more.

Among allies, it is something that we have traditionally been very good at, and it is something that they absolutely appreciate. The growing 3 Ranger co-operation with the Finns and Swedes is also very important, and we are starting to do more of that. I sense that there is an element of service rivalry in the north, which the UK could do better at by actually putting more Army personnel through the training package that we have in Norway, and not having to push them to Finland and Sweden. I have two points to make. There is an issue because although the Royal Marines have been training and operating in Norway for a long time, Norway’s role within NATO’s defence plan has fundamentally transformed with Finland and Sweden, so it is more of a reception or staging site for onward integration, with reinforcements then being pushed further to the east. There is a lot that the commandos need to understand in saying, “What is actually their purpose in Norway? Are they to be pushed further east? Can they potentially be bypassed by the Russians quite easily?” Also, critically, “Do they have the strike capabilities to back it up?” The UK can absolutely get into positions where they are doing active reconnaissance against the Russians, but if they do not have that strike capability, they are just effectively watching Russian positions. It is also important to note what the Russians did in Ukraine, because they went in in battalion tactical groups. They basically flooded the first battalion tactical group, which was destroyed. The second one came in, and they then started to pull in the ones from the third battalion tactical group, which effectively meant that all of their trainers were killed. So they are not looking at Arctic training at the moment. You know how difficult it is. It goes back to my earlier point about the opportunity NATO has here: we have active Arctic warfare skills, we are scaling them, and more allies are going north to get that training. For the Russians it is really quite a low priority, and they are still prioritising very poor offensive capabilities in Ukraine. They have said they want to create a division in Karelia and so on, but that is pretty difficult when you are in that fight. Within the next couple of years, NATO could be in a completely different position in the north. NATO as an alliance, and its individual members, cannot lose that advantage.

Thank you.

The UK’s 2025 strategic defence review highlighted Canada as a vital ally for our transatlantic security. We know about that whether through Five Eyes or through NATO, as well as Canada’s ability to build 15 River-class destroyers, which are based on the UK’s Type 26 frigate design. We are also aware of the huge training facility in Alberta—the British Army training unit in Suffield—which is apparently seven times the size of the Salisbury plain training area. Given all that, what are your views about closer collaboration between Canada and the UK? Should that come in the form of JEF membership? I know that the Canadians politely declined back in 2013, but should we resurrect that idea?

The Canadians did decline that invitation, which was interesting in signalling their intent. Closer collaboration and a framework mechanism would be indispensable in terms of the Canadian interests in the Arctic. The High North is rather different, because the Canadians have their own interests in the Arctic, so it is about how our High North focus and their really rather different view of the Arctic would fit. I think the big question for many people is whether the JEF should expand or be aligned through framework partner nations. Of course, Canada is part of the Commonwealth and an ally; many of us think we should use the Commonwealth more visibly, as is possible, in terms of military sharing and alignment. I am quite hesitant to see the JEF diluted beyond the 10 at this moment, but there could certainly be closer collaboration. I wonder how closely Canada’s geostrategic interests sit in the High North, as opposed to in other parts of the Arctic.

Dr De Vore, given Donald Trump’s assertions, whether on buying or annexing Greenland or the derogatory remarks about Canada, do you think the Canadians would be more amenable to JEF membership? That would mean that six out of the eight Arctic nations, excepting the US and Russia, would be members of JEF, so this might be the time. Do you think that should be done?

I think they probably would be more amenable. They are broadly trying to diversify their security partnerships, and I think JEF would be a logical next step in doing that. In addition to trying to buy Type 26 from us, they have also decided to buy Swedish fighter aircraft, so I think a possibility of aligning with JEF is highly likely. I have two caveats in terms of conditions that I would impose on their membership of JEF, because I have the same concerns as Caroline. The first concerns their commitment to higher levels of defence funding. As Ed mentioned, at the moment we are at the trailing end of JEF. One reason why JEF functions so well is that it is the club of European NATO members that actually feel threatened and are willing to step up more in funding and realistic preparations. The Canadians promised in 2014 that they were going to spend 2% of GDP on defence. Only last year did they finally achieve that through creative accounting. They threw everything into the defence budget: Veterans Affairs, their signals intelligence agency, and their domestic information infrastructure expenditures. In some ways, introducing the Canadians into JEF today would introduce a country that would be at the very tail end in what it is committing to security and defence. The second issue is Caroline’s issue. I would love to have Canada as a member of JEF if we could define JEF’s sphere of responsibility. It would pose a lot of significant dilemmas for JEF if the north-west passage and the Asia-Pacific Arctic all of a sudden fit in JEF’s sphere of competence. Essentially, I would love to bring the Canadians in. They operate in the area, they are very professional and they are Five Eyes so we can exchange intelligence and planning with them quite seamlessly. But I would like them to nail their flag to the mast on higher defence spending and, for them to join JEF, I would like a real delimitation of the geographical sphere of competence within which JEF functions.

