Thank you very much, Chair, and to the Committee for having me. Let me give a sense of the overview and where all these things fit in. What I was trying to set out in the essay was very much the backdrop. The priorities we set out were the things the FCDO is focusing on. Part of what I was trying to do with the Chatham House essay was to set out the backdrop we are dealing with and what the UK has to respond to, and that is an increasingly dangerous and much more unstable world. The reality is that in response to that we are having to focus more heavily on security and on building Britain’s strength and resilience in response to that. In fact, that security issue was very much reflected in the priorities that I set out but, alongside that, as well as talking about our security and how we respond to the unstable world that we face, I also said that we have to be more agile in our alliances and use that, in effect, convening power—the soft power as well as the hard power—in how we respond to a more dangerous world, because we need to shape the world, not simply try to shelter from the storm. I was also clear about our humanitarian priorities, our values, and the need for us to be confident in upholding those values. Our focuses around development, on humanitarianism and on women and girls are very much reflections of those values. The overarching thing was the context, the threats that we face as a country, the turbulence in the world, and then how we respond on building our strength and resilience, developing our alliances and upholding our values. If you retrofit that to the priorities that I set out for the Foreign Office earlier in the year, the first was continuing that national security priority, which is obviously completely in line with the essay. Secondly, on economic growth, I have changed the focus so that it is about not just economic growth but growth and resilience. That is very much in response to the instability in the world. If you look at something like the strait of Hormuz, our strongest economic policy at the moment is seeking to get that reopened. It is also about strengthening our border security. Our migration focus was about not only our border security but how we build our democratic resilience and work internationally to tackle issues of migration. On building alliances, again that is a clear priority set out earlier in the year. Finally, the women and girls and development and climate priorities are very much about the reflections of our values. For me, then, the six thematic priorities that I set out earlier in the year were very much in line with that broader essay, which sets out the context. I will come back to the AI issue as the final point in a second, but you also referred to the geographic priorities. It is always a challenge when trying to write a broad, overarching foreign policy essay: do you start from the geography and move around the world, or do you try to address the broad themes, which means you will highlight geography from time to time as part of highlighting the themes? Of course, Ukraine is central to our security. The issues around the middle east, including Israel-Palestine, are about both our security and our values, and so too are Sudan and Lebanon. They cut across both the issues around our security and our values. So I think those are very much in line. The area where I would agree that things are moving on at pace is around AI. That is just about a sense of the pace at which everybody is grappling with the speed at which technology is changing. That creates huge opportunities, but also huge challenges and threats. As part of a visit to China, where I went to see some of the work they are doing on AI and robotics, I was very struck by the pace at which things are moving. We have also seen a lot of the debates with the US around Anthropic and so on; that is also about the pace at which those things are moving. I agree that that was not highlighted in the priorities in February. That is a reflection of the pace at which things are moving. This is me looking forward and thinking, “This is going to shape everything that we do, I think, over the next 18 months to two years.” It is going to influence all our foreign policy debates, which means we in the Foreign Office are going to have to adapt.

Our position remains that we want to see the strait of Hormuz fully reopened. This is about an international shipping lane and the law of the sea. Therefore, no country can do what Iran has been seeking to do. They have been deliberately trying to weaponise the strait to hijack the global economy, effectively. There are currently three shipping routes: the northern route that goes through Iranian waters, the central route that has been the traditional IMO-endorsed route, which we believe is significantly mined; and then a new southern route only in Omani waters. The central and southern routes are in Omani waters. Despite signing the memorandum of understanding, Iran decided to attack commercial shipping in that southern route in Omani waters. That is a violation not just of their own memorandum of understanding, but of Oman’s sovereignty, and it is a violation of freedom of navigation and the law of the sea. I think Iran has hugely overreached. They decided to claim that the memorandum of understanding gave them the ability to do this; of course, it doesn’t. It totally undermines the law of the sea. We now have is an increasing of pressure on all sides, and an increase in the return to conflict. Obviously, we want to ensure that we can get the strait reopened. That means reaching a ceasefire again and going back to the talks process. On that basis, Iran has to halt the attacks on commercial shipping, and I do not think that can be allowed to continue.

We continue to oppose tolls and charges. In fact, that was the discussion that I had with American colleagues last week while we were at NATO. We were talking about how we could not end up with tolls and a system on the strait of Hormuz that would undermine the freedom of navigation and the law of the sea. At the moment, we are seeing the escalation of rhetoric around the conflict itself and the putting on of pressure. Our position remains the same: we support freedom of navigation and we are opposed to tolls in the strait of Hormuz, just as we are everywhere else. I have pointed out to some of our international colleagues that the strait of Dover is busier than the strait of Hormuz and the Suez canal put together. We, the UK, do not support tolls in the strait of Dover, so we make the same arguments everywhere else in the world. Any restricted routes where there are international shipping routes need to be free from tolls and open for freedom of navigation.

It is true that we are not heavily involved in that area of the world, or in exactly what is happening in Cuba, but we supported the proposal to hold an emergency UN debate on Cuba, because we think it is important. We have raised concerns, and we obviously have support through our embassy there. It is true to say that we are more heavily involved in what is happening in Europe and the middle east than what is happening in Cuba.

I don’t know the ratification process, so I would need to get back to you on that.

That is true.

