Written questions by Murray.

Whether he plans to provide additional financial support to low-income women experiencing food insecurity during pregnancy and the postnatal period, beyond existing maternity and low-income support schemes.

Awaiting answer.

What the total operating expenditure of the Child Maintenance Service was in the 2024-25 financial year.

The net operating expenditure of the Child Maintenance Service for the financial year 24/25 is £105.7m.

How many (a) paying and (b) receiving parents use the Child Maintenance Service Collect and Pay service; and how many (i) paying and (ii) receiving parents will move onto that service as a result of proposed changes.

As of the end of September 2025, there were 317,100 Receiving Parents and 303,800 Paying Parents using the Collect & Pay service. It is proposed to reform the Child Maintenance Service (CMS) when Parliamentary time allows to create one streamlined service where the CMS would collect and transfer all maintenance payments. The precise number of paying and receiving parents who would move into a new streamlined service would depend on a number of factors including the size caseload at the time of implementing the proposed reforms and the choices made by customers.

What the average annual amount of child maintenance paid through the Child Maintenance Service was in the most recent year for which figures are available.

The information requested is not readily available and to provide it would incur disproportionate cost.The department publishes Child Maintenance Service official statistics every three months, with section 8 of the latest bulletin showing that £84.4 million of child maintenance due was paid through the Collect and Pay service during the quarter ending September 2025

How much revenue was generated from fees charged under the Child Maintenance Service Collect and Pay scheme in 2024-25; and what estimate she has made of the total annual revenue expected to be generated by the proposed (a) 2% fee on standard Collect and Pay payments and (b) 20% fee on non-compliant payments.

The table below shows collection fees received in financial year 2024-25.Collection fees2024/2025£000(a) Paying Parent Collection Fees Received£56,993(b) Receiving Parent Collection Fees Received £11,141(a+b) Total Collection Fees Received£68,134 The information requested on the total annual revenue expected to be generated by the proposed (a) 2% fee on standard Collect and Pay payments and (b) 20% fee on non-compliant payments is not readily available and to provide it would incur disproportionate cost.

What outcome measures will be used to assess the first phase of the Job Guarantee rollout, and when the Department plans to publish the results.

As a part of our recent publication on the Jobs Guarantee, the department has published a draft Grant Funding Agreement (GFA) which outlines expected outcome measures that will be used to assess grants administered under phase one of the scheme.Schedule 4, Part B of this draft GFA outlines the expected outputs and outcomes that may be assessed in Phase One of the scheme. Final outputs and outcomes will form part of final grant funding agreements made with successful grant applicants.We will monitor performance throughout the first phase to inform the delivery of the national roll out later in 2026.

If he will set out how his Department will ensure that jobs under the Jobs Guarantee scheme are additional, including whether they represent newly created roles or existing vacancies.

Eligible young people participating in the scheme are likely to have multiple barriers and complex needs which may have prevented them from securing employment. The scheme will break the cycle of unemployment by guaranteeing meaningful paid employment opportunities that might otherwise be out of reach. It is a requirement of the Jobs Guarantee scheme that jobs created or sourced under the scheme do not cause existing employees or contractors to be displaced, dismissed, or to have their hours reduced.

How many job starts are expected to be delivered in (a) Glasgow and (b) Edinburgh under the first phase of the Jobs Guarantee rollout.

The first phase of the Jobs Guarantee will provide jobs to more than 1,000 young people in Birmingham & Solihull, East Midlands, Greater Manchester, Hertfordshire & Essex, Central & East Scotland, Southwest & Southeast Wales. In phase one, we expect to make around 150 referrals across the Central and East Scotland region, which includes areas covered by both Glasgow City Council and The City of Edinburgh Council, alongside other local authorities. Maps published alongside our grant guidance show the phase one delivery areas and the distribution of demand across local authorities. These can be viewed here: Phase One Delivery Area Heat Maps - GOV.UK. Phase One will be followed by national roll out of the Jobs Guarantee across Great Britain later in 2026, providing a total of 55,000 jobs over the next three years.

When she plans to respond to the correspondence of 5 March 2025 from the hon. Member for Mid Dunbartonshire, case reference CMPT12025-20534.

The Department aims to respond to all correspondences within 20 working days, but there may be instances where there is additional information needed that may cause delays. We are sorry for the length of time it has taken to reply to the Hon. Member. The response to their letter was sent on 18 July.

Whether her Department has made an estimate of the proportion of UK pension scheme assets invested in fossil fuel-related holdings; and what plans she has to (a) encourage phased divestment from fossil fuels and (b) promote greater investment in climate solutions through the Pension Schemes Bill.

