I welcome everyone to this very unusual joint meeting of the Home Affairs Committee and Northern Ireland Affairs Committee. We are holding this session in response to recent events in Northern Ireland, to look at the response to the recent disorder in Belfast. For the Home Affairs Committee, this follows on from our work looking at the policing response to the disorder after the Southport attack in summer 2024. We will also explore the arrangements that the Government have in place to identify and respond to irregular migration to and from Northern Ireland, which the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee looked at in its recent inquiry on policing and security in Northern Ireland. To be clear, we are not linking the two issues: we want to understand the policing and the issues around migration, but we are not making a link between the two. For our first panel, we will start with questions about the recent disorder before moving on to questions about irregular migration. Before we start our questioning, I highlight that there are live criminal proceedings relating to the attack in Belfast on 8 June and the subsequent disorder. In line with Parliament’s sub judice rule, we will not discuss the details of any individual cases. Could our witnesses introduce themselves? Let’s start with Mr Beck—unfortunately, he had travel problems, so he joins us online—then come to Mr Montgomery and so on.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear virtually in front of you today. I am Davy Beck, assistant chief constable responsible for the crime department in the PSNI. Good afternoon.

Good afternoon, everyone. I am Eddy Montgomery and I am the director of enforcement, compliance and crime within immigration enforcement in the Home Office. I have responsibility for leading the UK’s operational response to tackling irregular migration, alongside law enforcement partners. To an extent that involves—not exclusively—identifying, arresting and detaining individuals who have no right to be in the United Kingdom, disrupting organised crime groups who violate or exploit immigration routes, managing those on immigration bail in our communities, and applying sanctions and penalties to those who are unlawfully in the United Kingdom and try to access work, benefits and services.

Good afternoon, Chair. My name is Miles Bonfield. I am the director of investigations for the National Crime Agency.

I am Duncan Capps, the acting border security commander. I have been in post since 1 April. I have cross-system leadership responsibility, principally focused on organisational immigration crime and protecting UK borders.

We will start our questioning on the policing aspect.

We were all concerned, outraged and horrified by the disorder on the streets of our United Kingdom. All our thoughts are with those who were impacted. Davy, can you talk us through the PSNI’s experience and response to the disorder we saw in Belfast a few weeks ago?

Unfortunately, this is the third year in a row that we in Northern Ireland have witnessed what I could only describe as atrocious violence and racism that has impacted many of our communities, who are still very much reeling from what was experienced. By way of background, we had a brutal knife attack in the north Belfast area on the evening of 8 June, which led to life-changing injuries being suffered by Mr Stephen Ogilvie. He and his family are in our thoughts at this time. The suspect in that incident was a foreign national with leave to remain in the UK. He was arrested promptly at the scene and has subsequently been charged with attempted murder. As the Chair said, I am conscious that the case remains before the courts, so I will not go into any specific details of the incident. The attack was captured on video by a member of the public. That footage went viral very quickly. Our inquiries indicate that the male suspect entered Northern Ireland via the common travel area in February 2023 and was subsequently granted leave to remain in the UK until 2028. We continue to investigate the origins of the male, with one potential line of inquiry indicating that he may be from Chad, not Sudan, as was initially indicated. We continue to investigate that line of inquiry with the relevant authorities in Chad. Following that incident, throughout 9 June we became aware of significant online calls for protests at sites across Northern Ireland. Those calls had a clear anti-immigration and extreme right-wing theme. There were also significant calls for people to come prepared for disorder. For example, people were instructed to wear masks, dress in black and leave their electronic devices at home, we believe in an attempt to frustrate the police’s subsequent investigations. We then saw really serious, sustained and what I would describe as racially motivated disorder across Northern Ireland on 9 June. Groups, mainly men, blocked roads, set fire to vehicles and went straight to the street, destroying property and attacking the homes that they believed to belong to ethnic minorities. This was some of the most serious disorder and violence we have seen in Northern Ireland for many years. Had it not been for the response of police, supported by colleagues from the fire and rescue service and the ambulance service, I have no doubt that lives could well have been lost on that night. Some of you will have seen the footage of our officers evacuating families from their homes. Many of them had young children. In one incident we saw children aged six and eight being recovered from a house where their father had attempted to hide them. In another incident, a two-month-old baby was rescued by our officers and colleagues from the fire and rescue service. The following day, we again saw further calls for widespread protests. Thankfully, disorder was more localised on the second night, but again it caused considerable concern. There were attacks on our officers and attempts to attack the properties of migrants. This disorder was conducted by those I would describe as thugs. They were responsible for targeting some people simply because they perceived them not to be white. Many of those attacked have been resident in Northern Ireland for many years—in some cases, their entire lives—and many are key workers in our health service. They contribute significantly to society, much more than the mindless thugs who targeted them. As I said, police officers came under sustained attack on both nights. We had 49 officers injured—some suffering concussion, burns and smoke inhalation, as well as other injuries. I think it is fair to say that the chief constable has made it absolutely clear that we were stretched on those initial nights in our response to the incidents of disorder. As a consequence, this is the third year in a row that we have had to summon mutual aid support from GB police colleagues. In the region of 168 officers joined us from GB. My colleagues and I are certainly very grateful for that support and assistance, which gave us the added resilience to sustain two significant nights of disorder and to return to normality thereafter. I reassure the joint Committees that a significant investigation team has been put in place to investigate that totally unacceptable disorder. To date, we have made 35 arrests: 27 of those people have been charged directly to court, seven have been bailed pending further investigative action and one person has being reported to the Public Prosecution Service. The day after the outbreak of the disorder, we published the first image of a suspected rioter. Since then, 16 sets of images have been released into the public domain. Again, I think that illustrates that we are relentlessly pursuing those who are responsible. One person has been charged with attempted murder, and there have been charges in respect of arson with intent to endanger life. That, too, evidences the serious nature of what we were faced with. In addition to responding to the disorder, we put significant time and effort into engaging with our ethnic minority communities across Northern Ireland. Personally, I have spoken to a number of representatives of those communities. I would say that those communities are still very much living in fear. People are afraid to go about their daily activity, and we have seen racist criminal damage, assaults and threats continue in parts of the country. Clearly, tensions remain high at this stage. We continue to see and remove racist material across a number of locations. There has been speculation about paramilitary involvement. The chief constable addressed the Policing Board last week specifically on that point. I echo what we said at that point: it is clear that members of loyalist paramilitary groups were present at some sites of the disorder, and were involved in directing the violence at a number of locations. I will pause there. I am happy to take any follow-up questions or comments.

Thank you very much, Mr Beck, for the comprehensive and at times painful explanation of the PSNI’s experience of what happened. I join in your thanks to the emergency services, and I am sure that goes for all colleagues around the table. Please pass those thanks on to the emergency workers who are on the frontline. I note two things, if you will indulge me, Chair. First, I am conscious of the rules, but Chad was mentioned; I think that is the third country in relation to this particular case, and that that could have unintended consequences for people from other parts of the world. The speed and evolution of a situation like this is such that it is vital that communication is as accurate as possible, to mitigate some of the unintended consequences. Earlier today, Mr Swann, my colleague from South Antrim, and I met young people from Northern Ireland. They raised a number of issues with us, one of which was the hurt, fear and, in some cases, shame that they felt after the events of a few weeks ago. I would be grateful if you could expand a little on the impact of the disorder on community cohesion in Belfast and across Northern Ireland.

I would summarise that in one word—fear. There is considerable fear, which has been palpable across ethnic minorities, but also disappointment among a greater number of people in Northern Ireland, who were also appalled by the sights that they saw. There was significant effort from the voluntary sector to assist, support and respond to the signs—often quietly, behind the scenes. It is important that we recognise the voluntary sector and their response to these incidents. That was quite significant. But there is still considerable fear and tension within communities. Unfortunately, we are seeing examples of continued intimidation, offensive material and the stoking up—at a localised area level—of those fears and tensions. We continue to police those issues. We continue to engage with the wide range of community representatives and ethnic minority representatives to get a feeling for where they currently are and to provide that support, visibility and reassurance. But I think the main response is the arrests and the proactive investigation. That sends a clear message across those communities that we are responding to these issues.

Mr Beck, I am of colour; I am not white. I spend a lot of time in Northern Ireland as a result of family connections. We all have a responsibility to ensure that Northern Ireland is viewed as, and in reality is, the safe place that many of us know it to be—for anyone, whoever they are and wherever they are from. All political leaders and, as you say, civic society have a responsibility to make sure that happens. You touched on the fact that—I didn’t get the number—a number of officers from GB came over to help the PSNI response. Presumably, capacity was one of the challenges that the PSNI faced when policing the recent disorder in Belfast. What were the other challenges?

Just to be clear, 168 officers from GB came to assist us as part of our mutual aid requirement. This is the third year in a row we have had to ask for mutual aid. That, again, emphasises many of the concerns that the chief constable has shared with you and the other Committee members about our dire resourcing and financial constraints, which we continue to navigate. Those officers helped with the deployment on the ground, but also by providing resilience and support to our public order units as they faced the third and fourth nights of deployment and full mobilisation across the PSNI. It was vital to have that additional support. Outside the resourcing element, the issue of information and misinformation was key. This is the third year that we have had a trigger incident that has brought about disorder very quickly, fuelled online. Therefore, it has been difficult to predict in the usual sense of tensions and so on. These incidents are inflaming tensions very, very quickly, and that is very hard to get ahead of. That offers challenges—you touched on this earlier—about information and the speed of information. The learning from the terrible incidents in Southport in 2024 and the guidance issued across police services in the United Kingdom have indicated that we have to be more fleet of foot in our response, our information and our communication.

