Written questions by Wrigley.

Pursuant to the Answer of 8 January 2025 to Question 21470 on Hospices: Charitable Donations, what recent assessment he has made of the adequacy of the proposed funding increase for hospice care.

We are supporting the hospice sector with a £100 million capital funding boost for adult and children’s hospices in England to ensure they have the best physical environment for care. The funding will help hospices to provide the best end of life care to patients and their families in a supportive and dignified physical environment.We are also providing £26 million of revenue funding to support children and young people’s hospices for 2025/26. This is a continuation of the funding which until recently was known as the children and young people’s hospice grant.Most hospices are charitable, independent organisations which receive some statutory funding from integrated care boards (ICBs) for providing National Health Services. The amount of funding each charitable hospice receives varies both within and between ICB areas. This will vary depending on demand in that ICB area, but will also be dependent on the totality and type of palliative care and end of life care provision from both NHS and non-NHS services, including charitable hospices, within each ICB area.We are also working to make sure the palliative and end of life care sector is sustainable in the long term and are determined to shift more healthcare out of hospitals and into the community through our 10-Year Health Plan.

For which roles his Department has considered using non‑deterministic AI systems; and what mechanisms he plans to put in place to (a) monitor and (b) mitigate associated risks.

The Ministry of Defence intends to exploit AI across a broad spectrum of use cases from the frontline to the back office to make all parts of Defence more efficient and effective. This may include the use of ‘non-deterministic’ AI systems (such as Large Language Models). Joint Service Publication 936 on Dependable AI provides a robust framework to address AI-related risks around human control and unpredictability as part of our existing risk management process. This ensures that our legal, ethical and safety obligations are always fulfilled for all AI use cases. We expect that use cases such as training simulations and operational planning exercises will require robust assurance so that outcomes remain valid and repeatable.

What steps her Department is taking to assess the reliability of non-deterministic AI before it is used to support (a) policing, (b) public safety and (c) immigration processes.

The government recognises the importance of operational trust in AI systems. The Home Office is actively working to ensure the responsible adoption of AI technologies within our processes.This includes evaluation and assurance of AI tools in line with relevant industry guidance and regulatory standards including HMG AI frameworks.

Innovation and Technology, if he will take legislative steps to introduce a regulatory framework to set standards for (a) testing and (b) verification of non-deterministic AI systems.

It is right that most AI systems are regulated at point of use by our existing expert regulators, who are best placed to do this. In response to the AI Action Plan, Government committed to building regulators’ capabilities to do this.Additionally, the Government is developing legislative proposals which will allow us to securely realise the enormous benefits of the most powerful AI systems. We will launch a public consultation, and engage with a full range of stakeholders, on our legislative proposals in due course.

What assessment he has made of the potential impact of non‑deterministic AI behaviour on the validity of (a) training simulations and (b) operational planning exercises.

The Ministry of Defence intends to exploit AI across a broad spectrum of use cases from the frontline to the back office to make all parts of Defence more efficient and effective. This may include the use of ‘non-deterministic’ AI systems (such as Large Language Models). Joint Service Publication 936 on Dependable AI provides a robust framework to address AI-related risks around human control and unpredictability as part of our existing risk management process. This ensures that our legal, ethical and safety obligations are always fulfilled for all AI use cases. We expect that use cases such as training simulations and operational planning exercises will require robust assurance so that outcomes remain valid and repeatable.

Pursuant to the Answer 13 June 2025 to Question 57485 on Chemicals: Sanitary Products, what further (a) research and (b) evidence does his Department plan to commission.

In February, the Government published a draft Code of Conduct setting out how we intend to consult when using the new powers in the Product Regulation and Metrology Bill - Product safety: checks and balances on developing policy and legislation - GOV.UK. It is this approach that the Government will take in relation to period products.Officials are currently reviewing the evidence base concerning the safety of these products, from which any evidence gaps will be identified, and appropriate expert evidence or further research will be sought. The Department welcomes continued engagement on this important matter from relevant external organisations.

Pursuant to the Answer 13 June 2025 to Question 57485 on Chemicals: Sanitary Products, which groups his Department plans to consult.

In February, the Government published a draft Code of Conduct setting out how we intend to consult when using the new powers in the Product Regulation and Metrology Bill - Product safety: checks and balances on developing policy and legislation - GOV.UK. It is this approach that the Government will take in relation to period products.Officials are currently reviewing the evidence base concerning the safety of these products, from which any evidence gaps will be identified, and appropriate expert evidence or further research will be sought. The Department welcomes continued engagement on this important matter from relevant external organisations.

What steps he is taking to ensure that AI-generated intelligence products are (a) reproducible, (b) trusted and (c) secure.

