Written questions by Cartlidge.

With reference to Annex 1, Clause 7, of the UK/Mauritius: Agreement concerning the Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia [CS Mauritius No.1/2025], which activities his Department considers risk conflicting with the obligations in Article 3(2)(b).

As set out in Annex 1, Clause 7 of the Treaty, the UK holds the right to notify Mauritius about any activity that is seen as potentially undermining, prejudicing or otherwise interfering with the long-term, secure and effective operation of the base on Diego Garcia. Mauritius would then commence a Security Review in respect of these activities . This means that the UK will have an effective veto over any activity that presents a clear and direct threat to the base on Diego Garcia. There is no limit to the scope of activities considered under this condition.

How many (a) ships and (b) submarines are currently (i) in-build and (ii) on order.

There are currently eight ships in build, with a further eight on order. These include the next-generation Type 31 General Purpose Frigates, Type 26 Anti-Submarine Frigates, and the Fleet Solid Support ships, to be crewed by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. There are currently five submarines in build, and one on order. This includes the Dreadnought class, the replacement for the Royal Navy’s current Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines, and Astute-Class attack submarines. The above figures do not include programmes that are in development but not yet contracted for, such as SSN-AUKUS submarines, Multi Role Strike Ships and the Type 83 Air Defence Destroyer. These ships and submarines, together with other capabilities, are a vital part of achieving the new hybrid navy as outlined recently in the Strategic Defence Review.

With reference to Annex 3, Clause 2, of the UK/Mauritius: Agreement concerning the Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia [CS Mauritius No.1/2025], whether an official from his Department will sit on the Joint Commission.

As Annex 3 of the Treaty states, the UK delegation to the Joint Commission will consist of one senior representative (as co-chair with Mauritius) and four additional representatives. Decisions on who will represent the UK side will be made in due course.

With reference to Annex 3, Clause 2, of the UK/Mauritius: Agreement concerning the Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia [CS Mauritius No.1/2025], when the Joint Commission will first meet.

The date of the first meeting of the Joint Commission has not been set. Once the Treaty enters into force, the Joint Commission shall meet at least twice a year or more frequently on the request of either the UK or Mauritius.

With reference to Annex 1, Clause 5, of the UK/Mauritius: Agreement concerning the Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia [CS Mauritius No.1/2025], what the areas of assistance agreed to provide Mauritius to (a) monitor, (b) detect and (c) adjudicate security risks and conduct Security Reviews were.

As set out in the new UK-Mauritius Strategic Partnership Framework, Mauritius and the United Kingdom will cooperate on matters relating to maritime security. This includes the UK working with Mauritius to improve maritime surveillance, the tracking of suspicious vessels and data sharing. Further engagement on the details of this cooperation with Mauritius is ongoing.Decisions on the areas of assistance required for Mauritius to adjudicate security risks and conduct Security Reviews will be made as part of the current implementation process.

Whether his Department's messenger service routinely keeps records of when departmental hard copy (a) documents and (b) publications were sent to (i) parliamentarians and (ii) external stakeholders.

The Department’s messenger service does not hold specific records of what is delivered and to whom.

Whether (a) he, (b) his then political advisor and (c) any other person employed in his parliamentary office received a hard copy of the MOD policy paper entitled, Defence Command Paper 2023: defence's response to a more contested and volatile world, published on 18 July 2023, on the morning of 18 July 2023.

I refer the hon. Gentleman to the Point of Order raised by my right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary (John Healey) on 23 June 2025 (Official Report, column 903).

Pursuant to the Answer of 9 June 2025 to Question 52037 on F-35 Aircraft: Meteor Missiles, what assessment he has made of the potential impact of the delay to the integration of the Meteor air-to-air missile with F-35B aircraft on F-35 capability.

With the F-35 Lightning, the RAF is already equipped with one of the most advanced fighter jets in the world, and the integration of METEOR will further improve the aircraft's capability in future years. While Meteor integration is in progress, the UK's fleet of F-35 aircraft already carry AIM-120 AMRAAM. Once operational, Meteor and AMRAAM will offer a complementary capability.

