Written questions by Obese-Jecty.

What assessment he has made of the scale of the damage to Loch Long caused by radioactive water from the burst pipework at HMNB Clyde.

There has been no unsafe radioactive material released into the environment of Loch Long at any stage. The Royal Navy frequently engages with regulators who report there is no significant impact on the environment or public health. Appropriate preventative measures are in place to reduce safety risk, and the events reported reflect the rigorous monitoring that is carried out to ensure that any issues are identified and dealt with. His Majesty’s Navy Base (HMNB) Clyde complies with international best practice as recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Nuclear safety at these sites is independently overseen by the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR) and the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), who have robust powers to address concerns and recommend changes where necessary. These structures ensure that nuclear safety is treated with the seriousness that it requires.

Commonwealth and Development Affairs, with reference to her Department's press notice entitled UK targets sanctions circumvention and crypto networks exploited by Russia, published on 20 August 2025, which financial networks used by Russia have been targeted in order to restrict Russian exploitation.

The UK remains committed to increasing economic pressure on Russia including its financial and energy sectors. This includes carefully targeted sanctions against Russia's attempts to circumvent sanctions and create alternative payment systems, including through its use of cryptocurrencies such as A7A5. The 20 August 2025 package of sanctions targeted crypto networks and financial systems in Kyrgyzstan being exploited by Russia, building on over 2700 existing UK sanctions against Russia. UK sanctions complemented action taken by the United States who announced similar measures targeting the cryptocurrency. Sanctions are a critical instrument of the UK's foreign, national and security policy and are deployed selectively and proportionately to complement other tools as part of a wider strategy to deter Russia from continuing its illegal invasion of Ukraine. We continue to monitor the impact of our sanctions closely and engage with third countries on Russian circumvention and where Russia is attempting to exploit financial networks.

Commonwealth and Development Affairs, with reference to her Department's press notice entitled UK targets sanctions circumvention and crypto networks exploited by Russia, published on 20 August 2025, what estimate she has made of the value of material the Russian military have purchased through the Kyrgyzstan-based OJSC Capital Bank of Central Asia.

The UK remains committed to increasing economic pressure on Russia including its financial and energy sectors. This includes carefully targeted sanctions against Russia's attempts to circumvent sanctions and create alternative payment systems, including through its use of cryptocurrencies such as A7A5. The 20 August 2025 package of sanctions targeted crypto networks and financial systems in Kyrgyzstan being exploited by Russia, building on over 2700 existing UK sanctions against Russia. UK sanctions complemented action taken by the United States who announced similar measures targeting the cryptocurrency. Sanctions are a critical instrument of the UK's foreign, national and security policy and are deployed selectively and proportionately to complement other tools as part of a wider strategy to deter Russia from continuing its illegal invasion of Ukraine. We continue to monitor the impact of our sanctions closely and engage with third countries on Russian circumvention and where Russia is attempting to exploit financial networks.

With reference to page 41 of the National Security Strategy 2025, published in June 2025, CP 1338, what progress he has made on (a) identifying, (b) protecting and (c) cultivating other sovereign capabilities that are foundational to the UK’s (i) industrial base and (ii) long-term competitiveness.

The Defence Industrial Strategy (published on 8 September 2025) outlines a dynamic, defence and innovation-focused industrial base, emphasising the growing importance of ensuring UK sovereignty, operational advantage, and freedom of action. It sets out the Government’s commitment to strengthen the defence sectors that are essential for national security and supply chain resilience, as well as those with the greatest economic growth potential. The detail of these sectors is set out in section 1.3.3 of the Defence Industrial Strategy. The Defence Investment Plan will set out in more detail how we will support the UK’s long-term economic growth and competitiveness through our investment choices.

With reference to page 133 of his Department's Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 2 June 2025, what progress he has made in conducting a holistic assessment of defence infrastructure requirements.

As part of the Defence Investment Plan Defence has cohered the totality of the Defence Lines of Development for current capabilities and future Strategic Defence Review deliverables. This includes infrastructure for which the front-line commands and delivery agents have made a holistic assessment. Those capabilities and deliverables will be prioritised against force plans.

What assessment he has made of the potential merits of restoring occupational pensions to people who withdrew them prior to the establishment of the Pension Protection Fund.

This Government has not made an assessment on the matter. The Financial Assistance Scheme (FAS) existed prior to the Pension Protection Fund, to make payments to members of qualifying DB schemes that started to wind-up between 1 January 1997 and 5 April 2005. The FAS provides compensation to eligible members of DB pension schemes, such as in cases where the employer has undergone a qualifying insolvency event and the scheme lacks sufficient assets to meet its liabilities. It makes payments to eligible members who are unable to receive the full value of their accrued pension benefits, helping to safeguard retirement income where the scheme itself cannot secure those benefits in full.

With reference to page 43 of the National Security Strategy 2025, published in June 2025, CP 1338, what progress he has made on building at least six new (a) munitions and (b) energetics factories.

The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) committed to invest £1.5 billion in an 'always on' pipeline for munitions and to build at least six new energetics and munitions factories in the UK this parliament. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is currently developing a plan to deliver this commitment alongside our wider Defence Industrial Strategy, delivering long-term investment to boost UK growth and generating skilled UK jobs and export opportunities. The MOD is carefully considering arrangements for 'always on' and for new energetics and munitions factories including their potential locations, and more detail will be set out in due course. Work is ongoing in respect to the new factories and further announcements will be made in due course.