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) continues to exploit AI tools to support intelligence analysts in producing robust and comprehensive assessments. Assessments that incorporate AI analysis are held to the same rigorous standards, such as the Professional Head of Intelligence Assessment Common Analysis Standards, which ensure the highest levels of objectivity, rigour, and auditability. In parallel, we are offering all staff AI training to ensure the MOD is best placed to interpret, manage and keep appropriately secure the large volumes of complex and often conflicting data. This will enable senior decision-makers to spend more time acting on accurate, timely intelligence assessment.

Innovation and Technology, if he will publish guidance on the safe use of non-deterministic AI in public sector decision-making systems.

The AI playbook clearly describes the non-deterministic nature of probabilistic, AI-based predictive analysis and automated decision-making, while prescribing ten key principles for the safe and responsible use of AI. For example, it highlights the non-deterministic and probabilistic nature of AI models—specifically large language models (LLMs)—which can yield inaccurate or hallucinated outputs. Accordingly, it stresses legal and ethical duties, requiring departments to register AI-powered algorithms via the Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard. It also recommends and emphasises meaningful human oversight, including monitoring, assurance, and user feedback mechanisms, with a risk-aware approach from inception through the entire life cycle of the services.

Whether his Department has made a cyber risk assessment of the use of Palantir’s software in centralised NHS data platforms.

In awarding the contract for the NHS Federated Data Platform (FDP), NHS England made an assessment of the cyber risk and the protections offered by each bidder. The FDP has extensive security arrangements in place to manage cyber risk, including: strong network security, such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems to monitor all network traffic to and from the platform, which helps to block unauthorised access and detect suspicious activity;data encryption, as all data stored on the platform is encrypted, both when it’s being transferred, or in transit, and when it’s at rest, or stored on servers; andregular security testing, as the platform undergoes regular penetration testing and vulnerability scanning to identify and fix any weaknesses in its security. It is a contractual requirement that personal data stored in the FDP and its associated services (FDP-AS), including the NHS-Privacy Enhancing Technology, cannot be accessed by the provider’s own personnel or contractors from outside the United Kingdom. The FDP-AS contract stipulates that all data must be held within the UK and is subject to UK Data Protection Law, including the UK General Data Protection Regulation. All FDP data processes and systems need to comply with the Technology Code of Practice, Government Data Standards, the Department’s Guide to good practice for digital and data-driven health technologies, the Data Protection Act 2018, and the UK General Data Protection Regulation, the Information Commissioner's Office’s guidance, and associated regulations, standards, and guidance.The contract was awarded in conformance with public sector procurement law, as required. The National Health Service ran an independent procurement exercise. The choice of preferred supplier was not made by a single person, as it was the result of assessment by many different individuals. NHS England has a duty to treat all suppliers the same regardless of the public perception of any organisation, or the opinions held by any of their shareholders.NHS England cannot exclude any supplier that is lawfully established and able to bid from participating in the procurement. The procurement process received external validation from multiple Government departments, as well as independent evaluations by Infrastructure and Projects Authority reviewers. There were no identified security concerns in relation to the contract awarded for the NHS FDP.The Procurement Act 2023 has introduced new powers to exclude and debar suppliers from public sector contracts if they pose a national security risk. Cabinet Office has established the new National Security Unit for Procurement, which is responsible for investigating suppliers on national security grounds, both within the Government supply chain and for the wider public sector.

What due diligence steps his Department takes to assess national security risks before awarding public health data contracts to firms with links to (a) foreign intelligence or (b) military operations.

In awarding the contract for the NHS Federated Data Platform (FDP), NHS England made an assessment of the cyber risk and the protections offered by each bidder. The FDP has extensive security arrangements in place to manage cyber risk, including: strong network security, such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems to monitor all network traffic to and from the platform, which helps to block unauthorised access and detect suspicious activity;data encryption, as all data stored on the platform is encrypted, both when it’s being transferred, or in transit, and when it’s at rest, or stored on servers; andregular security testing, as the platform undergoes regular penetration testing and vulnerability scanning to identify and fix any weaknesses in its security. It is a contractual requirement that personal data stored in the FDP and its associated services (FDP-AS), including the NHS-Privacy Enhancing Technology, cannot be accessed by the provider’s own personnel or contractors from outside the United Kingdom. The FDP-AS contract stipulates that all data must be held within the UK and is subject to UK Data Protection Law, including the UK General Data Protection Regulation. All FDP data processes and systems need to comply with the Technology Code of Practice, Government Data Standards, the Department’s Guide to good practice for digital and data-driven health technologies, the Data Protection Act 2018, and the UK General Data Protection Regulation, the Information Commissioner's Office’s guidance, and associated regulations, standards, and guidance.The contract was awarded in conformance with public sector procurement law, as required. The National Health Service ran an independent procurement exercise. The choice of preferred supplier was not made by a single person, as it was the result of assessment by many different individuals. NHS England has a duty to treat all suppliers the same regardless of the public perception of any organisation, or the opinions held by any of their shareholders.NHS England cannot exclude any supplier that is lawfully established and able to bid from participating in the procurement. The procurement process received external validation from multiple Government departments, as well as independent evaluations by Infrastructure and Projects Authority reviewers. There were no identified security concerns in relation to the contract awarded for the NHS FDP.The Procurement Act 2023 has introduced new powers to exclude and debar suppliers from public sector contracts if they pose a national security risk. Cabinet Office has established the new National Security Unit for Procurement, which is responsible for investigating suppliers on national security grounds, both within the Government supply chain and for the wider public sector.