We are going to come to some of those issues in a moment, Mr Beck, so you will get more questions on that shortly.

Okay, grand. To summarise, information and misinformation is another key issue for us.

I am very interested in the point you made about the role that paramilitary and sectarian organisations played. I know that the International Organisation for Migration has recently published a report about the exploitation of young people in Northern Ireland by those groups. I am not asking you to comment on that at the moment; I just want to put it on the record as something that is of concern to many. I will turn now to my co-Chair, Tonia.

You were talking about misinformation and disinformation, Davy. What challenges does the use of social media by malign actors pose when you are responding to disorder?

First, the speed at which those issues, the echoing of messages and the video of the incident found their way on to social media, and the speed of the commentary—internally in Northern Ireland, but also from GB and wider afield—compounded the issues and inflated the tensions. We saw false reports about the victim’s condition and false images of the victim issued online. There were gruesome images published that were not correct. That had an impact on the victim, on the family and on the tensions. We worked very hard on our investigative stance in respect of the online commentary. We have a number of open investigations. There is a differential between what is repugnant and distasteful and what may well be criminal, but we are working our way through that with legal advice. Where there are opportunities, we will progress those investigations with a view to bringing people before the courts if that is achievable. Some of this commentary is external to the UK. The reach of that is significant. That leads to issues with our response, and speed of response, to the commentary and misinformation. We have learned from previous years. We were much quicker in our media facilities, our commentary and the information we put out online. Sometimes in policing we tend to wait until we have all the information or a perfect picture of the information. That was not possible in these circumstances. This was a real threat to life. The clock was ticking, so to speak. We had to balance information in a timely fashion, where perhaps in the past we would have waited until we had a fuller picture or we would have allowed more time for the entire information to materialise. We do not have that luxury any more.

You have mentioned how important the timelines are for you in getting as far ahead of the game as you can. I get that, but the accuracy of the information going out is also of great importance. Are there any issues with getting the right information out there for the PSNI?

There is a balance between accuracy and time. Certainly, checks and balances were put in place to ensure that we could stand over the accuracy at that time. All these investigations and issues such as disorder are dynamic and very fast-moving. The picture will change over time as well, but I think it was incumbent on us to ensure that we provided communities and ethnic minorities with factual information that we had at that time to reassure the greatest number of people about the actual circumstances and what we were doing to respond to them.

How do you work with the Home Office to share information about the ethnicity and immigration status of suspects?

There are national guidelines about when the police may consider disclosing the nationality and ethnicity of a suspect. We believe that we acted within those guidelines. There was a requirement to respond quickly and accurately for a policing purpose, which was about maintaining public confidence in the justice system and therefore addressing the concerns. We were in communication with the Home Office. We had spoken with the Home Office on a number of occasions just to relay what information we were aware of up to that point. There was good communication and there were good onward discussions, but clearly we got to a point, particularly when the Chief Constable was conducting a media facility with the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, when we were required to call for calm, as you would expect, and for peaceful protests. As part of that reassurance message, it was appropriate and right for our policing purpose that we provided information about the origins of the suspect at that time. I think that helped, at that minute in time, in terms of providing reassurance and commentary and being seen to get ahead of the fast-moving commentary online.

One thing I wanted to pick up on, Davy—I know that we have spoken about it before, including with the Chief Constable—is around funding. You said that you had the mutual support from GB, with 168 officers, and that it was the third year in a row that you had had to call on that mutual aid. I think it is obvious that you do not have adequate resources to deal with the disorder, but to what extent was the £4 million funding provided by the UK Government in the aftermath of the disorder adequate?

That additional £4 million is certainly helpful, and we welcome it. Currently, we would estimate the cost of the disorder to be in the region of £5.4 million, but the clock is still ticking on that. I still have significant resources as part of the investigative team dedicated to investigating the disorder, so the costs continue to rise. The costs are in excess of £4 million, but certainly that £4 million was critical. When you balance that against our current financial situation, this year, in-year, we have a funding gap that is currently in the region of £75 million, which grows to £92 million next year, and to £149 million the year after. Significant funding pressures exist this year and in subsequent years, based on our predictions at this minute in time. Clearly, that £4 million is of help, but it does not address all the issues. Of course, the true cost to policing probably extends beyond the financial expenditure. It is also reflected in officers and staff being diverted from services to the community, which are services that we want them to provide within communities each and every day, and services that those communities rely on each and every day. An example is that we had to divert staff from our public protection branch from addressing some of the issues that we talked about when we were last with your Committee: rape victims, domestic violence victims, and violence against women and girls. A number of those officers were diverted to deal with disorder. We also had officers who were investigating the recent terrorist attacks at Dunmurry and Lurgan who were diverted into public order and investigative roles, so the impact goes wider than the financial impact.

We have heard all the time, and especially when we were in Derry/Londonderry, about your community officers having to be moved when you have such disorder. This is the third year in a row. Another thing that we have heard is that there have been cuts to youth outreach programmes. You have spoken about the voluntary sector quietly working behind the scenes. We heard in evidence last week that the funding for that work has gone, because of the implementation of the local growth fund. Are you seeing that as a direct impact on the recent disorder? Those volunteers are going out as volunteers; they are not going out as organised groups. Is the fact that they are not on the street or the street corners, looking out for and talking to these young people, having an impact on policing? Has it impacted on the disorder?

On the first point, in respect of protecting neighbourhood community officers, we worked really hard this year to protect those officers and to maintain them as much as possible within their communities, because we felt that that was where there was the most value in terms of local engagement, local reassurance and local visibility right across Northern Ireland. We worked hard to do that, and the mutual aid officers and the mobilisation across the PSNI allowed us to do it, but there were other areas that clearly we had to extract and abstract officers from at that time, as I have identified. But we take on board the comments about the need to protect neighbourhood and community officers. Of the 35 arrests that we have made so far, five have been juveniles, so we have maybe seen a shift, with fewer juveniles involved in this disorder. Perhaps that does indicate the more co-ordinated fashion of the disorder we saw this year. At the time of this disorder, the schools were not out for the summer break, so that may also have had an impact, to some degree. We have not, as yet, seen a spike in juvenile offending, but I think it fair to say that there has been a reduction in provision, particularly in the community sector, in some of the funding streams that you mentioned. From a policing perspective, we are concerned about that, and I know that there is concern in those communities about the voluntary sector’s ability to maintain the level of diversionary activity that it would normally provide in the summer months. Unfortunately, I suspect we will not be in a position to assess that until the end of the summer. We will get more of an indication then, but perhaps that will be too late to adjust this current year.

I know we need to move on, but I have two more quick questions. How quickly does the mutual aid from GB arrive, and did it arrive in time?

Taking the learning from the previous two years, we triggered that earlier this year, effectively on the first day following the disorder. That was with us from Scotland within 24 hours of that trigger—much quicker and much slicker. That is where the learning comes in, but it is not a sustainable way to provide that public order support, and it does come with significant costs.

I am sorry to bombard you, but what additional support, if any, does the PSNI need from the UK Government for any future disorder?

Our recovery plan has outlined the key areas of support that we need, in terms of resilience around our neighbourhood officers, our investigative capability and indeed our public order capacity. All of those are contained within the business recovery case that we have previously discussed with the Committee, in terms of what we need moving forward. That is to regrow to around 7,000 officers and 2,500 staff, and there is still significant progress to be made if we are to fulfil that, and funding needed to allow us to do it.

I am conscious that we need to move on, and we are bombarding you with questions, Mr Beck, but we have a couple more questions for you, starting with Sorcha Eastwood.

Good afternoon, everyone. Mr Beck, you have touched upon foreign actors in the social media space throughout this disorder. There were images and pictures shared that were actually in Russia but were purporting to be areas in Northern Ireland. There is a temptation to make things about us and think that we are very special and unique in Northern Ireland, but actually this could have been anywhere in the United Kingdom, as we have seen over the last number of years. This is a national security issue. It is aggravated by local and historic factors within Northern Ireland, but my fear is that there are foreign actors who are desperately wanting to destabilise our democracy. You will be very aware of the defending democracy taskforce and some of the measures we are trying to take through the Representation of the People Bill. It is my understanding that last weekend, at a parade in Belfast, wi-fi was disabled. That was presumably done to stem rioting or potential riotous behaviour. Could you give any more information about that and how it could potentially be deployed in future?

Yes, we are certainly alive to the risks around external actors. I think you have covered that extremely well in terms of the potential risks. We are aware of those risks; we continue to raise those risks. In our response to national security threats, and terrorism and counter-terrorism more broadly, that is one of the key areas that concerns me and is something that we will continue to work hard to prepare for and respond to. I think you are right that there are rogue states, so to speak, that will utilise the tensions in Northern Ireland for their own means, to create tension and havoc in our local communities. We are aware of that, we will respond to that, and we will work, as part of counter-terrorist policing, to try to manage and mitigate those risks.

I appreciate that. Not to cut across you, but you have referred to mutual aid, and it is my understanding that mutual aid was made up of three or four constabularies from across the UK, one of them potentially in Scotland, where we know that there had also been attempts to stir up disturbance. Do you think that that was a deliberate attempt to frustrate the value of the mutual aid officers who would be going to Northern Ireland by spreading them thinly on the ground in their own patch before they came over here?

Very quickly, Mr Beck.

I have nothing to indicate that that was planned as such, but you will see attempts to stir it up right across the UK in response to any tensions or any trigger incident that may happen anywhere.

