Welcome to today’s session of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Today we are hearing from Salome Zourabichvili, the fifth President of Georgia, as part of our inquiry on disinformation diplomacy. President Zourabichvili, thank you very much for joining us today. We were expecting to host you in person, but you are unable to be here due to the ongoing situation in Georgia. Could you tell the Committee and those watching what sort of situation Georgia is currently in at the moment?

First of all, thank you very much for your invitation to attend the Committee. I would certainly have been very glad to attend the Committee physically, which gives the possibility of more direct contact, if it were not for the current situation, which every day brings repressive new laws in Georgia. In the last few days, the political leaders of some of the pro-European parties that have joined the co-ordination that we have just set up were called into the prosecutor’s office to face criminal charges because they supposedly did not take part in some investigation from the Parliament. That is very clearly part of the political struggle or fight that is going on against civil society on one side, the political parties and political leaders on the other side and the protest movement as such. To go back to the—

I am very sorry, Madam President. There are technical problems on our side. I understand that it is not possible to turn this up any louder than it is. Your voice drops slightly. We have a lot of people here in the room and online. I am so sorry. I am going to need to ask you to speak unnaturally loudly because the sound is not good.

I can speak more loudly.

Yes, that is great. Thank you.

To go back to the origins and describe the situation, we had elections last October. During these elections there was very clearly, in everybody’s eyes, including all the observation missions that were here—as time goes by, we discover new details that just confirm this—a large and sophisticated manipulation operation, which was clearly inspired and supported by Russians and Russian methods. As a consequence, the political parties declined to enter the Parliament, which they do not consider legitimate. The Parliament met in a non-constitutional form against the letter of the constitution. Very shortly after the election, less than one month later, the Prime Minister, who is also therefore not considered legitimate, made a statement to declare that he was stopping the discussions about Georgia’s path to joining the European Union. Both the manipulation and rigging of the elections, and, even more so, the statement made by the Prime Minister, started huge mass protests in Georgia, which are going on up to today.

How long have the mass protests been going on?

It is five months if we start counting since the elections and four months exactly if we start counting since the statement of the Prime Minister.

Are they every day? Are they once a week? How often do they take place?

They are every day. Yesterday, for instance, was the anniversary of 31 March 1991, when Georgia, with more than 90% of the voters, recognised and demanded independence. It was a very important date in that sense. We had a massive protest of many thousands of people. I do not have an exact count. These protests are going on. They are going on in different parts of the country. They are touching different segments of the country because practically everybody is in one way or another under these repressive laws. To describe the situation, there was not only this manipulation of elections and the statement about stopping our path to join the European Union, which has been supported by more than 80% of the population for the last 30 years in all opinion polls and votes. Very quickly after this statement, we saw the continuation and acceleration of what happened already last year, which was—you have probably heard about it—the Russian law. That is a copy of what Russia has been doing to suppress civil society in Russia, except that, in Georgia, this process is going extremely quickly. Practically every other day we have new laws that are copies of what Russia has been doing, and methods that are very similar, with repression and violence on the street. People are hijacked in their homes and in subways. They disappear and they reappear in some police station or jail.

Is there any estimate as to how many people have been arrested as a result of the demonstrations?

All in all, about 400 people were arrested at different times. Some were arrested for administrative offences and some for criminal offences, despite the fact that these protests have been absolutely peaceful, without either any demand for something that would not be peaceful or any actions that were not peaceful. About 50 of those people are still in prison today for criminal offences. That could range from seven to 11 years. Nobody really knows what they have done, but it is qualified as “group violence” and things such as that.

It is qualified as “group violence”. That is why people are being arrested.

It is “group violence” for some of them. It is also “resisting arrest”. There are many different qualifications. All in all, they are treating like criminals people who are very well known in society. Some of them are young artists and musicians. All the pictures and videos that have been taken of these protests over these 125 days show that they are absolutely peaceful. It is very difficult to sustain those accusations, but they are being sustained because we no longer have a justice system in Georgia. That has been the process.

Before we move on to the details of what has happened, I wanted to set the scene generally. If someone who did not know anything about Georgia is watching this for the first time, they might be thinking, “Why are they speaking to this woman from Georgia? What is going on in Georgia?” It very helpful for you to have set this out in the way that you have. I would like to move on to Blair, who has some particular questions.

