Environmental Audit Committee — Oral Evidence (HC 1427)
Welcome to this oral evidence session with the Secretary of State, which is part of our ongoing inquiry. Secretary of State, thank you for coming before us today. Would you like to briefly introduce your team?
Yes, indeed. I have Kate Hughes, our director and UK lead climate negotiator, and Ryan McLaughlin, director of net zero strategy. I am sorry that the Chair cannot be here, but it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship.
Thank you very much. Yes, unfortunately Toby Perkins is ill today and not with us, but I am standing in for him. Thank you for the statement that you gave to the House. I think many of us found that really informative, and extremely helpful given the shortage of time this afternoon, because it means that you do not have to make a further statement straightaway. In that statement, you said to the House that the Government would be “making new announcements in the coming months” about climate finance. We had hoped that the recent Budget might have been an opportunity to do that. When should we expect more on climate finance?
I will come to your question, Chair, and I will not make an opening statement, but let me just say, because I think it is important context for our discussions today given the focus on COP30, that, as I said in my statement to the House, we do think it is right for Britain to engage in this multilateral process, and British leadership really matters. I would say this about both the previous Labour Government and what it did, and the previous Conservative Government as well, with net zero going into law and 80% of the world now being covered. When we passed the Climate Change Act in 2008, 60 countries followed. We are only 1% of global emissions. We can only protect future generations if we engage in this global process, and people really do respect British leadership. I think what you saw from COP30 was that, for all the difficulties and challenges, which we will get into, 190-plus countries put their trust in multilateralism. In the global context that we are in, that is incredibly significant. Perhaps we will get into that. On your question, which is about the next round of ICF, obviously those discussions are going on in the context of a reduced ODA commitment. As you would expect, we will be making announcements in the coming months as we run into the next financial year. The Prime Minister has said that even within this reduced context, climate remains a priority for him, but obviously those are discussions that are going on across Government.
Of course, there is another way of looking at all those countries putting their faith in multilateralism: if they feel that multilateralism is not getting there fast enough, and they do not want to get there fast enough, maybe it is also a way of delaying things. Why was more progress not made at COP30 along the lines that you set out in the objectives before it, and indeed that the president of COP set out in his objectives before it?
The context of multilateralism working, which is important, is that after the Copenhagen summit of 2009 the world was heading for 4° of global warming. The world is now heading for 2.3° to 2.5° of global warming. That is really bad, but it does represent progress, and it is really important to register that. The successes of this COP were the commitment to try to keep 1.5° within reach and setting out some processes for that, and the trebling of adaptation finance by 2035 within the overall finance number agreed last year at COP29. As you know, Chair, we struggled more to get the road map on the transition away from fossil fuels in the final agreement; some countries did not want that in the agreement. I do not want to sugarcoat this—it is hard, because every country faces its own compelling constraints—but part of what is interesting about this COP is that more than 80 countries, global north and global south, supported the idea of a road map and the Brazilian presidency will now take that forward. That will feed into COP31. I would have preferred to have had it in the final agreement, but it is significant that you had a diverse group of countries saying, “This really matters and we need to take this forward.”
One of your commitments in the statement that you made to the House was that you would be working with Brazil on the shaping of that road map. When do you propose to have officials meet to do that? What are the staging posts that you see as the transition to COP31? What do you need to achieve in setting out that pathway?
The road map needs to start with the science of what we need to do as a world and why fossil fuel extraction matters. Why do we need this transition away? Because of the role of fossil fuels in relation to the climate crisis. It needs to look at what the transition will mean for different countries at different stages of the transition. A point made by different countries as we discussed the road map on the transition away from fossil fuels is that it needs to involve sharing of lessons and best practice for what you can do, including on a just transition. Those are some of the things that it will do. On the engagement with Brazil, I think the Brazilian presidency is somewhat still recovering from COP30, but we are already engaging with them on those questions.
One of the big factors at COP30 was the fact that the US was not there, at least not officially—the President was not there. What are the ways in which the UK can work at different levels, for example at state level or with US businesses? What light can you shed on any hope that America is still engaged at a sub-governmental level?
There is a contextual point to make to begin with: some people said that when the US decided to pull out of Paris, there would be a domino effect—lots of countries would pull out. That has not happened: 190 countries said, “We continue to have faith in the Paris agreement.” That is significant. I would also say that, despite our differences with the US Administration, there are areas where we can have common ground, such as new nuclear, where we are working with them. It is also the case that there is real engagement at state level. I believe Gavin Newsom, the governor of California, was at COP. I met him in October in New York and talked about some of the common agenda that we are working on. Each country has to make its own decisions on its own behalf, but the big picture is one of the transition carrying on and happening. Just to give you one example of that, I think China could be more ambitious, but if I had said to you 10 years ago—and you have great experience in these matters—that China would be promising an absolute cut in its emissions by 2035, you would not really have believed me. You would have said, “That’s not going to be happening.” Do I wish it was more? Yes, but it represents—and I did an event at COP with India, which has reached its target for non-fossil fuels as 50% of electricity five years early.
