Written questions by Francois.

For what reason his Department has advised senior military officers not to speak on the record at events where a Minister is present; and if he will make an assessment of the potential impact of that guidance on (a) levels of transparency and (b) public awareness of the vision of the armed forces for the future, in the context of the Spending Review 2025.

This is not true. Recently, the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Roly Walker spoke on the record, and live on Sky Television at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference on the same day as the Secretary of State for Defence.

Whether any journalists have been invited to (a) attend and (b) observe activities relating to the Ajax armoured vehicle programme since 1 February 2025.

Journalists are routinely present at events where Ajax is demonstrated and/or discussed. Ajax is currently in the manufacturing and fielding platforms to the Army phase of the programme.

If he will set out what (a) technical and (b) management issues are causing the delay in the RAF’s E-7 Wedgetail aircraft WT001 flight test programme; and what steps his Department is taking to ensure the late-2025 in-service date is achieved.

The Wedgetail programme has already completed three test flights and will continue to undertake comprehensive ground and flight tests throughout 2025 to achieve the approved In-Service Date. Engagement continues with Boeing and the Ministry of Defence to ensure the In-Service Date is achieved.

Whether he has had discussions with his US counterpart on the (a) future of the E7 Wedgetail programme and (b) interoperability between both nations.

The Ministry of Defence have continual engagement with the US regarding the E-7 programme, specifically through the trilateral agreement and working groups established in 2022. These focus on collaboration and interoperability as directed in a Joint Vison Statement signed in 2023.As highlighted in the recent Strategic Defence Review, the E-7 Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning & Control aircraft provide significant advantages in warfighting, such as more persistent deep strike options. Growth of the Royal Air Force Airborne Early Warning and Control capability was identified in the recent Strategic Defence Review, as advantageous to the UK and NATO.

What steps his Department has taken to ensure the (a) financial accountability and (b) value for money of the E-7 Wedgetail programme; and what assessment he has made of the potential merits of launching an independent review of the programme’s (i) management and (ii) expenditure.

Identified as part of the Government Major Project Portfolio (GMPP), the Wedgetail programme is subject to regular reviews by the National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority who undertake regular assessment of the E-7 programme and report their findings at regular intervals through the GMPP.

Whether the Royal Air Force plans to (a) reconsider its procurement strategy and (b) evaluate the acquisition of the E-2D Hawkeye to replace or supplement its existing E-7 Wedgetail fleet, in the context of the US Air Force's decision to procure the E-2D Hawkeye instead of the E-7 Wedgetail for airborne early warning and control capabilities,.

The Ministry of Defence is continuing with its procurement of E-7 Wedgetail in order to meet the national and NATO requirements for an Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEWC) capability which is interoperable with its allies.As highlighted in the Strategic Defence Review, AEWC aircraft provide significant advantages in warfighting, such as more persistent deep strike options.

Whether he considered including a new medium helicopter programme within the Strategic Defence Review; and whether he plans to implement such a programme.

There are no plans to change the extant New Medium Helicopter competition which started on 27 February 2024 with the release of the Invitation to Negotiate to Airbus Helicopters UK, Leonardo Helicopters UK and Lockheed Martin UK. The Ministry of Defence is continuing with the established procurement process, managed by Defence Equipment and Support, and the proposal will be evaluated through 2025 when, subject to Government approvals, a contract award is anticipated.

When he plans to answer Question (a) 56739, (b) 56740 and (c) 56741 on Strategic Defence Review, tabled on 3 June 2025.

I responded to the right hon. Member's Questions 56739 and 56740 on 11 June 2025 and to Question 56741 on 10 June 2025.

How many (a) industry bodies, (b) defence industry companies, (c) media organisations, (d) trade associations, (e) think tanks and (f) other non-Government (i) bodies and (ii) people were given access to the Strategic Defence Review 2025 before 9.00am on 2 June 2025.

For the launch of the Strategic Defence Review, the Government offered embargoed briefings to our people and senior defence leaders, plus certain Parliamentarians, trade unions, businesses, allies and media. This was broadly consistent with the approach for previous defence reviews.

What assessment he has made of the potential impact of the planned £6 billion of new efficiencies this Parliament on existing defence (a) programmes and (b) capabilities.

We will deliver nearly £6 billion of new savings over the course of this Parliament through efficiency and productivity savings, civilian workforce changes, structural simplification and contractual efficiencies. As we are focusing on delivering savings through increased efficiency and productivity, we expect to minimise any capability impacts.Alongside the Defence Investment Plan later this year, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) will publish a Defence Reform and Efficiency Plan, which will provide further detail on the range of reforms across the MOD which will deliver these efficiencies.

What steps he took to ensure that the early release of unredacted hard copies of the Strategic Defence Review, published on 2 June 2025, to (a) people and (b) companies did not result in market-sensitive information being used for commercial advantage.