Some of the issues are shared right across the area, including the British overseas territories and countries with which we have strong historic relationships, including members of the Commonwealth and so on. Of course, there is an interrelation, which can be around refugees, the wider economic and trade relations and, crucially, security arrangements and relationships. Whenever there is a void—where there are instability and insecurity—organised crime and organised criminal gangs can exploit that, which can have an impact. We have had some engagement around what has been happening in Haiti, exactly because of the risks and impacts on other neighbouring countries. We are looking particularly at some of those organised crime issues too.

No, I agree.

We keep the emergency humanitarian aid under continuous review, and that is important. Wherever there are particular crises, we are ready to respond. At different stages through this, we have had particular discussions with our consular team, who are there, to make sure they have support, and we discuss that with other countries as well. I don’t know whether there is anything to add on that, Nick.

I think this links in to the issues around settlement trade. Do you want to cover those at this point?

Okay. Look, the new Prime Minister is obviously going to have to consider how he wants to address this issue. I have not discussed it with Andy Burnham yet, although I have discussed some of the policy areas that it touches on. Let me say a bit more about the advisory opinion and our approach. It is an advisory opinion, so my view is that we should make sure we are advised by it. It is not binding but it is important. Obviously, we have to take our own decisions about how we abide by international law, but we should respect the advisory opinion and its conclusions as we do so. I do not think any other nation state has produced a policy document in response to the ICJ, but we have to be clear about the way in which we are respecting the advisory opinion and respecting it in the things that we do. If you look at some of the key conclusions, they are around the different ways in which the occupied territories and green line Israel should be treated, and about the different ways in which, for example, trade and economic trade should be treated. That is why I think this goes into some other things. In terms of the formal—

We do not normally do formal responses, as in documents or policy documents that set out a response to an advisory opinion report. Successive Ministers have said to you, “Look, we are still considering this. We will respond.” I think that because we have said that, we need to be clearer with you about the nature of our response. That is why I can give you some reflections today, but ultimately the new Prime Minister is going to have to reflect on exactly how he wants to respond to it as well. I can talk a bit more, as and when you want me to, about some of the issues around the content of the advisory opinion and, secondly, some of the policy issues that flow from it. But we are in a slightly complicated situation at the moment, because we are in the final week for the Prime Minister, with a new Prime Minister beginning next week. Although, as I said, I have managed to talk to Andy Burnham about some of the issues that we have been working on in respect of settlement trade and sanctions, I have not managed to talk to him about this issue. I understand your frustration on this, but he will need to take a view on how we respond. I am happy to talk to you about some of the content issues, including the way in which we should respond to some of the content in it.

I think it is wrong to say there would be a policy document in response, because no nation has done that and we would not normally do that. But in terms of our articulating something to you—whether that be orally, in a written ministerial statement or in writing—I think you have been promised that through an extensive period, and therefore we need to do that. I can give you some reflections that would contribute to that today, because I recognise that you have waited for a long time and you have asked these questions over a long period of time—

I am also conscious that because a new Prime Minister is about to take office, there will be some things that he will also want to reflect on in terms of the way in which we respond to you.

Yes, and I think a lot of what he was referring to were the issues we had as a party in opposition. It was about our early response to this, in which we should have been faster to call for a ceasefire and clearer from the start about the importance of international humanitarian law. That is a reflection for us a party, and I agree with it.

I also think we need to have stronger action going forward. We should be clear about the things we have done. We recognised the state of Palestine, which was a historic decision, and suspended the previous Government’s negotiations on a trade deal. We have suspended all arms exports to the IDF that could be used in Gaza, and we have had four waves of sanctions, including the sanctioning of two members of the Israeli Cabinet and the most recent wave of sanctions on violent settlers. We restored funding to UNRWA, increased support to the Palestinian Authority for both funding and capability building, and done the medevac and student evacuations. We also introduced a new international peace fund with Australia and Canada, and we have been strong advocates for the peace process. Yesterday, I again met the Palestinian Prime Minister to discuss what we need to do on next steps, because I am deeply worried about what is happening in Gaza and the risk of the 20-point plan running into the ground, and what is happening in the west bank with the settlements and settler violence, some of which is clearly settler terrorism and is part of a deliberate strategy to undermine the viability of the two-state solution—a solution we believe in. The two areas that we have looked specifically at going further on are around trade with the illegal settlements and expanding the sanctions regime. The particular thing about the sanctions regime is how it links back to the expansion of the illegal settlements. When we face the E1 expansion, which is fundamentally aimed at undermining the viability of the two-state solution and will be deeply damaging, we need to be able to use some stronger levers and put on some stronger pressures. At the moment, our ability to put sanctions on is limited, but I have been working on this for some time, and we think there are areas where we should go further.