Thank you very much, Davy. We have heard that racially motivated crimes are at the highest level since records began. You rightly raised the response from the voluntary sector; groups like Anaka did much of the heavy lifting on supporting and housing some of the many, many people who were put out of their houses. Do you think that there is the required seriousness at an Executive level in addressing race hate, deradicalisation and even some of the legislation around racial motivation in crime in Northern Ireland? I will come back on the issue that you raised about paramilitary actors, but in terms of a cohesion strategy and a proactive response from the Executive, are we at the races here?

You are right in your interpretation around the crime figures. Racially motivated hate crime in Northern Ireland is now at its highest level since we began recording, and it is trending upwards. That raises a major concern for us in policing. We have seen that with the disorder over the last number of years. The figures today show that hate crime is up by around 10%, but race crime is up by around 17%, so that rise in hate crimes is primarily driven by a rise in race crimes. We have seen that right across all areas of policing geographically, albeit with the largest volume in the greater Belfast area. We are trending above the five-year trend, and there are significant issues around criminal damage—arson being the most significant offence within the hate category. Sorry, what was the second part of your question?

Is there an adequate response in terms of a cohesion strategy from the Executive?

In terms of response, the feedback I have had directly from communities is a degree of frustration that this is the third year in a row in which those communities have been the focus of significant disorder, tension and violence. My experience has been that those communities are appreciative of the policing support and the policing response to those issues, but there is a feeling of frustration around a longer-term strategy across Northern Ireland to address the core issues of community cohesion. You are right about that.

You are correct about the frustration, and I acknowledge that on many other issues you are policing political failures, one of which has been the failure to update race hate legislation for over two decades. As you know, many of those representing minority ethnic communities are raising that. Does the absence of updated legislation about race hate motivation present any challenge for you in policing and prosecution terms?

I think we are falling behind the rest of the UK, in terms of the legislation. We will make best use of whatever legislative frameworks and whatever offences there are. You have seen that in our response and the types of offences we have investigated thus far. We will continue to investigate, but you are right that from a policing perspective we are falling behind.

We do not have time to get into this at length, but you have raised the Chief Constable’s confirmation that paramilitary actors were involved in the disorder. You have also raised the reports of checkpoints and healthcare workers being asked for ID from masked men, who we presume were organised. Do you think that there is an acceptance, or a tolerance, of a level of paramilitary involvement in violence and the orchestration of violence and disorder in Northern Ireland? Is that being allowed to persist?

Again, very quickly, Mr Beck, and then we will move on.

I don’t accept that from a policing perspective. You will have seen how hard we worked to address the disorder, our work through the paramilitary crime taskforce to address paramilitary crime, and the work we continue to do with communities to provide alternative ways and mechanisms to stabilise communities.

I appreciate that this is not entirely a policing problem. Right down to paramilitary emblems flying from lampposts all over my constituency and others, there is a tolerance of a level of paramilitary involvement in Northern Ireland that is not, one way or the other, being properly addressed and eradicated.

That is fair. I think that is indicative of the post-conflict society that, unfortunately, we are still very much in.

We are now going to move on to migration topics, so it will not be quite so focused on you, Mr Beck, and we will bring in the rest of the panel. I will start with Bell Ribeiro-Addy.

I want to get into some questions about your roles and structures, but before I do, I want to address the scale of the issue. According to the NISRA’s own data, net migration to Northern Ireland was about 5,800 people in the year up to mid-2024. Of everyone who came to live there, 34% came for work, 35% came to join family, 14% came for education, and 10% came to seek asylum. Asylum seekers overall make up 0.1% of the population. Given those figures, do you consider Northern Ireland to have a particular illegal migration crisis? If so, what numbers are you working on?

The starting point for me has to be that the absence of controls means that we do not have a comprehensive picture of what the actual migration issues are—irregular or regular. That is why we work with the National Crime Agency, Home Office intelligence, Border Security, the Garda and Republic of Ireland authorities to try to enhance that picture. The agreement that we got in March with the Prime Minister and his counterpart in the Republic of Ireland, to enhance the data picture, improve biometric and asylum matching, and have a joint risk assessment, will be fundamental to how we drive that forward. I do not see any greater threat in Northern Ireland. We look at the threat to the United Kingdom as a whole. The CTA is not just a threat to Northern Ireland but to the whole United Kingdom.

Does anybody else on the panel want to comment on whether or not there is a particular illegal migration crisis?

I would not use the word “crisis”. It is obviously a concern, and certainly in our wider strategy for countering illegal migration—particularly that which is facilitated by organised immigration crime—Northern Ireland has a specific set of issues because of the CTA. But if you look at asylum claiming from small boat entries last year, it was just over 41,000 out of a total of ninety-something-thousand who claimed. The scale is greater in mainland UK. I would not characterise it as a crisis, but quite clearly from what the assistant chief constable said, there are real concerns about the fallout from what is happening there.

I know that we do not have a verified estimate of the undocumented population in Northern Ireland—presumably because it is so small, just like the number of migrants in Northern Ireland overall—but we do have some data for enforcement activity. I think you had 1,284 arrests, over 900 of which were from Operation Gull. Detections at ports, arrest measures and enforcement capacity are not necessarily the underlying part of the problem. Do you have an evidenced estimate of how many people in Northern Ireland are without lawful status? If not, on what basis was such a policy being built?

Again, I think that the absence of controls means that we are never going to have that unless we fundamentally change the CTA.

We will have some more questions on that shortly, by the way, so we are going to drill down into that a bit more.

On the statistics, 70% of all our activity in Northern Ireland is focused on Op Gull and tackling CTA abuse. Over the past two years, we have done 3,000 enforcement visits. The vast majority were to ports—airports, sea ports and transport hubs around Northern Ireland. We have done over 2,500 arrests and removed a thousand people. We take the threat very seriously, and the vast majority of my resource is focused on tackling that threat.

Can you briefly summarise what your respective roles were in addressing irregular migration in Northern Ireland?

Much as in the wider role that I have, any kind of illegal migration into the United Kingdom is a concern of the border security command. We are there to provide system leadership across Government with agencies and partners. I have statutory authority through the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025 to set priorities to all of those organisations, which they have to have due regard to. Basically, our job is to provide a coherence within that and to set a strategy. Obviously within that, abuse of small boats routes, clandestine routes and, particularly, any abuse of the CTA, both through Ireland into Northern Ireland and into the mainland United Kingdom, is a concern. I have a role within that as part of my statutory role.

From an NCA perspective, the NCA’s mission from Parliament is to protect communities from serious and organised crime. In this particular regard, our mission is to address those serious and organised crime elements that are facilitating irregular migration. Much like border security command, our mission is to ensure a shared awareness and common purpose in terms of an intelligence picture and to take action against serious and organised crime. With regards to your previous question, from a SOC assessment perspective, while infrastructure and travel routes have increased to provide opportunity for organised crime groups coming into the common travel area, we have not seen an increase in the serious and organised crime threat over the same period emanating from the common travel area.

Without wanting to repeat what I said at the outset, my job is to use that intelligence and focus resource and deploy the teams to where that threat is greatest.

How do you all work together? How do you co-ordinate effectively?

Very happily.

That’s easy enough. Duncan, what role specifically does border security command play in addressing abuse of the CTA? Does the CTA form part of the command’s holistic strategy to secure UK borders?

The broader strategy that we have set is about stopping organised immigration crime facilitating illegal entry into the UK. We moved back from that. Of course, what we are trying to do initially is stabilise those countries where people are coming from. You will be aware of some of the difficulties with that. We are trying to stop those criminal gangs from facilitating illegal border crossings. When we come to the near border area, we are particularly trying to stop facilitation in near border partners. Principally, that is Belgium, and then obviously France as well, which you are aware of—I know that a lot of you have been out there. That is particularly in those cases where people might fly from those airports into Ireland to then cross the border or might fly in directly and abuse that. We also try to deal with any of those pull factors, both in the mainland and within Northern Ireland as well, where criminal gangs in particular try to abuse those migrants that do come in. Abuse of the CTA specifically is unlike the situation with small boats, which, broadly, is a relatively cheap model. The facilitators generally charge quite a lot of money to get people in through the common travel area. As you are probably aware, that leads to greater exploitation, particularly in the area of exploiting women, particularly in terms of enslavement and human slavery. That, and the taskforce work that we do there, is part of that. With regard to the specific tactical responsibilities, that is the lead of the National Crime Agency, the Police Service of Northern Ireland and immigration enforcement. They retain operational independence and their powers. My job is to set priorities and control the wider strategy.

In presenting some of the data that I have to yourselves and listening to your response, it seems like there is not a lot of data on the scale of the crisis. I am unsure about how you share data between enforcement bodies to tackle irregular migration if there is not that much data to begin with. Can you outline what the barriers were to that?

Before you answer that, Paul Kohler has questions in a similar vein.

Can you give us a feel for how you establish the data? I understand the problems. What are the techniques you use and how confident are you in the data that you do have?

I know you asked one of the questions earlier. One of the things that is a good indicator is the number of people seeking asylum who had come into Northern Ireland last year. I think the number was 1,517. That number, while significant, is nowhere near what it has been on the mainland. That gives us an idea, broadly. As Eddy said, of course, for those people who enter in a clandestine way whom we do not pick up or who do not claim asylum, that is a more difficult figure. On the sharing of intelligence, the intelligence picture is rich and the organisations work closely together. I will let the NCA talk for itself, but the UK intelligence community, Home Office intelligence, which is part of Border Security Command, the National Crime Agency and I share information. Miles, do you want to cover some of what you do particularly?

