Written questions by Cartlidge.

With reference to the letter from the Right Hon. Member for Liverpool Garston to the Hon. Member for South Suffolk dated 29 July 2025, how much of the stated NATO-qualifying expenditure will be spent on the implementation of the UK – EU Security and Defence Partnership.

The Department’s spending plans will be set out in the Defence Investment Plan, which will be published in the autumn. The share of this spending that relates to individual categories of spend will be considered as part of future returns to NATO.

With reference to the letter from the Minister for Defence Procurement and Industry to the hon. Member for South Suffolk of 29 July 2025, how much of the stated NATO-qualifying expenditure will be spent on hybrid threat responses in the (a) 2027-28 and (b) 2028-29 financial years.

The Department’s spending plans will be set out in the Defence Investment Plan, which will be published in the autumn. The share of this spending that relates to individual categories of spend will be considered as part of future returns to NATO.

With reference to the letter from the Minister for Defence Procurement and Industry to the hon. Member for South Suffolk of 29 July 2025, how much of the stated NATO-qualifying expenditure will be spent on supporting modern deterrence in the (a) 2027-28 and (b) 2028-29 financial years.

The Department’s spending plans will be set out in the Defence Investment Plan, which will be published in the autumn. The share of this spending that relates to individual categories of spend will be considered as part of future returns to NATO.

Whether the Defence Investment Plan will report based on a cost envelope in relation to (a) his Department's budget or (b) NATO qualifying defence expenditure.

The Defence Investment Plan will set out the Department's spending plans to deliver the vision of the Strategic Defence Review against its forecast budget. This will be based on the Department's Spending Review settlement, and the MOD's projected share of the Government's ambition to spending 3% of GDP on defence in the next Parliament as and when fiscal and economic conditions allow.

With reference to the Prime Minister's Oral Statement of 25 February 2025 on Defence and Security, Official Report, column 633, whether the annual increase in defence spending will include the Single Intelligence Account.

The Prime Minister has been clear about the contribution our intelligence and security services make to the defence of our nation. The commitment to spend 2.6% on defence from 2027 will include all spend relating the Single Intelligence Account.

Whether the Defence Investment Plan will report based on a cost envelope of (a) 2.5%, (b) 3% or (c) 3.5% of GDP on defence expenditure.

The Defence Investment Plan will set out how the MOD will deliver the vision of the Strategic Defence Review within the MOD's share of the Government's commitment to spending 2.6% of GDP on defence by 2027, and 3% of GDP in the next Parliament as fiscal and economic conditions allow.

With reference to recommendation 33 of the Strategic Defence Review: Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, published on 2 June 2025, whether he plans to make any amendments to the Single Source Contract Regulations regarding the delivery of the UK’s nuclear deterrent.

In accordance with recommendation 33b (Nuclear Industry Flexibility - Ensuring it has the flexibility to incentivise industry investment in infrastructure and asset management) of the Strategic Defence Review, the Department will be conducting a review of the Single Source Contracting Regulations (SSCRs). The review will commence by the end of September 2025 and will conclude within the current financial year in readiness for any necessary legislative changes following ministerial and parliamentary approval.

With reference to recommendation 34 of the Strategic Defence Review, published on 2 June 2025, what discussions he has had with stakeholders on the successor to the Dreadnought class submarine since 2 June 2025.

This Government is fully committed to the United Kingdom’s independent nuclear deterrent, underpinned by our triple lock commitment to continue to build the four new Dreadnought Class submarines, maintain our continuous at sea deterrent and deliver all the required upgrades, including the replacement warhead. The Government has accepted all of the Strategic Defence Review’s recommendations. We routinely hold discussions on possible future national security and defence capabilities with our industry and international partners.

With reference to recommendation 32 of the Strategic Defence Review: Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, published on 2 June 2025, which government departments will participate in the progress review of the National Endeavour for delivering the UK’s nuclear deterrent.

The National Endeavour to maintain and renew the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent is a whole of Government effort. The Ministry of Defence works closely with other Government departments, including the Cabinet Office, His Majesty’s Treasury, the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, to ensure its effective delivery. The National Security Council (Nuclear) remains committed to regularly reviewing progress on the National Endeavour. It receives comprehensive updates on delivery at least twice each year, with involvement from all relevant Departments.