There were two things under consideration in December. First, at that point, we were still seeking to support what we hoped, in the autumn, was a process that would make progress towards a two-state solution. We had the 20-point Gaza peace plan, and those 20 points explicitly linked into the Palestinian Authority ultimately taking over in Gaza. As part of that internationally supported 20-point plan, there were references effectively to moving towards the two-state solution. Among other countries, we had supported the recognition of the state of Palestine. It also felt like a huge amount of work, including work involving the United States and many different countries, was under way to put that pressure on. The other thing is that there are practical difficulties with this, and I can go through some of the practical difficulties we have been working to overcome. One thing that has changed since then has been the total blatant disregard by the Israeli Government for any of these processes. In fact, they have been doing the opposite; they have been accelerating the work around the illegal settlements and pursuing action in not just the west bank but Gaza—the humanitarian restrictions in Gaza—

I recognise that; I am just explaining that in the autumn we were seeking to try to leverage a diplomatic process that, at least in Gaza, did seem to be delivering some pressure and some progress. We also raised a series of concerns through the Christmas recess and into the new year about what was happening in terms of the settlements and the continuing humanitarian crisis in Gaza. In that period, it became clear how difficult this was going to be and the risk that we were going backwards. The second thing that has changed has been that other countries have sought to make some progress. Therefore, we have always said that we should work with international allies on this. You have Spain, Ireland—

Only a small number of other countries have done this, and they have faced significant limitations. What we are trying to do at the moment is learn from those limitations and see how much further we can go. In terms of the options we are looking at, we are looking at going further than other countries. We have also continually led the way on a lot of the sanctions issues. At the moment, one of the things that we are looking at is around expanding the sanctions regime so that you can use it in a targeted way against the settlements. If you look at the E1 settlements at the moment, we have the ability through the sanctions regime to go after settler violence for abuse of human rights. We can take action and we can put sanctions down where there is evidence it is linked to settler violence, but if it is simply a contractor that does a contract for E1, it is quite hard for us to use our existing sanctions regime to do that. We think we need to expand the sanctions regime to look at making it more about international humanitarian law, not just human rights abuses. That would allow us to then say to all businesses that are considering contracting to develop the E1 settlements, “If you do, we will be pursuing sanctions.” It will take us a bit of time to bring that in and expand that, but I strongly think that we need stronger levers to be able to put pressure on international businesses that are tempted to get involved in the E1 settlements. Those settlements are illegal and they should not be going ahead. It is about not just short-term illegality but the long-term undermining of the viability of a two-state solution. The warning that I want to be able to give to businesses now is, “Do not engage with the E1 settlements.” We are going to pursue sanctions on that, and we want to work with other countries to encourage them to do the same.

On the trade issue, there is how we use sanctions in a targeted way for those who do contracts, and alongside that, there is what more we can do on settlement trade. Compared with Crimea, there is additional complexity for the settlements. With Crimea, we had a sanctions regime for Russia and Belarus, and if they had knock-on consequences from what was happening in Crimea, to be honest, we thought that was fair enough. For the settlements, there is obviously an issue about not wanting to have an impact on Palestinian businesses in the occupied territories, and not wanting to have an impact on legitimate Israeli businesses in green line Israel that have never had any engagement with the settlements and that may have had all sorts of trading relationships.

Indeed. There are ways to do this through, again, the dedicated sanctions regimes, and we have also been looking at whether there are things you can do through the goods licensing process as well. In terms of where other countries have got to, because that is worth reflecting on, most other countries have focused on goods and goods only. Services is more complex. If we want to look at things like advertising bans and things like that, that is more complicated. Spain has done import of goods. Ireland will be completing its legislation next week. I spoke to the Irish Foreign Minister again yesterday; I have previously discussed it with her, but I spoke to her again yesterday about it at the Palestinian donor group. They made a decision to just focus on goods and not on services. Similarly, the Netherlands has done so. Norway is consulting on things. Slovenia did introduce an imported goods ban, and then they reduced it.

Yes. They are planning to do it through legislation. We would rather not have to do this through primary legislation, because that is a very complex route—

It just takes a long time. Ireland has chosen to do this through primary legislation. What we are looking at is what the options would be in terms of using secondary legislation, including using effectively the statutory instruments on the existing sanctions regime processes. We are looking at all of those things at the moment. Ultimately, the new Prime Minister will need to take a view on all of this, but these are the things that we are working through in some detail. The fundamental principle here is, first, that nobody should be profiting from stolen land and, secondly, that we need to have stronger levers to put pressure on, particularly around the E1 settlements, because of the damage that it would do. We want to have a position that reflects the fairness and what we think is right, but the most significant thing that is driving the pressure on this at the moment is the need to have additional levers and an ability to put pressure on in this area.

The reality is that I do not have a timescale at the moment. I want any action to be as rapid as possible. There are some things that you might be able to do more quickly than others, but they may not provide a full answer, and that is what we are looking at at the moment.

There have been rumours about different timescales. We are currently anticipating that it is possible that they will do so during August.

Exactly, and that is why we want to be able to give a clear warning at that point about what our intention is—so that even if the regimes are not fully in place, we want to be able to say to businesses that they should not be contracting with the E1 settlements.

Yes, I do. I can tell you that Alistair Burt is appointed as the UK’s first ever envoy for complex consular cases. His focus will be on the most difficult and complex detention cases involving British people overseas, including those where there are human rights concerns. Many of you will know Alistair as somebody who was an extremely well-respected Minister, including as Minister for the Middle East. I think he will have both the experience and the dexterity to be able to deal with what are often very difficult cases, with a lot of distressed families, and also the complex negotiations that need to take place with the states involved.

The good thing about Alistair is that you know that he will always tell us, he will always be honest about what he thinks, and he will do so in such a diplomatic way that you always think, “Well, fair point.”