If I can talk about how we do it from an NCA perspective, we hold the pen on strategic assessment to give an overall picture of the threat and particular assessment of areas affected, like the common travel area, to build the shared awareness across system partners. To build a common purpose, we supplement any governance groups that Border Security Command, immigration enforcement and PSNI can contribute to, to build that plan of what we are going to do together. On day-to-day collection, we use fusion centres that are staffed by our respective agencies. They are co-located, they come together and they have system access. Part of their job is to fuse into one picture what we can bring and to disseminate that for action. The only other part of that—which I will hand over to Eddy—is that, from a crime agency perspective, we support immigration enforcement in their tactical actions and their intensifications with either a strategic or a tactical intelligence picture, if it is required, or any other covert support that they may need in order to execute their role effectively and efficiently.

I have nothing major to add. Immigration enforcement does not have its own intelligence function per se, but we are a key part of the intelligence cycle, because we are on the ground, undertaking the operations. We feed our intelligence back, but we do not have our own intelligence function, so we rely heavily on Border Security Command and the NCA.

How confident are you that you know the size of the problem? How confident are you that what you know is correct?

It is extremely difficult to give a high degree of confidence in what is a clandestine area, but we do have confidence in the efficiency and effectiveness of the processes and systems that are in place. I will add, I suppose, that the National Crime Agency function is to do things as a Government that are very specialist, very niche and sometimes very expensive to do, so we do them once. I have a great degree of confidence in the service that we can provide to system partners, but we should not neglect the fact that this is a clandestine activity, which by its very nature is therefore done in the dark.

Mr Capps, your predecessor told us at a previous session how nimble criminal gangs are exploiting different routes. If we are successful in addressing the channel, do you see the common travel area as a new source of potential problems?

Yes, and I know that a number of you have interest in the small boat space. You will pick up that, as at today, we are 44% down on arrivals compared with last year and 50% down on actual boats—so 50% fewer boats, the lowest number we have had since 2020. That is very significant. You will be aware of some of the work that has gone into that space. I will not waste time here, but yes, displacement is a really big problem. As many of you are aware, these criminal gangs are very nimble, transnational and poly-criminal, and it is a very lucrative business. Earlier this year, we saw displacement into launches from Belgium. We had a launch right up on, or very close to, the Dutch border. We managed, broadly, to shut that down—we hope—with the co-operation of our Belgian partners. We are very worried about displacement into the CTA, particularly if new ferry routes come on, such as the new ferry route that comes from Boulogne into Cork. I used to have responsibility when I was in Border Force for our European partners. We work very closely with France on that. It absolutely is the case, which is why we must make sure that our strategy, while prioritising small boats for now, because that is the highest volume and the greatest threat to life, is not myopically focused on that; quite clearly, if we do that, all we are doing is squeezing it into those other vectors. As I mentioned earlier, we are unlikely, if we manage to bear properly down and make small boat crossings untenable, to see the same volume in other routes, because, thanks to the great work that the NCA and others do, it is very expensive and very difficult to do it. But that does not mean there are not some high-threat, high-harm individuals who would try to exploit that route. Sorry, that was a very long answer to your question, but it is a very apposite one.

I just want to come in on a couple of those points. To be clear, from a PSNI perspective, immigration control is not a PSNI function. Our role is very clearly around the prevention and detection of crime, primarily serious and organised crime and organised immigration crime that is linked to that cross-border movement. We also have a responsibility around safeguarding vulnerable people—in essence, victims of trafficking and modern slavery. We do have a role in terms of supporting our colleagues who are represented on the panel and also An Garda Síochána, in terms of that support and co-operation with our partners. We do, in essence, provide that policing support where criminality intersects with the CTA. I think there are clear intelligence gaps. We recognise that, and we are working hard to try to fill those gaps. From a policing perspective, our aim is to be absolutely intelligence-led in respect of our response to organised immigration crime. I think the scale of exploitation is increasing, and we have all commented on that. It is an increasing problem and something we are aware of. How we deal with that is through the co-ordinated approach that has been talked about—through Border Security Command, which I sit on as a representative for Northern Ireland, but also as part of our Joint Agency Task Force, which I co-chair with the deputy commissioner of AGS; all the key parties are represented at that body, which adds to the co-ordination of operational activity to address that criminality.

Good afternoon to you all. Duncan, I want to direct this to you, if that is okay. It seems to me that the frailty of your posture or the posture generally is that a lot of the focus is on airports and seaports. By definition, that means people are either illegally or irregularly within the United Kingdom until they ever come close to your detection. You mentioned flights from Belgium or Paris. How on earth can anybody board a flight in a Schengen area country and land in a non-Schengen area country, irrespective of the common travel area, without the appropriate passport or visa authorisation?

The answer is that they should not be able to.

So how is it happening? I am curious about that. As part of this discussion, we should be curious about that. How is it happening? If we are talking to the Irish—because that is where they are landing, in Dublin, Cork or Shannon, for example—are we not curious to ask, “How are people flying from non-CTA countries in the Schengen area to a non-Schengen area country in the CTA without ever being checked”?

I cannot answer that question. It is not my expert area.

Does anyone on the panel have an answer to that?

No. We deal with the serious and organised crime elements of that. As part of that organised crime element, there is some facilitation of movement in the way you describe using false documentation. That is part of that threat.

Every citizen of our country is going to be busted over the next couple of weeks trying to make sure they have the right documentation before they queue for hours and go through a process to make sure their holiday can be realised rather than rejected, and yet there seems to be a lack of curiosity around this. We have heard the CTA mentioned as an inhibitor. How is it that guards in the Republic of Ireland are able to board trains and board buses regularly and routinely pre and post Brexit to check people coming into their country, and yet we do not do it at all within the United Kingdom?

We have a few more questions on this area, so perhaps I will bring in Sir Alec Shelbrooke.

I’m fine; it’s been answered.

Okay. In that case, you can take on Mr Robinson’s question.

The reason we cannot do that in Northern Ireland is that I do not have the powers to board buses—I just do not have those powers.

You could do it with the PSNI.

But then that would be subject to the relevant risk assessments and safety protocols for PSNI. I cannot operate without PSNI.

You cannot operate without PSNI.

I do not have the powers, and my officers do not have the powers, just to stop buses and get on them.

So it is a power issue. It is nothing to do with the CTA.

Personally, there is also the safety of my officers in the way we do that, but first and foremost for myself, it is a power issue. I cannot lawfully stop a bus that is travelling from Dublin to Belfast.

Have you ever considered a joint operation with PSNI?

Davy might want to come in on this. From risk assessments, we think it is safer to do this, and we get better outcomes at the ports, whether that is airports, ferry terminals or train hubs.

Are you aware of people landing in Dublin and being told by Irish officials where to get the bus to Belfast, so they can present themselves?

Anecdotally I have heard that, yes.

You have heard that. Yet no joint operations, no curiosity about how people are able to land, and no discussions about how to close those avenues.

There is a lot of curiosity, and there is information sharing between us and the Garda, to target people. We prefer to target them at airports and ports, as opposed to on the road.

Yes, once they might come close to Great Britain. It doesn’t matter for how long they are in Northern Ireland.

Can I just ask about the entry/exit system? I went through Dublin at the beginning of this week, and I had to check my passport, even though I was in the CTA. I did raise that with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office when we met yesterday. How does the entry/exit system affect your work, if at all?

I will invite my colleagues from Border Force Immigration Enforcement to comment. Davy has got his hand up in relation to that. In relation to the previous question from Mr Robinson, from the NCA perspective, we support partners such as Immigration Enforcement, Border Force and PSNI to police the common travel area in the post-conflict environment that Northern Ireland presents with regard to the apparent community tensions. Davy may be able to answer that more particularly.

Mr Beck, you have volunteered yourself.

It was just on Gavin’s point around the stopping of vehicles. My colleague is correct in that Border Force does not have the power to stop vehicles on a public road. Where there is intelligence and information that organised immigration crime suspects are involved in the movement, we have assisted in operations and stopping the vehicles. We do not do that routinely because, as I said at the outset, our function is not to enforce immigration controls, but we do assist where there are intelligence-led operations and requests for that.

I am going to bring in Chris Murray. We have a few more questions on immigration, so I hope you will indulge us for a bit longer.

In many ways, the common travel area feels a unique part of the UK-Ireland set-up, but when you think about it, it is very similar to the Schengen area in Europe, where countries share their border controls and intelligence. I am trying to get my head around the challenges you face. Picking up on Mr Robinson’s point, am I correct in thinking that if a third country national is in the European Union, in a Schengen country, and they travel to Ireland and then cross into Northern Ireland and the UK, it is at the point where they travel from the Schengen area to Ireland that checks will be conducted on security systems as to whether they are a threat, and whether they have a visa to enter Ireland? I understand that some people get a visa to Ireland but do not have one for the UK, but broadly speaking it is at that point that a check takes place. Equally, if they move from the Schengen area into Northern Ireland, they will still be checked at that point, won’t they?

When someone moves into Northern Ireland?

Yes.

Checked by?

At the point of moving into the common travel area.

Coming from Paris to Belfast or Paris to Dublin, you would expect there to be a check, but only for non-EU nationals.

Yes, I think that is right.

Even though Ireland is outside Schengen, you do not get a check if you are an EU national on the entry/exit system.

Any non-EU national in the common travel area, who has travelled by a regular route has been checked.

So let’s say you boarded your plane from Paris, but you originally came from Turkey, and you went to Belfast or Dublin—I realise they are in different jurisdictions, but they are both in the common travel area. At that point, would you be checked at both places?

If you are coming through border controls, then yes, Border Force would check them.

So Paris into Belfast: checked. Would a person be checked coming from Paris into Dublin?

That is not my jurisdiction.

That is a European question, but they would have had to fulfil whatever the requirements for southern Ireland were for their visa and requirements. If your question is whether they are then checked on the border coming from the south of Ireland to the north of the island of Ireland, there is no check.

