Every parliamentary written question tabled by James Cartlidge this session, with the full answer and department. Back to the MP page.
Showing 1,361–1,380 of 2,781 · Ministry of Defence
With reference to the Government press release entitled New Storm Shadow and missile cooperation to boost jobs as UK and France reboot defence relationship, published on 9 July 2025, if he will list the personnel responsible for deciding whether the UK and France would enact a coordinated nuclear response.
It remains the case that only the UK Prime Minister and the French President can authorise the use of their respective nation's nuclear weapons.
With reference to his Department’s press release entitled New Storm Shadow and missile cooperation to boost jobs as UK and France reboot defence relationship, published on 9 July 2025, what the evidential basis is for the the conclusion that the UK-France Nuclear Partnership will ensure continued support for Ukraine.
The UK and France deepening nuclear collaboration, as set out in the declaration, is not a response to any specific event. The UK-France declaration does not set out a link between deepening our nuclear collaboration and our continued support for Ukraine.
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to the Government press release entitled New Storm Shadow and missile cooperation to boost jobs as UK and France reboot defence relationship, published on 9 July 2025, who will command the new 50,000 strong combined joint force.
Detailed planning of the Combined Joint Force (CJF), evolving from the currently existing Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), is currently under way with French colleagues following Thursday’s announcement.The current command structure of the CJEF under its Concept of Employment (CONEMP) is of a single operational commander provided by either the UK or France, appointed by both nations. It should be noted the CJEF is not a standing force, but made up of high-readiness forces available when it is deployed.All UK Service Chiefs, including VCDS and Commander Strat Comm, were consulted ahead of the agreement to create the CJF. Most significantly, on 24 March 2025 at the third annual UK-France All Chiefs meeting in London, the proposal was discussed with all of the French and UK Military Chiefs of Staff.
With reference to paragraph 61 of his Department's joint policy paper entitled Security and defence partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, published on 19 May 2025, when the last Security and Defence Dialogue between the UK and the EU took place.
The Security and Defence Partnership agreed with the European Union on 19 May is an example of this Government delivering on our manifesto commitments to strengthen European security, support growth and reinforce NATO. Implementation is progressing. Since May, the Defence Secretary has held discussions with the European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, where they discussed our ambition to explore the potential for enhanced UK-EU cooperation under SAFE. The Foreign Secretary has also held talks with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas on the geopolitical challenges that face our continent. We look forward to the foreign and security policy dialogue between the High Representative, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary this autumn. In addition, officials from across Government continue to hold consultations with their EU counterparts on a range of issues, including but not limited to Iran, Russia-Ukraine, and tackling irregular migration. As the Defence Secretary has previously said to this House, he will ensure that any UK commitment– whether financial or non-financial – provides value for the UK taxpayer and supports our defence goals. We will continue to prioritise engagement and cooperation on the issues that are most important in helping to safeguard European security and prosperity – all in support of this government’s NATO First defence policy. The Defence Secretary and I look forward to continuing to update the House on developments. The Defence Secretary’s offer still stands that he is happy to arrange a discussion with the Member of Parliament for South Suffolk who has shown such interest in these topics.
With reference to the press release entitled New Storm Shadow and missile cooperation to boost jobs as UK and France reboot defence relationship, published on 9 July 2025, whether the 50,000 strong combined joint force wil be (a) tri-service, (b) entirely British Army personnel and (c) other.
