Environmental Audit Committee — Oral Evidence (HC 24)
Welcome, everybody, to this special session of the Environmental Audit Committee, where I am pleased to say we will be following up on the session we had a few weeks ago on the national security assessment on biodiversity loss. Following that, we invited Ministers from the Department for the Environment, the Cabinet Office and the Foreign Office to join us; we are missing one out of three, which isn’t bad, and it is what we got. We are delighted to have Minister Mary Creagh, so thank you very much for coming along; Ros Eales from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office; and two senior figures from the Department for the Environment, who I will encourage to introduce themselves. Thank you very much, all of you, for joining us. I will start by asking you to introduce yourselves and any involvement you had in pulling together the national security assessment. Could I start with you, please, Ms Ledward?
I am the international biodiversity and climate director at DEFRA, with responsibility for all our overseas development spending, our negotiations and our analytical and science work on international biodiversity.
Thank you very much. I think we know who you are, Minister. Ms Randall?
I am Sally Randall. I am director general for the environment in DEFRA, which as well as that international work includes our domestic environmental responsibilities.
I am Ros Eales. I am director for energy and climate in FCDO.
Excellent, thank you very much. If I could come to you first, Minister, can you talk us through how the national security assessment on biodiversity loss was conceived and produced?
First of all, thanks, Chair, for agreeing to the slightly later start time. We have been having a bit of a pre-EAC workout in Committee Room 10 next door, which I can tell you is considerably hotter than this Committee Room. I am grateful to the Committee for the slightly later start. This document is a cross-Government strategic assessment developed by analysts and subject matter experts across Government. It was published in January of this year and basically brings together the scientific evidence, the policy analysis and national security expertise to inform our long-term resilience and security planning.
Talk us through the Departments that were involved and the extent to which this was a cross-Government endeavour. Who effectively was holding the pen on this? Whose report is this?
It was a cross-Government document developed by analysts from across the Government. You can see from its title who might have been involved, but it is not produced by a single Department. It was about bringing together that scientific evidence, policy analysis and national security expertise to look at resilience and planning.
That sounds like something led and co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office, with other Departments feeding in. Is that correct?
It is a convention that we don’t comment on internal machinery of national security assessments or the specific methodologies to formulate them. It is a cross-Government document.
Okay, thank you for that. We obviously, as I mentioned, asked the Cabinet Office to appear today, which it declined to do. It is responsible for collective Government and co-ordination of policy, as well as supporting the National Security Council. It told us that the security assessment is a DEFRA publication and sort of denied ownership of it. Is that how you see it? Do you see it as a DEFRA publication?
I see it as a cross-Government assessment. It is a cross-Government publication. Obviously, it has some heavy scientific analysis in it, but the power of it is that it does not belong to a single Department.
Its purpose was not really to be a public document, was it? Can you just explain what its purpose was?
It was not commissioned by me, so it—
Who should I ask then?
I don’t know. It predates me. It is not something that I commissioned. It is something that I became aware of.
So it predated this Government?
I believe so.
Okay, but its purpose was to inform Government internally, not to be published externally. Is that correct?
Andrea, do you want to come in on that?
I just do not think that was a question that was being discussed through the whole process. I think there is a published assessment—
Come on, let’s be serious: you produced this document and you had no idea whether you wanted it to mainly inform Government or mainly inform the general public? Seriously?
I think there is a public document that says HM Government on the front that does a very good job now of setting out the scale of the crisis and the urgency behind the issues. A number of other organisations have now built on this analysis and shown the importance of this work, so it has been very useful in that respect.
No, I do not disagree with that, but I was just trying to clarify. I believe that the reason that this is a public document is because of a freedom of information request. Is that correct? I think it is important that we understand whether this was something that was designed to inform Government or to ensure the public were better informed. That genesis is important. This is not a trivial matter.
No, I think this document was prepared for publication, for public consumption.
You mean the abridged version, if you like?
A public document that was published in January 2026—that is available—was developed as a public document.
Sure, but that was as a result of a freedom of information request into the unabridged version that was not intended for the public. I am just trying to be clear here.
I think the precise timing of the release of the publication was directly linked to the timing of a freedom of information request.
Right, but there may have been an abridged version published if there was not the freedom of information request, or not? This is like pulling teeth.
I can only comment on the public document that is available on the website.
Okay, thank you for that. Minister, the reason I was asking was I wondered whether there was agreement about what was produced, and whether there was resistance to the production of this document, which I agree is of tremendous importance and a real asset in terms of informing the general public about these issues. Did you face resistance about publishing this?
