Written questions by Cartlidge.

With reference to the press release entitled New Storm Shadow and missile cooperation to boost jobs as UK and France reboot defence relationship, published on 9 July 2025, whether the decision to coordinate the UK and France's respective nuclear deterrents will be reviewed at a future date.

We will enhance our readiness to coordinate our respective deterrents through nuclear dialogue and exercises, under the auspices of the new UK-France Nuclear Steering Group. We continually review our nuclear deterrence policy and posture in light of the international security environment and the actions of potential adversaries, to ensure we can meet the threats facing the UK and our NATO allies.

With reference to paragraph 61 of his Department's joint policy paper entitled Security and defence partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, published on 19 May 2025, when the last Security and Defence Dialogue between the UK and the EU took place.

The Security and Defence Partnership agreed with the European Union on 19 May is an example of this Government delivering on our manifesto commitments to strengthen European security, support growth and reinforce NATO. Implementation is progressing. Since May, the Defence Secretary has held discussions with the European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, where they discussed our ambition to explore the potential for enhanced UK-EU cooperation under SAFE. The Foreign Secretary has also held talks with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas on the geopolitical challenges that face our continent. We look forward to the foreign and security policy dialogue between the High Representative, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary this autumn. In addition, officials from across Government continue to hold consultations with their EU counterparts on a range of issues, including but not limited to Iran, Russia-Ukraine, and tackling irregular migration. As the Defence Secretary has previously said to this House, he will ensure that any UK commitment– whether financial or non-financial – provides value for the UK taxpayer and supports our defence goals. We will continue to prioritise engagement and cooperation on the issues that are most important in helping to safeguard European security and prosperity – all in support of this government’s NATO First defence policy. The Defence Secretary and I look forward to continuing to update the House on developments. The Defence Secretary’s offer still stands that he is happy to arrange a discussion with the Member of Parliament for South Suffolk who has shown such interest in these topics.

With reference to the press release entitled New Storm Shadow and missile cooperation to boost jobs as UK and France reboot defence relationship, published on 9 July 2025, how the 50,000 strong combined joint force will interact with NATO.

Detailed planning of the Combined Joint Force (CJF), evolving from the currently existing Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), is currently under way with French colleagues following the UK-France declaration announcement. This will be done in full consultation with NATO with respect to the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).As stated in the declaration the CJF will ensure the ability to plan and command a Combined Corps Capability. This corps can provide the Land component of a broader joint force combining all military functions, as part of NATO or bilaterally. The force will draw on corps level capabilities, including elements of the ARRC, as forces currently do under the CJEF Concept of Employment. It is not intended that the CJF will replace the ARRC, rather it will strengthen our warfighting corps through a deepened framework for interoperability and training.As this will be a NATO Strategic Reserve Corps, it is anticipated that the forces held at readiness for NATO will include those held at readiness for the CJF. The CJF will be fully interoperable and able to act in lockstep with the Alliance, whilst also providing a resilient framework for bilateral operations. The CJF will complement our already significant contribution to the Alliance.The current structure of the CJEF under its Concept of Employment (CONEMP) is for the use of high readiness national forces to respond to a crisis situation. There is no specified CJEF ‘state of readiness’. UK Troops offered to NATO as part of the Strategic Reserve Corps are currently held at Tier 3 with a readiness of 31-180 days.The current command structure of the CJEF, under its Concept of Employment (CONEMP), does not discriminate between using those forces already held at readiness for NATO or otherwise.

With reference to the press release entitled New Storm Shadow and missile cooperation to boost jobs as UK and France reboot defence relationship, published on 9 July 2025, whether the National Armaments Director was consulted prior to the decision to coordinate the UK and France's respective deterrents.

Appropriate organisations and officials were involved in the consultation process for the Lancaster House treaty refresh, prior to the announcement, on the joint decision to strengthen coordination and deepen cooperation between the UK and France's respective nuclear deterrents and nuclear research.

With reference to his Department's joint press release entitled New Storm Shadow and missile cooperation to boost jobs as UK and France reboot defence relationship, published on 9 July 2025, whether the lead reviewers of the Strategic Defence Review were consulted prior to the decision to increase UK-French nuclear research.

Appropriate organisations and officials were involved in the consultation process for the Lancaster House treaty refresh, prior to the announcement, on the joint decision to strengthen coordination and deepen cooperation between the UK and France's respective nuclear deterrents and nuclear research.

With reference to his Department's joint press release entitled New Storm Shadow and missile cooperation to boost jobs as UK and France reboot defence relationship, published on 9 July 2025, whether the National Armaments Director was consulted prior to the decision to increase UK-French nuclear research.