There is a lot of distress about this case, and there is evidence in the case that there has been a lot of focus on. But there are other cases, including of doctors and healthcare workers, being detained, without transparency and with real concerns about human rights abuses and real concerns about the implications. We have raised it. This is something that Hamish Falconer has been pursuing, and it is something that we will continue to pursue.

I can provide you with further details or get Hamish to provide you with further details. I know you have raised it with him.

There is really serious concern about human rights abuses. This is a very distressing case, because we know this is someone who has been a doctor providing medical healthcare for people as well. It has been raised internationally. Ultimately, it is the Israeli Government who need to be accountable for the decisions that they have taken. It is one of a whole series of individual cases where there are real concerns about the abuse of human rights law and the abuses of international humanitarian law.

I think there are two issues there: the settlement trade and the wider international humanitarian law breaches. On the settlement trade, I agree that we do need to do more. We have been looking at a range of different options as to how we go forward. The new Prime Minister will need to take a final view on those. I agree that we need to do more. A small number of individual countries may have gone further, but we are ahead of the EU in looking at this. The broader point about international humanitarian law is important because we have seen a series of breaches of international humanitarian law, not just in terms of what is happening in Gaza and the west bank, but in other parts of the world as well. Our sanctions regime currently cannot effectively be used just on breaches of international humanitarian law. That is what I believe we need to change, and that is what we are looking at how to change to expand the sanctions regime. That would then allow us to use sanctions in those cases where we have egregious breaches of international humanitarian law. For example, if humanitarian aid is being withheld in an obvious, detrimental and incredibly damaging and immoral way, we would have the ability to then use sanctions in those cases to put pressure on as well. At the moment, we do not have many of those levers. We have our diplomatic pressure, which works in some places, but not in others, however, we do not have a sanctions lever to use effectively in that way.

We have had some of those discussions and I am sure that those discussions will continue.

I am going to defer to Nick on this because some aspects of the scale and nature of our diplomatic presence raise a range of issues. We are very conscious of this as a priority area in terms of our relationship with the Syrian Government. It is something that Minister Falconer has been looking at a lot. We are currently recruiting for the next special envoy to Syria as well and we are reviewing the diplomatic presence.

We just had the NATO summit, last week, and as part of that I had very many discussions with Secretary of State Marco Rubio on a whole range of different issues, which were very positive discussions. The big focus has been on how we increase Europe’s role within NATO and I think that is exactly what we have delivered, working across European countries. The US remains a very important partner in NATO and the agreement really was about a stronger Europe within a stronger NATO, but Europe has to do much more to carry the weight, in particular in the face of the increased threats. My sense is that that that has been the biggest focus from the US on Europe over the last six months—ensuring that Europe does go further. Europe and Canada together have substantially increased the funding for NATO for defence as well. That really has been an agreement because the reality is we had all relied on the United States for too long and Europe, including the UK, does need to step up.

This first became a focus back in late January, early February this year. The view we strongly took, which was shared by all our European partners as well, was that Greenland is part of the Kingdom of Denmark, the sovereignty lies with Greenland and the people of Denmark and of Greenland, and it is for them to decide and for Greenland to decide its future, not for the United States to do so. That is our strong principle of sovereignty. What we did alongside that was work, again with our allies, on developing a multilateral response to Arctic security, because some of the points that the US made were about Arctic security, which is a shared issue, because if you want to defend the US against the Russian northern fleet, the crucial thing is that area of water between northern Norway and Iceland, between the UK and Iceland. The crucial question is how do you defend that in a maritime way? The role that the UK and Norway play is therefore fundamental to the defence of North America as well. That is why I went to the north of Norway with the Norwegian Foreign Minister, why we all pressed for a new Arctic Sentry as part of NATO, and that is what has been agreed and what is now operating. The carrier strike group was operating as part of that very recently. I think the response is a combination of us defending principles and coming up with a practical, alternative way forward to stop NATO fracturing, bluntly, and to make sure that we pull NATO together around Arctic security.

I’m going to defer to Dan Jarvis, the Defence Secretary, for decisions about the defence investment plan and the priorities and timescales within it. That is for them, rightly, to set out. In terms of the diplomatic issues, we have had some very strong, very positive, discussions with not just the United States but more widely with our allies, both about the defence investment plan and more widely about our co-operation. The UK does more than most countries to put our defence capabilities into NATO and to be part of the NATO response. We do more than a lot of other countries on that and will always continue to do so. I think we are the third biggest contributor, in cash terms, to NATO, and our support and role in NATO will continue to be incredibly important.

None of those areas were raised with me as an issue by any of our allies. Again, I think that the detailed decisions in terms of priorities are a matter for the Defence Secretary. What I would say is that the UK has particular specialist capabilities, and therefore it is right that there will be particular roles that it will play as part of NATO. Ultimately, no country can spread itself across every single area or capability; our contribution is limited and we are best focusing in parallel—that is the whole point of having a NATO alliance, that we focus alongside allies on different areas and capabilities.

I’m going to defer to the Defence Secretary on the nature of our defence co-operation on space.

We have always supported that for Ukraine, but we recognise that there are different obstacles and disagreements in different places around that. For us, Ukraine is already part of the defence of NATO territory; it is also, crucially, part of the defence of Europe and Europe’s stability as well. All you need to think about is Europe’s security and defence as running from the UK to Ukraine, from Norway to Turkey. They play a crucial role. There is a sense now of us moving into a new phase where Russia is on the back foot as a result of Ukraine’s resilience, the strength that has consistently been underestimated by Russia, and the support of Ukraine’s friends.