Chair, I will just draw the Committee’s attention to my register of interests. President Zourabichvili, we are seeing violence on the streets, violence in the prisons, the pressurisation of civil society and the seizing of assets. Everything that we are seeing in Georgia at the moment we saw five years ago in Belarus. Is Ivanishvili following the Lukashenko playbook? If he is, could you imagine a world where the Georgian people accept de facto Russian control rather than just control of 20% of Georgia?

First of all, yes, it is the same playbook as in Russia and Belarus. To give an example, only today the Parliament adopted three different laws. There is no debate at all in the Parliament. The law goes through the three committee stages in just three days. The first was the so-called American FARA law, which is just a new Russian law that gives more powers to the authorities to limit and constrain non-governmental organisations. The second law reintroduces a state treason article, which is what existed during the Soviet time, into the criminal code. The third law restricts the media and imposes additional restrictions in terms of both financial control and control of content. There are also some side laws on public service that ask public servants to get authorisation from their immediate superiors if they want to do any educational activities. All of that happened in one day. That shows the rapidity with which this playbook, which clearly was not written in Georgia, is being implemented by a very conciliatory Parliament and Government. All of them represent only one party and one man, Mr Ivanishvili. It is also important to note that at this stage in Georgia there is not one single independent institution. All the institutions have been taken over by this one-party rule. They are dominating their own people. That is true of the courts. It is true of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. It is true of the central bank, which, yesterday, had an official meeting with the Chinese central bank. It is true of all the regulatory commissions, including the one that regulates the media. It is a complete takeover of the state. The presidency was the last independent institution. They tried an impeachment procedure on me last September. That is the stage we are at. Are we going to become Belarus or not? There is one very important difference, which is the state of civil society in Georgia. Georgian civil society has been very resilient. Even during the Soviet times, and before that during other times of Georgian history, it was resilient. The Georgian population have a different characteristic. There is still a very vivid civil society, with non-governmental organisations that have resisted the Russian law and will continue with the FARA law. They will find alternative ways. There is also the fact that the situation is different. Georgia is a country that has been completely dependent on and sustained by our European and American partners. They helped us to create and reform the police and the army. All the institutions were supported by our partners. Currently, the Government are completely isolated from all these partners, which continue to have constant links with the Opposition, including me. We have not been abandoned.

I am sorry to cut across you, but Alex had some questions about what would happen if Georgia lost its links with the west and what the Government would do if they became isolated.

Thank you, President Zourabichvili. Carrying on from Blair’s questions, I wanted to ask first about the Georgian Dream party. You were supported by Georgian Dream back in 2012. Could you say a little bit about how that party has developed over the last 13 years?

It is not the last 13 years. When they came to power in 2012, they behaved in accordance with their programme, which was for Georgia to continue on the pro-European and pro-Euro-Atlantic integration track. It was this ruling party and majority that introduced into Parliament in 2018 the article that says that every institution in Georgia has to do its utmost to support the Euro-Atlantic integration path of Georgia. That has become a common objective of all the forces and institutions in Georgia. By the way, that is the article that I invoked when I was defending my trips to Europe at the time of the impeachment. I was requested by the constitution to do what I was doing at the time. There was a change, very clearly. It started to show around 2021, after the covid situation. As a result of the erosion of power, Georgian Dream clearly started taking steps to consolidate its own power. That entailed restricting some of the freedoms of the media or justice. It was a slow and almost imperceptible movement, which accelerated very clearly with the war in Ukraine. We then started having directly a very anti-western and anti-European rhetoric, saying that Georgia would not participate in the sanctions policy, saying that Georgia thinks its partners are trying to open a second front in Georgia in the fight against Russia and they are not going to accept that, and accusing our European and American partners of being part of a “global war party”. This was when we saw Georgian Dream directly attack the American ambassador and some of the European ambassadors for their statements whenever somebody was somewhat critical of its positions or actions. That happened very quickly. It started in 2022.

In your view, why was there such a pivot from being a very pro-European party to being suddenly a pro-Russian party?