It was a very low target, but it is progress—I take the point.
Sure, but the point is that it is actually less about individual countries—the EU published its target—and more about painting a picture. The why of this is really important. Of course, the why is that people are concerned about the effects of the climate crisis, which are much more apparent than they were, but also that see it as in their economic interests and in the interests of energy security. When I was at the roundtable on the transition away from fossil fuels, there were lots of countries saying, “Look, we’re importers of fossil fuels. We want to go for home-grown clean energy because we think that will give us energy security.” Someone wiser than me said, “You’ve got to distinguish the cycle from the trend.” The cycle has bumps in the road, but the trend is clear.
Finally from me, the Department obviously has to co-ordinate with DEFRA to ensure that climate and nature challenges are addressed together. Adaptation was one of the big issues that both you and the president of COP outlined beforehand as key. How is your Department co-ordinating with DEFRA to ensure that across Government the nature-based solutions—the solutions that are provided in the oceans, and not just the perpetual focus on forests—are actually at the fore?
This is a really important question, and I was pleased to be at COP30 with Mary Creagh, who is the DEFRA Minister for Nature, the special representative for nature, Ruth Davis, alongside Rachel Kyte, who is our special representative for climate. We are absolutely working together. It is worth emphasising the point that there is no solution to the climate crisis without a pro-nature solution, and there is no way to protect nature without tackling the climate crisis. The biggest threat to nature and biodiversity is the climate crisis, so we are working strongly together. Just one symbol of this is that we have talked about the road map on the transition away from fossil fuels that is part of the work that is going to be taken forward, but—and I know you said it is not just about deforestation—there is also a road map on protecting the forests that was agreed as part of this. Absolutely, I see the two as going hand in glove, and we work really closely together.
When we look at the future of the climate fund—the £11.6 billion of ODA money that was designated for climate and ringfenced, and the £3 billion that was ringfenced underneath that—is there still going to be clarity about the importance of nature, as was shown by that ringfence?
There will definitely be a big emphasis on the nature and biodiversity crisis as part of our future ICF.
Secretary of State, you mentioned that the science is still really bad, although not as bad as it was before. My Select Committee heard last week, in a very sobering panel, that there is evidence that perhaps things are significantly worse than the figures that you just gave. I am going to ask you a question about domestic climate action following COP. We heard a lot of evidence to show that, while there is support and understanding, it is at a very superficial level among the public. The carbon budget and growth delivery plan refers to the importance of voluntary consumer behaviour, independent of Government policy, to reduce emissions, but what we were told on Wednesday, and what we have heard throughout the inquiry we are holding on building the case for the energy transition, is that there is a significant gap between public understanding and the reality of just how serious the climate situation is, and that there is scepticism about how serious it is, or indeed about whether there is anything much that people can do. Do you think that consumers are sufficiently well informed about the nature of climate change?
I am sure that there is more that we can do, and I will be really interested to see the results of your inquiry. I would say that the public do get this, though. I think they see what is happening around them, and indeed around the world. The task for us is of course to explain what the science is telling us—a new chief scientific adviser, Emily Shuckburgh, has just been appointed in my Department; she has already contributed lots to public understanding in previous roles—but I think there are two things that are as important as explaining the science to people, and you have touched on them both. First, the message of despair is not only an off-putting message but not the right message. There is a danger—we are partly talking about COP at this session—that people think, “Well, you’ve been at this for 30 years and nothing’s changed.” That is just not right. If it had not been for this multilateral process, we would not be looking at 2.3° to 2.5°; we would probably still be looking at 4°. If it was not for this process—including, by the way, the Conservative leadership of my friend Lord Sharma at COP26, and parts of what the last Government did—we would not have 80% of GDP covered by net zero. The second point I would make is that we need to send a message that of course things are incredibly serious, but the mandate or the recipe is not for despair. There is also a third point about showing people the way that we can tackle both their biggest priority—the cost of living or affordability crisis—and the climate crisis. We are going to be unveiling our warm homes plan soon, which is absolutely about that: how do we cut bills for people through public investment and also cut emissions?
Thank you. Last week we heard about the co-benefits—the economic benefits, the military benefits, and the health and nature benefits—of energy security, to make your point for you, but the science is really scary. We were left in no doubt that there is a gap in public understanding. I take your point about avoiding a counsel of despair, and telling people what they should do about it, but in the Budget, energy bills, or electricity bills, were cut in two ways: by removing some of the renewables costs and by extending the warm home discount. We were told in the session last week that all that removing some of the green taxes has done is confirm people’s feeling that it is the “green crap” that is the cause of high energy bills. Do you think that was a mistake?