No, that has not been the focus of discussions at the moment. There is more focus on the Ukraine and the EU in those terms.

Some of the alliances—the more agile ones—we have are our core alliances, particularly around NATO and our close partnerships. For example, we work particularly with France and Germany and the E3, but more widely there is our European co-operation as well. We are obviously a member of the P5 and Five Eyes—structures that endure. The point I was making is that we increasingly need to work on an agile basis on different things. So far, we have focused on the coalition of the willing on Ukraine, which met again in Paris this week; the multilateral maritime mission, which is about having de-mining capability and reassurance support available to reopen the strait of Hormuz—sadly, we have not reached that point at the moment given everything that is happening in the strait of Hormuz, but nevertheless, it remains important—and a coalition on freedom of navigation. That is an economic security policy because there is a chokehold on the economy at the moment. We also have a new alliance of countries focused on violence against women and girls, which we have drawn together as part of an international coalition on how countries can learn from each other. It includes Spain, Jamaica, Morrocco and a series of different countries. You referred particularly to some of the issues around economic security and partnership. We are interested in working with countries such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and Canada—countries that are outside any of the big trading blocs, but where we have shared interests and different perspectives on things like maritime freedoms, critical mineral supply and so on. There are different areas that we can explore and do a lot more on.

We can lever our very effective existing diplomatic network and our relationships to support those things. Ultimately, it depends on how intensive you want the collaboration to be, what you want it to do in practice, and how much it is about alignment of the things that we are doing already.

I will pass over to Nick in a moment to follow up on some of the restructuring issues in the Foreign Office. In some ways, the focus on how conflict prevention fits into diplomacy and our approach is more important than ever because of the areas that we have chosen to focus on. Within our ODA allocations, the areas that we are focusing on and protecting are the fragile and the conflicted-affected states, but I have also been clear that those ODA approaches have to be aligned with diplomacy around conflict prevention. That means we will not have one bit of the system doing ODA over here and another bit, which is cross-cutting conflict prevention, over there. We try to align those and link them together. The areas we are putting the greatest focus on are Ukraine, which is fundamentally about how to contain and resolve the conflict; Sudan, where we are seeking to reach a ceasefire; and Israel-Palestine. The meeting I was at yesterday in Brussels was all about how to re-energise the 20-point peace plan for Gaza, broaden it and prevent the conflict from extending and erupting. We have also focused, revived and re-energised some of our work on sexual violence in conflict as part of the women and girls priority. That is particularly acute in Sudan, where we have seen the most horrendous sexual violence used in conflict. There is a broader backdrop. UK staffing in the FCDO, compared with the combined UK staffing of the Foreign Office and DFID, has increased by 39% over the past 10 years. That is not sustainable. As part of the spending review and focusing the organisation, we have a programme to reduce staffing, and we have had some staff reductions. That is the backdrop.

Stephen Doughty has just done a very intensive period of diplomatic engagement in the western Balkans. We have also had Karen Pierce as our envoy there. In terms of our expertise and capability, we maintain a very strong focus on the western Balkans. The other thing we are trying to do is make this more thematic across all development, because of the nature and way in which we are focusing much of the development funding on conflict-affected areas. As part of the reforms Jenny Chapman has been working through, we have set up what we call a community of expertise. It is effectively a new network of expertise on violence, conflict support and atrocity prevention, operating across our overseas network, providing support in-country in all the areas where that is significant and relevant. Nick should probably say more on that.

We have been looking at a range of options for G20 priorities next year, including looking at reforming finance to make it easier to mobilise, whether through the World Bank or other forms of development bank, finance and so on. We have definitely been looking at some of those finance reforms. Another area that I have been pushing personally as a priority is to do violence against women and girls as a global issue next year. There is a series of ways in which we can do that as an international priority. As you can imagine, a new Prime Minister is going to have to decide G20 priorities. We are not able to set that out more broadly at this point.

We have allocated funding on migration that is separate from the ODA budget for the first time. That is part of our significant expansion of the migration team in the Foreign Office. Alongside that, I have effectively been developing migration discussions with other Foreign Ministers. Very often, the issues around migration are simply seen as issues for Interior and Home Office Ministers to focus on. However, we know that if you really want to talk about prevention and some of the international issues and the impact, or if you want to support returns agreements, diversion or support for refugees in the region, you need to see this as a foreign policy priority. That is what we have been doing. That has helped support increased law enforcement co-operation. It has helped support a big increase in returns arrangements and returns agreements, as well as some of the upstream prevention work. That allows us some flexibility. This is a developing area of work that we are trying to expand significantly. That gives us some flexibility to do more of that prevention work where we are clear that it actually has an impact on migration. Sometimes you can identify projects that look really good, but do not necessarily have any impact in terms of preventing dangerous journeys.