Detailed planning of the Combined Joint Force (CJF), evolving from the currently existing Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), is currently under way with French colleagues following the UK-France declaration announcement. Any future basing will be subject to bilateral agreement between the UK and France and announced in due course when negotiated.The UK-France Lancaster House 2.0 declaration of 10 July 2025 committed to launch the Combined Joint Force – overhauling the existing Combined Joint Expeditionary Force to refocus it on the Euro-Atlantic and warfighting at scale to deter, placing it on an operational footing for the first time by endeavouring to significantly increase the declared Combined Joint Force (CJF) capacity, up to fivefold, ensuring the ability to plan and command Combined Corps Capability (the highest level of fielded forces in our armies). This Corps can provide the Land component of a broader joint force combining all military functions, as part of NATO or bilaterally. The CJF will facilitate the deployment of a force fully interoperable with NATO and available as the Alliance’s Strategic Reserve; this is a critical step towards the UK and France providing two fully interoperable Strategic Reserve Corps to NATO, enabled by the CJF.For the CJF Corps, our working assumption is a broadly equal split of force contributions. It will be constituted of UK and French forces held at readiness in their usual national basing arrangements. Existing UK and French exchange officers currently embedded in each other’s structures will act as operational coordination and support for the CJF at times when it is not being actively deployed.Like the CJEF, the CJF Force will be designed to meet the task at hand. The exact proportion of each nation’s contribution can only be defined with a specific task. The forces required would be selected from the UK and France according to a number of factors, including roles and availability.We anticipate that the CJF will operate as an integrated force in multi-domain operations and could include, as required, elements from the Maritime, Land, Air, Space and Cyber domains. The CJF is intended to be drawn from existing forces.The current structure of the CJEF under its Concept of Employment (CONEMP) is that there are no permanently assigned or standing forces, combined headquarters, nor planning teams. The CJEF draws on whichever national high readiness forces are declared as available, including lead elements at very short notice, if required for the operation. These are taken from the UK and France following bilateral agreement as appropriate. No UK Armed Forces units are permanently assigned to form the CJEF.The CJEF is not intended to be a standing force and thus is not planned to be permanently based anywhere.
With reference to the Government press release entitled New Storm Shadow and missile cooperation to boost jobs as UK and France reboot defence relationship, published on 9 July 2025, how the 50,000 strong combined joint force will interact with the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps.
Detailed planning of the Combined Joint Force (CJF), evolving from the currently existing Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), is currently under way with French colleagues following the UK-France declaration announcement. This will be done in full consultation with NATO with respect to the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).As stated in the declaration the CJF will ensure the ability to plan and command a Combined Corps Capability. This corps can provide the Land component of a broader joint force combining all military functions, as part of NATO or bilaterally. The force will draw on corps level capabilities, including elements of the ARRC, as forces currently do under the CJEF Concept of Employment. It is not intended that the CJF will replace the ARRC, rather it will strengthen our warfighting corps through a deepened framework for interoperability and training.As this will be a NATO Strategic Reserve Corps, it is anticipated that the forces held at readiness for NATO will include those held at readiness for the CJF. The CJF will be fully interoperable and able to act in lockstep with the Alliance, whilst also providing a resilient framework for bilateral operations. The CJF will complement our already significant contribution to the Alliance.The current structure of the CJEF under its Concept of Employment (CONEMP) is for the use of high readiness national forces to respond to a crisis situation. There is no specified CJEF ‘state of readiness’. UK Troops offered to NATO as part of the Strategic Reserve Corps are currently held at Tier 3 with a readiness of 31-180 days.The current command structure of the CJEF, under its Concept of Employment (CONEMP), does not discriminate between using those forces already held at readiness for NATO or otherwise.
With reference to the Government press release entitled New Storm Shadow and missile cooperation to boost jobs as UK and France reboot defence relationship, published on 9 July 2025, whether the First Sea Lord was consulted prior to the agreement to create the 50,000 strong combined joint force.
Detailed planning of the Combined Joint Force (CJF), evolving from the currently existing Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), is currently under way with French colleagues following Thursday’s announcement.The current command structure of the CJEF under its Concept of Employment (CONEMP) is of a single operational commander provided by either the UK or France, appointed by both nations. It should be noted the CJEF is not a standing force, but made up of high-readiness forces available when it is deployed.All UK Service Chiefs, including VCDS and Commander Strat Comm, were consulted ahead of the agreement to create the CJF. Most significantly, on 24 March 2025 at the third annual UK-France All Chiefs meeting in London, the proposal was discussed with all of the French and UK Military Chiefs of Staff.