Not at all, and I am not sure what the evidence is for that being people’s understanding. Let me say one other thing and then come to your question. On the public understanding point, the reason that I made the statement in the summer, which will be an annual statement, about the state of climate and nature was precisely to further public understanding. I am sure there is more we can do. On your point about the Budget, I am incredibly proud of what the Chancellor did in the Budget—taking £150 of costs off energy bills—and I will say two important things about this. She removed 75% of the costs of the renewables obligation from bills. That was a historical scheme that helped to drive down the price of renewable energy. But she did not just remove it; she put it into public spending, which has been a long-standing ask of people: “Look at the balance between levies and public investment.” Public investment can be a fairer way of doing it. We also announced the end of the ECO scheme but put more money—this is what we will be talking about in our warm homes plan—into capital investment to compensate. It is interesting, because the polling that I have seen says that the public, by two to one, say that renewables are more likely to cut their bills than fossil fuels. That is More in Common polling. I have real confidence that we can win this argument with people. People know what happened when Russia invaded Ukraine, and they know that gas prices continue to be higher than they were before that crisis. They know that without home-grown clean energy, we have no control over what happens. The thing to give us back control, as well as being the right thing for the climate crisis, is home-grown, clean energy that we control.
Luke Tryl told my Committee some weeks ago that, actually, energy security was more compelling for people as an argument than any other; the energy price does not convince people, even though people mention it. Emma Pinchbeck, chief executive of the Climate Change Committee, said to us on Wednesday that although the Budget measure is welcome, it has not done enough to close the spark gap, to ensure that people can benefit from the efficiency of electricity in transport and home heat. Do you want to go further on that? Do you think that it is realistic to do so?
As you will have heard me say to your Committee on previous occasions, I totally recognise that the way the levies and so on have been set up offsets quite a lot of the greater efficiency of electricity. I have always said that if we can find distributionally fair ways to do this, we want to do more to close that gap. That is something we continue to look at. The Budget did make quite a big step forward in what it did on the RO, but we want to look at going further.
The evidence we heard was that it has not gone far enough. I will ask just one more question if I may, Chair. The changes that are needed to deliver domestic action go well beyond your Department. How well are the Departments for Transport, for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and for Business and Trade performing in delivering on other areas of this agenda?
What you see from the carbon budget and growth delivery plan, which Ryan oversaw, is a cross-Government process where, whether it is DFT, DEFRA or others, they are absolutely engaged in this. Whether it was Steve Reed or, now, Emma Reynolds at DEFRA, or Heidi Alexander at Transport, there is absolute engagement and recognition of the importance of this agenda. It goes to the bigger picture that we have been discussing, which is that this is economically in our interests. We have had over £60 billion of private sector investment announced since the last general election, because of this stable framework. The quote I always think about is from Rain Newton-Smith of the CBI about the importance of the Climate Change Act in providing that stable framework. In the CBGDP, as we call it—it was actually an inherited target from the last Conservative Government, but it is really important that we set out for business and private investors that we are holding to that true north, if you like.
We talked earlier about the importance of being honest about the role that fossil fuels have to play. Sticking with the domestic side, it is really welcome that the UK is now committed to no new oil and gas licensing, but given that burning the reserves in Rosebank would produce over 200 million tonnes of CO2—more than the combined annual emissions of the 28 lowest-income countries in the world—and we know it will not reduce bills, will you also agree to stop Rosebank?
I think you know—I suspect we have had this conversation on previous occasions—that I cannot comment on specific planning decisions.
Secretary of State, it is great to have you here. You have talked already about the words of despair that you have been hearing, but you have also said that you want to make things distributionally fair as you go forwards. I am vice-Chair of the Business and Trade Committee and—I am sure this is the case with many others in their constituencies—we are hearing day in, day out about the impact of high energy prices on our high streets and on our communities. With the best will in the world, the measures set out in the Budget are not going to change that. What will you do to make sure that we protect our communities and reduce prices fast for those businesses—for retail and for leisure businesses? They are on their knees. What are you going to do about it?
There are two things I would say to you about what we have done. We have extended help with energy bills to 7,000 businesses through the British industrial competitiveness scheme. This is a really important announcement as part of our industrial strategy. I think it was approximately a few hundred under the last Government, and we are paying for that by finding costs in the rest of the energy system. I think that is a really important—
What does “finding costs in the rest of the energy system” mean?
It means reducing other costs in the system to pay for that, so that businesses get reductions in their bills.
How do we measure you on that? How do we measure the success of that?
You are going to see reductions in bills for the most energy-intensive businesses. But let me go to your wider question, because it is important. The second point I would make is that the best thing we can do to help businesses with their energy costs is to drive towards clean power, because that is the way in which we lower electricity costs, particularly wholesale costs. This is the point it is important to make to the Committee. The way we bring costs down in the electricity system is with clean home-grown power. We know that a system with greater renewables is the way to lower the wholesale costs.
Are you going too fast with this?
Let me just finish—
There will be no businesses left by the time you get there.