With reference to recommendation 32 of the Strategic Defence Review: Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, published on 2 June 2025, when the first review by senior Ministers from the National Security Council (Nuclear) committee on progress on the National Endeavour for delivering the UK’s nuclear deterrent will (a) begin and (b) conclude.

The National Endeavour to maintain and renew the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent is a whole of Government effort. The Ministry of Defence works closely with other Government departments, including the Cabinet Office, His Majesty’s Treasury, the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, to ensure its effective delivery. The National Security Council (Nuclear) remains committed to regularly reviewing progress on the National Endeavour. It receives comprehensive updates on delivery at least twice each year, with involvement from all relevant Departments.

With reference to page 123 of the Strategic Defence Review: Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, published in June 2025, what the total cost to his Department is of establishing MOD policy teams as part of CyberEM Command.

The Defence Cyber and Electromagnetic Force (DCEMF) remains in internal planning and design stages, with options presented to Defence but not yet endorsed by Military Strategic Headquarters. Resource and capability decisions are subject to the Defence annual planning cycle and the Defence Investment Plan, which will ultimately shape the design of the DCEMF and the speed, scale, and nature of implementation. I hope that the Hon. Gentleman will understand that until these processes are complete, details such as basing, costs, and workforce mix remain undecided and would be speculative.

With reference to recommendation 21 of the Strategic Defence Review: Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, published on 2 June 2025, what recent progress his Department has made on developing a new Defence Diplomacy Strategy.

With the backdrop of the challenging global environment outlined in the Strategic Defence Review and the National Security Strategy, the Ministry of Defence is developing a new Defence Diplomacy Strategy, in coordination and consultation with other Government Departments. The Defence Diplomacy Strategy will prioritise the use of the Defence instrument in support of UK defence and wider foreign policy objectives. It will ensure that we are taking a coordinated, strategic and deliberate approach to protect and promote UK interests and enhance UK influence.This work is being led by the Minister of State for the House of Lords who is responsible for international relations and defence diplomacy.

With reference to page 79 of the Strategic Defence Review: Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, published on 2 June 2025, what discussions he has had with the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs on a dedicated training programme for international defence engagement since 2 June 2025.

The Secretary of State for Defence has not engaged in direct discussions with the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs regarding this issue. The Defenvce Minister for the House of Lords is leading development of the Defence Diplomacy Strategy, which will direct activities in this field. Nonetheless, officials from both Departments continue to collaborate on a routine basis.

With reference to page 47 of the Strategic Defence Review, published on 2 June 2025, what assessment he has made of the risk of cyber attacks on legacy systems currently in use by his Department.

After years of underfunding and hollowing out under the previous administration, we recognise there is a need to invest more to bring our systems up to date. Defence routinely completes assessments of its digital systems. Understanding these risks is critical to Defence’s ability to defend against cyber-attacks.Based on these assessments, Defence continually implements security improvements to mitigate risks, addressing known vulnerabilities and the expansion of our Detect & Respond capabilities to identify and block threats. The greater attention to the cyber and Electro Magnetic domain promised in the Strategic Defence Review will strengthen our ability to deliver our critical outputs.

With reference to recommendation 5 of the Strategic Defence Review, published on 2 June 2025, when the first report of progress in establishing the fundamental capabilities of a core common platform will be submitted to the Secretary of State.

The fundamental capabilities of the core common platform set out within the Strategic Defence Review already exist and are being used today; however, they are not at the scale or delivering the integrated and innovative capabilities at the speed required to support the Integrated Force model. The regular progress reporting to Ministers will ensure that investment in these essential digital capabilities is closely monitored and prioritised through the Defence Investment Plan. The first progress report is due to be submitted to the Secretary of State in Autumn 2025.

With reference to recommendation 26 of the Strategic Defence Review: Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, published on 2 June 2025, what discussions his Department has held with the Department for Education on plans to expand in-school Cadet Forces by 30% by 2030.