It is part of routine cross-Government resilience planning, but I think it stands as a groundbreaking piece of work, because what it does for the first time is bring biodiversity loss, ecosystem degradation, pollution and national security together into a single cross-Government assessment and looks at that at a global scale. I do not think that that endeavour has been undertaken before. I am really pleased that it has gathered such significant levels of interest from your Committee, and both here in the UK and internationally, which demonstrates our impact and leadership in this interesting nexus around biodiversity loss. It often tends to be treated as something that happens “over there”—as something that happens to nature, as something outside—but this document looks at the human impacts as well. I feel like that blending of the human, the natural and then the systems approach is quite unique.
I agree. General Nugee, who we heard from, described it as a seminal work, so he was very much of the same opinion.
Sticking with cross-Government working in respect of climate change and national security, we note that a climate security taskforce was stood up a few weeks ago with a range of experts, including General Nugee, on it. It is co-chaired by Ministers from DESNZ and the Home Office, but we note that DEFRA is not part of it. Have you any thoughts on why that might be the case?
In a way, one of the consequences of this report is us looking at strengthening cross-Government co-ordination on climate and nature risks. You are right to say that we launched that taskforce during London Climate Action Week. This is short term, so it is a tangible but time-limited mechanism, bringing together security, military and academic experts to turn evidence into action. It will help close the gap between our ambition and our delivery, provide us with independent challenge. It will look at the key gaps and the most significant climate and nature-related risks to our security and resilience, and identify opportunities and areas of strategic focus for the Government, including where we can shape resilience outcomes internationally. Nature and food representation is essential, and of course water. We have experts on the taskforce—Nathalie Pettorelli and Tim Benton—but my understanding is that other experts will be added to it, and I am continuing to press for strong nature representation on it so that that nature focus is not lost.
Given that we know that things like the loss of pollinators threaten food security and that that can be a driver of conflict, especially as climate change becomes more of a challenge, do you not think that DEFRA should have been part of the chairing group or represented more prominently?
At the moment in DEFRA we are looking at land use, food security and climate adaptation and working on the full waste spectrum. I am happy and content that colleagues are chairing the taskforce, but I will expect regular updates, impacts and feedback on it. I think it is about us being in the heart of this, and I am confident that the academic experts that are there will do a great job. What we do know is that the value of pollinators to the UK economy is around £1 billion a year. We have Bees’ Needs, the event in RHS Wisley next week, celebrating pollinators and all the brilliant work happening across the country to try to protect and preserve not just bees but other pollinators; there are dozens of them that get a less good press than bees, so we have to look after the small things that don’t have such good PR. We have also announced today our species recovery fund, which is £60 million—the largest budget allocated by any Government—to protect and avoid the extinction of some of our most fragile populations. That goes from birds like the red-billed chough down, to the glutinous snail, which is extinct in England, to all sorts of exciting northern dune sand beetles. We are really focusing, through our environmental improvement plan, on the actions we are taking to tackle that biodiversity loss and make sure that when we turn up to the climate and nature conferences at the UN this autumn, we are shown to be, and are, playing our part in this global effort.
Thank you, Minister, for joining us. The full, unabridged version of the biodiversity national security assessment has been shared with multiple external groups, including media outlets. Why has this Committee repeatedly been denied access?
I was a bit confused about this, so I have gone back to basics on it. I think you asked me this question in DEFRA orals a couple of weeks back and there was this kind of, “Which document is which?” There is a thing called the futures report, and that is a completely separate document. Let’s just go back to what is in the record. The Times reported that the NSA was the conclusion of a 2024 report. I have seen the internal futures document—and my friend, the previous Farming Minister, Angela Eagle, also read it—but only as a result of you asking that question. It was not something I knew about prior to your question.
Thank you for that. Just to clarify, the report you are referring to there, which I did ask about in DEFRA orals a couple of weeks ago, was about the DEFRA futures report on the state of our critical systems from 2030 and beyond. That report is equally stark and seems also to have been suppressed, although I am glad that some Ministers have now read it. I think that could be a whole separate discussion and inquiry that this Committee could look at. What I am talking about today is the Joint Intelligence Committee’s national security assessment. My understanding is that only a redacted version of that report was released, as the Chair said, on the basis of a freedom of information request. Is it not the case that MPs and this Committee still only have access to a redacted version of the national security assessment?