With reference to paragraph 12, subsection E, of the policy paper entitled Security and defence partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, published on 19 May 2025, what recent progress he has made on conventional weapons cooperation through thematic dialogues via the UK-EU Security and Defence Dialogue.
The Security and Defence Partnership agreed with the European Union on 19 May is an example of this Government delivering on our manifesto commitments to strengthen European security, support growth and reinforce NATO. Implementation is progressing. Since May, the Defence Secretary has held discussions with the European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, where they discussed our ambition to explore the potential for enhanced UK-EU cooperation under SAFE. The Foreign Secretary has also held talks with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas on the geopolitical challenges that face our continent. We look forward to the foreign and security policy dialogue between the High Representative, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary this autumn. In addition, officials from across government continue to hold consultations with their EU counterparts on a range of issues, including but not limited to Iran, Russia-Ukraine, and tackling irregular migration. As the Defence Secretary has previously said to this House, he will ensure that any UK commitment– whether financial or non-financial – provides value for the UK taxpayer and supports our defence goals. We will continue to prioritise engagement and cooperation on the issues that are most important in helping to safeguard European security and prosperity – all in support of this government’s NATO First defence policy. The Defence Secretary and I look forward to continuing to update the House on developments. The Defence Secretary’s offer still stands that he is happy to arrange a discussion with the Member of Parliament for South Suffolk who has shown such interest in these topics.
With reference to paragraph 12, subsection F, of the policy paper entitled Security and defence partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, published on 19 May 2025, how many times the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has invited UK delegates to the Schuman Security and Defence Forum since 19 May 2025.
The Security and Defence Partnership agreed with the European Union on 19 May is an example of this Government delivering on our manifesto commitments to strengthen European security, support growth and reinforce NATO. Implementation is progressing. Since May, the Defence Secretary has held discussions with the European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, where they discussed our ambition to explore the potential for enhanced UK-EU cooperation under SAFE. The Foreign Secretary has also held talks with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas on the geopolitical challenges that face our continent. We look forward to the foreign and security policy dialogue between the High Representative, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary this autumn. In addition, officials from across government continue to hold consultations with their EU counterparts on a range of issues, including but not limited to Iran, Russia-Ukraine, and tackling irregular migration. As the Defence Secretary has previously said to this House, he will ensure that any UK commitment– whether financial or non-financial – provides value for the UK taxpayer and supports our defence goals. We will continue to prioritise engagement and cooperation on the issues that are most important in helping to safeguard European security and prosperity – all in support of this government’s NATO First defence policy. The Defence Secretary and I look forward to continuing to update the House on developments. The Defence Secretary’s offer still stands that he is happy to arrange a discussion with the Member of Parliament for South Suffolk who has shown such interest in these topics.
With reference to paragraph 12, subsection E, of the policy paper entitled Security and defence partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, published on 19 May 2025, what recent progress he has made on arms export control through thematic dialogues via the UK-EU Security and Defence Dialogue.
The Security and Defence Partnership agreed with the European Union on 19 May is an example of this Government delivering on our manifesto commitments to strengthen European security, support growth and reinforce NATO. Implementation is progressing. Since May, the Defence Secretary has held discussions with the European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, where they discussed our ambition to explore the potential for enhanced UK-EU cooperation under SAFE. The Foreign Secretary has also held talks with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas on the geopolitical challenges that face our continent. We look forward to the foreign and security policy dialogue between the High Representative, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary this autumn. In addition, officials from across government continue to hold consultations with their EU counterparts on a range of issues, including but not limited to Iran, Russia-Ukraine, and tackling irregular migration. As the Defence Secretary has previously said to this House, he will ensure that any UK commitment– whether financial or non-financial – provides value for the UK taxpayer and supports our defence goals. We will continue to prioritise engagement and cooperation on the issues that are most important in helping to safeguard European security and prosperity – all in support of this government’s NATO First defence policy. The Defence Secretary and I look forward to continuing to update the House on developments. The Defence Secretary’s offer still stands that he is happy to arrange a discussion with the Member of Parliament for South Suffolk who has shown such interest in these topics.