You will not be surprised to learn that I disagree with you on a whole series of those issues. Obviously, though, we continue to agree on the importance of the support for Ukraine, which is fundamental to our security. However, if you look at the different roles that we are playing in each of those areas, on security our role in terms of supporting Ukraine has been vital. Our role as part of NATO continues to strengthen, as part of strengthening European NATO. There is our support directly for Ukraine and we are now part of the European loans, agreed and announced yesterday. We have also played the crucial leadership role in the coalition of the willing, as we saw the Prime Minister and the French President chairing yesterday. Again alongside France, we are leading the multilateral maritime mission, which is about the support needed to ultimately reopen the Strait of Hormuz, where we do not believe that Iran has the de-mining capability to get it reopened. We also have the AUKUS relationship and the strengthening of that, and our work with Australia and the Indo-Pacific, and the strengthening of those relationships. We played a very important role in helping to defend our Gulf partners in the middle east when they faced attacks from Iran, and we continue to play an important role in the United Nations as well. In terms of our security—both our European security and the middle east as well—and in some of those wider global relationships, we have been playing a hugely important role. The other area that I would flag is Sudan: the UK has been the country that has shone the spotlight and continued to shine the spotlight on Sudan. I used the opportunity of NATO last week again to raise Sudan and the risk to El Obeid with other European colleagues, who have since put pressure on, and with the United States and with Gulf partners, who we are continuing to raise this with. The Prime Minister also raised it with President Trump as well. We are also playing an important role there, in what is probably the worst humanitarian crisis of the 21st century.

Your figures are not right. This has been a long, ongoing discussion. Let us go back to what the issues are with the Chagos Islands. The important issue is that we can—

That is a matter for the new Prime Minister—

He will set out his position. It is not an issue that I have discussed with him. The fundamental issue here is how we make sure that the capabilities around Diego Garcia, and our basing and its security, are protected from threats, including security issues around China or more widely. The important thing is that the security is protected. As part of that, we set out a treaty—that would be the effective way to do that. It is currently something that we are continuing to discuss with the United States. Those discussions will continue, and the new Prime Minister will take a view on them.

I do not think that is an accurate description of the discussions that took place, so I think you have an inaccurate report.

Not that I am aware of at all.

We are currently having discussions with both the US and Mauritius. We said that we wanted US agreement to the approach, because, of course, this is about the shared capabilities that we have. We have set out what we believe is a sensible way to address the security risks and the legal risk to the base. There is no getting around what those security challenges are, and we have a responsibility to ensure that the security there is protected. We will continue to work with both the US and Mauritius, but this issue is not yet resolved.

We have not set out any proposals for that. The issue is not yet resolved and those discussions are continuing.

This individual should not be in the United Kingdom; he should be deported. He has no right to be in the United Kingdom. I strongly support the action that the Home Secretary is taking. This is something that we have repeatedly raised with Pakistan and will continue to raise with Pakistan. It is not just this individual case; there are a small number of similar cases where we also believe that the individuals have no right to be in the United Kingdom and should be returned to Pakistan. Those discussions will continue, because we ultimately think that the rules should be enforced.

We have already taken some strong measures, and we have increased the number of foreign criminals being returned as a result of that. There has been a significant increase in the number of foreign criminals being returned over the last two years. We have also taken actions, including around visa measures and so on, that have prevented some of the abuse of the system. We have seen a reduction in that abuse in certain areas and from certain countries as a result of taking those measures around visas, or as a result of the negotiations that covered those things. We have also secured an increasing number of returns agreements. You will understand why I will not go into the detail of discussions with individual countries—but, broadly, do we believe that all possible levers should be looked at to ensure that the immigration system has credibility and the rules can be enforced? Yes, we do.

We work very closely with our NATO allies, particularly as part of the E3 and with some of the E5 countries—in other words, we have many discussions about the approach to Russia with France, Germany, Italy and Poland. You are right to describe Russia as the most serious threat to Europe. There are a range of different kinds of threat. In Poland, they are preparing to ensure that they can deter any direct military threats. I have been to see the concrete tunnels that are being dug along the border with Kaliningrad and the anti-tank defences they are ensuring are in place as a deterrence against physical threats. We are also seeing hybrid threats: the sabotage, cyber-threats and misinformation, and the industrial scale of disinformation, which I know the Committee has a lot of expertise on and has looked into in some detail. We seek to be able to respond on all fronts. NATO is a defensive alliance and is about deterrence and response, but we seek to have the strength and resilience to respond on all fronts. One of the things that we have done is to expand the Foreign Office’s capability on dealing with hybrid threats, including cyber-threats and also misinformation and disinformation. We are increasingly using sanctions to go after the Russian disinformation factories and those kinds of things, which are about destabilising democracies, as well as the more physical and tangible threats that we deal with. We are expanding that and working with allies to make sure that we have shared capabilities to respond. Beyond that, a lot of thinking on the strategy is linked to our response and support for Ukraine, and how we seek to bring the Ukraine conflict to a just and lasting peace that the Ukrainians want.

I think this is a really good point, and it is something that I have been reflecting on. In Poland, it is really striking how much they feel a society-wide sense of needing to ensure their strength, resilience and defences against the threat from Russia. That is also very clearly the case in Scandinavian countries such as Finland and Sweden. Again, some of this is about history, because it is a key issue for the Baltic states as well, whereas for the UK, on the far side of Europe, it can feel a little more distant, and yet those cyber-threats and hybrid threats can be very immediate. I do think this is something that we are going to have to debate far more, and it will need to be part of a public debate as we continue to need to increase defence investment, for example. It will have to be a much bigger part of our public debate than it has been for a long time. We all probably just assumed that we had a peace dividend after the cold war, but people actually took that peace dividend for granted for much longer than we collectively should have done. After Crimea, all the signs were there, and we needed to respond collectively. I think we will have to debate this a lot more.