Let’s just go back to the futures report, because that was a very early piece of work, and it dated from 2022. When I read it, I was a bit like, “Mm”—I was not impressed, frankly. As a non-scientist, I did not think it stood up. It was an internal horizon-scanning document; it was not formal, it was not adopted as Government analysis or policy and it is not part of our assessment. So that is that bit put to bed. This is the trouble when we have documents coming out: we are not quite clear which documents we are talking about. The futures document was not completed or quality-assured; it was internal analytical material. However, documents go through many versions, and we get to version 32 in the end, which is the thing that we put out. We have the thing that we put out, and it talks about the risks from wide-scale ecosystem collapse, from pollution, from boreal forest collapse and from mangrove collapse. All these risks are there for everybody to see. That is bad enough. We have enough to be going on with in the published document.
I am glad you have highlighted the DEFRA futures report. I take what you say—that the Department will need to look back at the evidence it produced. From what I saw, it was deeply worrying, because DEFRA experts were saying that our critical systems could be at threat of collapse potentially as early as 2030, with collapse an increasing prospect to 2050. If the Department has an updated assessment, let’s see it, let’s investigate it and let’s scrutinise it as a Committee. Accepting what you said about the need to focus on the content, all of us are here—yourselves and ourselves—because we want to make sure that the UK is as resilient as it can be, whether on food security, water security or, as this report says, the fact that biodiversity collapse is a threat to national security. As the Chair implied, it has been like pulling teeth, trying to get a full version of this report in front of us and trying to get a debate. I have been pushing for this since I first asked a question in January. Hasn’t this repeated delay just delayed us in getting on to what we really need to be doing, which is looking at the Government’s response to these huge, major risks—things like whether we have enough food to feed ourselves? Hasn’t it delayed us from getting on with that scrutiny?
No. We published our environmental improvement plan in December. We published a land use framework plan in March. As I say, today we are announcing our largest ever three-year species recovery fund. I would strongly counter the idea that we have been sitting waiting for this document to come out before we started shifting ourselves into taking action on this. We passed legislation to clear up our rivers, lakes and seas. We have effectively banned neonicotinoid pesticides. We have taken very strong action across every element of this, whether that is pollution, the entire waste system or food waste collections, which are all about reducing the methane from our food waste bins, which is the global warming gas we can do the most about in the shortest period of time. We have not been sitting around waiting for some scientists to check each other’s homework and then come to us and say, “Oh, Minister, things are really bad.” We know things are really bad. I spent three years as Chair of this Committee and three years as shadow Secretary of State. I have spent the last 15 years of my life, including the five years where I had my mini-sabbatical, talking and working with civil servants at Cranfield University, saying, “Things are very bad. Here is what Government need to do on a policy level.” With this document, it is not suddenly like we have all woken up when it is published and are like, “Oh crap, we had better crack on with things now.” We have been cracking on from day one.
I accept there is good work being done, and there are some good things in what you have just said.
Thank you.
We will want to scrutinise whether the extent of the response—it is not just about the DEFRA response; it is about the extent of the cross-Government response—is adequate for the scale of the challenge. One of my concerns is that if we look at the issues that arise from this report, they are not just about areas within DEFRA responsibility. They are about energy policy, trade policy, migration and security issues. How are the Government ensuring there is a cross-Government response to this, particularly noting that the Cabinet Office Minister declined to come in front of us today?
If we look at the actual report, on coral reef collapse it says there is a “realistic possibility” of collapse starting from 2030. We have done a lot of work and overseas programming with our overseas territories on—I can’t remember exactly what it is called, but it is something like spiny coral reef disease. We have been looking at what the resilient corals are that we can take out, put into nurseries and grow as replacement corals as the ocean warms. You heard on the news this morning about the massive marine heatwave that is taking place around the UK and about the octopus coming into Brixham and eating the crabs—all the stuff we like to eat. We are looking at these things through our overseas territories programming, through our global ocean resilience programme and through the various overseas marine funding, which I will ask Ms Ledward to come in and talk about more fluently than me.
Can we just be very clear how the Government are ensuring a cross-Government response to a report of this scale and severity?
I have set up a little taskforce—my own taskforce—that is mainly DEFRA. It is a group of all the civil servants working on this issue across Government and looks at environmental resilience and efficiency in Government. That is very important as well, because we need to look at our own environmental resilience and efficiency taskforce and at what we can do, as Government, as well. So there is a little bit of that going on. I accept that that is going on at a very official level, and that these are very simple projects. There is the circular economy. There are pilot projects in prisons, such as looking at water leaks in prisons, and the MOJ saved £4 million in one year just by finding and fixing leaks. These are really simple things, and they do not sound like a lot, but £4 million off your water bill is a good deal for the taxpayer and a good deal for the environment. In a heatwave, when we are all showering more and getting the paddling pools out, it is really important that Government step up and play their part. In terms of what we are doing across Government, we had the discussion about the climate security taskforce. I would say that this is now talked about in different Government Departments in a way that it was not when I was here in 2019—it was not an item for discussion in the Department for Education, the Ministry of Defence or the Cabinet Office. I think it absolutely is now.