One can ask. Maybe it was a superficial pro-Europeanism, which was fine as long as there were no challenges. As soon as there was a challenge and an obligation to choose, that is maybe when our neighbour Russia started putting more pressure on the people on whom it can put pressure. Mr Ivanishvili is one of those persons for whom Russia has some instruments of pressure. I would not know what those are, but I can only look at the facts and the rapidity with which Georgian Dream moved 180 degrees. Sometimes, I am accused by Georgian Dream and told, “We supported you, but you have changed. You have betrayed the objectives of Georgian Dream”. My answer is, “Never. I was pro-European and pro-western before you and I have stayed after you. I have not changed anything, but you have changed a lot”. It really is a 180-degree change. Russian propaganda is now taking major importance in the country. We have heard about the global war party, the deep state and all of that for two or three years. We hear anti-LGBT propaganda, saying it has come from the west, from the Europeans, and been imposed on Georgia against its values or whatever. Practically, the handbook in Georgia is about implementing not only the laws and methods of Russia or Belarus but their rhetoric and their propaganda. Very regularly over the last two or three years, Georgia and the Georgian leaders have been complimented by the Kremlin for making the right statements and taking the right positions, such as calling in China for discussions on the port of Anaklia. The discussions are quite advanced, but we do not know anything about them. The same Chinese partners are involved in Tbilisi airport. All of that shows that Georgia now has a different foreign policy at the same time as it has a very autocratic or neo-totalitarian policy within Georgia. We even have titushky. As those who are familiar with the Russian and Belarussian regimes will know, the titushky are police forces who are not police forces. They are informal police forces who wear a form of uniform. They are the people who are really carrying out all the direct violence. They are not identified, which is against all the conventions to which we adhere. They are not responsible for anything because they do not formally exist.

Thank you, President Zourabichvili. I just wanted to ask you a question. How would you characterise the role of Bidzina Ivanishvili in Georgian politics?

He had an informal hand in Georgian politics from the time when he came in. At some times he acted directly, being the Prime Minister. At other times, he retreated and said he would never come back, but then he came back in. What is clear today is that he is taking all the decisions. If we look at the people who are left in Georgian Dream, over the years all the people who were truly pro-European and pro-western have been removed from its ranks. There were many among traditional Georgian politicians. At the beginning, Georgian Dream was a large coalition that came about to defeat the previous regime, which had also turned quite authoritarian but not pro-Russian. This large coalition supported many people who were truly pro-European. Over the years, they left the coalition. The Georgian Dream that we have now is very small. It has turned inward and has very little intellectual capacity. There is clearly only one man and one decision. The 90 Members of Parliament who are sitting in this monocameral Parliament, as well as all the Ministers and people who are spokesmen for the party, all repeat the same message. There is not a single statement that is different on any issue, even on issues that are not very directly political where one of them could express a different opinion. That has not happened in the last two years. It is an absolute monolith. The one who decides is, very clearly, Mr Ivanishvili. Nobody challenges him.

May I ask you a follow-up question about Mr Ivanishvili? I believe he was sanctioned by the US authorities late last year and the European Parliament has also initiated recommendations that EU member states freeze his assets. According to my briefing, Transparency International Georgia has estimated that his entire business empire would fall apart if the UK were to impose sanctions on him because he has holding companies in two British overseas territories, the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands. Am I correct in understanding that the UK Government have not sanctioned him? If that is the case, why has that not happened?