That is one of the Committee’s recommendations that probably has cross-Government implications.

You make a fair point. We provided very effective help to Moldova in exposing and countering disinformation. We now do specific work in the Foreign Office that is about identifying these effectively industrial disinformation efforts, and then exposing and sanctioning them. Our part in the response to disinformation is to identify, expose and sanction. You are right that there are other aspects to this, but our focus is on what is effectively the foreign-instigated, industrial-scale disinformation. If someone is having an argument, we have a strong tradition of free speech in this country—people can say things that are wrong. However, there is a difference between that sort of freedom of speech debate, or people saying things that are wrong—that is part of our normal democratic arguments and debates—to the foreign-funded, industrial-scale disinformation. That has been our focus.

This is something that I am very worried about, and it is something that DSIT, the Ministry of Defence and the Home Office are engaged with, as well as the Foreign Office. There are masses of opportunities in AI, including huge opportunities for our defence capabilities in the use of AI, as well as partnerships and huge opportunities for our economic growth. The point I made in the essay is that it seems to me that this is analogous to the debates we had 70 years ago about nuclear safety. At that time, you had nuclear capability and the ability to use it for nuclear energy and nuclear power in ways that were safe, but you also had huge threats and risks, particularly if malign actors, terrorists or extremists can get hold of nuclear material. As a result of that, we developed international consensus on standards and guardrails. Some of what drove that was everybody’s understanding of the toxic threat, because of the experience of Hiroshima, and a recognition of what would happen if that capability reached the wrong hands. You can see similar issues now with AI, as we are having parallel discussions about standards and safety. However, we do not have a proper global engagement taking place between the biggest powers, particularly one that involves the US and China, or one that involves the UK as a third capability power. Thanks to the work that Rishi Sunak did, we have expertise on AI safety, which we have continued to build on. Therefore, my argument is that we should take a similar and parallel approach to learning from the experience around nuclear safety. We should be looking to develop global standards and a global debate about what the safeguards need to be.

NATO increasingly has to assess all those kinds of threats, including physical threats, and also the hybrid threats, including cyber-threats and so on. We have expanded some of the capability and the discussions across NATO countries on some of those cyber and hybrid threats as well. One issue that people are concerned about is that Russia has the capability to escalate when under pressure. Putin has that capability and there is the risk of escalation when he is under pressure—effectively a kind of desperate lashing out—and of him looking to find diversion tactics as well. Given the scale of the war economy that they have built up, if we reach the point of a peace agreement for Ukraine, there is still a risk that Putin’s response might be to then launch forays elsewhere, and that includes risks to NATO countries. What they are effectively trying to identify is that there are risks from Russia to NATO countries. NATO is a defensive alliance. We have to ensure that we have strong enough deterrents in place to prevent Putin thinking that there are easy hits against NATO countries and that there will be no response or that he will be able to get away with it. That is the point that the Prime Minister was making. It is one of the reasons why Poland is strengthening their physical border to have deterrents against that kind of threat.

We have been looking directly at this, and specifically gold and some of the other underpinning illicit finance issues. We have parallel work under way. In ensuring that we have all of the work and the different systems in place, there have been times when the EU has moved slightly ahead of us on this and times when we have moved slightly ahead of them. I can assure you that that work is under way. You will appreciate that we do not announce detailed sanctions and things before we do them, but we are looking at exactly this issue. There is a wider thing. The approach we have taken on Sudan is to put on the maximum, top-level diplomatic pressure, including on any countries that can influence the warring parties. Secondly, we are shining a spotlight to keep a focus on Sudan because it can very easily become a forgotten war. Thirdly, we are looking at some of the underpinnings, including illicit finance, other sanctions measures and arms flows. We are looking at all the different ways that we can put pressure on. Ultimately, we have to get to a ceasefire because this conflict is truly horrendous and the sexual violence that is part of it is incredibly disturbing.

We are looking at humanitarian corridors. We are keen to see those and keen to keep the pressure on both the RSF and the SAF, in terms of the humanitarian corridors. While most of our pressure has been about finding any route in to halt the RSF attack on El Obeid and prevent atrocities like we saw in El Fasher, we have also been seeking to keep pressure on the SAF because we need both sides to sign up to a ceasefire and agree to humanitarian routes in. Both sides have been restricting humanitarian aid. I will check about the specific discussions with Turkey and come back to you on those, but comprehensively, we have been focusing on all of those issues. Just as I walked into this room, I also got a message from the French Foreign Minister. I think they have been co-ordinating a G7 statement on Sudan as well. That has come out of some of the discussions we had last week at NATO, where I have been continuing to try and keep the focus and the international spotlight on Sudan.

Chris Elmore has been taking forward some detailed work with the Soft Power Council. We would agree that in the first year the focus ended up being too broad. We now need to focus on very practical deliveries for the Soft Power Council. The reality is that our soft power is spread across a whole series of institutions that deliver things, including the British Council, our universities, our premier league and our diplomatic network right across the world. We need the Soft Power Council to focus on what its added value can be and what particular things it can focus on and deliver. Chris has started working with the council in more detail on specific projects that they can focus on and deliver.