Can I just clarify? I do not want to spend any more time on this, but I do not think there is any misunderstanding about what report we are talking about. What you have just said does not tally with what we were told. The document that has been published is an abridged version of the biodiversity national security assessment. There is a longer, unabridged version. Many of us have already seen it; it has been leaked, and The Times has seen it, ITV has seen it and I am sure you have seen it, Minister. We asked your officials if we could see it under strict confidentiality, and we were told that we could not. I do not want there to be any misunderstanding about what we are talking about here. You suggested that the thing that was released was just a later iteration of the same report, but I do not believe that that is true. Can you clarify that there is an unabridged version of the biodiversity national security assessment and why this Committee was not able to see it?
What I can say is that the report as it stands is the one that I am discussing today; the official one that has been released is the one I am talking to today.
Right. The Times and ITV are able to see the other one, but this Committee cannot?
Like I say, I was a bit confused about the futures report.
I am not talking about the futures report. We are very clear what we are talking about.
Okay, so that is a separate thing. We cannot comment on internal machinery on national security assessments, the methodologies used to formulate them or the different versions.
I want to focus on the international collaboration, which I am assuming underpins the preparation of such security assessments. Minister, what level of co-operation is there between intelligence communities and organisations on the security threat from global biodiversity loss, compared to co-operation on security threats arising from climate breakdown?
I don’t know. I cannot comment on what there is between international intelligence and security agencies on these issues. They would not tell me if they did this, and I could not tell you if they had told me.
Biodiversity loss is a threat not just to the UK, and obviously preparation with other countries might allow us to be more prepared on the threats that are coming, including invasive species, pathogens and so on. How collaborative was the report in an international sense, or can you not tell us about that?
I genuinely do not know. What I can say in terms of our international partners is that we have strong relationships with embassies and Governments right across the world. We have a global demand for our expertise to help with how they value and account for nature. We have had a particularly successful partnership with the Government of Ecuador, who as a result of our technical assistance have put nature into their national accounts. There are a wide range of excellent projects. We are working now on global ocean accounting for small island developing states and the people that rely on the ocean for their food—I think 2 billion people rely on the oceans as their primary source of protein. We are trying to get into how we account for that and how they account for that in their national accounts, because it is clear that the primary risk they face is the loss of that food supply. We can talk about particular projects, but not in an intelligence and security framework. But, of course, it is about the security of the lives and livelihoods of the inhabitants of those places.
On the back of your assessment, are the Government now pushing for biodiversity loss to be framed more clearly and explicitly as a security issue and resilience issue in different fora, including, for example, in meetings and discussions with NATO? Also, are you taking this opportunity to incorporate these really important issues, for example, in UK trade negotiations?
We set out our international climate finance strategy, ICF4, on 22 June. That set out that nature is a priority for the UK’s international climate finance—protecting and restoring nature, including forests, oceans and coastal, terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems. That is a key part of the work that I do with Minister White and with Baroness Chapman in a triumvirate way, if I may use that slightly old-fashioned word. The “Chronic Risks Analysis”—a UK document—highlights biodiversity loss as a vulnerability, outlining the impacts on medicine, food security and food supply, because much of our medicine comes from forests and from plants that are at risk of extinction. We are trying to encourage international companies to understand that things that may not have been discovered yet are in these forests and that we have to protect these forests in order to protect the future of new and novel innovative medicines, for example, or beauty products or whatever it may be. So we have put biodiversity loss into our climate finance strategy, and it is part of our “Chronic Risks Analysis”.
Lastly, is the biodiversity loss national security risk assessment a topic that the UK might consider prioritising during its G20 presidency?
The G20 next year is an important opportunity for us to shape the global multilateral agenda. It is our first G20 since 2009, and it is going to be followed by our G7 presidency the year after, in 2028. The Prime Minister has outlined a five-point plan for growth at the G20 summit in South Africa, and it has included supporting global growth, reinforcing stability, and advancing economic stability and prosperity in the UK and beyond, but our environment and nature priorities are still in the process of being determined. We are going to announce our decisions on that later this year.
So you cannot tell us—
No.
—whether this will be a priority for the presidency?
Yes.
Reflecting on the Government’s response to the issues that came forward in the assessment and how that is affecting the work that we are doing, the OEP’s latest progress report made it clear that Government remain off-track in terms of meeting their nature goals, and it says we must “move mountains” by 2030 to be a global leader. What impact does this failure to meet domestic targets have on the UK’s standing internationally? I think we are meeting three out of 23 of our targets.
