Written questions by McMurdock.

What targets have been set for improving the speed and accuracy of container inspections over the next three years.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; orBorder Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

Whether her Department plans to increase the proportion of containers inspected.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; orBorder Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

What information is provided to importers on the expected timeframe for inspection of their containers.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; orBorder Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

How containers awaiting inspection are prioritised, including whether perishable or time-sensitive goods are given priority.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; orBorder Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

How many containers are awaiting inspection at London Gateway Port.

Border Force operates a risk‑based approach to container security, focusing resources on identifying and intervening against higher‑risk movements of goods rather than physically inspecting all shipping containers entering the UK.The Home Office does not hold centrally aggregated or routinely collated data on:the number or proportion of shipping containers physically inspected;the duration of container examinations or their impact on port processing times; orBorder Force staffing levels specifically dedicated to container examinations.It is therefore not possible to provide figures for the last three years on inspections, inspection times, staffing, or breach rates.Border Force uses a range of risk‑based targeting systems to identify containers for intervention. The primary system for risking shipping containers is the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability – Shipping Containers (AFTC‑SC) platform. This capability is supported by intelligence and information from across government, including law‑enforcement partners, international partners, and other relevant government and commercial sources.Container screening is supported by non‑intrusive inspection technology, including high‑energy X‑ray imaging. Where containers are selected for further examination, Border Force officers may also deploy specialist capabilities, including detector dogs and technical detection equipment.Border Force works closely with port operators and partner agencies to ensure that security interventions are delivered effectively while minimising disruption to legitimate trade. The Department keeps its approach under regular review to ensure that it remains proportionate and effective. The effectiveness of this intelligence‑led approach is reflected in publicly reported Border Force enforcement outcomes.

What information her Department holds on the average length of time taken to complete security and background checks on border force applicants.

BPSS (Baseline Personnel Security Standard) checks are required for Home Office roles. Checks for external applicants include the following:Civil Service eligibility;right to work / ID / address checks;employment history verification;health checks (where required); and,checks relating to security and integrity, including some role-specific checks for Border Force Officers.Due to the highly contextual, case-by-case nature of recruitment, it would be neither feasible nor instructive to provide an average timespan.

What discussions she has had with road haulage providers on the potential impact of fuel duty on their sector.

The Government is taking action to ensure that fuel at the pump remains affordable. At Budget 2025, the Government extended the 5p-per-litre cut for a further five months, until the end of August this year. The Government has also cancelled the increase in line with inflation for 2026/27; instead, rates will only gradually return to early 2022 levels by March 2027. The Government's action on fuel duty will save an average heavy goods vehicle more than £800 in 2026/27 compared to previous plans, and follows an extended period where freezes to fuel duty have resulted in substantial savings for the haulage industry. The Government regularly engages with industry representatives, and as with all taxes, keeps fuel duty under review.

What assessment he has made of the adequacy of the feed-in-tariff export payments in the context of the contribution of small-scale renewable generators to demand on the national grid.

The Feed-in Tariffs (FIT) scheme closed to new applicants in 2019, with existing tariffs maintained and only adjusted for inflation annually. The Smart Export Guarantee (SEG), introduced in January 2020, replaced the FIT export payment with a market-led mechanism requiring suppliers to offer tariffs for exported electricity. It supports the transition to smart and flexible energy systems and is designed to enable deployment without subsidies. The average bundled SEG tariff is 15.49p/kWh and with around 50 tariffs available on the market, the SEG provides consumer choice in a competitive market.

Communities and Local Government, with reference to his decision letter to Essex council leaders on local government reorganisation, dated 25 March 2026, if he will publish representations received from local authorities in Essex on the final decision on local government in Essex.

It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.

Communities and Local Government, with reference to his decision letter to council leaders in Essex on local government reorganisation, dated 25 March 2026, what plans he has to publish any representations from council leaders in Essex further to that decision letter.

It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.

Communities and Local Government, with reference to his decision letter to council leaders in Essex on local government reorganisation, dated 25 March 2026, whether he discussed the proposed models of local government reorganisation with the leaders of (a) Thurrock Council, (b) Basildon Council and (c) Essex County Council before making his final decision.

It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.

Communities and Local Government, with reference to his decision letter to Essex council leaders on local government reorganisation, dated 25 March 2026, on what date the decision outlined in his letter was formally taken.

It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.

Communities and Local Government, with reference to his decision letter to Essex council leaders on local government reorganisation, dated 25 March 2026, what discussions he has had with Cabinet colleagues on the local government model for Essex.

It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.

Communities and Local Government, with reference to his decision letter to Essex council leaders on local government reorganisation, dated 25 March 2026, how many consultation responses he reviewed from members of the public before deciding on the local government model for Essex.

It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.

With reference to her Department’s press release entitled Interest rate cap introduced to protect Plan 2 borrowers, published on 7 April 2026, what analysis her Department has undertaken of the effect of the cap on long-term student loan repayment burdens for graduates.

The government is capping the maximum interest rates on Plan 2 and Plan 3 student loans at 6%, instead of the Retail Prices Index (RPI) plus 3%, for the 2026/27 academic year. This short term measure will protect students and graduates from the potential of inflationary pressures due to the situation in the Middle East.Student loan interest rates are ordinarily set for each academic year by reference to the RPI value for the year to the preceding March. On that basis, interest rates for the 2026/27 academic year would normally be determined using the RPI figure for March 2026, which is due to be published on 22 April 2026.The impact of the interest rate cap on long term repayments for graduates, and on forecast cost impacts for the public purse, will depend on the March RPI value. Costs will be set out at Budget in the usual way.

With reference to his Department’s press release entitled NHS patients and British businesses to benefit from historic changes to medicines access following pharmaceutical partnership with USA, published on 2 April 2026, what modelling his Department has undertaken of the long-term cost implications for the NHS of the changes to medicines access and pricing.

The Department has already been clear that the estimated costs of the United Kingdom’s medicines pricing commitments are approximately £1 billion in England over the remaining three-years of the Spending Review. The final and longer-term costs of these changes will depend on future growth in spending on medicines.This is not something that we can pre-empt at this time as it depends on which drugs come to market and which are assessed as approved for use on the National Health Service accordingly.

Pursuant to his Department’s press release entitled Ministers rip up consultation culture, published on 26 March 2026, what mechanisms will be in place to allow Parliament to scrutinise decisions to reduce consultation requirements.

The government is committed to protecting the necessary checks and balances to ministerial and Parliamentary decision making. In line with standard processes, Parliament will have the opportunity to scrutinise and challenge any changes to consultation requirements where they are legislative.

Pursuant to his Department’s press release entitled Ministers rip up consultation culture, published on 26 March 2026, how many of the 131 consultation requirements referenced in the press release were from government-sponsored bills or secondary legislation.

All 131 consultation requirements were from existing primary legislation, not bills currently before Parliament or Secondary legislation. The government is committed to identifying existing disproportionate reporting and consultation duties that are slowing down delivery.

Pursuant to his Department’s press release entitled Ministers rip up consultation culture, published on 26 March 2026, what human oversight will be applied to decisions informed by artificial intelligence in reviewing consultation requirements.

AI tools are being used to identify statutory requirements to consult. Decisions remain the purview of ministers.

How many students have had their maintenance loans or grants withdrawn due to being reclassified as distance learners in the last 12 months.

It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.