Whether contracts awarded to Palantir Technologies Inc. for NHS data infrastructure permit cross-border data sharing without UK regulatory approval.

In awarding the contract for the NHS Federated Data Platform (FDP), NHS England made an assessment of the cyber risk and the protections offered by each bidder. The FDP has extensive security arrangements in place to manage cyber risk, including: strong network security, such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems to monitor all network traffic to and from the platform, which helps to block unauthorised access and detect suspicious activity;data encryption, as all data stored on the platform is encrypted, both when it’s being transferred, or in transit, and when it’s at rest, or stored on servers; andregular security testing, as the platform undergoes regular penetration testing and vulnerability scanning to identify and fix any weaknesses in its security. It is a contractual requirement that personal data stored in the FDP and its associated services (FDP-AS), including the NHS-Privacy Enhancing Technology, cannot be accessed by the provider’s own personnel or contractors from outside the United Kingdom. The FDP-AS contract stipulates that all data must be held within the UK and is subject to UK Data Protection Law, including the UK General Data Protection Regulation. All FDP data processes and systems need to comply with the Technology Code of Practice, Government Data Standards, the Department’s Guide to good practice for digital and data-driven health technologies, the Data Protection Act 2018, and the UK General Data Protection Regulation, the Information Commissioner's Office’s guidance, and associated regulations, standards, and guidance.The contract was awarded in conformance with public sector procurement law, as required. The National Health Service ran an independent procurement exercise. The choice of preferred supplier was not made by a single person, as it was the result of assessment by many different individuals. NHS England has a duty to treat all suppliers the same regardless of the public perception of any organisation, or the opinions held by any of their shareholders.NHS England cannot exclude any supplier that is lawfully established and able to bid from participating in the procurement. The procurement process received external validation from multiple Government departments, as well as independent evaluations by Infrastructure and Projects Authority reviewers. There were no identified security concerns in relation to the contract awarded for the NHS FDP.The Procurement Act 2023 has introduced new powers to exclude and debar suppliers from public sector contracts if they pose a national security risk. Cabinet Office has established the new National Security Unit for Procurement, which is responsible for investigating suppliers on national security grounds, both within the Government supply chain and for the wider public sector.

What assessment he has made of the security implications of awarding NHS data management contracts to (a) Palantir Technologies Inc. and (b) other companies with significant overseas (i) defence and (ii) intelligence clients.

In awarding the contract for the NHS Federated Data Platform (FDP), NHS England made an assessment of the cyber risk and the protections offered by each bidder. The FDP has extensive security arrangements in place to manage cyber risk, including: strong network security, such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems to monitor all network traffic to and from the platform, which helps to block unauthorised access and detect suspicious activity;data encryption, as all data stored on the platform is encrypted, both when it’s being transferred, or in transit, and when it’s at rest, or stored on servers; andregular security testing, as the platform undergoes regular penetration testing and vulnerability scanning to identify and fix any weaknesses in its security. It is a contractual requirement that personal data stored in the FDP and its associated services (FDP-AS), including the NHS-Privacy Enhancing Technology, cannot be accessed by the provider’s own personnel or contractors from outside the United Kingdom. The FDP-AS contract stipulates that all data must be held within the UK and is subject to UK Data Protection Law, including the UK General Data Protection Regulation. All FDP data processes and systems need to comply with the Technology Code of Practice, Government Data Standards, the Department’s Guide to good practice for digital and data-driven health technologies, the Data Protection Act 2018, and the UK General Data Protection Regulation, the Information Commissioner's Office’s guidance, and associated regulations, standards, and guidance.The contract was awarded in conformance with public sector procurement law, as required. The National Health Service ran an independent procurement exercise. The choice of preferred supplier was not made by a single person, as it was the result of assessment by many different individuals. NHS England has a duty to treat all suppliers the same regardless of the public perception of any organisation, or the opinions held by any of their shareholders.NHS England cannot exclude any supplier that is lawfully established and able to bid from participating in the procurement. The procurement process received external validation from multiple Government departments, as well as independent evaluations by Infrastructure and Projects Authority reviewers. There were no identified security concerns in relation to the contract awarded for the NHS FDP.The Procurement Act 2023 has introduced new powers to exclude and debar suppliers from public sector contracts if they pose a national security risk. Cabinet Office has established the new National Security Unit for Procurement, which is responsible for investigating suppliers on national security grounds, both within the Government supply chain and for the wider public sector.