We went through those yesterday, because I thought this question might come up, and we are doing much better than you would think. These are global biodiversity targets—they are for the entire world to deliver—but clearly we want to play our part. If we look at the green, amber and red, we have things where we are on track and things where I think we are off track. There is quite a lot where I think we are on track. For example, on target 3, the 30 by 30, we have a plan and we will be setting out next week our intentions. We are going to do a slightly innovative thing, which is that we are going to class-land as a—I do not know whether I am allowed to say this—
I think you have said it before.
I have said it before. We are going to class-land as bronze, silver and gold in terms of our trajectory towards 30 by 30. Not everything is going to be gold, but it cannot just be sitting at 7% and we say, “Oh, it is terrible, we have had a failure.” We have to look at what land is consecrated for nature, if you like, or is always going to be managed for nature. The land use framework has been interesting and important in being encouraging about what we need to do to go further. Our EIP has clear delivery mechanisms, which the previous Government’s EIP simply did not include. We have trajectories and we have financial allocations alongside it. On target 13, we have played a crucial part internationally on access and benefit-sharing regulations. That is that bit about these big companies, the Cali Fund and putting cash into it. On target 17, biosafety measures and distributing the benefits of biotechnology, again we are doing well there. On target 20, I think we are really world leading. This is about capacity building, tech transfer, legal understanding, and scientific and technical co-operation. We have had 250 years of going around the world and bringing back interesting specimens, whether they are plants, animals or fungi. Target 23 is very close to my heart, and I launched the gender-inclusive principles for biodiversity action. Often in this nature discussion, women’s voices are crowded out. So we developed, alongside indigenous people and local communities, what we wanted to do. That has informed a lot of the programming that we are now doing. It is very easy to get into an “It is all terrible” mindset. Things are bad, and I am under no illusions, but I think we are on target also to get the cash in that we said we would get. Looking at that, I am reassured that we are on target to hit the amount of money for global biodiversity. There is a huge interest from a variety of corporations that want to do this. They understand climate change and the risks associated with it. They are less confident on nature and biodiversity loss. They are certainly working very closely with us on projects that they feel are going to be good nature projects that will deliver stuff. It is only three targets, but I think we are underselling our achievements.
It is very encouraging, and I think we would all agree with what is written in the report, that meaningful progress is being made and that the foundations are in place. Specifically, we just want to understand whether the slowness of getting there has had any impact on our global reputation. Is there any international consequence of us being slightly behind where we might want to have been?
My colleague Minister Hardy attended the Ocean conference in Kenya. We are leading players in the global plastic pollution treaty, and we have been working on that. We are obviously very disappointed that it has not been effectively concluded. We are coming into a triple COP year and we are extremely keen to play a full part there. We have not been that involved in the desertification COP previously because it has not been seen as a thing that Britain needs to worry about, but I think the UK does need to worry about it. Perhaps I can ask Ros to say something about FCDO’s involvement in that.
We very much see the desertification COP, COP 17, as a moment to build a bit of momentum on some of the UK objectives, including resilience and food systems in the most vulnerable countries, which obviously are of huge concern at this moment in time. That will include improving soil health, as well as wider issues around, for example, peace, security and land rights, including fragile and conflict-affected states. Finally, we see it as a moment to think about our partnerships with the global south, particularly African countries. We are very much looking forward to that moment as an opportunity to build on that.
That is really encouraging, thank you. While we have you, Ms Eales, can you talk to us about any concrete ways in which that national security assessment we have been discussing may already have changed the UK’s international nature diplomacy?
The evidence in the report speaks to a number of the priorities that we in FCDO, in partnership with other Government Departments, have in approaching, and indeed taking action on, this issue. That includes some of the work on forests, which are an absolutely critical ecosystem. We have work around not only protecting those forests, but thinking about how we sustainably manage that natural resource and support local communities in doing that and thinking about their livelihoods. In terms of oceans, our Blue Belt programme is there to do that across the overseas territories, thinking about how we support sustainable management of, I think, 4 million sq km of oceans. There is also our wider work on water management, food security and the like. So a lot of the work are doing speaks to the priorities and issues set out in the report, and we will continue to build on that in future years.
Thank you. It sounds really impactful. I have a final question for the Minister. Are you still committed to introducing a global nature Bill to achieve the Government’s species protection aims?
We know that we have a water Bill coming in the second Session and we are certainly looking at what Bills will go forward in our third session. It is clear that there are issues with some of the nature and wildlife protections that have not been updated since, in some cases, 1989 and, in some cases, going back even further. I am very keen that we tackle that but, as you will understand, we have had 15 years of very little nature legislation, so we obviously have to take our place patiently in the queue.