What proportion of the budget for the Ministry of Defence will be accounted for by expenditure on the intelligence and security services not previously included in that budget in each year of the Spending Review 2025.

The PM announced in February that an increase in NATO qualifying defence spending to 2.5% would be fully funded by a reduction to the ODA budget. In line with practice among our allies, and recognising the increased contribution provided by our security and intelligence agencies on defence, we are including greater elements of the Single Intelligence Account spend in our NATO defence reporting. This will bring total NATO qualifying spending to 2.6% by 2027-28. This does not mean that the intelligence and security services will be added to the MOD budget.NATO qualifying defence spending has always included elements beyond the MOD TDEL budget. This includes elements of spend such as armed forces pensions.

With reference to to table 5.1 on pages 44-45 of the Spending Review 2025, published on 11 June 2025, CP 1336, whether the Single Intelligence Account budget will be added to the Ministry of Defence's budget in 2027-28.

The PM announced in February that an increase in NATO qualifying defence spending to 2.5% would be fully funded by a reduction to the ODA budget. In line with practice among our allies, and recognising the increased contribution provided by our security and intelligence agencies on defence, we are including greater elements of the Single Intelligence Account spend in our NATO defence reporting. This will bring total NATO qualifying spending to 2.6% by 2027-28. This does not mean that the intelligence and security services will be added to the MOD budget.NATO qualifying defence spending has always included elements beyond the MOD TDEL budget. This includes elements of spend such as armed forces pensions.

With reference to clause 5.59 of the Spending Review 2025, published on 11 June 2025, if she will state for each year of the spending review the financial quantum of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office's non-ODA budget accounted for by the portion of this funding which will contribute to the UK’s NATO-attributed defence spending, including FCDO-led programming in partnership with the Ministry of Defence and the Intelligence Community to counter (a) cyber attacks, (b) election interference, (c) disinformation and (d) other threats to stability.

Elements of FCDO’s programming budget will be evaluated for NATO eligibility in line with the NATO qualifying criteria.

What the total quantum is of the amount of money that will be added to the defence budget as a result of the incorporation of the intelligence and security services in each year of the Spending Review 2025.

The PM announced in February that an increase in NATO qualifying defence spending to 2.5% would be fully funded by a reduction to the ODA budget. In line with practice among our allies, and recognising the increased contribution provided by our security and intelligence agencies on defence, we are including greater elements of the Single Intelligence Account spend in our NATO defence reporting. This will bring total NATO qualifying spending to 2.6% by 2027-28. This does not mean that the intelligence and security services will be added to the MOD budget.NATO qualifying defence spending has always included elements beyond the MOD TDEL budget. This includes elements of spend such as armed forces pensions.

With reference to page 18 of the Strategic Defence Review, published on 2 June 2025, which back-office functions will be transferred to front-line roles.

The Government is endorsing the vision and accepting the Strategic Defence Reviews's 62 recommendations, including the recommendation that the MOD should seek to release all Regular personnel from administrative into front-line roles and should automate at least 20% of Human Resources, Finance, and Commercial functions by July 2028. Military personnel in administrative roles perform them with pride and skill. As we return to rebuilding warfighting readiness, it is important that we are using our highly trained and highly skilled military personnel for the roles only they can do. The Strategic Defence Review sets the vision; more detailed workforce planning will now be conducted within the department to make these changes in a deliberate, phased way.

What steps he is taking to ensure that people eligible for the Infected Blood Compensation Scheme receive payments in a timely manner.