For the launch of the Strategic Defence Review, the Government offered embargoed briefings to our people and senior defence leaders, plus certain Parliamentarians, trade unions, businesses, allies and media. This was broadly consistent with the approach for previous defence reviews.

What criteria were used to determine which (a) peple and (b) companies were granted access to unredacted hard copies of the Strategic Defence Review on 2 June 2025.

For the launch of the Strategic Defence Review, the Government offered embargoed briefings to our people and senior defence leaders, plus certain Parliamentarians, trade unions, businesses, allies and media. This was broadly consistent with the approach for previous defence reviews.

Whether any (a) people or (b) companies who received unredacted hard copies of the Strategic Defence Review on 02 June 2025 were required to sign non-disclosure agreements prior to receipt.

For the launch of the Strategic Defence Review, the Government offered embargoed briefings to our people and senior defence leaders, plus certain Parliamentarians, trade unions, businesses, allies and media. This was broadly consistent with the approach for previous defence reviews.

With reference to Article 2 of the UK-Mauritius Agreement concerning the Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia, published on 22 May 2025, whether he plans to put in place (a) further provisions and (b) enforcement mechanisms to ensure that Mauritius cannot impose restrictions on the right to operate the Diego Garcia base following the sovereignty transfer.

The United Kingdom will have full control and responsibility for the defence and security of Diego Garcia. Mauritius has a legally binding obligation under the treaty to not undermine, prejudice or otherwise interfere with the long-term, secure and effective operation of the base. Any future issues that may arise throughout the duration of the treaty shall be resolved through the Joint Commission, as described in Annex 3.

With reference the UK/Mauritius Agreement concerning the Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia, published on 22 May 2025, whether he plans to take steps with the government of Mauritius to help ensure the Diego Garcia Ramsar Convention site is protected without compromising military activities.

The Diego Garcia Ramsar Convention site is currently protected without compromising military activities. There will be no change to this once the agreement comes into force. The agreement provides an obligation to ensure the long-term, secure and effective operation of the Base. The UK will control access to and administration of Diego Garcia, in light of this obligation, and the Exchange of Letters on International Organisations provides that United Kingdom retains responsibility for the environmental protection of the Ramsar site in accordance with the site’s Management Plan.

With reference to Annex 1(1)(i) of the treaty entitled UK/Mauritius: Agreement concerning the Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia, published on 22 May 2025, what steps he is taking to prevent artificial (a) land and (b) seabed development by other countries with access to Diego.

The United Kingdom controls access to Diego Garcia under Annex 1.1.b and only the United Kingdom has unrestricted ability to manage, use and develop the land and surrounding waters and seabed in Diego Garcia. Mauritius and the United Kingdom will jointly decide on the construction or emplacement of any artificial islands between twelve and twenty-four nautical miles surrounding the island of Diego Garcia – this means nothing can happen without UK agreement.

With reference to paragraph 16(a) of Annex 2 of the UK-Mauritius Agreement concerning the Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia, published on 22 May 2025, how the Government plans to apply the definition of persons not connected to the operation of the Base for jurisdictional purposes on Diego Garcia.

The United Kingdom controls access, and therefore authorisations, for all persons permitted to be on Diego Garcia. Any person present without authorisation is a person not connected to the operation of the base.

With reference to paragraph 6(b) of Annex 1 of the document entitled UK/Mauritius: Agreement concerning the Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia (CS Mauritius No.1/2025), what steps he plans to take to ensure that the UK's submission does not compromise the Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia’s operations.

The UK is not obligated under the treaty to provide any operationally sensitive detail to Mauritius. Any submissions made under Annex 1 paragraph 6 will undergo assessment by the UK in consultation with the US to ensure operations are not compromised.

With reference to paragraph 8(a) of Annex 2 of the document entitled UK/Mauritius: Agreement concerning the Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia (CS Mauritius No.1/2025), what estimate he has made of the cost to the public purse of providing assistance to the Government of Mauritius in the provision of (a) facilities and (b) amenities for Mauritian law enforcement officials on Diego Garcia as defined in Article 19 of the Agreement over the next ten years.

As per paragraph 10 of Annex 2, the UK and Mauritius will be agreeing separate arrangements and operating procedures as necessary to assist and facilitate the exercise of Mauritian jurisdiction in respect to paragraph 8. There will be no additional facilities on island to enable Mauritian jurisdiction.

With reference to Article 3 of the document entitled UK/Mauritius: Agreement concerning the Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia (CS Mauritius No.1/2025), how his Department will co-operate with the Government of Mauritius on maritime security, including efforts to combat (a) trafficking and (b) piracy.

Mauritius and the United Kingdom will cooperate on matters relating to maritime security. Our contribution will focus on providing training and building institutional partnerships. This will contribute to preserving the safety, security, stability and prosperity of the Indian Ocean region and will support the future operation of the Base on Diego Garcia.