Thank you, Minister, for coming in front of us today. Not all the questions I am going to ask are uniquely your responsibility, but you are the Minister in front of us today. I will also be looking for some answers from Ms Eales as well. Every critical ecosystem is on a pathway to collapse and irreversible loss of function, and you, Minister, have already said today that all these risks are there for everyone to see. Yet, we are cutting our overseas development assistance, which this Committee and others have heard is an important way of investing in protecting that biodiversity globally. Is it possible to adequately respond to the challenges posed by the national security assessment with ODA levels reduced to just 0.3% of our national income?
I would say that we are allocating around £6 billion of international climate finance from our aid budget over the next three financial years. That is going to be allocated between mitigation and adaptation, and it is going to also retain a strong focus on nature. Our goal is to deliver an additional £6.7 billion of UK-backed climate and nature-positive public finance, non-ODA, through our contributions to the IMF’s Resilience and Sustainability Trust, our guarantees to multilateral development banks, UK Export Finance and British International Investment. We are also keen to mobilise billions more from the private sector over the three years, including by leveraging the City of London’s position as the green finance capital of the world. The nature of the world has changed. That money has gone in order to meet our NATO obligations under defence. But we are talking about national security today, and both parts of that security are very important. I would also say that our partnership on climate security with the EU has been formalised under the security and defence partnership last year, and we have some joint priority projects for joint delivery and holding initial technical exchanges. So there is some work going on with the EU in the security and defence space as well.
Maybe we can provide an example here. It is useful that you mentioned the defence investment plan. People will not be able to see this, but there is a debate going on right now in the main Chamber about rearmament and warfighting readiness. We are debating putting billions of pounds into military hardware, yet in the context of national security and the importance of global biodiversity to that, The Times has reported that funding for the Congo Basin forest action programme has been quietly cut by 79% due to the wider cuts to foreign aid. I cannot help asking: is this not indicative of the Government failing to take the security impacts of biodiversity as seriously as they do our defence priorities?
Public finance cannot do it all. The idea that we can have a pound for the climate, a pound for nature and a pound for desertification is over. We are not the only Government that are ramping up war readiness and national security as a result of the changing geopolitical situation. In reviewing the projects, we are generally looking at the ones that have reached completion or where we feel there has been less impact; we are looking at this through that lens. Perhaps Ms Ledward would like to say something; I do not know about the Congo Basin partnership.
I think Ros is probably best placed to talk specifically about the Congo Basin forestry programming, but I think the CBD and the United Nations environment programme have clarified that, for the $220 billion of nature-positive finance in the system, there are $7.3 trillion each year of negative, harmful finance flowing in the system. So it is a 30:1 ratio of positive to negative, harmful to nature-positive flows. The trick is how you pivot, shift the system and start to tackle the harmful subsidies and some of the finance that is having a negative impact. It does not require large amounts of UK public finance to do that; it is about a new development paradigm and a shift to a new development approach, which means using technical assistance, science, data and some of our other levers to do that.
Building on that point and the need to think about how we mobilise further and greater sums of finance into nature and climate, that is certainly something we are focused on. Indeed, in a forest context, our Partnerships for Forests programme has mobilised over £1 billion of private investments into forests across the globe, including in the Congo basin, but also in central, west and east Africa, LatAm and south-east Asia. That is very much thinking about how we use forests as sustainable commodities, manage them responsibly and support local communities to do that, while ensuring livelihoods as well. That is a good example of the approach that we globally—all of us—need to think about in terms of how we leverage in nature-positive investment.
I am aware of time, so I will try to go quite quickly, and I will come back to private finance in a moment. On this issue of a new approach to how we use public finance to protect global biodiversity, Baroness Chapman described the decision to drop the nature sub-pledge under ICF4 and move instead to an approach that seeks to integrate climate and nature into aid programming as “a gamble”. Again, given everything we are talking about, and the risks of global biodiversity collapse to our national security, is it wise to be taking a gamble?
Well, she said what she said. I would say that, given the new realities of the funding, we have been laser-focused on making sure that nature and the oceans are at the front and centre of this and that every pound delivers for not just aid but climate mitigation and adaptation as well, and levers in money from elsewhere. It is a change from the old 0.7%, money out the door programme through DFID offices, with all the visits that I did back in 2006 to the DRC—it is an incredibly difficult country to work in, by the way, and there are issues around that. I feel like we are not going to do it on our own. We have to do this in partnership. In terms of the old days of Germany doing this, USAID doing that, France doing this, and everyone turning up with their flags on it, we just have to get better at this.