The delivery of compensation is a matter for the Infected Blood Compensation Authority (IBCA) as an operationally independent arm's-length body. As of 17 June, IBCA has contacted 1,707 people to start their compensation claim, and 1,346 have started the claim process. 462 offers of compensation have been made, totalling over £395 million, and so far 310 people have accepted their offers with more than £231 million paid in compensation. Going forward, IBCA is aiming to contact an average of 100 people to begin their claim every week. At that rate, they expect to have brought in to claim all those infected people who are registered with a support scheme this calendar year. Whilst the roll out of the Scheme is an operational decision for IBCA as an independent body, I fully support their commitment to moving forward as swiftly as possible and as the Minister, I stand ready to help and assist in any way I can to speed up the payments. I am restless for the speed of delivery to increase, but I respect that operational independence going forward, as it is important that I do.

With reference to page 16 of the Strategic Defence Review: Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, published on 2 June 2025, how frequently the Defence Investors’ Advisory Group will meet.

The frequency of meetings of the Defence Investors' Advisory Group has yet to be determined. The Defence Investors’ Advisory Group will be an important element in supporting the Government’s aim of boosting private investment in the defence and dual-use technology sectors, and in supporting new entrants and innovation.

With reference to page 18 of the Strategic Defence Review, published on 2 June 2025, what information his Department holds on when it will receive funding to increase the number of active reserves by 20%.

Our Reserve Forces help the UK Armed Forces meet the threats we face at home and overseas, with the scale, skills, agility and connection to society that we need, in a cost-effective way. The diversity of knowledge, skills, experience, and behaviours that Reserves bring from their outside jobs are an invaluable strength. We have received the recommendation and are looking at how to undertake this in due course.

With reference to page 16 of the Strategic Defence Review, published on 2 June 2025, who will sit on the Defence Investors’ Advisory Group.

As set out when the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) was published, the Government accepts the vision and recommendations of the Review, including the establishment of a Defence Investors' Advisory Group. The SDR suggests that Defence should build relationships with the investors behind the innovators. The Review recommends that external expertise should be systematically accessed through a new Defence Investors' Advisory Group whose membership includes venture capital and private equity investors.

With reference to page 16 of the Strategic Defence Review, published on 2 June 2025, what the requirements are for membership of the Defence Investors’ Advisory Group.

The SDR recognises that today, much of the best innovation is found in the private sector, while the increasing prevalence of dual-use technologies has widened the net of potential suppliers that can contribute to Defence outcomes. The Review is clear that Defence must embrace its role in seeding innovation and growth, rapidly adopting new technology to keep the Integrated Force at the forefront of warfare. It specifically recommends that external expertise should be systematically accessed through a new Defence Investors' Advisory Group. This will be an important starting point in boosting private investment in the defence and dual-use technology sectors, and in supporting new entrants and innovation.

With reference to page 18 of the Strategic Defence Review: Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, published on 2 June 2025 what estimate he has made of the cost to his Department of increasing the number of active reserves by 20%.

Our Reserve Forces help the UK Armed Forces meet the threats we face at home and overseas, with the scale, skills, agility and connection to society that we need, in a cost-effective way. The diversity of knowledge, skills, experience, and behaviours that Reserves bring from their outside jobs are an invaluable strength. The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) presents an exciting opportunity to invest in our Active Reserve, and the Secretary of State for Defence has agreed to all the SDR recommendations. We anticipate it will become necessary to increase the UK’s Active Reserve forces by at least 20%. We have received the recommendation and are looking at how to undertake this in due course.The Ministry of Defence is not in a position to comment on when exactly that will be, as this will be dictated by a range of internal and external factors. In the meantime, to restore mass and resilience in a crisis, Defence must make much better use of the resources available by urgently reinvigorating how it engages with the Strategic Reserve and improving recruitment and retention within the Active Reserves.

Pursuant to the Answer of 9 June 2025 to Question 57297 on Chagos Islands: Sovereignty, what the total cost to his Department’s budget in the latest spending review arising from the Chagos Treaty is; and if he will provide a breakdown of that cost in each year of the Spending Review.

The Government has acted to secure our national interest, strengthen our national security, and to protect the British people. As set out by the Secretary of State in his statement, this is at a cost of less than 0.2% of the annual defence budget.