To your last question, I certainly do not know. What I can tell you is that Mr Ivanishvili has, although I do not know the exact list, assets on offshore islands, not only in British offshore islands but in others. He takes all the decisions. This is evidenced by the fact that he has made the Parliament adopt what is called an offshore law, which allows Georgian citizens to bring back assets from offshore islands or other countries to Georgia without any dues or verification. He has benefited from that. He has already used this law, which was adopted just three months ago, to repatriate his artwork collection, which is announced publicly to be worth half a billion dollars. It might also be the case that he has repatriated other things that we do not necessarily know about. That law is very dangerous. I vetoed it at the time, but my veto could not override the unanimity of the Parliament. I vetoed it because it allows anybody who would become Georgian tomorrow, any potentially sanctioned oligarch anywhere in a country friendly to Mr Ivanishvili, to bring assets into Georgia without any dues or any “know your customer” verification of where those assets come from originally. It really makes Georgia a possible grey zone for the future in a very organised manner. Together with that, we have also seen what was at the beginning quite a careful policy on sanctions towards Russia. Georgia was publicly saying that it was not going to adopt sanctions but would conform to the international financial sanctions. Gradually, Georgia has gone away from this strict policy. It is now used as a circumvention platform for many of the goods that go to Russia. The same goes for the central bank. Surprisingly, this has not drawn much criticism from outside. At the end of last year, the president of the central bank adopted a regulation saying that sanctioned Georgian citizens would not be considered as sanctioned by the central bank or as sanctioned by Georgian banks if the proof sustaining their sanctions was not also sustained by the Georgian courts. We all know how independent the Georgian courts are. That opened a huge loophole. Given that I no longer hold the capacity to award Georgian nationality as President, it is very easy for today’s leaders of Georgian Dream. It is a huge loophole. It also puts the Georgian banks, which have been very strict in their application of international financial regulations and sanctions, in a very awkward position. They have to either accept the regulation of the central bank or isolate themselves. They have not yet been put in that situation because none of the sanctioned persons held bank accounts in the two major Georgian banks on which Georgia’s financial stability depends. They have not faced this contradiction in terms, but it might happen any day. That shows the dimension of the problem that we are in.

I just want to draw people’s attention to the time. We have a lot of questions. I know that Committee members have many questions that they want to ask. If it would be possible to keep the questions and perhaps the answers a little shorter, we will get through it. I am so sorry to keep asking you to do this, but would you mind leaning forward a little into your microphone? Your answers are very interesting, but I am missing bits. It might just be me, but I fear it might not be.

Thank you, Madam President. You talked about the foreign influence law and the US-inspired law on foreign agents. Could you say a little more about the impact this will have on civil society and the media in Georgia?

The intent—it might have the same impact as it has had in Russia—is to bring civil society, the media and non-governmental organisations close to closing down because they will not have any financial support. If they refuse to declare themselves as agents under one or the other of the laws, they will be susceptible to being accused of criminal offences and being fined or sentenced to jail under that law. First of all, it frightens everyone. Secondly, it has a very disruptive effect, as we saw during the elections. The NGOs that traditionally organised observers’ missions and worked to train observers, commission members and so on have directly come under attack. They did not know they were going to be fined, closed down or what was going to happen to them during the whole spring period. On the eve of the elections, they were not as prepared as they would have been in other conditions. It is very dangerous. It is a sword of Damocles over civil society.

Madam President, Russian interference in Georgia predates the most recent crisis. I am interested in the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. To what extent do you feel the response by the UK, Europe and the west was appropriate, given Russian aggression? Do you believe that response influenced Vladimir Putin’s future actions in the region?

Clearly, yes. That can be seen throughout history, even in the time of imperial Russia. Georgia has always been a ground for experimentation for Russian imperialism. What happened in 2008 was the “new Russia” experimented with military aggression against Georgia. It was not completely successful. There were many flaws in its military strategy at the time. Its operation was in part successful but not in whole. It certainly was not successful in stopping Georgia’s path towards Euro-Atlantic integration, if that was the objective. However, Russia saw that, even if it was not completely successful, that did not raise many protests from the western world, at least from the Baltic countries. The Polish President protested, but not enough to make Russia believe that it represented a major problem for Russia, so it continued in Crimea. Meanwhile, there was a major review of Russia’s military equipment and military strategy, and it went on to Crimea. Again, Russian propaganda managed to change the narrative. The reaction of the west did not come with one voice, as it should have. Then we come to 2022. Russia might not admit this to the outside, but it has to recognise that military intervention does not succeed. From a very wide perspective, Russia has had many problems with its military strategy. It did not fulfil its military objectives in three days, three months or three years. It has cost a lot in military equipment and in prestige outside of Russia. It has had to bring in North Koreans. It must be very humiliating for the Russians to be dependent on North Koreans to fight instead of purely on Russians. All of that shows Russia that the strategy of military intervention is not the best one, but maybe it is not the only one. There is an alternative, and, again, Georgia is the ground for experimentation. The alternative is to manipulate elections. The alternative is to have a proxy Government, whether that is an oligarch or a group of people. That is not costly. It does not raise any major uproar in western countries. Russia does not have to pay for that in terms of sanctions because it is not visible. If it does not work, you can retreat easily, as is the case in Romania. “The TikTok strategy did not work. We will try something different”. Georgia is clearly the ground for experimentation. Russia has not succeeded yet. That must be very clear. We are still there. We are still fighting. I am still there. I am not going anywhere. That is the difference with Belarus.

