Written questions by Downie.

Innovation and Technology, what assessment her Department has made of the use of artificial intelligence by social media platforms to support effective content moderation.

Awaiting answer.

Innovation and Technology, what assessment her Department has made of the extent to which social media platforms’ moderation standards reflect UK standards of age-appropriateness.

Awaiting answer.

What estimate he has made of the number of NHS refrigerators containing cellular internet of things modules manufactured by Chinese companies.

The Cyber Security Strategy for Health and Care to 2030 sets out a vision for a cyber resilient health and care sector, including focusing on the greatest risks and harms. Through the mandatory Data Security and Protection Toolkit (DSPT), we set a cyber security standard for National Health Service organisations proportionate to their risk profile and in response to the cyber threat. Adherence to this standard, in addition to the standards and guidance that we publish around procurement of medical devices, will help organisations to ensure that their networks are secure and that risks with associated Internet-of-Things medical devices are suitably understood and mitigated. The strategy is available at the following link:https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-security-strategy-for-health-and-social-care-2023-to-2030/a-cyber-resilient-health-and-adult-social-care-system-in-england-cyber-security-strategy-to-2030 Individual organisations are responsible for the procurement of medical devices. No estimate of the number of NHS refrigerators and other medical equipment containing cellular internet of things modules manufactured by Chinese companies is currently held nationally. As part of the procurement, risk assessments of equipment will be carried out in accordance with the Guidance on protecting connected medical devices, which is available at the following link:https://digital.nhs.uk/cyber-and-data-security/guidance-and-resources/guidance-on-protecting-connected-medical-devices Implementation of these guidelines and standards are monitored through the mandatory DSPT which is independently audited for NHS trusts. To further strengthen the resilience of the NHS critical supply chain, the Cyber Security Supply Chain Charter has been published. The charter allows current and future suppliers to publicly pledge to be a trusted partner to health and care system. We have a dedicated workstream in the Cyber Improvement Programme that is focused on this particular risk, developing tools and processes to increase cyber assurance and resilience. The charter is available at the following link:https://digital.nhs.uk/cyber-and-data-security/guidance-and-resources/cyber-security-charter-for-suppliers-to-the-nhs

Innovation and Technology, what estimate she has made of the proportion of critical national infrastructure reliant on cellular internet of things modules produced by Chinese technology firms.

It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.

Innovation and Technology, what steps she is taking to ensure public sector data is secure where Cellular Internet Modules may originate from foreign suppliers.

The UK has strong safeguards to ensure that data is collected and handled responsibly and securely. Companies registered in the UK are subject to our legal framework and regulatory jurisdiction.Public sector organisations are required to manage security and supply chain risks through established assurance and procurement frameworks, including the Technology Code of Practice, the Government Cyber Security Standard and following guidance from the National Cyber Security Centre. As threats to UK data are evolving, our response must be agile and proportionate. We actively monitor threats to UK data and will not hesitate to take action if necessary to protect our national security.Any device with a cellular module that is incorporated into the network or systems of UK Critical National Infrastructure will need to comply with that network’s cyber security practices and standards and, as such, should have robust security controls in place.The UK has one of the most robust data protection regimes in the world, with all organisations required to comply with our legislation to safeguard UK personal data when transferring it overseas. Failure to do so can result in enforcement action.Our data regulator, the Information Commissioner’s Office, has powers to take enforcement action and issue fines. Individuals who consider that their data has been misused can also take legal action.

Innovation and Technology, what assessment she has made of trends in the level of telecommunications equipment containing components manufactured in countries deemed to pose a security risk.

Telecoms supply chains are complex and international and are managed by industry. However, the government is committed to ensuring secure and resilient telecoms supply chains.The robust Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 regime places obligations on public communications providers to manage supply chain risks, including to identify, reduce and prepare for the risk of security compromises to their networks. Ofcom monitors compliance with these obligations through its information gathering powers, and the Secretary of State makes decisions on enforcement based on this information and additional advice. The Act also gives ministers powers to restrict the use of vendors in UK networks on national security grounds.The previous government have used the Act’s national security powers to designate Huawei in 2022, and issue legally binding directions restricting their use in UK telecoms networks, supported by a strengthened underpinned by an enforcement regime including clear financial penalties for non-compliance.The telecoms security Code of Practice was introduced in 2022, which sets out in detail the technical and organisational steps public communications providers must take to identify, reduce and manage supply chain and vendor‑related security risks, with compliance overseen and enforced by Ofcom. We are currently in the process of updating the Code of Practice to provide public telecoms providers with further guidance, reflecting recent changes in threats and technologiesWe are also committed to growing the UK’s role in Advanced Connectivity Technology supply chains. The government is supporting targeted R&D programmes with UKRI and other partners to support the development and commercialisation of next generation technologies. This will enable UK firms to participate more fully in global telecoms supply chains and reduce UK dependence on other countries.Telecoms supply chain risks are considered as part of cross-government efforts to improve the security and resilience of supply chains. The government works with business to address these risks, building the conditions required to deliver secure growth. The government continues to monitor and respond to turbulence in global sectors and supply chains that are crucial to the UK’s economic and national security.