That is not my question. My question is not whether they are checked within the common travel area; my question is will any non-EU national entering the common travel area, whether by plane or ferry, be checked by either an Irish or British border official?

Yes.

So anyone within the common travel area, unless they entered irregularly, has been checked?

Yes.

Thank you, I just wanted to make sure I had understood the clarification.

But is there not a problem that if a Turkish national boards in Paris and goes to Dublin, then travels to Belfast before leaving Belfast to go back to Paris, they are not going to go through EES?

No.

So we have a real problem with the contradiction between the common travel area and EES.

That is the European Union.

Their exit from the European Union would not be checked, but if they re-entered, they would still be checked. I wanted to make that clear because I want to ask what the challenges are for enforcement bodies in relation to the common travel area and the land border, particularly in relation to the land border. Obviously, irregular migration is a problem wherever it is. Whether you are entering Ireland, the UK or the common travel area, irregular migration is illegal and should not happen. But in respect of movement within the common travel area, what challenges do you face in relation to the land border?

We have probably answered that question through that discussion. The challenge is not being able to physically check someone when they cross over from the Republic into Northern Ireland.

Have they been checked coming into the common travel area already?

They should have been.

Yes, the non-EU nationals should.

Okay, so it is EU nationals that are the challenge?

No, but people still travel from the Republic of Ireland to Belfast on the bus even if they have been checked.

What does intelligence-led checks mean? What is the difference between intelligence-led checks for non-EU nationals and those for EU nationals?

I can talk generally about the intelligence picture, but this is around understanding where we see the most abuse of routes. That is breaking it down by, as you say, the nationalities and the routes they are coming in through. This is not restricted solely to Northern Ireland; there are routes over in mainland UK as well. We target operations and focus that resource on where we see or where we believe the intelligence suggests the most abuse is.

To add to that and to refer to your earlier question, the common travel area is there to facilitate and enable free movement, and that is a vulnerability that is exploited by organised crime groups. Having a balanced and proportionate response to that is a challenge. Our role, in terms of trying to counteract and address that challenge, is to provide a strategic and tactical intelligence picture to immigration enforcement and system partners, and work with the PSNI and Border Force immigration to collate an intelligence picture and point to trends and changes in how organised crime is facilitating and abusing that vulnerability.

Thank you. I get that, but what I am trying to drive at is whether an intelligence-led model of that will differ if those organised crime groups, or the people who you are trying to target, are from an EU background or a non-EU background, or a non-British background.

From our perspective, it is a vulnerability that is exploited, whether that is from an EU or a non-EU background, and whether it is in relation to serious and organised crime or indeed any other crime. Our approach is to look at the vulnerability, assess that vulnerability and support partners in putting in place their own plans in order to address that according to their missions and duties.

To go back to my earlier point—apologies if this is confusing—non-EU nationals are all checked when they enter the common travel area and EU nationals are not, but what you are saying to me is that it does not actually make that big a difference that non-EU nationals are checked and EU nationals are not checked when they come into the common travel area. You find that—I am not putting words in your mouth, but trying to interpret what you are saying—it does not make a difference, because some intelligence tells you to pursue one and some intelligence tells you to pursue the other; it doesn’t add anything for you.

What I am saying is that we approach the vulnerability that the common travel area presents from a threat, risk and harm perspective. So we look at how that vulnerability is exploited by organised crime. EU citizens may exploit the CTA for drug-trafficking purposes, going from, for example, Romania, through Europe, into Ireland, then into Northern Ireland and to GB from there. Our intelligence collection in relation to that and our sharing of intelligence with partners will be much the same as when we look at organised crime groups that are facilitating families from Afghanistan or Iraq coming through the common travel area and going into GB from Northern Ireland.

I am going to bring in Katrina Murray, because she has specific questions on organised immigration crime. Then we have Robin Swann on co-operation with the Republic of Ireland. Paul, do you need to come in on anything further? You can.

Just one very quick thing.

Okay, let’s go to Katrina and Robin and then go back to you, Paul.

Mr Bonfield, how significant is the role of organised immigration crime groups in Northern Ireland in facilitating unauthorised migration through the common travel area?

It is very difficult to give a definitive answer, because we have a fragmentary picture. If we zoom out, Duncan and I have already talked about the overall threat to the UK. Organised crime plays a significant role in facilitating irregular migration, but there is still a large part of irregular migration that is not facilitated, does not require to be facilitated, by organised crime. Does that answer your question, ma’am?

One thing that the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee is particularly concerned about is whether there are differences between the organised immigration crime in relation to Northern Ireland and the common travel area, and the channel crossings. Do we know whether there are paramilitary links, whether that involves republican or loyalist groups? Are different tactics used to tackle the two types of activity? I am thinking of the wider picture. Is this activity slightly different or exactly the same?

On the point about the response to paramilitary organised crime, the PSNI lead on that; their system responds to that. From an NCA perspective, we do not see reporting of paramilitary involvement in organised crime; that is not something that we see. I would characterise the common travel area abuse in this way: it is a vulnerability that is exploited by serious and organised crime, in much the same way as other vulnerabilities on the UK border are exploited by serious and organised crime. So in that sense, it is very much the same. The difference is the one that we have pulled out already in our answers, which is about the challenge of operating in an area where there are still community sensitivities and where there is an absence of data to collect.

Mr Capps, has the establishment of the Border Security Command made any difference to efforts to disrupt organised immigration crime groups within Northern Ireland?

I will have to defer to Miles. More broadly, we split the strategy into three geographical and thematic areas. One of them, of course, is reducing the pull factors. What is making the UK attractive to people who want to come here? That includes the criminal gangs that want to exploit migrants and their hope of a better life by coming and getting involved—illicit activity and criminality, which I know is what you are getting at. In the UK, that is quite a significant pull factor, which is why you have seen the Home Secretary’s efforts to drive that down. What we are doing to break that up is not just the taskforce, of which Northern Ireland is a big part, but the work we do on the continent with partners. It is having a broader effect because we have put a lot of resource into that. Under Wendy Gunney, we now have the domestic taskforce that works with police services in Northern Ireland and partners to try to drive down that criminality and reduce the pull factors. My hope is that, as we pick up momentum—of course, we are only two years old now—and the money is coming into those organisations as part of that programme, we will see an increase in bearing down on that, particularly in breaking up those gangs and where they operate. Most immigration crime happens on other sovereign territories, and we have to deal with partners. In the United Kingdom, we have a home advantage and can drill in using our police service and the National Crime Agency.

Mr Beck, do you want to come in?

Just to pick up on Katrina’s point, my assessment would be that organised immigration crime is increasing, and that that is indicative of the increase in direct ferry travel from mainland Europe into Ireland. That ferry traffic is up by about a third, so there is more opportunity, as a consequence of that, for organised criminal groups to exploit that increased traffic flow. That is something that we are aware of. Border Security Command gave me the opportunity to link in with Duncan and the national picture and ensure that the CTA element is considered. It also gives me the opportunity to link in with the domestic taskforce and have that connectivity in law enforcement right across the UK, and to then extend that through to collaboration, information sharing, knowledge and awareness with AGS as well. We are involved in our organisational response through a number of operations, including Operation Fusion, which in essence is our primary response to organised immigration crime. There has been significant disruption with seizures and arrests over the last number of years linked to our detections in that regard.

Thank you for what you have said so far, folks. Can I just ask about the bigger picture that was picked up by other questions? How strong is the cross-border co-operation between you and similar Irish authorities, especially regarding irregular or illegal migration?

I will start off, if I may. Davy Beck made reference to the joint agency taskforce with AGS that he co-chairs. That is a really good structure that brings together a strategic level and a tactical level with really good co-operation and strength.

I was going to say that Minister O’Callaghan attended the border security command’s organised immigration crime summit last year. I think he took up the appointment in the February, and he came to that in the May. That was very good for promoting wider co-operation. He met the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach. We do not just co-operate on organised immigration crime; of course, there is poly-criminality. A lot of those organisations are involved in drugs. I happen to have the maritime responsibility as well, and we do a lot with them on drugs coming out of central America, particularly the at-sea drop-off piece. That co-operation is really strong, and it spans not just organised immigration crime but drugs and other high harms.

I would just point to the reference made earlier to the UK-Ireland summit in March, where the Prime Minister and his counterpart reinforced the need for data sharing and the various elements that underpin that.

Mr Beck?

I have mentioned the joint agency taskforce; we also have a cross-border strategy, which was refreshed in 2025 and runs until 2027. That north-south co-operation, collaboration and information sharing is as strong as it has ever been, if not stronger. On the east and west, we are well connected through my office to border security command, our regional organised crime units and counter-terrorism policing, all of which I sit on a range of boards for that ensure that east-west collaboration and co-ordination as well.

Meetings, visits and strategies—what is the output? How many arrests and prosecutions have there been from the cross-border work with your colleagues in the Republic?

Again, from a policing perspective, there are significant operational outcomes. In Op Fusion alone, over the last three years there were in the region of 165 disruptions, around £1.4 million cash saved, over £24 million—

Sorry, Davy—in regards to immigration?

From my perspective, it would be immigration crime, Robin. I think my colleagues would have to comment on immigration.

Specifically, for criminals related to organised immigration crime, we have arrested 250 in the past year.

At what point geographically?

That would be in Northern Ireland.

Mr Capps and Mr Beck both referred to increased ferries—I think it was mentioned that on the route from Boulogne to Cork they had increased by a third. What are you doing additionally to work with the Irish authorities regarding that increased ferry travel?