To the point about having to pivot to a different strategy, we have seen Russia occupying Crimea and we have seen Russian activity in Moldova and other countries. To what extent has Russia been able to influence Georgian politics through the breakaway states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia? Has that given Russia any leverage? Is the lack of leverage the reason why it has had to pivot to other approaches?

That situation has not given Russia any leverage. It is a very touchy, difficult and sensitive problem for all Georgians. We all suffer the occupation of those two territories, but we suffer in silence. It has not given any leverage because it has not brought Georgia to its knees. It has not brought Georgia to say no to the European path or the Euro-Atlantic NATO integration path. That means it has not been effective. That is probably the main objective of Russia in Georgia: to prevent Georgia from becoming part of the Euro-Atlantic community.

I am sorry, Madam President. Are you effectively saying that the annexation of those two regions in Georgia was a form of intimidation by the Russians? It was essentially saying, “Unless you stop, we are going to take over the whole country”, and that has not worked.

It might have been only to say, “We have two occupied territories, and you will never recover them if you do not change your policy and your behaviour”. We know from experience, because this has happened before, that these supposed carrots that Russia is sending to the Georgian leadership never work. They never go back. They never recede. It has not worked. The Georgian path towards the European Union has not only continued despite the fact we have tanks 40 kilometres from Tbilisi; it has accelerated. It has accelerated thanks to Ukraine and to the reactivity of the European Union to the Ukraine situation. That has probably increased the pressure from Russia on whoever is under its control in Georgia.

At a time when we are talking about the possibility of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, is there a lesson that Ukraine should learn from Georgian negotiations with Russia?

We had negotiations that successfully stopped the war—Sarkozy came in as a mediator—but they were not successful in solving the situation of the occupied territories. The Russian army did not withdraw, so it was a very small success. One lesson that should be learned by Ukraine is never to accept holding elections as long as its territory is under partial occupation and under the threat of war. Just a few days ago, Mr Putin set out a policy that is directly derived from Georgia. He said, “If we have a neutral Administration and democratic elections in Ukraine”—why he calls for democratic elections, we do not know—“we will discuss peace talks”. It will mean the manipulation of elections, in the same way as we had in Georgia. It must also be possible to find an oligarch in Ukraine. The same scenario will apply to Ukraine. Yes, the population is very much united around Zelensky, but after a time you might see people emerging who are useful for Russian propaganda.

Ukraine is also seeking EU membership and NATO membership. Earlier, you outlined the importance of the Euro-Atlantic pathway. Is membership of those two organisations, in your mind, the only true deterrent to Russian aggression?

Yes.

That is nice and simple.

Madam President, can I focus specifically on the elections last October? You have been very clear that you regard them as illegitimate. You have referred to them as a “complete falsification” and international observers have condemned them. You have also called them a Russian special operation. Can you say why you regard them as being manipulated by Russia?

The elections were preceded by intensive propaganda work by the Russians. They were accompanied by Russian propagandists entering our territory. We know how they have been working. During the elections, they used a multiplicity of methods of fraud. They were all used at the same time but in different manners in different regions. We had 3,500 call centres that were used to monitor voters and control the votes of people who were put under pressure. To put people under pressure, private individuals’ information was used. The person who had been in charge—again, a neutral authority, an independent agency—was removed a year before the elections. That agency, which controls and protects personal information, was placed under the control of one party. That information—who has health problems and needs public financing, who has somebody in jail, who has had contact with foreign countries—is key to any election in Georgia. All of that was used in a very systematic manner. There is no organisation in Georgia that would be able to think of such a scenario without any outside support. There might be organisations that could execute it to a certain point, but they certainly could not conceive of such a wide-ranging operation.

You have described various forms of electoral malpractice, but do you have any direct evidence showing that it was being run by Russia?