Whether his Department has undertaken a cross-Government security risk assessment of sensitive data contracts awarded to Palantir Technologies Inc.

It is long-standing policy that the Government does not disclose the specifics of its security arrangements, including with suppliers.The UK takes national security extremely seriously and has taken robust action to ensure the security of sensitive government data. As set out in the recent National Procurement Policy Statement, the Government mitigates supply chain and national security risks by ensuring appropriate data and security controls are in place. All contracting authorities are encouraged to follow the Government Security Group’s guidance on Tackling Security Risk in Government Supply Chains, which details best practices for procurement, commercial, and security practitioners when selecting and onboarding suppliers.We also encourage organisations to adhere to the National Cyber Security Centre and the National Protective Security Authority’s supply chain security guidance when selecting technology suppliers, which outlines the required security standards and procurement considerations.The National Security Unit for Procurement (NSUP) has been established to support Ministers in assessing suppliers on national security grounds in line with the Procurement Act 2023. NSUP works closely with government departments to oversee implementation of these measures and enhance supplier security assessments across the procurement process.

What discussions she has had with the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government on reviewing the balance of funding between housing support for private rents and long-term capital grants for affordable housing.

My department has been supporting the development of a long-term housing strategy which the government intends to publish later this year. At Spending Review 2025, the government announced the biggest boost to social and affordable housing investment for England in a generation, confirming £39 billion for a successor to the Affordable Homes Programme over 10 years from 2026-27 to 2035-36. The programme will prioritise homes for social rent and will make more homes available for those who would otherwise struggle to afford private rents. The Government also announced a 10-year social housing rent settlement from 2026 at CPI + 1%, alongside a consultation on how to implement social housing rent convergence.

How much and what proportion of (a) Housing Benefit and (b) the housing element of Universal Credit is paid to private landlords.

In 2023/24, total housing support provided to private rented sector (PRS) tenants amounted to £12.3 billion (in 2024/25 prices). Of this, £3.9 billion was delivered through Housing Benefit (HB), while £8.4 billion was provided via the Universal Credit Housing Element (UCHE). This means that HB accounted for 32% of total PRS housing support, with UCHE making up the remaining 68%. The Department does not hold information on housing benefit payments made to private landlords in other OECD countries. Housing support systems vary significantly between countries, and as such, comparisons of housing benefit payments across international contexts should be treated with caution. The information requested on Housing Benefit paid to private landlords by region and local authority is publicly available. It can be accessed via Benefit expenditure and caseload tables 2024 - GOV.UK (Benefit Expenditure by Local Authority 2023/24) Housing Benefits Expenditure, £m real terms, 2025/26 prices, from 2014/15 to 2023/24 Housing Benefits Expenditure, £ million real terms, 2025/26 prices2014/152015/162016/172017/182018/192019/202020/212021/222022/232023/24TotalHousing Benefit (Private Rented Sector)£12,584£12,063£11,135£10,193£8,898£7,096£5,980£5,376£4,491£3,872£94,674Total Housing Benefit£33,636£33,296£31,482£29,488£26,844£23,249£20,811£19,474£17,574£16,805£266,500Housing Benefit PRS Proportion of Total Housing Benefit37%36%35%35%33%31%29%28%26%23%33%

How much Housing Benefit is paid to private landlords in each (a) region and (b) local authority.