With reference to page 109 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, when the enhanced recce-strike capability via Project ASGARD will be (a) operational and (b) shared across defence.

I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave him on 8 September 2025, to Question 73577, which remains extant and explains the current position for the Army’s project ASGARD. The next iteration of ASGARD, focused at Corps level operations, will be tested in Quarter 2 2026.

What methods of illegal entry into the UK have been used since 5 July 2024.

The Home Office publishes statistics on detected irregular arrivals to the UK in the ‘Immigration System Statistics Quarterly Release’. Data on detected irregular arrivals by method of entry (including small boat arrivals), age group, and sex is published in table Irr_D01 of the ‘Irregular migration to the UK detailed datasets’, with the latest data up to the end of June 2025.

With reference to page 42 of the National Security Strategy 2025, published in June 2025, CP 1338, in what ways the defence industrial base will be redefined to include (a) academia, (b) dual-use civilian-military companies, (c) financial services, (d) technologists and (e) trade unions.

The Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) (published on 8 September 2025) sets out our approach to redefining the defence industrial base. In order to adopt a whole of society approach to keeping the UK safe and boosting economic growth, our definition must reflect the deep range of partners and expertise both within our traditional defence sector and those in adjacent sectors. The DIS (section 1.3.2) therefore redefines the UK defence industrial base to include academic institutions (including dual-use civilian-military companies), UK-based companies, banks and other financial services companies, goods and services firms, technologists and technology firms, and trade unions and their members.

With reference to page 46 of the National Security Strategy 2025, published in June 2025, CP 1338, what progress he has made on increasing the ability of the UK to pool defence capital with allies.

We are working with partners on a series of potential opportunities to pool defence capital with allies, including through multilateral initiatives, aggregating defence demand, increasing European interoperability and standardisation, enhancing cooperation through the EU's Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument and exploring other international mechanisms.

By when the (a) Defence Support and (b) Defence Digital will move to the National Armaments Director group.

Defence Support was integrated into the National Armament Director (NAD) Group as of 1 April 2025. Defence Digital moved into the (NAD) Group on 1 July 2025.

He will list the Ministry of Defence sites that have been released for disposal under the Defence Estate Optimisation programme since 5 July 2024 and (a) have been sold and (b) remain unsold.

All Ministry of Defence disposals, and the planned disposal dates, are already listed on the House of Commons Defence Disposal Database. This includes three Defence Estate Optimisation disposals since July 2024, and the remaining phases of a further two sites.

With reference to page 134 of his Department's Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 2 June 2025, what progress he has made in identifying where operational infrastructure does not meet requirements under force development plans.

Defence maintains risk registers and capability assessments across all defence lines of development, this includes infrastructure. The defence investment plan will cohere current capabilities and future Strategic Defence Review deliverables, Those capabilities and deliverables will be prioritised against force plans the prioritisation of the above includes examination of both risk and capability assessments.

With reference to page 136 of his Department's document entitled Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 2 June 2025, what progress his Department has made in appointing a board member with responsibility for infrastructure to all Front Line Command boards.

Each Front-Line Command contains a director level post who represents infrastructure both on their board, and within the central Ministry of Defence senior infrastructure board. As part of defence reform, the infrastructure operating model and senior boards composition, will be examined to ensure they meet the Strategic Defence Review commitments.

With reference to page 136 of his Department's document entitled Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 2 June 2025, what progress he has made in ensuring that infrastructure requirements are fully integrated into (a) capability development and (b) investment decisions.

The Defence Investment Plan (DIP) will cohere current capabilities and future Strategic Defence Review deliverables, this includes the infrastructure which supports or enables the capability. Those capabilities and deliverables will be prioritised against force plans and published within the DIP.

If he will set out the remaining lifespan of each RAF Chinook airframe in service.

There are currently eight HC5, 14 HC6 and 29 HC6A Chinook variants in service. I am withholding the information relating to the remaining lifespan of each Chinook airframe in service as its disclosure would be likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the Armed Forces. I can, however, reemphasise that the retirement of the 14 oldest Chinook helicopters will be synchronised with the delivery of 14 new state-of-the-art Chinook H-47 Extended Range aircraft from 2027 onwards.

What recent progress he has made on implementing the Future Cruise Anti-Ship Weapon programme.

The Future Cruise Anti-Ship Weapon programme continues to progress with our European partners and has recently entered the development phase.

How many RAF Chinook (a) HC5, (b) HC6 and (c) HC6A variants are in service.

There are currently eight HC5, 14 HC6 and 29 HC6A Chinook variants in service. I am withholding the information relating to the remaining lifespan of each Chinook airframe in service as its disclosure would be likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the Armed Forces. I can, however, reemphasise that the retirement of the 14 oldest Chinook helicopters will be synchronised with the delivery of 14 new state-of-the-art Chinook H-47 Extended Range aircraft from 2027 onwards.

What assessment has he made of whether the Future Cruise Anti-Ship Weapon programme will meet all extant key user requirements.

The Future Cruise Anti-Ship Weapon programme is moving towards its Full Business Case approval in 2026 where the Key User Requirements will be formally set. The programme continues to assess how best it can meet and exceed user requirements which stretch well beyond current requirements and capabilities to meet future threat needs.