It is of course cheaper to cross on a ferry than by airports and air, and they are potentially easier to board. For example, in the “one in, one out” deal, we picked up one stowaway on the ferry that went across to Cork, so we knew that people were trying to return via that way. We have worked hard with the French authorities, particularly on port security in Boulogne. We have worked with Ireland on security on the Cork end of that ferry, to make sure that we have the right co-operation there. It is a concern, because any routes that are potentially open to illicit stowing away or coming in with false documentation mean that you have a greater volume. It is obvious you can get a greater volume of people on a ferry than on an aircraft. We have concerns about that.

You said you worked with the Irish authorities in Cork. Do you have a physical presence in Cork?

Yes. We have a liaison officer from Border Force in Cork.

Do you have any operational challenges in working with the Irish authorities on enforcement activity that you think we could help resolve?

I cannot really comment. That would probably be one to have a conversation with Border Force about. The co-operation of the Committee in keeping the dialogue going and the support piece would be very helpful, if that is the question.

Data sharing was covered earlier on. Is there adequate data sharing between your authorities and the Irish authorities in regards to the numbers, routes, travel and numbers of people coming in?

I sense that that is an improving picture.

Four years ago, it was not great, but things have improved steadily. The relationship has improved steadily. The commitment and desire to work together collaboratively has improved. We are not there yet, but the commitment given by the leaders of both countries means that we are all working towards the same thing now.

Four years in.

Well, I was going back to when I started doing this, four years ago. That was my base point.

But it hasn’t actually—

No, it has improved.

Has the relationship improved or has data sharing improved?

Both.

Massively.

Could it improve further?

I think that is what we are working towards.

From a SOC perspective, in that area, the sharing of tactical and strategic intelligence has improved, and the commitment to use constructs like Europol to provide a common picture with the Irish authorities has improved. It is part of the UK-Ireland security talks to take those elements further and go harder on some of the data sharing elements, as far we can.

Are extradition arrangements with Ireland working?

Davy has his hand up, so I will defer to him.

Yes, co-operation more generally is really positive and works really well. Clearly there are some limitations and time issues, in respect of MLATs, that take some time, but operationally they are swift and there is good information and intelligence sharing. To touch on Robin’s question, we do not have immediate access to biometric data from a crime perspective because Ireland is not aligned to the Prüm biometric sharing process. We have raised it with our colleagues in AGS, and they are acutely aware of it as well. It is probably one of the key gaps I would suggest. Again, we are attempting to address it through the intergovernmental agreement in terms of opportunities to try to close down those gaps.

How big a difference would that make if it was completed?

It would speed up identification when there are suspicions around the organised criminality aspect. You would have access to biometrics in a relatively short space of time, as opposed to having to go through the longer processes of applications through Europol and so on.

And are extraditions working daily?

Yes.

Are both north and south Ministers involved and sighted on this?

Yes.

As is my understanding, yes.

Mr Beck, from the PSNI’s perspective, are irregular migration and organised immigration crime in Northern Ireland given sufficient priority by the Home Office?

My initial answer is that I think they are. In our role at PSNI, can I devote the significant resources it warrants to it? I probably struggle to devote the resources to organised immigration crime that I should, simply because of the constraints and competing pressures and priorities across Northern Ireland. In terms of the Home Office, I think that the Border Security Command and our co-operation with NCA and the Home Office is really good and positive. There is an evolving recognition around the complexities of the CTA and the impacts of it more generally on citizens, north and south. For me, it is the strategic response around that information sharing, intelligence and the targeted interventions that there is an increasing awareness and response to, if that answers your question.

Mr Montgomery, what is your view on whether the Home Office gives sufficient priority to irregular immigration and organised crime in Northern Ireland.

Absolutely. There has been a commitment from the Home Secretary to invest further into immigration enforcement, which will see a disproportionate uplift in resource coming into Northern Ireland to tackle the CTA and immigration enforcement over the next two to three years. We will be uplifting resource considerably.

At the moment, there are 5,000 immigration enforcement officers employed in the UK. There are 57 in Northern Ireland. Does that sound like a lot of resource?

I dispute those figures. Is that 57 immigration officers in immigration enforcement, Border Force or—

Immigration enforcement officers. Those are the figures we have.

Yes, but they are not the totality of our response to CTA, because I have crime teams—

But it is an indicator. There are 5,000 in the UK and only 57 in Northern Ireland. Is that not an indication of how resource is being utilised?

But we deploy our resource to threat. As I said, we are uplifting our resource by 25% over the next 12 months. Also, I deploy resource across the whole of the United Kingdom to tackle CTA, so there are other routes and ports as well. The totality of immigration enforcement’s response is not just focused on what I deploy in Northern Ireland.

If there are no further points you wish to make, I will bring this part of the session to a conclusion. We will move on to panel with Ministers. [Tonia Antoniazzi in the Chair] Witnesses: Alex Norris, Matthew Patrick and Eddy Montgomery.

Welcome to the second panel. This is a ministerial session between the Home Affairs Committee and the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee on policing and disorder and community cohesion. Minister Patrick, what has been your response to the disorder seen in Northern Ireland in the last month, and has the UK Government provided the PSNI and other organisations with adequate support?

I was horrified by the disorder, as was everyone in this room who saw it. The Secretary of State has been unbelievably clear that when we see people being burned out of their homes because of the colour of their skin, it can be called nothing but pure, out-and-out racism. I think there has been real moral clarity, and the Secretary of State has led that, but I think right across the spectrum people have come out and condemned that—and rightly so. I was totally appalled by what we saw. I was so grateful to the security services and community services for their response. I said at the time that I really worried that the world’s eyes were looking at Northern Ireland and seeing, frankly, a small proportion of people acting in a way that brought Northern Ireland to one of its lowest moments in recent years. For me, that is nothing like the Northern Ireland that I see and, I am sure, you see, Chair, every single day. I am horrified that people across the world might get that impression—that tourists who are thinking of where to go might think that that is the norm or that a business that is thinking of where to invest or locate international staff night look at that and think twice. I was appalled. It was deeply self-destructive. The thugs that went out to cause that disorder and undertake that abhorrent racism did nothing but deep damage to people in Northern Ireland. You asked about Government support for institutions. You will note that we secured an additional £4 million uplift for the PSNI. That is really important, not least because of the costs of overtime and mutual aid, on which we were keen to step in to support. You will know, as we rehearsed it at the Committee just last week, that this is on top of a record settlement for a devolved Executive in Northern Ireland. Obviously, it is in their gift to set funding, whether for the police or community services, at a higher level, but in that moment, we wanted to step in and we did.

On the £4 million, we just heard Assistant Chief Constable Davy Beck say that at the moment, the true cost stands at £5.4 million, and that amount is growing. Obviously, 168 officers arrived within 24 hours of the disorder, and that mutual aid was very much needed and was swifter, but this is the third year in a row that disorder has broken out in Northern Ireland. They are getting better at dealing with events such as this, but they do not have enough money and are not adequately resourced to do so. What else can the Government do?

One of the things the Government can do is work closely with the Executive to support them in the process of setting a budget. As I mentioned to the Committee, the Executive has been given a record settlement—more than ever before in the history of devolution. Funding for the police is in their gift, as it is a devolved matter, outside of the additional security funding that we put in directly. One thing we can do is support the component parts of the Executive to come together to set a budget. Just last week, we were in talks to try to make progress on that. That is about recognising our commitment to making progress on this issue, so that the PSNI can solve funding issues.

What happens next year if it happens again?

As you rightly mentioned, for three years in a row, disorder has broken out in Northern Ireland. I am sure that Minister Norris will tell me that the same is true for England, Wales and Scotland, with different parts having a spike of activity at different points. We do not want our police to be in a situation where they are unable to cope with an unexpected incident. Clearly, our police are there to keep us all safe. We want our police to be in a situation where they can meet an incident such as this. They did meet it, and did so tremendously, but I accept that that was not without real difficulty. That was why we were successful in securing £4 million extra money for the police.

One of the things we have spoken about in the Committee is the impact of cuts on youth outreach programmes and community outreach programmes, as part of the local growth fund. Those groups are key to keeping communities together. We heard in Committee last week that the local growth fund and that not being there for them has meant that these people are now unpaid. They went out as volunteers, off their own bat, to support these communities, but had they been there monitoring the situation continuously, they would have been doing a job. The police have had to go in to do that now; the problem is that that has wider consequences for social cohesion. Minister, what can we do? This is just not sustainable.

As I mentioned to the Committee last week in relation to the local growth fund, I will never sit before the Committee and have anything other than praise for those groups. They do tremendous work, and they have powerful advocates in this Committee and others, which I hear loudly and clearly. I have sat across the room from those very people and heard about the great work that they do. We have been clear that the funding split cannot and will not change, but we have also been clear that that does not mean we are saying, “Tough.” We are not saying, “But the Executive has received more than £300 million in additional funding since this issue has arisen, so they can fund this.” We could say that, but we do not. We have taken it upon ourselves, and the Secretary of State and I have sat down with these groups and the PEACEPLUS programme—something else that the UK Government funds to the tune of hundreds of millions of pounds—and tried to be creative. In the modern age, that is what you expect of us. It is not good enough to say, “There’s something over there. Good luck.” I want to effect change. That is why I have made sure we bring people together and do everything we can to find a creative approach to securing funding for these people. Applications have gone in, as you know.

You talk about PEACEPLUS. Has the Irish Government provided any funding in response to the disorder in Northern Ireland?

I am not sure about that. You mentioned previously that there might have been some funding. Is that correct, Chair?

I just wanted to find out if you know anything about that.