You have set me up perfectly for my next question. The biodiversity national security assessment cites the Amazon rainforest as one of the most critical ecosystems for us in terms of its role in food production and weather cycles, but the UK is yet to make a contribution to the Tropical Forest Forever Facility. Norway has, France has, Germany has, and so have Brazil, Indonesia and even Luxembourg. When will we make a contribution?
I cannot say; that is above my pay grade. I would say that the Prime Minister was quite clear last year that it was not never. It was about not now.
Do you believe that the Treasury is the blocker to this?
I genuinely do not know. We have announced our approach to tackling deforestation in our supply chains. We have 29,000 hectares of deforestation associated with our consumption in this country, and we have said that we will aim to introduce regs in Great Britain that operate consistently alongside that EUDR. I think that is a very significant moment. We think that that will be good for forest peoples, good for the businesses and also good for us as UK consumers, in terms of our consciences being clear that the coffee, cocoa and rubber are using are free of illegal deforestation.
There is something like a $700 billion annual biodiversity funding gap globally—obviously, that is not exclusively to be met by this country. The Cali Fund was intended to be a way of getting private finance to fill some of that gap. Can you confirm to the Committee how many donations the Cali Fund has received so far from UK businesses and what the value of those donations has been?
It was launched a year ago in Rome. It has received one contribution from a UK AI start-up called Terra Viva and that came in in COP30 in Brazil. We need businesses to see the benefits and invest in the fund as the most appropriate mechanism for sharing benefits from the use of DSI. What we have done at Kew is digitise the 7 million specimens, going right back to Darwin, of all the plants from around the world that it holds. That is just the most incredible database, and people can go and find those plants, because it is all geo-located. They are getting the benefits of this, but they are not giving anything back to the custodians of those incredibly precious areas. We have progress on the Cali Fund. We have the Armenian presidency working closely with us on the biodiversity convention, and we have UK, Chile, Colombia, Armenia, the Netherlands, Norway and the European Commission working together as Governments to try to encourage the funding into the Cali Fund.
Just to come back to the Tropical Forest Forever Facility, last week the Minister at Kew Gardens indicated that this was not just a nice idea to have; it was essential. We are at a stage where other countries that said they would commit to it are looking to see what commitment we are going to make. The danger is, of course, that if we do not make one, then money may not come into the fund altogether. Minister, you have said that we are doing our bit by trying to cut down consumption, and that is admirable, but the problem is that if we are not responsible for having forests cut down, somebody else will step in and say, “If the wood is not going to Britain, or the goods that are being produced from the cut-down forest are not going to Britain, they will go somewhere else.” My question to you is, why is this not being given priority in the aid budget we have at present? We know that there is waste in the aid budget. We actually thought this idea up. We want to be world leaders; we hear all the time that the UK wants to be a world leader. Why are we not finding the funds by giving some priority to a project that we were responsible for trying to promote?
You are right about the Tropical Forest Forever Facility. It is a critical evolution in forest finance. We have supported its development. We have pledged £2.5 million to support the establishment of the fund, and we are committed to it being a success. We have done a lot through FCDO in the REDD+ space, which is tackling deforestation. There is data that will be critical to inform TFFF monitoring, and we have contributed £48 million of funding towards that at this date. Paradoxically, I am not the international forest Minister—that responsibility is held in DESNZ—so I might ask FCDO to say a little bit more.
I will just reiterate the points. We have been firmly supportive of this fund. We have committed to its establishment. We have played a role in shaping it. We are not in a position, as my Minister said to the IDC last week, I think it was, to contribute financially right now, and that is our current position. As the Minister says, we are hoping, engaging and doing everything we can to ensure it is a success.
In the discussions with the other contributors, whether it is the private finance sources or other Governments, are we in danger, if there is not a commitment from the UK, of the funding package we had hoped would come from other Governments and from private investors falling apart?
That is the phase we are going through at the moment. It is not just resting on the UK; there are other organisations and countries that would want to crowd into this, and we are working hard to make this fund a success.
I have some questions about COP17. In the light of the fact that the Minister needs to leave at 4.30 pm, I am going to slightly switch the order around here, because there is something I really want to be able to ask her about. I am very pleased to hear about your cross-departmental taskforce. As a subset of that—you will know this is a subject dear to my heart—how closely are you working with DESNZ to make sure that climate and nature action are co-ordinated in a mutually reinforcing way in the context of COP17 and COP31?