While the Department does not hold data on the proportion of UK pension scheme assets invested in fossil fuels, our largest pension schemes are mandated to conduct climate scenario analysis and report on their climate-related financial risks, including those related to fossil fuels. This is done under the framework of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). The Pensions Regulator (TPR) has published guidance on climate-related reporting, reviewed how schemes are addressing climate risks, and provided feedback to the industry on areas for improvement. TPR reports that the UK pension sector is increasingly playing a role in tackling climate change, with many schemes setting net-zero targets and actively engaging with companies to reduce emissions. This government is however not complacent and is determined to make the UK a clean energy superpower and meet our net zero goals. The government is currently consulting on the development of UK Sustainability Reporting Standards and our Transition Plans manifesto commitment. These measures aim to improve transparency and accountability across the economy, helping investors—including pension schemes—understand how climate and nature-related issues affect their portfolios. To support this, the Department for Work and Pensions is to undertake a review of the effectiveness of the climate reporting requirements this year considering feedback from stakeholders. The reforms outlined in the Pensions Scheme Bill do not include a general requirement for pension schemes to divest from certain assets or industries. The larger, more consolidated system, for which we will legislate, will however be better equipped to manage systemic risks, as well as invest more in projects and businesses that support the shift towards a more sustainable and lower-carbon future.

What steps her Department is taking to help (a) increase awareness of and (b) mitigate the health risks faced by night workers.

Reducing ill health at work is an important area of focus for the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) as outlined in their strategic objectives. One of the ways this is achieved is supporting employers to protect their workers’ health and keep them in the workforce. Having considered the impact of shift work on health and safety, HSE has published free guidance for employers to support them in managing the risk (Managing shift work [HSG 256]). Under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 all employers have a duty, so far as it is reasonably practicable, to protect the health, safety, and welfare at work of all their employees. Specifically, the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 require employers to assess health and safety risks to employees and to put in place arrangements to control those risks. Therefore, if an employer assesses night work as a risk they should introduce control measures including those outlined in the guidance.

What assessment her Department has made of the risk that the Collect and Pay service charge system can be used to place additional financial pressure on the paying parent.

All parents are given the option to use the Direct Pay service, where no fees apply. If a paying parent pays on time and in full on Direct Pay and there is no reason to believe they would be unlikely to pay; they cannot be forced to use the Collect and Pay service. The 20% collection fee for paying parents is a deterrent against non-compliance and offsets the cost of action needed to recover arrears.

For what reason the Child Maintenance Service charges parents to use the Collect and Pay system.

Collection fees were introduced in 2014, with the objectives of subsidising the cost of the service; encouraging greater parental collaboration and more family-based arrangements; and encouraging compliance.

What assessment her Department has made of the potential impact of the Child Maintenance Service Collect and Pay service fees on families.

The Government is dedicated to ensuring parents meet their obligations to children, taking robust enforcement action against those who do not. Cases in Collect & Pay represent the most difficult cases, as many of these have been unwilling to pay voluntarily or have not been compliant in a Direct Pay arrangement. Cases where the paying parent has missed payments or demonstrated behaviour that suggests they are unlikely to pay, can be put on the Collect and Pay service. Fees only apply to the Collect and Pay Service. A fee of 20% is added to what the paying parent needs to pay, while 4% is deducted from maintenance paid to receiving parents. The receiving parent charge is only applied from the maintenance that the Child Maintenance Service has successfully collected. Fees were introduced in 2014, partly with the objective to encourage greater collaboration and more family-based arrangements rather than using a statutory service.After Collect and Pay fees were introduced an assessment was carried out by the previous government and published in The Child Maintenance Reforms; 30 Month Review of charging. In July 2024 the government consulted on the proposal for wider reform to consolidate the CMS into a single service type where the CMS monitors and transfers payments. The consultation Improving the collection and transfer of payments, also proposed a new fee structure of just 2% for receiving parents, deducted from maintenance received; 2% for compliant paying parents, on top of maintenance owed; and 20% for non-compliant paying parents, on top of maintenance owed. Following consideration of public responses concerning fees and other proposals in the consultation, and subsequent ministerial decisions, next steps will be detailed in the Government Response, which will be published in due course.

What estimate her Department has made of the average cost difference between the (a) paying and (b) receiving parents for the Child Maintenance Service Collect and Pay service charge.

Collection fees only apply to the Collect and Pay service and are intended to provide both parents with an incentive to collaborate, and offset the cost of the scheme. Entry to the service is permitted if either both parents agree to it, or if the paying parent is deemed ‘unlikely to pay’. Paying parents therefore have the more influence in deciding which service type a case goes into. The 20% collection fee for paying parents is a strong deterrent against non-compliance. The 4% collection fees for receiving parents acknowledges the costs associated with maintaining the case and provides a financial incentive for parents to consider using, or returning to, Direct Pay, or having a family-based arrangement, where appropriate.

What assessment she has made of the potential impact of fees to use the Child Maintenance Service's Collect and Pay system on people using that system.