Of course I do not. I do not have access to the secret services or any services of the Georgian state, which should be the ones controlling and holding this information. I do not know whether our partner countries were observant enough to have this information, but we have lived long enough in the shadow of Russia to know when Russia is planning something. Those who still doubt that should look at what has happened in Romania or Moldova. Romania was saved by its constitutional court, which we do not have any more. It was very well thought through. In the second case, Moldova was saved by the diaspora. I was directly involved as President to try to build a presence in our diaspora, which is very numerous. Of 3.5 million Georgians, 1 million are abroad. Those 1 million were prevented by many different means from exercising their right to vote. In the end, only 17,000 could vote. That shows the extent to which the election was controlled and manipulated.

Before we move on, I will just pass on some information to you. While we have been hearing evidence, in the main Chamber of Parliament the British Home Office has been making a statement about the implementation of the foreign influence registration scheme. Making it clear that we believe Russia is a threat to our country, the Home Office is seeking to introduce regulations to curtail Russian influence in the UK and ensure that there is proper registration of various bodies attached to the Russian state. Russia is stated specifically as a country that is a threat to ours: “We are responding to the whole-of-state threat Russia poses”. Then it goes into the details. As you have been asked about the influence of Russia on the elections within your country, we are making statements in our Parliament about the need to curtail Russian influence on ours.

Yes, the novelty of the new hybrid strategy of Russia is that it can reach anywhere. In the case of military aggression, it could reach only the countries around its borders. This hybrid strategy, this electoral strategy accompanied by propaganda and laws, can happen in any other country that is chosen by Russia. I am not counting the cyber-attacks on me personally. The presidential Administration were attacked three times over the last year and a half. An element that was unique to Georgia was the immigration of a number of Russians. Following the war against Ukraine, about 100,000 immigrants came to Georgia. That had a positive effect on the economy, hence the good figures that we have had for some time, thanks to the money that they brought into the Georgian economy. There was no control at all on the Russians who came in. They benefited from a one-year visa that can be renewed just by passing the border. It is a huge army. The vast majority are people who are absolutely innocent of anything, but it still allows for many uncontrolled activities in Georgia.

In that sense, we have received no support. There was no clear strategy to counter the Russian strategy. In the beginning, some of us looked at this propaganda as almost hilarious. They were trying to say that our friends and supporters for the last 30 years were trying to throw us into a war and they would be responsible for that war, if it were to happen, when the whole of Georgian history shows that the only country responsible for war has been Russia. We did not believe that this propaganda would work. It was very effective to a certain point. In fact, it allowed people who were supporting the regime for different personal reasons to say to themselves and to others, “No, I am not pro-Russian. I am not supporting a pro-Russian regime. It is just that I do not want war. I am supporting a regime that avoids war in Georgia”. In that sense, it has been an effective instrument. We were not able to prevent it, at the time it was happening, through a counterstrategy. There has not been a real policy of supporting us to counter this strategy.

I do not know whether it is going to help us directly, but it is certainly very positive. The more people realise what is happening, the sooner we will see a real strategy. I have also been talking to the Europeans about this. This strategy of propaganda and the manipulation of elections together deserves to be studied. Taking the Georgian example, you were asking me what proof I have. Our European partners should have been much faster in trying to look at how things were being manipulated and rigged. We have to think about tomorrow’s electoral observation missions and those who come in advance. What should they look at? How should they prepare themselves? We are facing completely different elections. If the whole western world is not prepared for that, we are going to lose those battles. It would be naive of us to look only at old forms of rigging elections and not at the new possibilities to affect the minds and decisions of voters.

While we are talking about the impact of disinformation, Imedi TV is one of the main propaganda organs of the GD Government. I dipped into its feed today. It was full of some of the things you have been describing. It was blaming Georgia for its own invasion by Russia, cheerleading the attacks on peaceful protesters and laying the groundwork for banning the Opposition. People at home in the UK would be surprised to know that that television station is owned and operated in London. Do you have a view on that? What should the UK do about the fact that so much of that disinformation and propaganda is emanating from the city in which we are sitting today?

I think you know what you should do.

Do you want to expand on that?