I do not see it that way, because of what happened. It is important to understand the context of this, which is that Russia invaded Ukraine. Fossil fuel prices went through the roof, and that is what businesses are paying for. And the last Government left us exposed. We came in 17 months ago and we could have said, “Let's carry on with business as usual”, but that would continue to leave our country exposed. It is high gas prices that have made life difficult for businesses, and the feeding through into electricity costs. The way we get off that fossil fuel rollercoaster for businesses, individuals and families is by driving towards clean power. We continue to look more widely at what we can do to help businesses. I know there was a case made, for example, at the Budget for what they call a targeted electricity discount. We continue to look at that issue. We were not able to do that in the Budget, but I totally understand some of the issues that businesses are facing, and we continue to look at what more can be done within a difficult overall fiscal context.
Secretary of State, in the run-up to COP30, the UK played a leading role in helping Brazil design the Tropical Forests Forever facility, so it is hugely disappointing that the UK Government will not be contributing to it. What conditions, fiscal or otherwise, would need to be met for the Government to commit funding to the TFFF?
First of all, let me say we are proud of the work that we did on the TFFF with the Brazilian presidency. It is a very innovative idea for funding. It is about an investment approach to how we protect our forests. We did a lot of work in the background over a couple of years with the Brazilian presidency. That is the first point to make. We are incredibly supportive of this idea. Secondly, COP30 came right in the context of the Budget, so we were not able, because of wider fiscal circumstances, to make an investment at the time of the Budget. But it is important to say—this is something the Prime Minister made clear in his meetings with President Lula and at COP30—that we are absolutely not saying we are never going to invest in this facility. We continue to look at those issues across Government and keep this under review.
Would any future funding from the TFFF be part of the international climate finance, or would it come from a different budget?
That is a really important question, and it is worth explaining the background. I said that the TFFF is a different approach because it is an investment approach where you get a return. We think probably only a modest percentage of any investment would be ODA-eligible. This is not a grant; it is like an investment. We continue to look at this and at what is possible, both through the ICF and more widely. This would be what is called a financial transaction, in the parlance that we use in Whitehall, and we continue to look at what might be possible. Nobody should be in any doubt about our belief that the TFFF is an incredibly important idea and approach, and it has this co-operation between public and private. One of the other things that we will be doing—we have already done this, but we will be doing more of it—is working with the City of London, which can play a big role in this.
Secretary of State, you and I have not agreed—
For 20 years.
For 20 years, and we will not agree, on your goal of reducing the consumption of fossil fuels and the output of CO2 emissions. Indeed, I suspect that this argument is increasingly being accepted. The banks are now dropping out of the scheme for net zero, oil companies are saying they are going back to concentrating on producing oil, and a whole range of other indicators would show that. However, the one thing that I think you and I probably would agree on is the importance of preserving tropical forests and avoiding their destruction. Ironically, some of that destruction has been due to net zero policies and the production of ethanol to put into petrol, and so on. But the one thing that the Government singularly failed to do at COP was to give leadership on that. One of the ways in which that could have been done was with the money that was promised for protecting forests—I can understand why communities cut down trees and whatnot to produce land for agriculture—but that was not delivered. You have talked a lot about leadership today. Do you think that our leadership, on the issues on which you want to be the leader, has been damaged by the decision, for whatever reasons, not to provide finance and leadership to other countries to protect tropical forests?
I cannot resist just briefly addressing your first point, but I will come on to your second point.
Briefly.
Yes, briefly. On your first point, Sammy, with the greatest respect, I think it would be a total dereliction of duty if we walked away from this engagement, because we would be betraying future generations. If we say, “We’ll just let climate change take its course,” that will be an absolute disaster. It is true that there were siren voices saying that we should walk away from this process. That would be a total betrayal. I have two kids, who are 15 and 16; they would rightly look at me in the future and say, “You have left future generations in the most appalling circumstances.” I cannot emphasise this enough: we are responsible for 1% of global emissions, and if we walk away, we are signing an absolute disaster warrant for future generations. On your point about forests, I am really proud of what we are doing on the agenda to tackle deforestation, including a £1.5 billion investment in forests in ICF4. We saw progress at COP on a whole range of issues around the pledges regarding the Congo basin and indigenous people. We are also co-chairing the forest and climate leaders’ partnership with Guyana. Of course, as with other countries, difficult fiscal circumstances meant that we could not make an investment into the TFFF at COP30, but that is something that we will return to.
I am glad that you mentioned Guyana. While we talk about preserving forests, we cut down a swathe of forest with British money for a road in the middle of the forest. First, we have failed to produce the finance that would have helped to protect forests. Secondly, even domestically, we have not produced the legislation that would ensure that, where there is illegal damage to forests and harvesting of wood from forests, there is no market for that in the United Kingdom.
Is this about forest risk commodities?
Yes.
It is in schedule 17 to the Environment Act.
I am glad that you are asking this question, because this is really important and we recognise the urgency of taking action on these issues. I think it is right to explain some of the background to the Committee. I was grateful to you for saying that you wanted to raise this issue. There is an interaction here—it concerns Northern Ireland—with the EU, which is also planning to act on these issues, so we are looking at how we make sure across Government that any action the EU takes is consistent and, as much as possible, aligned with the action that we take.
It’s vice versa, isn’t it, Secretary of State?
We need to align our actions so that—
They have already indicated the direction they are proposing to go in; we have not.