With reference to paragraph 15 of the policy paper entitled Security and defence partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, published on 19 May 2025, what recent progress he has made on establishing a UK-EU dialogue on peace mediation.
The Security and Defence Partnership agreed with the European Union on 19 May is an example of this Government delivering on our manifesto commitments to strengthen European security, support growth and reinforce NATO. Implementation is progressing. Since May, the Defence Secretary has held discussions with the European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, where they discussed our ambition to explore the potential for enhanced UK-EU cooperation under SAFE. The Foreign Secretary has also held talks with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas on the geopolitical challenges that face our continent. We look forward to the foreign and security policy dialogue between the High Representative, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary this autumn. In addition, officials from across government continue to hold consultations with their EU counterparts on a range of issues, including but not limited to Iran, Russia-Ukraine, and tackling irregular migration. As the Defence Secretary has previously said to this House, he will ensure that any UK commitment– whether financial or non-financial – provides value for the UK taxpayer and supports our defence goals. We will continue to prioritise engagement and cooperation on the issues that are most important in helping to safeguard European security and prosperity – all in support of this government’s NATO First defence policy. The Defence Secretary and I look forward to continuing to update the House on developments. The Defence Secretary’s offer still stands that he is happy to arrange a discussion with the Member of Parliament for South Suffolk who has shown such interest in these topics.
What percentage of the drones provided to Ukraine since February 2022 have been British made.
Where the UK's drone industry can meet Ukraine's drone requirements, the Ministry of Defence sources from UK industry, and this is true of the majority of the spend on drone procurements for Ukraine. This has been reaffirmed by the Defence Secretary's announcement at the Ukraine Defence Contact Group on 4 June 2025, where he pledged £350 million investment into drones this financial year, with the majority of the spend to be with British companies.
Pursuant to the Answer of 25 March 2025 to Question 39917 on Unmanned Air Systems: Procurement, how many drones in (a) logistics, (b) strike and (c) intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance roles were purchased by his Department since 25 March 2025.
I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave him on 8 July 2025 to Question 64478.
How many Puma 3 AE drones has his Department ordered since 5 July 2024.
Due to operational security, we cannot provide details on the numbers or types of drones ordered by the Ministry of Defence.
How many Parrot Anafi USA drones has his Department ordered since 5 July 2024.
Due to operational security, we cannot provide details on the numbers or types of drones ordered by the Ministry of Defence.
How many FPV drones his Department has ordered since 5 July 2024.
Due to operational security, we cannot provide details on the numbers or types of drones ordered by the Ministry of Defence.
How many Black Hornet drones his Department has ordered since 5 July 2024.
Due to operational security, we cannot provide details on the numbers or types of drones ordered by the Ministry of Defence.
How many drones his Department has provided to Ukraine by (a) reconnaissance, (b) logistics, (c) FPV and (d) long-range one-way attack since February 2022..
The UK has delivered over 70,000 uncrewed systems to Ukraine since Russia's illegal invasion began. This includes hundreds of long-range attack drones, first person view (FPV), loitering munitions, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) drones and maritime drones. As a former Defence Minister, he will know that for operational security reasons, we cannot provide details of the types of military drones purchased by the Ministry of Defence for its own purposes or those purchased for Ukraine.The UK is also co-leading the Drone Capability Coalition (DCC) with Latvia, which is working to increase the quality and quantity of drones provided to Ukraine. The DCC is currently focusing on small UAS and interceptors through competitive tenders, and as announced by the Defence Secretary in January, will provide 30,000 FPV drones for Ukraine by August of this year.
How many Ghost MK4 drones has his Department ordered since 5 July 2024.
Due to operational security, we cannot provide details on the numbers or types of drones ordered by the Ministry of Defence.
How many 7.62mm rounds his Department has ordered since 5 July 2024.
I am withholding the information requested as it is operationally sensitive.