As President, I never talk directly about sanctions that should be taken by this or that country against this or that personality. I do not think that is my role. As a policy, I can certainly say that sanctions need to be well directed. These are core issues about freedom of information. I am thinking about the judges who are passing sentences that come out of nowhere and the policemen who are perjuring themselves and providing proof for something that does not exist. Those are the categories of people who should be under threat of sanctions. Another thing that I can say on sanctions, if that is what you want to hear from me, is that until now the sanctions have not been used correctly. Where these are just punishing sanctions, yes, to a certain degree they please the protest population. They say, “Okay, we have been heard”, but they do not serve their ultimate purpose. We should link these sanctions into a stick-and-carrot policy of conditionality: “If you revoke a number of decisions and laws and set new elections”. That is the only way. It is not because the Opposition want new elections; it is because that is the only way out of this political crisis, which has lasted for five months and is paralysing the country. “If you set a date for new elections, revoke a number of laws and liberate these prisoners, we can start talking about lifting some of the sanctions or putting Georgia back on the map and back in contact and partnership with European and western countries. If you do not do it, you will have a new set of sanctions, which will be this, this and that. They will address this person and that person”. That is the way to make those sanctions part of a policy. If I have one request and criticism of all our friends, who have been so supportive of Georgia through all these years, it is that we need more of a policy and fewer reactive measures. Reactive measures and nice statements are fine, but a coherent and consistent policy is very much needed. You should not forget that Georgia is on the Black sea coast. It is a link between Europe, the Black sea and central Asia. If a country knows the transit role of Georgia more than anybody else, it is Great Britain. You were here at the time when you were controlling the roads to India and the east.

Before we get into all that—we could really be here all day—let me move on to Aphra.

Thank you so much for your answers so far. I just want to focus a bit on the disinformation that we have been discussing. You talked about the war in Ukraine being a turning point for Georgian Dream. How has your perception of disinformation changed over the time of your presidency? Has it become more acute? Was the war in Ukraine a turning point for that?

It was before that. During the time of my presidency, the turning point was the end of 2021 and the beginning of 2022. That is when the official speeches by Mr Ivanishvili and the parliamentarians of Georgian Dream started treating our partners as enemies. They no longer mentioned that Russia is occupying our territories. They did not criticise it for its aggression in Ukraine or did so only very softly when they really had to and could not do otherwise. There was all this propaganda. At the beginning of 2022 and in mid-2022, it became very aggressive against our partners. They accused them of everything that has gone wrong in Georgia. They accused them of imposing their own values against the identity of the Georgian church and so on and so forth. You can find all the things that you hear in Russia repeated here, not very ingeniously by the way, through television stations such as Imedi TV and the Georgian Public Broadcaster. I had the utmost difficulties having interviews on the Georgian Public Broadcaster while I was President, despite the fact that it is in its own charter that it has to do that. It has become pro-government media. The situation of the media had already deteriorated very early. Reaching people outside the capital and outside those who use social networks became more and more difficult. The official government propaganda, which was the same as Russian propaganda, began to reach more and more people over the last two and a half years.

Thinking about the challenges with trying to get your message across or communicate what you want to, did you have any tools to counter the disinformation that was being put out? If Georgian Dream is amplifying these disinformation messages, is it possible for others to combat that disinformation when there is no political will to tackle it?

We are past disinformation now because they are showing who they are, in the regressive laws that they pass, the decisions they take and the way they torture or mistreat people in prison. Yesterday, a female politician was taken to a police station and stripped naked. She was not under arrest or anything. She was provisionally detained. All of that becomes known. We are a small country, so word of mouth works very well. All these things that they are doing today are playing against their propaganda. Today, it is reality that is challenging the propaganda. We need to be supported. We need to support the regional media. They are very courageous, are doing an extraordinary job, and are reaching down to families and small cities, but they need support. They are using very small budgets, but even those budgets are very restricted today. They are under pressure. One of the most famous journalists is in prison and has been hunger striking. Again, she is a woman. She is continuing her fight. That is what represents Georgia today.

The evidence that you have just given is very shocking and horrible to hear. Can I just underline what Aphra has asked? For us sitting here in the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, in this inquiry we are looking at disinformation and we are trying to draw lessons. In particular, what lessons should Britain or the Foreign Office in particular learn? What more could we have done to counter disinformation before we get to the horrible stories that you are now telling us? Was there more we could have done? Do we learn lessons from that and can we apply those lessons in other countries, which may be suffering from that disinformation? Indeed, we may suffer it ourselves in the future. Sorry, Aphra. I am going to ask the question again and just see if there is anything else that you are able to tell us.