The campaign to increase the Cadet Forces by 30% by 2030 (’30 by 30’) is backed by £70 million of extra funding. The diverse and unique nature of the individual Cadet Forces and the federated approach to delivery mean that this funding will be spread across the single Services, Ministry of Defence (MOD) Centre, and supporting organisations. Work is currently underway to establish how the 30% increase will be realised, and costings will be refined through the ongoing Defence Investment Plan process. The recommendation of the Strategic Defence Review covers both school and community-based Cadet Forces across the country. For a number of years, one focus for Cadet growth has been through the ongoing joint Department for Education (DfE)/MOD Cadet Expansion Programme (CEP) in schools. The CEP will form a key component of the new ‘30 by 30’ campaign, and our important engagement with DfE on the delivery of this discreet element will continue. We wish to grow Cadets in areas where the need is greatest. The MOD and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) are working together to achieve this aim. In addition to our ’30 by 30’ campaign, MOD future growth plans will be aligned with areas with the highest deprivation levels and the weakest social infrastructure, including MHCLG’s Plan for Neighbourhoods programme places.

With reference to recommendation 26 of the Strategic Defence Review: Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, published on 2 June 2025,what the cost to his Department is of increasing the Cadet Forces by 30% by 2030.

The campaign to increase the Cadet Forces by 30% by 2030 (’30 by 30’) is backed by £70 million of extra funding. The diverse and unique nature of the individual Cadet Forces and the federated approach to delivery mean that this funding will be spread across the single Services, Ministry of Defence (MOD) Centre, and supporting organisations. Work is currently underway to establish how the 30% increase will be realised, and costings will be refined through the ongoing Defence Investment Plan process. The recommendation of the Strategic Defence Review covers both school and community-based Cadet Forces across the country. For a number of years, one focus for Cadet growth has been through the ongoing joint Department for Education (DfE)/MOD Cadet Expansion Programme (CEP) in schools. The CEP will form a key component of the new ‘30 by 30’ campaign, and our important engagement with DfE on the delivery of this discreet element will continue. We wish to grow Cadets in areas where the need is greatest. The MOD and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) are working together to achieve this aim. In addition to our ’30 by 30’ campaign, MOD future growth plans will be aligned with areas with the highest deprivation levels and the weakest social infrastructure, including MHCLG’s Plan for Neighbourhoods programme places.

With reference to page 79 of the Strategic Defence Review: Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, published on 2 June 2025, whether he has a target date for forming a dedicated training programme for international defence engagement.

A training programme has been in place since the formation of the Defence Attaché & Loan Service Centre in 2016, preparing personnel to deploy into International Defence Engagement Roles across the world. Following the publication of the Strategic Defence Review, an internal review aiming to establish a Defence Diplomacy Career Stream is underway to further professionalise our people, which will include an examination of training provision. Until this review is complete, a target date for changes to the training pathway cannot be set.

With reference to recommendation 37 of the Strategic Defence Review: Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, published on 2 June 2025, when he expects the Royal Navy’s hybrid carrier airwing to reach full operational capability.

The Hybrid Air Wing, underpinned by the Royal Navy’s approach to Maritime Aviation Transformation, represents the evolution of the Fleet Air Arm to a crewed-uncrewed mix of drones, fast jets, helicopters and one-way effectors that will deliver enhanced lethality and combat mass for North Atlantic Sea Control, Homeland Defence and Carrier and Littoral Strike. Fielding a suite of capabilities that puts Europe’s only 5th generation aircraft carriers at the heart of NATO, the Hybrid Air Wing will be Uncrewed Where Possible, Crewed Where Necessary. The Hybrid Air Wing is an iterative concept, with individual capabilities subject to spiral development to keep pace with the threat; this means that there will not be a single declaration of Full Operational Capability. The investment decisions to support Strategic Defence Review recommendations are being developed by the Ministry of Defence and will be published in the Defence Investment Plan.

With reference to page 122 of the Strategic Defence Review: Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad, published in June 2025, where the Spectrum Coordination Office will be located.

The Defence Cyber and Electromagnetic Force (DCEMF) remains in internal planning and design stages, with options presented to Defence but not yet endorsed by Military Strategic Headquarters. Resource and capability decisions are subject to the Defence annual planning cycle and the Defence Investment Plan, which will ultimately shape the design of the DCEMF and the speed, scale, and nature of implementation. I hope that the Hon. Gentleman will understand that until these processes are complete, details such as basing, costs, and workforce mix remain undecided and would be speculative.