We are indeed. I didn’t manage to tell the Committee that we have also launched our “Government Estate Nature Plan” as well last week. It is quite niche, but the Government own 4% of the land in England and we have crowded in other large landowners, like the Crown Estate and some very large private estates. We have got to about 10% of the landmass in England, and we have developed some principles about how we are going to manage that land and how we are going to experiment using different nature-positive approaches. It has been hard, and I did make a joke that it was worse than the Labour party in terms of getting the standing orders and the terms of reference established—that took us about six months. But we are now in a position where we have these landowners signed up to these principles, and there is some exciting work going on there. In terms of cross co-ordination, it is a bit weird when you go to these COPs. Often, Minister White will be doing her stuff and I will be doing my stuff, and we might see each other for 20 minutes over breakfast. She has very specific and particular things that she is doing, and often I will be doing my very specific and particular things—oceans, methane and the saltmarsh declaration, for example, last year—which are not the areas where she is working. I have covered stuff in the past on transport and education. Often I am the catch-all Minister and she is much closer, as you would expect, to the actual detailed negotiations.
What I was hoping to get to was to what extent nature is being seen as a way to mitigate and adapt to climate change.
You would have to ask her, but I would say that there is this aim to bring the COPs together and to get out of this artificial segmentation of, “This week it is climate, next week it is nature.” That is not how the world functions. These are all massive systems, and they are dealt with through an accident of United Nations history in three completely different conferences, which all have their own carbon footprint costs, secretariats and wranglings going on. There is a move to see how we can do more together; that is not about me and Minister White, but about taking a look at the UN and how it functions better.
Do you have any sense of what the timeline on that greater integration might be?
I don’t, but we are engaging with partners. Our nature security assessment, which is obviously the subject of this session, has generated significant international interest. It is strengthening our evidence base for international engagement and shaping how we are talking to our partners.
It sounds like there is still not as much integration between DEFRA and DESNZ as maybe you would like. There is still a fairly clear division of labour there.
She is not coming to my biodiversity COP, but I am going to her climate COP, and we will both be at the UN General Assembly where all these issues will be discussed. Of course, during London Climate Action Week just a couple of weeks ago, we had the first ever Nature Day at Kew Gardens. At Kew they have a tree, the Kew Oak, that died in the heatwave the previous year, I think. They have left it there to say, “Climate change killed this tree.” There are some quite interesting, creative and innovative actions happening. Is this happening at the speed or intensity that I would wish? Probably not, if I am being honest, but we are bringing nature into the climate in a way that it has not shown up before, and that can only be a good thing.
I have some more questions about COP17, but I will direct them at Ms Eales. Going back to the biodiversity national security assessment, how is that informing the UK’s approach to COP17? In particular, I wonder if there are three top objectives that the Government have in relation to COP17.
I think I actually answered the question on the top objectives previously, but let me say them again. They are to build momentum on UK objectives, which are around resilience in food systems in the most vulnerable countries, including improving soil health; peace, security and land rights, including in fragile and conflict-affected states; and then the final point around strengthening the partnerships with the global south and, in particular, African countries.
Thank you for recapping those. You may also have touched on this. Looking at the 2030 targets and the 2050 goals, clearly we are not on track to achieve those at the moment—there has been quite significant drift. Do the Government have a specific plan for how they will accelerate progress towards those goals at COP17?
This is the CBD COP, I think. Going into CBD COP17 in Armenia, the key thing is going to be the global review and looking at those 134 national reports that have been submitted by Governments from across the world. In looking at that, we will have to focus on the increased mobilisation of finance from all sources as the key area where we have to accelerate progress the fastest. The Cali Fund will be a critical part of that, as has already been discussed. We will be looking at the global biodiversity framework fund that was established. The UK is the largest contributor to that to date. We will also be trying to focus on sustained collective action to deliver those 2030 targets and how we can all keep working together on that.
They are global targets. They are not “us” targets; they are “everybody” targets. That is the thing. Can I just say something about the Dutch Government? They have looked at our nature security assessment and they have asked Wageningen University & Research to examine their national biodiversity research needs. They are copying what we have done on the NSA, which I think is quite an interesting development. We are also in a partnership with them on circular economy finance, because we know, domestically here, that we need to invest a lot more in our circular economy infrastructure. They have lots of brilliant operationalised methods and techniques. We have the money in the City of London, and they have all the people who know how to do it, so we have signed a partnership for some joint working between us. Again, this was during climate week, and this is what I mean. You say, “Where is nature showing up?” It is like, “We don’t want plastic bottles in the environment, so what are we going to do on the recycling side?” Even here there is a bit of an artificial distinction between climate and nature. But, actually, everything is connected.
It is indeed. Thank you.
Thank you very much indeed. We hope that your Dutch counterparts get an opportunity to read The Times so they can see all the information in the report. Minister Creagh, Ms Eales and colleagues, thank you very much for your attendance today. This sitting is adjourned.