What else could have been done? Again, it is direct support and direct training to make people understand how disinformation works. I have seen many of that type of programme on different western and European channels. We did not have any of that on the main channels. To learn how to identify what is fake news is very important. Social networks are very widely used in Georgia. They could be used more by organisations outside of the country that know how to track disinformation and can reach Georgia through social networks. One very important initiative that I have heard of from, I think, the Czech President, if I am not mistaken, was that European countries should replace Voice of America and Radio Liberty. That is a very important initiative. I do not know how Great Britain can figure in that but, clearly, information is where the next war is going to be had. Together with information goes preparing, preventing and everything that has to do with elections. Another thing I did not mention was that technology was used in our elections in a very disruptive way. The company responsible for this technological equipment was the same company that was operating in Venezuela. We did not know that at the time. Some of our partners probably knew these things better than we did, but did not feel that it needed to be observed or controlled. From now on, in all elections under Russian pressure, directly or indirectly, there should be very strict scrutiny of all the different means and methods that they can use.

Thank you, Madam President. Here on the British Foreign Affairs Committee, we often think about what unique role the United Kingdom can play. In high-level diplomacy, what do you think the UK can do to support Georgian democracy and territorial sovereignty?

For Georgian democracy, it is attention and, if possible, this policy of conditionality I have described. I am not guaranteeing it will give a result, but I see it as the only outside pressure that can add to the pressure on the authorities coming from the economy, from the finances and from the street protests. It is a triangle under which there is going to be isolation and this conditionality could play a role. Beyond that, there is a wider strategy. Georgia should be seen as part of wider European security. We, after all, are the other face of Ukraine. If Russia wins partly some territories in Ukraine, has a very shaky ceasefire or whatever will happen, we are really the southern part of Russia. If Russia is stopped well or not well on some line in Ukraine, it is not to be without any cost. Rapidly, one year after Georgia acceded to the candidate status, Russia could be able to grab Georgia. That is part of the challenge for our partners and it is a challenge for European security on a wider scale. It is, again, the Black sea. If you have Georgia introducing China on the shores of the Black sea, I do not think that European security as a whole is well served. Another issue, though not an immediate one, is that when the time comes for real peace talks with Russia on occupied territories there will be no real peace with Russia that does not include all the occupied territories of Russia. For so long, Russia has not considered itself as a normal country that has borders it has to defend and it has to respect. It will always feel inside itself this imperialistic urge, which will translate to any of its neighbours, where the weakest point will be. Occupied territories are not just one or the other or the third one. It is all the occupied territories, because it is a reflection of the way Russia sees itself in the world.

Thank you for those comments about wider European security. To what extent do you have concerns that Russia uses Georgia as a jurisdiction to propagate the evasion of economic sanctions that have been put on the Russian regime? If you think that is a concern, is there more that you believe the UK, the EU and the US can do to support your country to prevent that evasion?

To a certain extent, you have given us part of the answer earlier, but it is important to ask it as a straight question, just to see if there was anything that you had not said earlier and to complete it.

There is a risk that Georgia becomes a grey zone. That is, of course, a challenge for everyone. There are many means through which those countries, for instance the United States, have been very active on the borders and customs of Georgia exactly for that reason: to be able to control not only at that time the sanctions, but the trafficking. That could be reinforced and that should, again, be a pressure put on the ruling party.

Unless anybody has any other questions, I just have one more. What are your hopes for Georgia in the future?

My hopes for Georgia are the ones for which I came back from France, where my family emigrated: to help and support Georgia’s European past, democratic past and stable future. These are shared by the very vast majority of the Georgian population, so I am confident that, whatever the ups and downs and the very difficult position we are in today, the Georgian population will manage to have its way, as it has always supported its own strong independence and its own way in wider Europe.

Thank you very much and thank you for taking the time to answer our questions today. If anything occurs to you after this session and if there is anything you think, perhaps, we also should have known about, would you be kind enough to write to the Committee with any further information that you might have? It has been a great pleasure meeting you.

Yes. We have just created a co‑ordinating body of the pro-European opposition parties and one of our decisions is to send information in our name to our major partners. It was coming to you in different ways, I know. This way, the information gets there on time and in a consolidated manner. Thank you to all of you, very much. It was very informative and I hope I can one of these days come physically to meet with you. Thank you very much.

It would be very nice to meet you in person at some stage, I hope. Thank you very much.