Innovation and Technology, what steps her Department is taking to diversify supply chains in strategically sensitive areas of technology like cellular internet of things modules.

It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.

Innovation and Technology, what steps her Department is taking to reduce UK reliance on technology manufactured in countries like China that pose a security risk.

The Prime Minister has emphasised that national security is the first duty of our government. Supply chain resilience and security remains a core part of this, and multiple government departments are working closely with international partners to embed resilience into critical UK and global supply chains.We take an actor‑agnostic, risk‑based approach to supply‑chain resilience. Instead of reacting to individual firms or components in isolation, we focus on the structural chokepoints and systemic dependencies that create national‑level vulnerability, regardless of where in the chain they arise.

Innovation and Technology, what assessment she has made of the potential impact of cellular IoT modules used in areas of smart tech, healthcare medical devices and other connected systems on national security.

It has not proved possible to respond to the hon. Member in the time available before Prorogation.

Innovation and Technology, what assessment her Department has made of the potential implications for research security of Chinese firms acquiring ownership or influence in university technology commercialisation.

The Government recognises the importance of safeguarding the UK’s research and innovation ecosystem, including the university spinout sector, from risks associated with foreign ownership, influence, or investment. The government will not hesitate to use our powers to protect national security wherever we identify concerns and we have a range of effective measures in place to do so. The Government is actively protecting the UK’s research and spinout ecosystem from national security risks. The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA), working with the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), supports universities and spinouts through the Secure Innovation programme, providing advice on due diligence, investment screening and managing security risks. Targeted Secure Innovation Security Reviews further help early‑stage firms identify and mitigate vulnerabilities linked to foreign engagement. The Government has powers under the National Security and Investment (NSI) Act 2021 to review and, where required, intervene in investments that may pose a risk to national security. The Government also monitors the market at all times to identify acquisitions of potential national security interest.

Innovation and Technology, what assessment her Department has made of trends in the level of Chinese investment in university spin‑out companies over the past five years.

The Government recognises the importance of safeguarding the UK’s research and innovation ecosystem, including the university spinout sector, from risks associated with foreign ownership, influence, or investment. The government will not hesitate to use our powers to protect national security wherever we identify concerns and we have a range of effective measures in place to do so. The Government is actively protecting the UK’s research and spinout ecosystem from national security risks. The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA), working with the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), supports universities and spinouts through the Secure Innovation programme, providing advice on due diligence, investment screening and managing security risks. Targeted Secure Innovation Security Reviews further help early‑stage firms identify and mitigate vulnerabilities linked to foreign engagement. The Government has powers under the National Security and Investment (NSI) Act 2021 to review and, where required, intervene in investments that may pose a risk to national security. The Government also monitors the market at all times to identify acquisitions of potential national security interest.

Innovation and Technology, whether her Department has issued guidance to universities on mitigating foreign investment risks in research-intensive spin‑outs, including investment originating from Chinese companies.

The Government recognises the importance of safeguarding the UK’s research and innovation ecosystem, including the university spinout sector, from risks associated with foreign ownership, influence, or investment. The government will not hesitate to use our powers to protect national security wherever we identify concerns and we have a range of effective measures in place to do so. The Government is actively protecting the UK’s research and spinout ecosystem from national security risks. The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA), working with the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), supports universities and spinouts through the Secure Innovation programme, providing advice on due diligence, investment screening and managing security risks. Targeted Secure Innovation Security Reviews further help early‑stage firms identify and mitigate vulnerabilities linked to foreign engagement. The Government has powers under the National Security and Investment (NSI) Act 2021 to review and, where required, intervene in investments that may pose a risk to national security. The Government also monitors the market at all times to identify acquisitions of potential national security interest.

Innovation and Technology, what assessment her Department has made with the Department for Education of the potential impact of recent instances of Chinese owned companies taking equity stakes in UK university technology research spinout companies on technology security.

The Government recognises the importance of safeguarding the UK’s research and innovation ecosystem, including the university spinout sector, from risks associated with foreign ownership, influence, or investment. The government will not hesitate to use our powers to protect national security wherever we identify concerns and we have a range of effective measures in place to do so. The Government is actively protecting the UK’s research and spinout ecosystem from national security risks. The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA), working with the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), supports universities and spinouts through the Secure Innovation programme, providing advice on due diligence, investment screening and managing security risks. Targeted Secure Innovation Security Reviews further help early‑stage firms identify and mitigate vulnerabilities linked to foreign engagement. The Government has powers under the National Security and Investment (NSI) Act 2021 to review and, where required, intervene in investments that may pose a risk to national security. The Government also monitors the market at all times to identify acquisitions of potential national security interest.

Innovation and Technology, what assessment she has made of the potential impact of Chinese companies supplying cellular modules for use in the UK’s critical national infrastructure on national security.