Mr Arnold, in terms of collaboration between the UK and Canada, the River-class destroyers would obviously offer excellent protection for the UK and Norwegian Type 26 frigates. The frigates could concentrate on anti-submarine activities as the River-class destroyers are primarily an anti-air platform. Given that context, what are your views on Canadian membership of JEF? Do you think that it is not required, or something that the Government should pursue?

I think it is something that the Government should pursue. I absolutely agree with what Marc said. There seems to be a bit of a change in the defence and security posture of the Canadians with their new Government. They need to show that they are absolutely serious. That is important. Equally, the changing posture of the US to look at security of the homeland actually gives the Canadians, potentially, a bit of an opportunity to push more of their assets on to the High North and support. It is not just about defence spending; it is about deployability. Bear in mind that the Canadians deployed to Kandahar; they fought in the south with the UK. They should want to do this in a proactive manner to pull the European focus westward as well. On JEF in particular, the Canadians will primarily look at how JEF has treated Denmark over Greenland, which is pretty poorly, quite frankly—both the treatment from JEF collectively, and from the UK. Last year, when Greenland started to get back into the discussion after President Trump came back, the strongest words were from President Macron and then Chancellor Scholz. When it came round the second time it was the Nordics first—Sweden and Finland—then President Macron, then Chancellor Merz. The UK was then slightly onside, with nothing from a JEF point of view. From Canada, you would actually say, “Well, is JEF right for us?” The other thing that has slightly complicated the situation is that JEF offered enhanced partnership to Ukraine last year. That was a bit of political symbolism because, right about then, the narrative was about whether a NATO membership would be forthcoming, so JEF gave that political level. The Ukrainians are going to take part in Lion Protector later this year, with minehunting vessels that we were not able to get into the Black sea to support them. They are starting to do activity, but it does get complicated. You have JEF-plus, which is the plug-in that has been offered to anyone who wants it; particularly to look at Germany, France and Canada, you now have the enhanced partnership, which is special to Ukraine; and then you have full membership. It is slightly muddy as to what all these terms mean. The invite to Canada as it was previously given was that the door was always open—it did not turn off in 2013, it is sort of, “When you’re ready.” Both the threat from Russia and the changing unpredictability of the US makes the geopolitical reasoning for Canada joining pretty concrete.

We touched earlier on our UK commander forces in Norway and the work they do. I was lucky enough to spend a week with them recently, and I saw just how formidable they are. It would be interesting to see how much more formidable they would be with new capabilities and newer equipment, but I will set that aside for now. How well do you think the UK is integrating with our allies, particularly in Norway with the Lunna House agreement and the Type 26 frigate programme? I will probably aim that question at Ed.

It is integrating very well. I think Norway is the benchmark, particularly in the region, but also in other areas. My worry is that if you look at all the bilateral deals that we have done over the years, quite often they are signed by the Foreign Secretary. They are done through the FCDO to the Ministry, but they are generally resourced by the MOD, because they have a large defence component. At the moment, if you look at all the things that we have signed up to with the UK at the centre of the web, the issue will be that if there is a crisis, all our allies will pull on that string and say, “You promised us this,” or “You promised us that”—whether it is mutual defence with Finland and Sweden, moving up to a brigade in Estonia, or, we still have a commitment under KFOR in Kosovo under SANDROCK, which we had to reinforce two years ago. Now we have Lunna House, Trinity House, and with the UK-France, we have Lancaster House. Crises happen gradually and suddenly. If all our allies say, “You promised this to us,” there is effectively nothing less. At the moment politically in terms of support for Ukraine and potentially deploying a reassurance force there is a lot of capability that we potentially do not have, so we are going to have to prioritise, and that may mean letting some allies down.

Yes, I do.

Under the threshold, it is already happening. I think that if you look at the level of Russian incidents, whether that be critical infrastructure or pulling on the strings of treaties, it is already there. That comes back to my earlier point about how long the first phase is.

Yes, I think that conflict in the High North is almost certain within the timeframe of the next 10 or 15 years. It might not be a conflict where the cause is the High North; it could be that we have another iteration of Russia-Ukraine or a Russian conflict with the Baltic states, and therefore what kicks off in the High North is epiphenomenal or secondary to a conflict that occurs elsewhere. There are also potential causes of conflict in the High North, but I think that one of these going violent within the next decade or two is extremely likely.

NATO is the defensive alliance, so NATO is not going to instigate a war with Russia, particularly not in the Arctic or High North. The Kremlin may do it through deliberate policy, and I would say the timeframe for that being likely is around the next three to five years. The issue is that it could just happen through miscalculation, and that could happen tomorrow. When you have a variety of people on the NATO side saying, “We’ll be ready in ’29,” “We’ll be ready in ’27,” or whatever it may be, the enemy does get a vote, and if it happens through miscalculation, you need to be ready to respond immediately.

Thank you very much, Professor Kennedy-Pipe, Dr De Vore and Mr Arnold. It has been an absolutely fascinating session, and you have laid an excellent foundation for our inquiry on the High North with this first hearing.