I have not heard about that. I am very happy to find out more. It was part of my briefing pack, so I wondered if you have any details about that.

I don’t. I was just trying to find out if it is true.

Okay. If anyone has any details, I am very happy to try to find that out. It is not something that I know about.

Okay. Thank you very much.

Good afternoon, panel. In about 2004-05, I was living in Belfast, and there was a bit of a spike in anti-immigration rhetoric, with attacks on some houses, especially in the Holylands area of Belfast. I and a few friends decided to go around leafletting—this was pre-politics—and we put out little cards saying “Welcome” to people all around the area. I was really saddened to see in the recent reconciliation inquiry that we are doing in the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee that we have reached an all-time high since records began—coincidentally, the year that I was going around with some friends putting out those postcards. This simple question is to either Minister Patrick or Minister Norris. Does the Government recognise that trend—that direction of travel—in terms of racially aggravated and motivated crimes, in particular? If so, what can you do about it?

It would be hard not to recognise that. You noticed this as a concerning thing 21 years ago. I mentioned the racism that we saw on the streets of Belfast just a few weeks ago, and we have therefore seen an uplift in reporting. It is a challenge for us all. Your opening demonstrates perfectly the issue. I have long believed that the capacity of any Government—Governments working collectively and collaboratively and on their very best day—is about this big, and it is about a 10th of the size of the problems facing any country. If we are only waiting on Government to solve those problems, we will be waiting a very long time. That is not to diminish for a second the effort being made right across Government; it is just a recognition of that fact. You were out there 21 years ago doing those leaflets, Mr Smith, and I think that is part of the answer. The community groups that I have sat down with pre and post the recent disorder in Belfast are part of the solution. I sat down with the police, who themselves faced terrible difficulty just before this, with some attacks at stations. I was speaking to some officers at Dunmurry. They, too, are clearly part of the solution. That is concerning. We can all see the uptick, the abuse, the coarseness and the racism that comes with that, and that worries us. I say that everyone has to do their bit, so let me talk about what the Government is doing—I am sure Minister Norris will add to this. A record settlement is going into the Executive. When you look at the issues, how do you tackle the hatred that we see? It is a whole-of-society approach. You need the enforcement part. Where you can, you need prevention. I am Jewish, and I talk a lot about how we might solve antisemitism. It is not the most romantic of answers, but sometimes getting to a place where people are not angry and looking for someone to blame is part of the solution, so it is a whole-of-society approach. That is something that the Government really recognise.

You have begun to answer my follow-up question, but I will just give Minister Patrick an opportunity maybe to add to that. Clearly, as you said, there is a limited role for Government. When we think about how we live in socially cohesive communities, it is an all-society issue, but there is a role for Government, and one of the roles is analysis of the problem: taking one step back, looking at the horizon level, and saying, “Okay, how have we got here from 2004, when community relations meant a different thing in Northern Ireland?” Well, it still means what it meant then, but it has grown in lots of ways. Do you have any sort of analysis or structural assessment to add for why we are seeing, particularly in Northern Ireland, these trends over time of the breaking down of social cohesion, and especially increased racially aggravated crime and so on?

I would be interested to know whether that is particularly specific to Northern Ireland. We have both spoken about hate that is peddled. There is a very lucrative market in peddling hate, division and anger. You see it on social media: you see how people construct accounts entirely around pumping out videos that are going to distort the truth and make you angry. They are very successful at that, and they are very lucrative business models. Part of the way you solve this is through the moral clarity that I think we have seen from people on the back of the recent disorder in Belfast. Coming out quickly and calling it out for what it is—racist thuggery—is actually really important. Some of the work we have done during that disorder, to get messages out there saying, “Go home. Don’t take part in this,” is also really important. It is obviously a worrying trend, but you can look back throughout history, and I suspect that, whenever the state has not felt as prosperous as it could have done, for years and years, this sentiment has risen. But I do not think the answer can simply be, “Oh, we’ll grow the economy; it will be fine.” Is that part of the answer? Of course it is. But, as Minister Norris says, growing the economy but not looking like you have control of the issues that people care about is a recipe for anger, and anger finds someone to be angry at. We have a real duty to bring about the conditions that mean there is less anger, but we also have a duty to make sure that, where we see that anger directed at people based on the colour of their skin, we are unequivocal in condemning it, challenging it and standing up to it.

I have a final question for anybody on the panel. There is a particular dimension to Northern Ireland, which is paramilitarism. I was going to ask this in a roundabout way, but I will just say it as a statement. Paramilitarism is involved in disorder in Northern Ireland, and, it seems to me, was involved in the horrendous scenes that we saw recently in north Belfast and elsewhere. And here we are, 20 years on from the work that I was doing in Belfast. What more can we do to tackle paramilitarism? A lot of the protests and the disgusting disorder is not organic. It is not just bubbling up. There are very much co-ordinated efforts there. And yet here we are, 30 years on from the Good Friday agreement and paramilitarism is still an insidious threat to social cohesion in Northern Ireland, and, as we have seen in this session, is involved in organised immigration crime. What more can we do to tackle that? How are we going to deal with it once and for all?

Paramilitarism was never justified, ever, and it is not today. You spoke about 21 years ago, but I think it is really important to note the huge progress made in the last 28 years since the Good Friday agreement, with enormous strides forward. But that does not mean there are not relics of paramilitarism in organised crime now. It does not mean that there are not people who have holds over some communities and cause them intense damage. They might state that they are looking out for a community or an area, but they are the people who bring harm to that community, to that area and to all of us. That is why there is a duty on all of us to stand up to it. We support an Executive programme on paramilitarism and organised crime with funding. It is important that we do that. That programme does a range of things, from supporting the police in some of their work to diversionary tactics and understanding why people go into that path. It is obviously a concern. It is one we take seriously and one we support the institutions across Northern Ireland to tackle.

In the interests of time I will pass to someone else.

Minister Norris, how concerned are you about evidence of abuse of the common travel area in fuelling irregular immigration and the crime associated with it?

Have you made any proposals or any changes recently? What has happened?

Is it just resources? Are you changing any processes in immigration enforcement checks?

There was a joint risk assessment undertaken by the Home Office and the Republic of Ireland on the common travel area. What has emerged from that?

Is there more to be achieved in that co-ordination between the UK and the Republic of Ireland?

Alex, who do you believe is responsible for protecting and policing the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic?

We have just had a panel with myriad individuals giving evidence. Border Force say there are issues that are for PSNI, PSNI say there are issues for Border Force, and NCA say they are happy to work with anybody as long as they are in partnership. There was no sense of cohesion. As the Minister who has self-identified as responsible within the Home Office, how are you going to bring that cohesion about?

With the Chair’s indulgence, I asked Mr Montgomery a question that was based on the focus of enforcement being at our airports and seaports. Clearly, that means there is an understanding that there are people within the United Kingdom or the Northern Irish part of it. I asked him, “Are you only concerned whenever people are going to move from one part of the United Kingdom to Great Britain?” He agreed and accepted that. My question to you is whether that is the position of Government, and whether your concern is not actually whether people are in the United Kingdom illegally or irregularly, it is that they dare to come across the Irish sea and move into Great Britain.

We heard that in the Irish Republic the Garda Síochána regularly board trains and buses. When I asked Mr Montgomery, he indicated that he does not have the power to do that in Northern Ireland. Have you ever been asked to provide that power legislatively?

No—have you been asked by Border Force to provide that power to them?

Thank you.

Minister Patrick, in 2020, The Detail, an investigative journalism outlet, reported that there were more immigration checks in Northern Ireland than in London. Anecdotally, we hear those checks have only increased. In fact, we hear from some that Northern Ireland is effectively one big border for a lot of people in terms of checks they are subjected to. We have heard this afternoon from the previous panel about the various dimensions of co-operation and data-sharing with the Republic, properly. Our colleagues will explore some of the deficits that Brexit has created in terms of that sharing. Are you concerned that all of this chat about how the border is the problem, which is obviously a political platform for many of those repeating it, is increasing anxiety and racial tensions? What opportunities do the Government take proactively to demonstrate the grip they have on this issue?

I am concerned that people use the awful attack on Mr Ogilvie for ends of anger and hatred. I don’t think anyone could fail to be deeply shocked, worried and even angry, when they saw what had happened to him. There is a duty on everyone, be that a Member of Parliament or a member of a community, to show moral leadership and recognise what is happening, and what some of those people are doing. To the comments made before by Minister Norris, I do not think that means we should for a second dismiss the legitimate concerns there are about immigration and checks. It is appropriate that we are doing that. It has been talked about whether there is appropriate resource. If I am honest, I expect that will be a conversation that will be disputed for decades, about getting the right approach and where it sits. Our responsibility is to be clear-headed. Where there are issues that might fuel concerns, we tackled them. Where malign actors try to make something out of issues in order to cause disruption, we tackle that at source. You are going to come back in, but you asked me about another—

Of course, and we have spent the afternoon properly. As I say, nobody is negating people's genuine anxiety over, for example, the crime that was the trigger point, as somebody said, for some of the disorder last week. Clearly, there is co-operation, data sharing and extensive checks, but it is unclear if the Government are proactively taking steps to reassure people, in order to close down some of the space for those whose entire political platform is about hardening the border in Ireland or increasing racial tension. Are you proactively reassuring people that you have that grip and that all appropriate enforcement and engagement is happening? We know that across the European Union and across the world, borders exist and co-operation happens. Are you doing that proactively, to ensure that we are not increasing anxiety about it and increasing a clamour for what is effectively mass racial profiling in Northern Ireland or, as I say, a hardening of the border? Are you taking those opportunities to say, “We’ve got this”?