The Government is dedicated to ensuring parents meet their obligations to children, taking robust enforcement action against those who do not.Cases in Collect & Pay represent the most difficult cases, as many of these have been unwilling to pay voluntarily or have not been compliant in a Direct Pay arrangement. Cases where the paying parent has missed payments or demonstrated behaviour that suggests they are unlikely to pay, can be put on the Collect & Pay service. Fees only apply to the Collect and Pay Service. A fee of 20% is added to what the paying parent needs to pay, while 4% is deducted from maintenance paid to receiving parents.Fees were introduced in 2014, with the objectives of subsidising the cost of the service; encouraging greater collaboration and more family-based arrangements; and encouraging compliance.When Collect and Pay charges were introduced, an assessment was carried out by the previous government and published in The Child Maintenance Reforms; 30 Month Review of charging. The government response to the assessment was that application fees may influence some parents’ decisions regarding their maintenance arrangement.On 8 May 2024 the consultation Child Maintenance: Improving the collection and transfer of payments was published by the previous government before being extended on the 31 July by the current government. The consultation included a range of proposals with the key one being to remove the Direct Pay service and consolidate the CMS into a single streamlined service that monitors and transfers all payments. In addition, it also proposed a new fee structure of just 2% for receiving parents, deducted from maintenance received; 2% for compliant paying parents, on top of maintenance owed; and 20% for non-compliant paying parents, on top of maintenance owed. Following consideration of public responses concerning fees and other proposals in the consultation, and subsequent ministerial decisions, next steps will be detailed in the Government Response, which will be published in due course.

If she will take steps with Cabinet colleagues to encourage private pension schemes to voluntarily offer inflation protection for pre-1997 defined benefit pension entitlements.

It is for sponsoring employers to decide on what pension benefits they offer, provided they meet minimum standards. Scheme rules set out how the scheme should be run. It would not be appropriate for the Government to interfere in decisions made by individual schemes, beyond setting clear, affordable minimum standards that apply to all. Pensions legislation does not usually apply new provisions retrospectively to rights that have already been accrued. It is generally seen to be unreasonable to add liabilities to pension schemes that could not have been taken into account in the funding assumptions that determined the contributions to be paid at the time. In some cases, the additional unplanned liabilities could result in significant additional contributions for the sponsoring employers, and ultimately threaten the future viability of some schemes. It is extremely important to achieve a balance between providing members with some measure of protection against inflation and not increasing schemes’ costs beyond a level that schemes and employers can generally afford.

If she will make an assessment of the financial status of people (a) who received pre-1997 defined benefit pensions and (b) who received payments from schemes with mandatory increases.

Analysis by the Pensions Regulator estimates that, as of 31 March 2023, more than three quarters of schemes provide indexation on scheme benefits accrued before 6 April 1997. This is in addition to any Guaranteed Minimum Pension rights accrued between 1988 and 1997, which must be indexed by the scheme. These schemes represent over 80 per cent of the membership of private-sector occupational Defined Benefit (DB) pension schemes. This information is published and available at: Data requests | The Pensions Regulator The Department does not hold any data on the financial status of the members of these schemes.

If her Department will make an assessment of the potential merits of implementing measures to support pensioners whose defined benefit schemes are underfunded.

The UK has a robust and flexible regime for protecting defined benefit (DB) pensions. Sponsoring employers are ultimately responsible for meeting the promised pensions and DB pension schemes are subject to the statutory funding objective which requires them to have sufficient and appropriate assets to provide for their pension liabilities. Schemes must be valued, at least every three years, and where there is a funding deficit a recovery plan must be put in place, and the deficit filled as soon as the sponsor can reasonably afford. The Pensions Regulator has a range of enforcement powers and can intervene to protect member benefits when needed. Where an employer becomes insolvent, and the scheme winds up underfunded, benefits are underpinned by the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) which can provide compensation at 100% of scheme benefits for pensioner members and 90% of scheme benefits for deferred members.

If she will take steps to address the lack of statutory inflation protection for pre-1997 defined benefit pension entitlements.

It is for sponsoring employers to decide on what pension benefits they offer, provided they meet minimum standards. Scheme rules set out how the scheme should be run. It would not be appropriate for the Government to interfere in decisions made by individual schemes, beyond setting clear, affordable minimum standards that apply to all. Pensions legislation does not usually apply new provisions retrospectively to rights that have already been accrued. It is generally seen to be unreasonable to add liabilities to pension schemes that could not have been taken into account in the funding assumptions that determined the contributions to be paid at the time. In some cases, the additional unplanned liabilities could result in significant additional contributions for the sponsoring employers, and ultimately threaten the future viability of some schemes. It is extremely important to achieve a balance between providing members with some measure of protection against inflation and not increasing schemes’ costs beyond a level that schemes and employers can generally afford.