Written questions by Pritchard.

Whether he has undertaken analysis on the likelihood of (a) Egypt, (b) Japan, (c) Saudi Arabia, (d) South Korea, (e) Turkey and (f) Taiwan obtaining independent nuclear deterrents.

Awaiting answer.

What steps he is taking to ensure that the HM Armed Forces Veteran ID card is accepted as photo identification by (a) banks, (b) foreign exchange services and (c) polling stations.

The HM Armed Forces Veteran Card was introduced to improve recognition of our veterans and provide an easier way to prove veteran status when accessing the services, discounts and concessions available to veterans. The Veteran Card is now accepted within the identity checking policies of many organisations including as identification for voting in elections, where it is included on the list of photographic identifications accepted in polling stations as voter ID, in addition to the already accepted MOD Form 90 Defence Identity Card. The Veteran Card can also be used as evidence in Disclosure and Barring Services (DBS) checks and for some domestic flights with some airlines.It is important to note that it is not a formal identity document, and different organisations will have their own policies in this regard. Banks are required to follow specific regulations and standards for identity verification, which specify a small number of official identity documents, such as a passport or driving licence.The Office for Veterans’ Affairs continually advocates for wider acceptance of the Veteran Card where possible within legislative and sector-specific constrains.

What research his Department has undertaken on the (a) disposal of Parsons Barracks and (b) use of that site for strategic defence purposes.

Both Parsons and Venning Barracks have been identified for future disposal when they become surplus to military requirements as part of the Ministry of Defence’s Defence Estate Optimisation work and Future Soldier: Transformation of the British Army reforms. As this is not forecast to be before 2030, our assessments are still underway.

Whether his Department has researched the potential need for Venning Barracks in delivering future strategic defence policy.

Both Parsons and Venning Barracks have been identified for future disposal when they become surplus to military requirements as part of the Ministry of Defence’s Defence Estate Optimisation work and Future Soldier: Transformation of the British Army reforms. As this is not forecast to be before 2030, our assessments are still underway.

What plans he has for the disposal of land at Parsons Barracks; and what land at MOD Donnington he plans to retain for strategic defence purposes.

Both Parsons and Venning Barracks have been identified for future disposal when they become surplus to military requirements as part of the Ministry of Defence’s Defence Estate Optimisation work and Future Soldier: Transformation of the British Army reforms. As this is not forecast to be before 2030, our assessments are still underway.

Whether he has undertaken analysis on the likelihood of (a) Egypt, (b) Japan, (c) Saudi Arabia, (d) South Korea, (e) Turkey and (f) Taiwan obtaining independent nuclear deterrents.

It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.

If he will take steps with the Secretary of State for Defence to second homeland security personnel to the Royal Military Police to identify and counter extreme right wing activity in His Majesty's Armed Forces.

The British Army takes far-right extremism extremely seriously and is fully equipped to act swiftly and decisively where necessary to uphold its high standards. Robust measures are firmly in place to prevent and address any such activity. At present, there are no plans to second homeland security personnel to the Royal Military Police, as the Army's existing frameworks and partnerships effectively manage the identification and countering of extreme right-wing behaviour within His Majesty's Armed Forces.

What estimate he has made of the quantity of chemical compounds imported by Iran from China since 2025.

The Ministry of Defence cannot comment on the specifics of chemical importations by the Iranian regime, as doing so could provide an advantage to those who may seek to harm the UK.

If he will publish the origin of the component parts of the munitions used in the attack on UK armed forces personnel in (a) Akrotiri and (b) Erbil.

The Ministry of Defence is currently analysing the origin of the component parts of the munitions used in the attacks on UK Service personnel in Akrotiri and Erbil. We will publish any relevant findings once the investigation has concluded.

If he will ensure that UK Armed Forces personnel in (i) Oman, (ii) Bahrain, (iii) Qatar and (iv) Cyprus are provided with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear protective kit.

The requirement for personal protective equipment, is reviewed based on operational circumstances. For reasons of safeguarding operational security, we will not comment further.

What estimate he has made of the quantity of ballistic missiles imported by Iran from China since June 2025.

The Ministry of Defence cannot comment on the specifics of the Iranian missile regime, as doing so could provide an advantage to those who may seek to harm the UK.

What assessment he has made of the potential risks of Iran's (a) diesel-electric submarine fleet, (b) mini-submarines and (c) underwater unmanned autonomous vehicles on (i) the Royal Navy and (ii) UK commercial shipping.

The Ministry of Defence routinely monitors and assesses the capabilities and activities of the Iranian Armed Forces, including its naval assets.

What steps he is taking to ensure safeguards in the use of AI in the defence systems within the continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent.

The delivery of defence capabilities enabled by artificial intelligence (AI) will be ambitious, safe and responsible. Research to identify, understand, and mitigate against risks of applying AI for sensitive defence affairs is underway. Routine nuclear deterrence operations continue to be conducted in accordance with the highest standards and controls. Regardless of any potential application of artificial intelligence in our strategic systems, we will ensure human political control of our nuclear weapons is maintained at all times. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will understand that I will not comment further on the details as to do so would prejudice the capability, security and effectiveness of the Armed Forces.