Appropriate organisations and officials were involved in the consultation process for the Lancaster House treaty refresh, prior to the announcement, on the joint decision to strengthen coordination and deepen cooperation between the UK and France's respective nuclear deterrents and nuclear research.

With reference to his Department’s press release entitled New Storm Shadow and missile cooperation to boost jobs as UK and France reboot defence relationship, published on 9 July 2025, what the evidential basis is for the the conclusion that the UK-France Nuclear Partnership will ensure continued support for Ukraine.

The UK and France deepening nuclear collaboration, as set out in the declaration, is not a response to any specific event. The UK-France declaration does not set out a link between deepening our nuclear collaboration and our continued support for Ukraine.

With reference to the Prime Minister's Oral Statement of 25 February 2025 on Defence and Security, Official Report, column 633, referencing spending 2.6% on defence from 2027, how much will be spent out of the defence budget on increasing capacity in the intelligence and security services from 2027.

The Intelligence and Security Services are funded through the Single Intelligence Account (SIA), which is separate from the Ministry of Defence's budget.The budget for the SIA from 2027 onwards is set out in the Spending Review 2025 document - GOV.UK.

Pursuant to the Answer of 10 July 2025 to Question 65293 on Defence: Finance, if she will publish the percentage of GDP spent on defence for each financial year since 2018/2019.

Historic NATO qualifying defence spend as a percentage of GDP is published on the NATO website: 240617-def-exp-2024-en.pdf

Pursuant to the Answer of 10 July 2025 to Question 65293 on Defence: Finance, if she will publish the average increase as a percentage of GDP spent on defence expenditure from 2027, excluding the addition of intelligence and security services spend.

NATO qualifying defence expenditure is calculated using standardised NATO definitions of defence spending, as agreed by NATO allies. Annual defence expenditure per country is reported to NATO on a regular basis and is published on their website.

With reference to paragraph 15 of the policy paper entitled Security and defence partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, published on 19 May 2025, what recent progress he has made on establishing a UK-EU dialogue on peace mediation.

The Security and Defence Partnership agreed with the European Union on 19 May is an example of this Government delivering on our manifesto commitments to strengthen European security, support growth and reinforce NATO. Implementation is progressing. Since May, the Defence Secretary has held discussions with the European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, where they discussed our ambition to explore the potential for enhanced UK-EU cooperation under SAFE. The Foreign Secretary has also held talks with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas on the geopolitical challenges that face our continent. We look forward to the foreign and security policy dialogue between the High Representative, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary this autumn. In addition, officials from across government continue to hold consultations with their EU counterparts on a range of issues, including but not limited to Iran, Russia-Ukraine, and tackling irregular migration. As the Defence Secretary has previously said to this House, he will ensure that any UK commitment– whether financial or non-financial – provides value for the UK taxpayer and supports our defence goals. We will continue to prioritise engagement and cooperation on the issues that are most important in helping to safeguard European security and prosperity – all in support of this government’s NATO First defence policy. The Defence Secretary and I look forward to continuing to update the House on developments. The Defence Secretary’s offer still stands that he is happy to arrange a discussion with the Member of Parliament for South Suffolk who has shown such interest in these topics.

With reference to paragraph 12, subsection E, of the policy paper entitled Security and defence partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, published on 19 May 2025, what recent progress he has made on conventional weapons cooperation through thematic dialogues via the UK-EU Security and Defence Dialogue.

The Security and Defence Partnership agreed with the European Union on 19 May is an example of this Government delivering on our manifesto commitments to strengthen European security, support growth and reinforce NATO. Implementation is progressing. Since May, the Defence Secretary has held discussions with the European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, where they discussed our ambition to explore the potential for enhanced UK-EU cooperation under SAFE. The Foreign Secretary has also held talks with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas on the geopolitical challenges that face our continent. We look forward to the foreign and security policy dialogue between the High Representative, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary this autumn. In addition, officials from across government continue to hold consultations with their EU counterparts on a range of issues, including but not limited to Iran, Russia-Ukraine, and tackling irregular migration. As the Defence Secretary has previously said to this House, he will ensure that any UK commitment– whether financial or non-financial – provides value for the UK taxpayer and supports our defence goals. We will continue to prioritise engagement and cooperation on the issues that are most important in helping to safeguard European security and prosperity – all in support of this government’s NATO First defence policy. The Defence Secretary and I look forward to continuing to update the House on developments. The Defence Secretary’s offer still stands that he is happy to arrange a discussion with the Member of Parliament for South Suffolk who has shown such interest in these topics.