Sure, and we are looking at the implications of their legislation and any action that we take, but we are really determined to take action on these issues. We recognise their importance; we just need to do so in a way that works.
Can I bring you back to the TFFF? You rightly said that it is an investment, but it is an investment that prioritises fixed payments to financiers, and country transfers are junior and volatile. The portfolio performance drives what countries receive, not the stewardship quality of the forest. There is no causal link between the quality of stewardship in the forest and the arresting of deforestation, and the money that is received, because there is a deliberate disjunct between the financial investment, which is cyclical—most of this money is being invested in emerging markets—and the cycle of investment and return, which may go up at the very time that deforestation increases, so there is no causal link here. That is one of the pushbacks that people in the market have given to the construction of the fund. Given that the UK was very instrumental in putting this fund together in Brazil, what are your responses to that challenge?
I am very wary of going toe to toe with you on these quite complicated questions, Chair, given your background. I will try to extract what you are saying as much as possible. Forgive me if this is simplistic, but the way I think about this is that the TFFF is essentially a mechanism whereby concessional finance from the public sector and concessional investment can lever in private money and generate a return that can then be used to help tackle deforestation. Much of this is in the design of the fund and the design of how the money is dispersed, and that is something that we and the investors are engaging with Brazil on. I recognise that the amount of money you have to invest in tackling deforestation will be determined by the performance of the fund, but I am not sure I quite buy some of what you said.
Maybe we can continue this elsewhere.
Secretary of State, the new just transition mechanism will be applied by all countries, including our own, once the details of its operation have been agreed. As the UK decarbonises, how are you looking to ensure there is a just transition here, when people, places, sectors and workers are left behind?
Let me say something quickly about the mechanism. The mechanism has now been agreed, we think it will be a good way to share best practice from different countries, and the just transition is incredibly important. We have just unveiled our North sea future plan, and it has a big emphasis on the importance of the just transition in lots of different ways. The most important way to think about this is that although our North sea workforce has led the way for decades when it comes to oil and gas, and it will continue to do so for decades to come, something like 70,000 jobs have been lost in the North sea in fewer than 10 years. The big question is whether we can also build the future industries: carbon capture and storage, offshore wind and hydrogen. We unveiled our clean energy jobs plan earlier this year. It showed not a target, but something more like a forecast for the number of extra clean energy jobs we are going to need to meet our plans—400,000 by 2030. This is why I think the debate has changed so much, because this is the massive opportunity of the future. Whether it is carbon capture and storage or some of the other things I have talked about, my Department is really focused on being not just an energy policy Department, but an industrial policy Department. In other words, how do we get the supply chain jobs? How do we make sure those jobs go to the right people? How do we have a proper transition for oil and gas workers who might be looking for other industries to go into? That is the way we are thinking about this.
You mentioned the clean energy jobs plan. It has been criticised for being too focused on short-to-medium-term jobs, such as construction for major transition projects, and lacking a longer-term career pathway. How do you respond to that assertion?
I do not really see it that way. I will just give you an example to bring this issue to life. I was proud to go and announce that the Rolls-Royce SMR would be at Wylfa in north Wales, and I was with the Prime Minister and the Chancellor. There are 3,000 construction jobs as a result of that, but there are many thousands more jobs in the supply chain. We are rebuilding the nuclear industry in this country. Whether it is Sizewell C, the SMRs or fusion, there is a huge opportunity here. In a way, some of those supply chains atrophied and we have got to rebuild them. We see this, yes, as being about the construction, but it goes way beyond that. One of the things that Great British Energy is doing with its supply chain funds is trying to work with the private sector to get jobs stationed here. Whether it is Hull and the expansion of the work there in relation to wind turbines, or the new cable factory at Port of Nigg, there is lots going on. We are absolutely focused on winning this race, not just in terms of construction but in terms of the longer-term sustainable jobs.
Following on from that, how do you plan to tackle the barriers that prevent existing energy sector workers from transitioning successfully, as recommended by the Energy Security and Net Zero Committee? I cannot help mentioning at this point that the cuts to level 7 apprenticeships, certainly in the built environment sector and the energy sector, are really stopping people in those professions from diversifying, with some of those level 7 courses being absolutely vital for finishing the qualification. How do you plan to tackle those barriers?
I spent part of my Sunday reading the ESNZ Committee report, which I think came out on Friday. It was an important read. I will give you just one example. As part of our North sea plan, we have announced plans for a job-brokering and job-matching service to help North sea workers to transition into these new industries. I think about it in this way. When we came into Government, I thought that there was not an understanding of what the skills needs of the clean energy workforce would be. There was more of an understanding than I had thought, and there was a lot of great data, but there was not an intentional way in which the jobs that needed to be filled were going to be matched with the people who could fill them. What our clean energy jobs plan is kicking off—I emphasise “kicking off”—is trying to have that matching. We will have a whole steering group, with representatives from across Government, trade unions and industry, to say, “What are the tangible things we need to do to make sure that these supply chain jobs, these skilled jobs and these construction jobs can be filled by people?” Whether it is the work we are doing with Skills England, or things like the North sea job-matching service that I have just talked about, there is a much more intentional way of thinking, “How do we fill these skills gaps?”