You can see that with the Secretary of State, myself or other officials being very clear with communities in Northern Ireland. I spoke with many of them following that disorder. We spoke with some of the community groups that do on-the-ground work to give that reassurance. Let me be really clear: those community groups weren't all saying, “Oh no, everything’s fine. I don’t know what’s wrong.” I am struck by a conversation I had with one gentleman who just said, “People don’t feel listened to.” Actually, it is not just about listening, but it is also about being seen to listen, and that is about respect. If people don’t feel listened to, they don’t feel respected. We owe it to the people we serve to respect them and listen carefully. There are programmes I can speak to you about, but the Committee is doing part of that work by holding our feet to the fire and scrutinising our work. That will be part of the reassurance package that everything that reasonably can be done is being done. Minister Norris has spoken about stepping that up, and I will let him go into more detail on that.

You said you have spoken to the First Ministers and to the Executive. We have discussed this afternoon and elsewhere the corrosive impact of paramilitaries and the failure to get a grip on that, as well as completely stalled action on some of the quality-of-life issues around waiting lists, lack of housing and economic opportunity, which we know sometimes drive anxiety. We also know we do not have any cohesion strategy involving efforts to de-radicalise and properly address mythology. What engagement have you had with the Executive about their obligations and deficits in that regard?

We spoke with party leaders just a few weeks ago, as you all know, and those conversations were not initially intended to be on this topic, but it featured quite heavily, as did the duty to call this out and to tackle this at all levels. That is well known and well understood. What more can we do? I have mentioned before the Executive programme to tackle paramilitarism and organised crime. I have spoken about the investment we are making directly into the police and about the record settlement. There are community programmes alongside that which we have put money into. We are always looking for better ways that we might do that, because when you have a community in which people can so quickly take the actions that were taken just a few weeks ago, that cannot do anything but concern you. No one has a monopoly on good ideas, and we do our best to fund some of the brilliant groups that operate across Northern Ireland and our brilliant police service, which does incredible work in very difficult circumstances. If anyone has further ideas about what more we can do in UK Government, I welcome them. We obviously work closely with the Executive. They have many of those responsibilities, and we try to support each and every Executive Minister in their duties. To your point before, if what drives some of that anger is a combination of a predisposition to concern about a certain group and rising frustration, we must have a twin-track approach. You need to educate and prevent the former, but deliver properly—deliver the housing that people need and bring down the waiting lists in the health service that people are frustrated about. When we have spoken with the Executive Ministers, each and every one has recognised the challenge they have, and they are determined to deliver on it. There are areas where you can point to real progress, but everyone would expect a budget to be set soon and delivery to go on.

I will finish on this. You have said, “Of course there are great ideas and great action,” but that is reactive. There is no proactive strategy to address and prevent those issues, despite the fact that we have had three years of deliberate waves of racist violence. I will leave you with one point that you must see in all of this, as in so many other aspects of dysfunction: the hand of veto politics—legitimate legislative opportunities and Government action being thwarted by vetoes deployed by political parties. I hope that one of the things you consider are the strategies which, across the political spectrum, people have wished to see but have been thwarted in part by political vetoes.

Unfortunately, race has always been used synonymously with immigration in public discourse, and I know that has certainly been displayed in the racist violence against people who are lawfully meant to be in the UK or against black British citizens. I note that Neil Basu, the former police national lead for counter-terrorism, has warned that far-right agitation over migration is the biggest national security threat facing the country. Why have the Government not yet taken any action against Elon Musk’s Twitter platform for inciting violence in Belfast, and do you have any plans to?

Minister Norris, going back to your comment about the First and Deputy First Ministers sharing data or asking the Home Office for more data and information, quality data is important for local delivery and local services in Northern Ireland. What role does Mears have in that with regard to their interaction with you, the Northern Ireland Executive and Departments? Surely they should be the data owner?

You are saying that the issue of not having that information, which was raised by the First and Deputy First Ministers, is your responsibility. Does Mears have no role in regard to interaction with the Executive and Northern Ireland Departments? Is that all through you? That is the way Mears has acted in the past.

I want to pick up the point about Mears before I move on to another question. You said that Mears holds the contract for the whole of Northern Ireland. What is the total cost of that contract, both in total and per asylum seeker per year? To follow that up, is community cohesion a KPI that Mears is held to account for by the Home Office in that contract? How often does Mears breach their KPIs, both in terms of what they report to you and when you inspect them?

But the taxpayer does contract Mears to do this, to the tune of billions of pounds, so could you undertake to write to the Committee with those four specific answers? I am happy to remind you what the questions were later on, if that is helpful. I want to move on to try to understand how the common travel area fits into the Home Office’s wider challenges on tackling irregular migration. Obviously there are a whole host of challenges, including the small boats issues. It was very positive to hear earlier that small boats crossings are down by 50% from their peak. There are also people overstaying their visas, entering regular routes illicitly and trying to change from other routes. How does the common travel area figure in your matrix of risks for irregular migration threats to the UK?

You seem to be describing that as a sort of pan-UK challenge, rather than specifically saying that Northern Ireland is a particularly attractive part of the UK because it can be accessed via a land border from the common travel area. That is how I interpret what you are saying. Moving to my next question, the common travel area is over 100 years old. In terms of what makes the risk of attracting illegal migrants rise up and down, there are various variabilities. Obviously, we have had the changes around Brexit. As you push down entry in other parts of the UK—via small boats, for example—it might, as you have alluded to, increase in other places. There are changing patterns, and people arriving into the common travel area from third countries through Ireland. What are you looking for that makes it rise up your risk register? At what point do you start allocating further resources to it?

My final question is on exactly how we analyse data and take it in. Obviously, one of the risks is that a third country national comes into the EU, moves from mainland EU to Ireland and then travels into the common travel area from there. Do we share a watchlist with Ireland so that people will be on the same watchlist whether they enter a UK port or airport or an Irish one? There is a coda to that question. After we left the EU, we left instruments such as SIS II, Prüm, joint investigation teams—

European arrest warrants.

And European arrest warrants, exactly. How is the lack of access to those European instruments an impediment to securing the common travel area?

I will follow on from my colleague from Edinburgh East and Musselburgh, and I put on the record that he is not related to me in any way whatsoever. Are you satisfied that there are sufficiently robust processes in place at entry points to Ireland from outside the common travel area, to prevent the entry of people who intend to reach the UK illegally? If not, what more needs to be done?

What is the relationship with the liaison officer in Cork and the authority?

It is great to see you again, Minister Norris. To what extent do the UK and the Republic of Ireland co-ordinate asylum and immigration policies?

A lot has been done on the soft work between countries. We have got together and discussed common ground. As you say, we are different, but what can we do together? What steps have you taken to manage the risk that there are different asylum policies in the UK and Ireland and to manage misuse of the CTA?

Do you want to share anything you think is a great idea—or can you not share it with us?

With regard to the relationship between ourselves and the Republic of Ireland and the return of third-country nationals, can you tell us how many people the UK has returned to the Republic?

Do you then track their follow-on status if the Republic of Ireland sends them back to the third country?

You have set up the next question. Of those 500, how many returned? How many tried to come back a second or third time?

You would have that information?

You were in the Public Gallery for the previous panel, Minister Norris. Davy Beck from the PSNI talked about the importance of biometrics in being able to manage the whole system. Where are you with regards to achieving that with the Irish Government?

Reverting to the first question and your first answer, 500 have been returned to the Republic of Ireland. In the past, the Irish Government used language that the majority of their illegal or irregular migration actually comes through the UK. What is the reverse? How many illegal or irregular immigrants to the Republic of Ireland are returned?

So 500 for the first answer—

You will have noticed from my previous comments that I am exercised by the entry-exit system and its interaction with the CTA. I travelled into Ireland this week and I flew back last night from Dublin. It appeared to me that I was having to have my passport checked in a way that I did not use to in the CTA, so I am concerned about that. I am also concerned about the impact more widely of EES on UK nationals over the course of this summer. We members of the Committee visited the Port of Dover on Thursday and saw the incredible investment it has put in, but it cannot use any of it, because the French system has not been switched on. Minister, first, what are you going to do to make sure that the common travel area is properly respected and that we do not end up having some form of passport checks by the back door? Secondly, what are you going to do about all those people who hope to travel to continental Europe over the summer, and all those lorry drivers and freight companies who are going to be very concerned about their cargo?

To be fair, the Irish nationals had to do the same as I did—to go through passport checks.

The problem is that the system has not been switched on in terms of using the consoles. The 90-odd terminals that we saw at Dover, and the many that there are at St Pancras and at the LeShuttle are there, but they cannot be switched on.

We heard that once flow is affected, that is too late. Action needs to be pre-emptive. We heard strong evidence from community groups in Dover, as well as the port itself, that what happened over the May bank holiday was not acceptable to people who live in the area. Can you please use your good offices to put pressure on the Commission and the French Government to suspend the checks over July and August, when we know that there will be difficulties? Probably about the third week of July, you, Minister, might find it important not to have headlines about traffic going into Dover. Headlines on other matters might be something you would be keen on. May I urge you to do that, please?

Does anyone want to add anything?

If I may, Chair. The DG of Police aux Frontières is visiting Dover today, as part of our ongoing co-operation, being hosted by DG Border Force. That is a very live conversation. Obviously, it is something we are very concerned about.

Even on a port-by-port basis, I think Dover, Eurotunnel and so on are very much an issue. Clearly, our entry-exits are working phenomenally well—credit to the Home Office for that. We are not seeing the problems at our ports.

Some of my constituents think that small boats are arriving on the shores of Northern Ireland. Can you—

Thank you very much for putting that on the record.