Yes. They have had two meetings since I was appointed. The first one I was due to go to was unfortunately at the time that the Iran conflict broke out. The second one was more recent, and Chris had more focused, detailed discussions with them on trying to refocus on some tangible outcomes. But I am sure I will do so.

We are part of that coalition and, as you rightly said, we are co-chair with Finland. It is why, for example, we have raised our concern about journalists not being able to get into places like Gaza to provide reporting.

Look, the whole FCDO has to have a sharper focus and not have as many staff, as we have now compared with 10 years ago—we have seen an expansion—that is the case across every area. That does not mean that we are reducing focus in terms of the things we do. We have raised the diplomatic cases of journalists with individual countries for exactly that reason.

Let me write to you on that case, because I do not know, for example, what points our consular Minister may have pursued on that. To update you on Jimmy Lai, I raised that again directly as part of my visit to China. I raised that specifically with the Foreign Minister.

Yes, you are right. I also pay tribute to what Chris Elmore has been doing to try to get the finances on a more secure footing. We have increased the grant in aid funding for the British Council. We have also almost concluded the process of restructuring its loan.

That process is under way. We are part way through the process. We have had the applications. It is in process.

We will take the decision as swiftly as possible once the final interviews are concluded. How long it then takes for the individual to take up post will partly depend on what post they are currently doing and what the transition will be. We want to have a new PUS in place as rapidly as possible. I pay tribute to Nick, who has done such an important job of continuing to lead the organisation in the meantime.

Yes, we do have oversight of it. It is rightly the responsibility of the PUS, and Nick has taken on those responsibilities in terms of implementation. That is a classic civil service responsibility. We do have oversight, and other Ministers in the Department have also had a chance to look further at the overall programme. Ultimately, implementation and delivery are the responsibility of the PUS.

I will quickly point out that we have substantially improved the FCDO’s performance on written questions. There has been a big turnaround. It would be fair to criticise the FCDO’s performance on written questions, but there has been some very heavy lifting and extensive work. The evidence that Seema Malhotra gave to the Committee was about all the work that has gone on to improve performance and turn that around. Of course there are tensions around the pace of change. You can make changes quickly and then get on with things. On the other hand, if you take longer, there is a less intense period. There are trade-offs. Ultimately, those management decisions are matters for the civil service.

We protected ODA, which was not covered in this round. Obviously, ODA had previously taken a reduction. In terms of this decision, it was protected.

I am appalled by it.

I think that everyone in the Foreign Office is very clear of my view on this.

Thank you for the report, which I welcome. It affects the Cabinet Office as well, so we will do a formal response in due course. I do not think it would be right for the Committee to have a veto. There are lots of appointments over which Select Committees have scrutiny, where they make recommendations, including some very transparent recommendations and reports, but do not have a veto, because the Government ultimately have to take responsibility rather than have a cross-party Committee make the final judgment. I do not think that would be right for an appointment, and there are lots of areas where that is the case. I think you have made a very strong case for better scrutiny. When those political appointments take place, and there are not very many of them, they tend to be prime ministerial appointments, so I think that the new Prime Minister would ultimately have to take the final view. All I would say, having looked at the points you have made today, and have raised with me previously—and also having been a Select Committee Chair—is that I have a lot of sympathy with your point about the need for scrutiny.

I have had a brief conversation with Andy Burnham about Europe and our relationship with Europe, but I have not had a detailed discussion with him about the reset, because obviously we know that the summit is delayed until the autumn. That will be for him to set out. I know, for example, that he has written an article referring to some of these issues. I have also had more detailed conversations with him about some of the ongoing issues that we have been dealing with. I spoke to him before the NATO summit, for example. That is why I could say very clearly that the commitments to Ukraine and NATO remain 100% commitments in the strong view of the incoming Prime Minister.

That is not my sense from any issues that have been raised with me. I know that a lot of work has been ongoing, but I do not think it would be right for me to pre-empt an incoming Prime Minister.

I will certainly look at that Bournemouth University work; I am not aware of the details. I can also tell you that I met the Sri Lankan Prime Minister at the end of May, alongside Minister Malhotra, and we explicitly discussed the issues around the investigation of historical abuses and the importance of delivering justice for victims and their families. We discussed that and its importance.

I do not know whether we have raised that individual case—obviously we have diplomatic engagement at every level—so let me check and get back to you. We have certainly raised the broader issues around the need for accountability and detailed investigations, because it becomes part of what is effectively a truth and reconciliation process. That is critical. I will follow up on that individual case.

Let me just say that I feel very strongly about this. This is totally unfair on our diplomats, who work for the United Kingdom. They serve abroad to support all of us. They do a job on behalf of all of us, and their children should be treated fairly—in exactly the same way—in the university system. I feel very strongly about this. There have been different legal discussions about the frameworks and things across Government, but my position remains very strong that they should be treated fairly and in the same way as other people, as if they had been doing a posting here in the UK. They could just as easily have been working in the Foreign Office in King Charles Street, or they could have been working in any of our embassies across the world.

We are making representations to try to resolve individual cases. We are doing that on a case-by-case basis. We want some kind of overarching safeguards, because this should not be coming up for anybody. Frankly, I think it is totally bonkers; it is a bonkers interpretation of what is going on. If you want to make a very loud noise about this as well, by all means do so, because it is completely unfair on our diplomats and their kids, who deserve the same chance at university as everybody else.

Thank you.