You mentioned the report from the Energy Security and Net Zero Committee. I think you gave a lovely segue for the Chair of that Committee to come back in on you.
A plug.
Thank you very much for reading the report. To return the compliment, I spent part of yesterday reading your engagement strategy; there were very good points in it. I look forward to your fuller response to our report. You touched on SMRs in an earlier answer. One of the things that is clear is the opportunity in the nuclear supply chain for people moving from oil and gas in particular. Something that struck us in evidence was the desirability of taking a fleet approach to large scale—to the EPRs. What is next after Sizewell C? It would be a way of giving very strong long-term signals both to the supply chain and to the workforce. What is your response to that?
Two points. First, alongside our SMR announcement, I have commissioned GB Energy-Nuclear to look at the potential of large-scale, and we see a strong case for another large-scale reactor. I am awaiting the strategic spatial energy plan, which will be published next year. This will try to go well beyond 2030 to say, “What are the energy needs going to be going forwards?” The reason I say that is because we know that electricity demand will at least double by 2050, so I think there is a really strong case for new nuclear. Obviously, that has a big public expenditure price tag, but the way we have talked about it is by saying that, by the end of 2026, GBE-N will report back to me on the potential for large-scale. Secondly, I have also asked them to look at the potential in Scotland, where we believe there is potential. The current Scottish Government are not in favour of new nuclear, but I think there is a huge opportunity for Scotland. Some members of the Committee may disagree with me about nuclear, but I would say that the scale of the climate crisis is such that we need all the tools at our disposal. Also, when I look at our country, I feel that the biggest issue we face is the crisis in affordability and the cost of living, and one of the best answers for that is good jobs at decent wages with strong trade unions. The nuclear industry has a really good record on that.
Thank you, Secretary of State, for your leadership in Brazil; I think it is increasingly important, given that the United States and President Trump have jettisoned their responsibilities in this space and there has been a dilution of the consensus that we previously enjoyed on the climate crisis at home. Bearing that in mind, how can the Government continue to expect to demonstrate climate leadership, while also being uncertain about how much money they will be contributing to international climate efforts beyond next spring?
It is so interesting, this. I think there is real recognition of British leadership, and a real demand for British leadership. If you look at the long sweep of history, going back to the mid-2000s, we have really established ourselves as a country that cares about this, and I pay tribute to all members of the Committee who were—broadly speaking—on this bus. We know that there is no point in going to COP and telling other people to do things and not doing stuff yourself, because then people say, “Well, you’re just saying one thing, but you’re not doing it.” It really matters that we were the first country to pass the Climate Change Act; that Theresa May put net zero into law; and that 80% of GDP is now covered. People recognise that you have difficult domestic circumstances, like the fiscal circumstances that we and others face, which make it harder. But I think people give us credit for the fact that, for example, we were the leading country with our NDC target of 81% by 2035. Then the Danes came along and announced 82% at COP30—I am sure I said to the Danish Minister that they did that just because they wanted to be 1% better than us. That is the kind of ambition that you want to see, and I think there is recognition of that. ICF is really important, and the story of development, adaptation and resilience goes hand in hand with the mitigation story.
We seem to be looking to Denmark in all sorts of different ways at the moment. Sticking with climate finance, we were pleased that climate and nature are both top priorities for the ODA budget. When making future announcements on international climate finance, will you commit to presenting climate finance commitments transparently, including how they interact with nature finance commitments?
This is an important point, and actually it was a less high-profile, but nevertheless important, piece of the discussions at COP30. As you know, countries submit BTRs—biennial transparency reports—as part of the Paris agreement, which seek to set out information on the financial support that is being provided. We are always open to doing more to provide a sense of the investment we are making. I was involved in the original $100 billion pledge that Gordon Brown made around 2008 or 2009 in Copenhagen. I know it was a source of frustration to developing countries that there was not the transparency there might have been, so we are always open to ways in which that transparency might be improved.
Can you be specific about what we might do?
We think that the BTRs are important. I do not know whether Kate wants to add anything on this transparency question.
I think transparency is a core element of the Paris agreement as well, and so by submitting those biennial transparency reports we provide information looking backwards in terms of what we have done, including on our climate finance and on our action. We also produce reports called our 9.5 reports, which provide future transparency on what our forthcoming climate finance looks like as well. We are absolutely committed to doing all of those, and all parties from the developed countries do those 9.5 reports, and others are able to do those as well.
Secretary of State, what are your priorities on international climate action from now to COP31?