The Prime Minister has emphasised that national security is the first duty of our government. The Government has a broad set of tools to safeguard our Critical National Infrastructure, including The Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021, The Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018, The Procurement Act 2023 and The Product Security and Telecommunications Act 2022.The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill will also be introduced when parliamentary time allows, to deliver a step change in the UK’s national security, requiring essential and digital services in scope to have robust cyber security practices and standards. This will include empowering regulators to designate critical suppliers, ensuring that the most important suppliers to essential and digital services are subject to the regulatory regime.Any device with a cellular module that is incorporated into the network or systems of UK Critical National Infrastructure will need to comply with that network’s cyber security practices and standards and as such should have robust security controls in place. If such a device falls within scope of The Product Security and Telecommunications Act 2022 then it will also need to comply with the requirements of that Act.

Innovation and Technology, what assessment she has made of the potential impact of Chinese-manufactured smart devices in the UK's critical national infrastructure on national security.

National security is the first duty of our government.Under the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act 2022, any connected device intended to be used by consumers must meet three basic requirements: no universal default or easily guessable passwords; transparency about the minimum length of time manufacturers will provide security updates; and information on how to report security vulnerabilities directly to manufacturers.The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology launched a Call for Views on 12 May 2025 on proposals to strengthen the cyber security of enterprise connected devices. Research commissioned in 2021 by DSIT of 400 businesses showed significant gaps in device security practices with 58% of businesses not requiring security checks when purchasing connected devices. Our Call for Views included a draft Code of Practice, developed with the National Cyber Security Centre, which sets out 11 security principles for manufacturers, covering areas like secure updates, authentication, data protection, and device integrity. Feedback is being considered, and a government response will be published in due course.The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill will also be introduced when parliamentary time allows, to deliver a step change in the UK’s national security, requiring essential and digital services in scope to have robust cyber security practices and standards. This will include empowering regulators to designate critical suppliers, ensuring the most important suppliers to essential and digital services are subject to the regulatory regime.

Innovation and Technology, what discussions (a) his Department and (b) Ofcom have had with international counterparts on international satellite regulations to increase the availability of satellite broadband in the UK.

As set out in the Industrial Strategy, which closely aligns to the objectives of the UK Space Strategy and C-LEO programme, DSIT is committed to ensuring appropriate spectrum availability to support Advanced Connectivity Technologies (ACT), including satellite broadband. DSIT will continue working closely with Ofcom and international counterparts ahead of the World Radio Conference 2027, as well as collaborating with Ofcom domestically to promote efficient, innovative spectrum allocation and regulation that supports the development and deployment of ACT.

Innovation and Technology, what recent discussions he has had with his international counterparts on improvements to international satellite regulations to support the objectives of the (a) UK Space Strategy and (b) C-LEO programme.

As set out in the Industrial Strategy, which closely aligns to the objectives of the UK Space Strategy and C-LEO programme, DSIT is committed to ensuring appropriate spectrum availability to support Advanced Connectivity Technologies (ACT), including satellite broadband. DSIT will continue working closely with Ofcom and international counterparts ahead of the World Radio Conference 2027, as well as collaborating with Ofcom domestically to promote efficient, innovative spectrum allocation and regulation that supports the development and deployment of ACT.

Innovation and Technology, what discussions he has had with Ofcom on satellite regulations, in the context of the forthcoming World Radiocommunication Conference 2027.

In preparation for WRC-2027, Government officials are working with Ofcom and spectrum users to develop UK positions that reflect our national priorities, including enhancing rural connectivity, ensuring a resilient telecommunications sector, and supporting an international spectrum framework that enables the UK space and advanced connectivity technologies industries to thrive globally. DSIT Officials also engage with Ofcom on spectrum regulatory issues under discussion at the ITU, including Equivalent Power Flux Density limits, to help shape outcomes that align with the UK’s strategic interests.

Innovation and Technology, what assessment he has made of the potential impact of amending regulations on international satellites on (a) Scottish rural communities and (b) digital resilience.

In preparation for WRC-2027, Government officials are working with Ofcom and spectrum users to develop UK positions that reflect our national priorities, including enhancing rural connectivity, ensuring a resilient telecommunications sector, and supporting an international spectrum framework that enables the UK space and advanced connectivity technologies industries to thrive globally. DSIT Officials also engage with Ofcom on spectrum regulatory issues under discussion at the ITU, including Equivalent Power Flux Density limits, to help shape outcomes that align with the UK’s strategic interests.

Innovation and Technology, what assessment his Department has made of the potential impact of equivalent power flux-density regulations on (a) rural connectivity and (b) the competitiveness of UK satellite broadband services.

In preparation for WRC-2027, Government officials are working with Ofcom and spectrum users to develop UK positions that reflect our national priorities, including enhancing rural connectivity, ensuring a resilient telecommunications sector, and supporting an international spectrum framework that enables the UK space and advanced connectivity technologies industries to thrive globally. DSIT Officials also engage with Ofcom on spectrum regulatory issues under discussion at the ITU, including Equivalent Power Flux Density limits, to help shape outcomes that align with the UK’s strategic interests.