Whether the Government uses IFlyTek for any translation services.
Awaiting answer.
Every parliamentary written question tabled by Alicia Kearns this session, with the full answer and department. Back to the MP page.
Showing 1–20 of 403 · this parliament
Whether the Government uses IFlyTek for any translation services.
Awaiting answer.
With reference to the Answer of 22 April 2026 to Question 111844 on Schools: Allergies, which organisation will schools be required to report allergy incidents.
Awaiting answer.
Commonwealth and Development Affairs, whether (a) Ministers and (b) officials in her Department have (i) met with and (ii) received communications from (A) Groze Consulting Limited, (B) CGC reSolutions Ltd and (C) Morris de Corve and Associates Limited registered as representing the Republika Srpska Entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Awaiting answer.
Pursuant to the Answer of 19 May 2026 to Question 472, whether any of the enhanced technical solutions and technological tools rely on Chinese (a) technology and (b) equipment.
Awaiting answer.
Whether her Department has conducted an assessment of trends in links between Chinese Communist Party United Front organisations and individuals involved in (a) labour exploitation, (b) money laundering and (b) irregular migration schemes in the UK.
As is longstanding government policy, it would be inappropriate to comment on specific national security matters.This Government, working closely with our law enforcement partners, is strengthening our understanding of Chinese organised crime activity in the UK. Where crime is identified, we will pursue all avenues to ensure the perpetrators are brought to justice.Where there are individuals who pose a threat to our national security, we are committed to using the full range of powers available to disrupt them. This includes the National Security Act 2023, which introduced a significant package of measures to be used against the full range of state threats activity.
What steps her Department is taking to prevent people with known links to Chinese organised crime groups from being treated as community representatives by public bodies.
Awaiting answer.
What assessment her Department has made of the potential implications for its policies of evidence in the Wilson Report on the direction of Chinese organised crime activity by the PRC.
Across the country, officers are confronting complex serious organised crime groups who collaborate across borders.We are stepping up efforts by introducing a world class National Police Service to bring together specialist capabilities and adopt best-in-class technology. This will bolster action to detect and disrupt the most dangerous criminals.As is longstanding government policy, it would be inappropriate to comment on specific national security matters.This Government, working closely with our law enforcement partners, is strengthening our understanding of Chinese organised crime activity in the UK. Where crime is identified, we will pursue all avenues to ensure the perpetrators are brought to justice.
Commonwealth and Development Affairs, with reference to Questions 129898 and HL14926 on Taiwan: International Relations, if she will correct the record and state Taiwan is a full member of the Asian Development Bank rather than an observer.
The Government recognises that Taiwan participates in the Asian Development Bank as a full member economy under the designation "Taipei, China" and is happy to correct the record in this respect.
What steps she is taking to improve police access to Cantonese, Hakka, Hokkien and Eastern Min language capabilities for serious organised crime and national security investigations.
Counter Terrorism Policing continues to maintain the technological tools andtranslation capabilities necessary to meet legislative and evidentialrequirements.CTP are strengthening this capacity, including through the development anddeployment of enhanced technical solutions and by increasing the number ofsuitably cleared translators.
Whether her Department has made an assessment of trends in the level of People's Republic of China-linked transnational repression involving criminal proxies targeting UK-based dissidents.
Perpetrating states use a wide range of methodologies to conduct transnational repression. The UK’s approach to countering state-directed threats is systematic, comprehensive, and continually improving.The Government continually assesses the threat using a multisource model - combining intelligence assessments, policing insight, international engagement and contributions from civil society and affected individuals - to improve our understanding of behaviours and countries of concern.Some foreign states are recruiting proxies to commit harmful acts that threaten the UK’s national security.The implementation of the National Security Act has provided our intelligence services and police with a suite of measures to protect our national security, the safety of the British public, and our vital interests from malign state threat activity. Individuals may be at risk of committing an offence under the National Security Act if they knew, or ought reasonably to have known they were undertaking activity on behalf of a foreign power.
Whether her Department is taking steps to support the use of artificial intelligence tools by police forces to help tackle language barriers in investigations, particularly those involving less widely spoken languages and dialects.
Awaiting answer.
What assessment she has made of the adequacy of Chinese language training, including in Hokkien and Hokchia dialects, provided to police officers investigating organised crime.
Awaiting answer.
If her Department will take steps to help ensure that police forces have access to an adequate number of security-vetted translators proficient in Chinese languages and dialects, including Hokkien and Hokchia, for use in organised crime investigations.
Awaiting answer.
Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what steps her Department is taking to support Taiwan's inclusion in (a) the World Health Organisation, and (b) other multilateral organisations.
I refer the Hon Member to the answer provided in the House of Lords on 9 March in response to Question HL14926.
What assessment he has made of the potential implications for his policies of the decision by the Australian Department of Defence to migrate its systems out of Global Switch data centres following the 2016 acquisition; and what steps his Department took to assess whether equivalent risks existed in the United Kingdom.
It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.
Whether the Home Office or any of its contractors used Global Switch data centres for the storage or transmission of government data between 2016 and 2026.
It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.
Whether sensitive government data was (a) stored in and (b) transmitted through Global Switch data centres following the acquisition of a 49% stake by Elegant Jubilee Ltd in December 2016.
It has not proved possible to respond to the Hon Member in the time available before Prorogation.
Whether his Department conducted a national security review of the acquisition of Global Switch by Elegant Jubilee Ltd in December 2016.
It has not proved possible to respond to the Hon Member in the time available before Prorogation.
Innovation and Technology, what assessment she has made of the potential impact of the 2016 Chinese consortium acquisition of Global Switch on the company’s valuation and growth trajectory relative to the broader data centre market.
The Government does not assess or track the specific commercial valuation of individual companies in the data centre sector, such as Global Switch.The data centre sector is a success story for the UK and is continuing to grow. It is critical to supporting the UK’s digital economy, underpinning AI adoption, cloud services and productivity across almost every sector.
Commonwealth and Development Affairs, whether her Department used Global Switch infrastructure, including interconnection and on-ramp facilities, for communications with British overseas missions between 2016 and 2026.
It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.