That is a great question. Obviously, it will be hosted in Türkiye but with Chris Bowen as the president of the negotiations from Australia, and both countries will work together to find common ground. The fundamentals of this are—Bill drew attention to it earlier—that the world is off track from 1.5°, and we have to find ways in which we raise ambition. Some countries promise more than they can deliver; some countries promise less than they actually end up delivering. We have to collectively drive up ambition. In the weeds of the COP agreement—the Mutirão—there are mechanisms to drive up ambition, so that is the fundamental task. Every COP, given the scale of the emergency that Bill was talking about, has to have a focus on this. Some people say these COPs are a waste of time; I genuinely do not believe it is a waste of time, precisely for the reasons that Bill set out, which are that we need accountability and focus on these issues. Leaders going and Ministers gathering together is, apart from anything else, a system of accountability. First, it is about 1.5°. Secondly, given the previous discussion we had, it seems to me that taking seriously the road map on the transition away and the road map on countering deforestation will be crucial elements of what COP31 needs to do. The last point I will make is that one thing that strikes me about the COP is that it has now become the anchor for two things that are not part of the formal negotiations: countries getting together to push agendas forward—we saw this with the Powering Past Coal Alliance, and we have now seen it on the transition away from fossil fuels—and action in the real economy. There were thousands of businesses, members of civil society and—somebody was asking about this earlier—states and mayors. In a sense, that is where the transition is really happening. I think that both for keeping 1.5° alive, and for action in the real economy, and for making good on the promises we made at COP30, those are the tasks for COP31.
What is the plan to achieve those things?
Working across countries is the only answer. We had a couple of meetings of what is called the High Ambition Coalition, which was formed in Paris, bringing together progressive developed countries and developing countries, and that met at COP30. I am not just saying this because I have a civil servant on either side of me, but our civil service is incredibly admired around the world for its intelligence, its creativity, its imagination and its ability to engage on these issues. For Kate and her team—she may want to say something about it—it is an all-year-round process. It is like the Forth road bridge.
Absolutely. We will continue to work with Brazil, with the current presidency and with the incoming presidency team as well, to understand its ambitions and how we can support it across the range of issues that are important to us and will be important to them. We will also engage the wider set of stakeholders that the Secretary of State mentioned and talk to a range of different countries around the world to understand what they want to achieve from COP31 and how we can align those interests.
There is a paradox about these negotiations. Countries fight like anything for their own individual priorities. I was struck when, as always with these things, we were up all night on the Friday night, and the different groupings of countries were gathered together in a room by the presidency. In fact, Kate was showing me a picture earlier on—it brought back slight PTSD for me. We held out on this question—we were pretty insistent that there should be a reference back to COP28 and the agreement, broadly speaking, on fossil fuels. For quite a lot of that night, I thought that there was not going to be an agreement. I genuinely thought there would be no deal. The EU and the UK were really pushing on this, but in the end people did want an agreement. People wanted to keep the show on the road because they saw it to be in their own interests. That does not mean I have rose-tinted spectacles about how far off we are from where we need to be, but I think that is the really important truth of this.
You talked about the hosting arrangements for COP31. What opportunities and challenges do they present?
I think it is better that two countries want to host it than nobody wanting to host it. It is a costly business, and the fact that both Australia and Türkiye both wanted to host it is significant. I think Ethiopia is going to host 32, and that is already decided; we do not quite know about 33 yet. I am good friends with Chris Bowen, the Australian Minister who will be president of negotiations. I think he will do a fine job. I think Türkiye will do a good job of hosting it. In a sense, I am glad that there has been an agreement, because the fear was that we would not get to an agreement, and then we would be slightly in limbo.
Finally, you talk about COP in terms of bringing all these different people together from civil society and elsewhere. Has the nature of COP changed in that it is now more about those big political statements of intent and about bringing people together and networking, with the real work being done elsewhere—outside of and between COPs?
That is a really interesting question. It is like what Churchill said about democracy being the least worst system we could have. It is the same with the COP. You have 193 countries negotiating. I think you are right that Paris sets the framework, and in a sense we are all now working off the Paris framework. The negotiations provide an anchor for what actually happens. Also, there are things agreed in the negotiations that we probably will not talk about that are pretty important, like the agreement on carbon markets in article 6 at last year’s COP. It is not glamorous—Barry knows a lot about it—but it is incredibly important, and it was worked on for nine or 10 years before an agreement was reached. Beneath the headlines, quite a lot of other important negotiating work goes on.
Secretary of State, let us stick to the fact that the COP30 final text made no explicit reference to fossil fuels. I hear the frustration from you on that, which I share. I think it is beyond debate that a factor in why that happened is the enormous number of fossil fuel lobbyists taking part. One in every 25 participants at COP30 was a fossil fuel lobbyist—that is up 12% on last year alone. What will the UK Government do between now and COP31 to deal with that and ensure that no fossil fuel lobbyists and polluting industry lobbyists have such a strong effect on those important talks?
We are always careful about who is in our delegations, but in a way I think the issue goes beyond that. I think it is because if you are a fossil fuel producer and very reliant on fossil fuels—I am not saying I agree—you have a massive challenge. In retrospect, what happened at COP28 was pretty extraordinary: having the UAE, a fossil fuel producer, hosting it, while committing to the transition away. I am sure you are raising valid issues about who comes to COP, fossil fuel lobbyists and so on, but I think there is a much bigger issue here, which is: what do countries see as in their interests? How much pressure are they getting? How much can they diversify? Where I see the road map playing a role is in starting to paint the picture of what diversification looks like and what a transition away looks like, including for countries that are very reliant on fossil fuels. One of the things I said at one of the roundtables is, “We shouldn’t do this fossil fuel road map because it’s easy—it’s not easy; it’s really hard. That is why we’ve got to do it, and that’s why it’s so important.”
Secretary of State, you mentioned future generations, and I hope you will forgive me for reflecting that my generation will be living with the impacts of climate change for somewhat longer than yours.
Gee, thanks! That’s you and me, Barry.
Speak for yourself! I am going to live a very long time.
I believe that earlier you said the trend is clear in relation to the energy transition. I agree that we do not want to be defeatist, nor would I say that we want to be under any illusions. In the last year, global CO₂ emissions from energy rose to a new record, total fossil fuel use grew to a new record, and global demand for energy use continues to grow faster than for renewables—albeit that renewables are growing fast, our demand for energy is growing faster. I am interested to know whether you genuinely would agree that it would be more accurate to say that there is, as of yet, no transition, and that we need to prepare for a very disrupted future.
I think you have to hold two truths in your head. I am not saying this because I want to paint a rosy picture—I recognise a lot of what you said—but the two truths you have to hold are: first, the world is moving, and I think the transition is unstoppable; and, secondly, it is not moving nearly fast enough. Both those things can be true. Last year, we had double the investment in clean energy compared with fossil fuels. That was not the case 15 years ago, so there has been a transformation. The World Energy Outlook produced by the IEA has a very good section on the net zero pathway and what is and is not working on that. One of the areas where we are overachieving is on the growth of renewables; in other areas, we are underachieving. You have to hold both those truths. I think that if we tell people, “We’ve made no progress”, that is kind of a recipe for despair. I also do not think that that is accurate. If it were true, we should say it, but I do not think it is true—the world has moved and made progress, but we have to go further, of course.
Finally, Secretary of State, you set out your key focus areas for the COP before you went there. One of those was adaptation and resilience, and you said you wanted to see that elevated to equal priority with mitigation, and that you wanted to agree the indicators for the global goal on adaptation. How do you think that went?
I do not know whether Kate wants to come in on this, because there was quite a problem at the end. I can come to the adaptation finance, but the global goal on adaptation was one of the more problematic parts at the end of COP, wasn’t it?
Yes. The global goal on adaptation—
He gives you the difficult questions, I have noticed.
Yes, I know—typical politician.
May I just say a huge thanks? Secretary of State, you rightly said how respected our civil servants are in the international negotiations. Thanks to both Ms Hughes and Mr McLaughlin for all their work year-round on this. It is hugely appreciated. Please go on.
Thank you. Agreement was reached, and we had the gather on the global goal on adaptation, but many countries, including those who made their voices heard in that plenary session, were keen for more work to be done on the global goal on adaptation in the indicator sets. We have all agreed that we will pursue that in Bonn in the inter-sessionals this year and, no doubt, at COP31 as well, so more work to be done on that, as there always is on all the issues, but particularly on adaptation.
One important agreement that maybe did not get the attention it deserved—this will probably unite the whole Committee—was the agreement to treble adaptation finance by 2035, as part of the NCQG, the $300 billion agreed last year. I think that that is an important commitment. It reflects what developing countries are facing—
That is the new collective quantified goal, just so we do not use too many acronyms.
Sorry, yes—because, as we saw from Hurricane Melissa and its impact on Jamaica, this is now; this is happening. Resilience adaptations are unbelievably important. By the way, they have to go together, because the more we do not, the higher the temperature, the worse and more out of control the adaptation resilience needs are going to be. That was important progress and important to deliver. As this is the final question, let me say one other thing, Chair. I say honestly that whatever our position on such issues, the question of Britain’s engagement is so important. This is a challenging geopolitical time, but collectively we should be proud that we have built up a reputation for British leadership. We can have influence and we are not powerless, and that goes to a view of the UK and our ability to engage multilaterally. For my part, we are absolutely committed because it is the right thing both economically and for future generations—including Chris, who will live much longer than me—to carry on engaging on this, because it is really in our national interest.
The way in which you have paid handsome tribute to the work that the Conservatives did in office is absolutely right. Perhaps you could tell some of your colleagues that encouraging the Conservatives to resume bipartisanship, rather than playing yah-boo-sucks politics, would be much more helpful. We need that bipartisanship. It is what has given us the leadership that you so rightly refer to. You spoke of two truths. I am sure that in Philosophy 101, you learned that if you have two irreconcilable facts and you do not like them, you call that a contradiction; if you have two irreconcilable facts and you do like them, you call it paradox. I take it that it was a paradox to which you were adverting to Chris Hinchliff.
Yes.
Secretary of State, thank you very much for coming before us. We have slightly gone over the time, but not by too much, I hope. Again, thanks to your civil servants who have been with you, too.