In 2023/24, total housing support provided to private rented sector (PRS) tenants amounted to £12.3 billion (in 2024/25 prices). Of this, £3.9 billion was delivered through Housing Benefit (HB), while £8.4 billion was provided via the Universal Credit Housing Element (UCHE). This means that HB accounted for 32% of total PRS housing support, with UCHE making up the remaining 68%. The Department does not hold information on housing benefit payments made to private landlords in other OECD countries. Housing support systems vary significantly between countries, and as such, comparisons of housing benefit payments across international contexts should be treated with caution. The information requested on Housing Benefit paid to private landlords by region and local authority is publicly available. It can be accessed via Benefit expenditure and caseload tables 2024 - GOV.UK (Benefit Expenditure by Local Authority 2023/24) Housing Benefits Expenditure, £m real terms, 2025/26 prices, from 2014/15 to 2023/24 Housing Benefits Expenditure, £ million real terms, 2025/26 prices2014/152015/162016/172017/182018/192019/202020/212021/222022/232023/24TotalHousing Benefit (Private Rented Sector)£12,584£12,063£11,135£10,193£8,898£7,096£5,980£5,376£4,491£3,872£94,674Total Housing Benefit£33,636£33,296£31,482£29,488£26,844£23,249£20,811£19,474£17,574£16,805£266,500Housing Benefit PRS Proportion of Total Housing Benefit37%36%35%35%33%31%29%28%26%23%33%

How much Housing Benefit was paid to private landlords (a) in real terms and (b) as a proportion of total Housing Benefit expenditure in each of the last ten years.

In 2023/24, total housing support provided to private rented sector (PRS) tenants amounted to £12.3 billion (in 2024/25 prices). Of this, £3.9 billion was delivered through Housing Benefit (HB), while £8.4 billion was provided via the Universal Credit Housing Element (UCHE). This means that HB accounted for 32% of total PRS housing support, with UCHE making up the remaining 68%. The Department does not hold information on housing benefit payments made to private landlords in other OECD countries. Housing support systems vary significantly between countries, and as such, comparisons of housing benefit payments across international contexts should be treated with caution. The information requested on Housing Benefit paid to private landlords by region and local authority is publicly available. It can be accessed via Benefit expenditure and caseload tables 2024 - GOV.UK (Benefit Expenditure by Local Authority 2023/24) Housing Benefits Expenditure, £m real terms, 2025/26 prices, from 2014/15 to 2023/24 Housing Benefits Expenditure, £ million real terms, 2025/26 prices2014/152015/162016/172017/182018/192019/202020/212021/222022/232023/24TotalHousing Benefit (Private Rented Sector)£12,584£12,063£11,135£10,193£8,898£7,096£5,980£5,376£4,491£3,872£94,674Total Housing Benefit£33,636£33,296£31,482£29,488£26,844£23,249£20,811£19,474£17,574£16,805£266,500Housing Benefit PRS Proportion of Total Housing Benefit37%36%35%35%33%31%29%28%26%23%33%

What steps her Department is taking to help incentivise private landlords to rent to benefit recipients.

Rental discrimination against people who receive benefits has no place in a fair and modern housing market. The Renters’ Rights Bill takes direct action to stop discriminatory practices against households receiving benefits in the private rented sector. It will address overt discriminatory practices, such as ‘no DSS’ adverts, and any indirect practices designed to intentionally prevent someone entering into a tenancy. DWP does not incentivise private landlords to rent their properties to benefit recipients. We do provide housing support towards rental costs for private renters in receipt of either Housing Benefit or Universal Credit via the Local Housing Allowance. Discretionary Housing Payments are also available from local authorities to those who face a shortfall in meeting their housing costs.

What the cost of Housing Benefit was in each of the last ten years.

In 2023/24, total housing support provided to private rented sector (PRS) tenants amounted to £12.3 billion (in 2024/25 prices). Of this, £3.9 billion was delivered through Housing Benefit (HB), while £8.4 billion was provided via the Universal Credit Housing Element (UCHE). This means that HB accounted for 32% of total PRS housing support, with UCHE making up the remaining 68%. The Department does not hold information on housing benefit payments made to private landlords in other OECD countries. Housing support systems vary significantly between countries, and as such, comparisons of housing benefit payments across international contexts should be treated with caution. The information requested on Housing Benefit paid to private landlords by region and local authority is publicly available. It can be accessed via Benefit expenditure and caseload tables 2024 - GOV.UK (Benefit Expenditure by Local Authority 2023/24) Housing Benefits Expenditure, £m real terms, 2025/26 prices, from 2014/15 to 2023/24 Housing Benefits Expenditure, £ million real terms, 2025/26 prices2014/152015/162016/172017/182018/192019/202020/212021/222022/232023/24TotalHousing Benefit (Private Rented Sector)£12,584£12,063£11,135£10,193£8,898£7,096£5,980£5,376£4,491£3,872£94,674Total Housing Benefit£33,636£33,296£31,482£29,488£26,844£23,249£20,811£19,474£17,574£16,805£266,500Housing Benefit PRS Proportion of Total Housing Benefit37%36%35%35%33%31%29%28%26%23%33%