Pursuant to the Answer of 10 July 2025 to Question 65293 on Defence: Finance, what the total quantum of spend on the Chagos settlement is, for each remaining year of the current Parliament.

The UK’s financial obligations under the UK-Mauritius Treaty can be found in the document ‘UK/Mauritius: Agreement concerning the Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia’, which is available on Gov.uk. Payments will be managed responsibly within the government’s fiscal framework and reported in annual accounts in the usual way. Obligations within MOD and FCDO budgets have been agreed through the recently published Spending Review. No payments will be made until the treaty is legally binding.

With reference to paragraph 12, subsection E, of the policy paper entitled Security and defence partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, published on 19 May 2025, what recent progress he has made on arms export control through thematic dialogues via the UK-EU Security and Defence Dialogue.

The Security and Defence Partnership agreed with the European Union on 19 May is an example of this Government delivering on our manifesto commitments to strengthen European security, support growth and reinforce NATO. Implementation is progressing. Since May, the Defence Secretary has held discussions with the European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, where they discussed our ambition to explore the potential for enhanced UK-EU cooperation under SAFE. The Foreign Secretary has also held talks with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas on the geopolitical challenges that face our continent. We look forward to the foreign and security policy dialogue between the High Representative, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary this autumn. In addition, officials from across government continue to hold consultations with their EU counterparts on a range of issues, including but not limited to Iran, Russia-Ukraine, and tackling irregular migration. As the Defence Secretary has previously said to this House, he will ensure that any UK commitment– whether financial or non-financial – provides value for the UK taxpayer and supports our defence goals. We will continue to prioritise engagement and cooperation on the issues that are most important in helping to safeguard European security and prosperity – all in support of this government’s NATO First defence policy. The Defence Secretary and I look forward to continuing to update the House on developments. The Defence Secretary’s offer still stands that he is happy to arrange a discussion with the Member of Parliament for South Suffolk who has shown such interest in these topics.

With reference to paragraph 12, subsection F, of the policy paper entitled Security and defence partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, published on 19 May 2025, how many times the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has invited UK delegates to the Schuman Security and Defence Forum since 19 May 2025.

The Security and Defence Partnership agreed with the European Union on 19 May is an example of this Government delivering on our manifesto commitments to strengthen European security, support growth and reinforce NATO. Implementation is progressing. Since May, the Defence Secretary has held discussions with the European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, where they discussed our ambition to explore the potential for enhanced UK-EU cooperation under SAFE. The Foreign Secretary has also held talks with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas on the geopolitical challenges that face our continent. We look forward to the foreign and security policy dialogue between the High Representative, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary this autumn. In addition, officials from across government continue to hold consultations with their EU counterparts on a range of issues, including but not limited to Iran, Russia-Ukraine, and tackling irregular migration. As the Defence Secretary has previously said to this House, he will ensure that any UK commitment– whether financial or non-financial – provides value for the UK taxpayer and supports our defence goals. We will continue to prioritise engagement and cooperation on the issues that are most important in helping to safeguard European security and prosperity – all in support of this government’s NATO First defence policy. The Defence Secretary and I look forward to continuing to update the House on developments. The Defence Secretary’s offer still stands that he is happy to arrange a discussion with the Member of Parliament for South Suffolk who has shown such interest in these topics.

How many Puma 3 AE drones has his Department ordered since 5 July 2024.

Due to operational security, we cannot provide details on the numbers or types of drones ordered by the Ministry of Defence.

How many Parrot Anafi USA drones has his Department ordered since 5 July 2024.

Due to operational security, we cannot provide details on the numbers or types of drones ordered by the Ministry of Defence.

How many FPV drones his Department has ordered since 5 July 2024.

Due to operational security, we cannot provide details on the numbers or types of drones ordered by the Ministry of Defence.

Pursuant to the Answer of 25 March 2025 to Question 39917 on Unmanned Air Systems: Procurement, how many drones in (a) logistics, (b) strike and (c) intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance roles were purchased by his Department since 25 March 2025.

I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave him on 8 July 2025 to Question 64478.

Pursuant to the Answer of 4 July to Question 62701 on Defence: Finance, when the Single Intelligence Budget was last included in the core defence budget.

The Single Intelligence Account is not included in the Ministry of Defence’s budget.Historically, the SIA’s budget has included elements of NATO-qualifying defence expenditure. In order to recognise the important contribution the intelligence agencies play in national defence, by 2027, we will consider the whole of the SIA to be NATO-qualifying, in line with our allies. It will be included towards the 2.6% target for core defence spending.