If he will take steps to help improve the living accommodation for Armed Forces personnel located at Clive Baracks, Tern Hill in Shropshire.

Clive Barracks has been identified for closure under the Defence Estates Optimisation Portfolio, as such, work has been limited to routine and planned preventative maintenance. All troops accommodated at Clive Barracks will be relocated ahead of the closure of the site, in 2029. Service Family Accommodation (SFA): The Defence Housing Strategy sets out a vision for the future transformation of military homes; 90% of military homes will be upgraded, renewed or rebuilt, through a record £9 billion investment over a decade. The Armed Forces Bill will establish the new Defence Housing Service (DHS), which will put the needs of Forces and their families first. In Financial Year 2024-25, 121 Service Family Accommodation (SFA) properties serving Clive Barracks received replacement UPVC doors and windows, and 52 SFA received replacement loft insulation and roofs. Single Living Accommodation (SLA): In 2025 the installation of 88 Self-Contained (single occupancy) pods with ensuite bathrooms, shared kitchen & utility rooms, was commissioned by the Army, with further works in progress to improve on-site ablutions, due for completion by the end of the Financial Year. No further improvement works are identified currently.

If he will provide details of collaboration with the French Government on the UK nuclear deterrent.

The UK and France work closely together on a range of nuclear research and technology matters, including as part of the 2010 Teutates Treaty. Our deepening co-operation under the 2025 Northwood Declaration includes nuclear policy, capabilities and operations. Release of information relating to the UK’s nuclear deterrent and our collaboration with Allies on nuclear matters is considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account considerations regarding national security, defence and international relations.

What steps he is taking to counter engagement with extreme online political content by members of the armed forces.

The Ministry of Defence remains vigilant to the risks associated with Service personnel engaging with extremist or extreme online political content and treats such matters with the utmost seriousness. Such behaviour is wholly incompatible with the values and standards of the Armed Forces.Defence maintains clear expectations of conduct, requiring all personnel to uphold the core values of respect, integrity and commitment, and to adhere to strict rules on political impartiality. It also voluntarily applies the Government’s Prevent Duty. Service regulations set out clear restrictions on online and public activity to ensure personnel do not engage in behaviour that could undermine the reputation, neutrality or operational effectiveness of the Armed Forces. Through a combination of clear behavioural standards, mandatory training, counter-terrorism intelligence, vetting and robust personnel policies, Defence works to reduce the risk of Armed Forces personnel engaging with extreme online political content.

If he will convene the pensions forfeiture committee to meet and agree to cease the pensions of ex-UK armed forces personnel who are fighting in support of the Russian Federation's illegal war in Ukraine.

Pension forfeiture for public service pension schemes, including the Armed Forces Pension Scheme, is governed by primary and secondary legislation, notably the Pensions Act 1995 and the Occupational Pension Schemes (Assignment, Forfeiture, Bankruptcy etc.) Regulations 1997. Under this legislative framework, an Armed Forces pension may only be forfeited following certain serious criminal convictions, except in cases involving a monetary obligation. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is not aware of any successful convictions of active or former Service Personnel for fighting on behalf of Russia in Ukraine. If the MOD becomes aware of any such convictions, we will consider the implementation of forfeiture policy where relevant.

If he will increase stockpiles of the component parts of the D5 Trident II.

Enabled by the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement, as amended for Trident in 1982, the United Kingdom buys title to an agreed number of a shared stock of Trident II D5 missiles from the United States of America (US). These missiles are maintained at the Kings Bay Submarine Base, Georgia. The UK is working with US partners to extend the life and replenish the Trident II D5 missiles to meet the future programme requirements of both Nations. These life extension programmes will provide sufficient missile packages, including spares, to support the UK’s requirement.

Whether any (i) UK and (ii) Commonwealth armed forces personnel have had their Armed Forces Pension revoked as a consequence of fighting with the Russian Federation against Ukraine.

Pension forfeiture for public service pension schemes, including the Armed Forces Pension Scheme, is governed by primary and secondary legislation, notably the Pensions Act 1995 and the Occupational Pension Schemes (Assignment, Forfeiture, Bankruptcy etc.) Regulations 1997. Under this legislative framework, an Armed Forces pension may only be forfeited following certain serious criminal convictions, except in cases involving a monetary obligation. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has no recorded instances of an Armed Forces pension being forfeited as a result of an individual fighting for Russia in Ukraine. Neither is the MOD aware of any successful convictions of active or former Service personnel for fighting on behalf of Russia in Ukraine.

What steps he is taking to defend the UK from (a) ballistic and (b) hypersonic missile attack.

The Ministry of Defence does not comment on specific capabilities, as doing so could provide an operational advantage to those who may seek to harm the UK.The UK has a suite of capabilities to tackle the missile threat which is advancing, proliferating and converging. The Government has announced an investment of up to £1 billion this Parliament to enhance our integrated air and missile defence with a focus on homeland defence. The UK's nuclear deterrent exists to deter the most extreme threats to the UK and our Allies. Its purpose is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression.