Every parliamentary written question tabled by Ben Obese-Jecty this session, with the full answer and department. Back to the MP page.
Showing 1,481–1,500 of 2,242 · Ministry of Defence
With reference to page 113 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 8 July 2025, what (a) airborne early warning and (b) control capability does the RAF contribute to NATO plans in the Euro-Atlantic.
The UK will contribute the E-7 Wedgetail aircraft once operational. The Wedgetail is an airborne early warning and control aircraft that will deliver cutting-edge capabilities and strengthen the Alliance.
With reference to recommendation 29 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what progress he has made on establishing an initial operating capability for a new Defence Uncrewed Systems Centre.
There are a series of sprints running to scope out the governance and structure of the Defence Uncrewed Systems Centre (DUSC) that will build on the work delivered to date by the Defence Uncrewed systems Design Authority (DUxDA). The outline governance proposals for the DUSC are on course, to be presented to the 3* Uncrewed Systems (UxS) Steering Group in November for endorsement.
With reference to page 120 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what the future structure of the Royal Navy’s Information Warfare Group will be.
The Royal Navy (RN) does not have a formally titled ‘Information Warfare Group’. Information Warfare (IW) is a specialisation within the Warfare profession, not a discrete unit or group. The Strategic Defence Review’s reference is therefore not to an established body, but to the Royal Navy’s IW specialisation and its ongoing transformation. The aim is to make IW more coherent, capable, and better able to deliver operational advantage and lethality to the maritime front line, without increasing workforce numbers or cost.
With reference to page 127 of the Strategic Defence Review, published on 2 June 2025, what progress he has made on maximising the intelligence capabilities of (a) Royal Navy, (b) Army, (c) RAF and (d) Space Command intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance organisations.
As set out in the Strategic Defence Review (SDR), work to establish a single defence intelligence enterprise under the banner of 'Military Intelligence Services' (MIS) is continuing. Key stakeholders across Defence have been consulted, and draft proposals have been developed. This work has been executed through the existing structures of the Intelligence Function, which has already delivered enhanced coherence across several activities. The SDR sets out the requirement for further integration under the MIS, and the enterprise continues to develop as planned. Work on the Defence Intelligence Charter is ongoing, and Defence is aiming to publish the Charter by the end of 2025 however its publication will be coordinated with a wide range of Defence Reform activity and SDR delivery and thus is subject to change with dependencies across both. The Ministry of Defence's existing intelligence capabilities, incorporating Defence Intelligence (DI), PJHQ Joint Intelligence (J2), UK Special Forces J2, and Royal Navy, Army, RAF and Space Command intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance organisations) will operate under MIS with functional leadership provided by DI.
With reference to page 109 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, whether the UK contribution to the Strategic Reserve Corps is capable of deploying anywhere in Europe.
The Strategic Reserve Corps (SRC) are Supreme Allied Command Europe’s (SACEUR) most credible warfighting land forces, useable in competition, crisis or conflict. They can be deployed anywhere in Europe in support of NATO plans and to enact SACEUR’s prudent planning options.
With reference to page 127 of the Strategic Defence Review, published on 2 June 2025, what progress he has made on improving defence intelligence capabilities to (a) better meet today’s threats and (b) optimise for warfighting.
Defence is taking forward a large range of projects and programmes aimed at improving defence intelligence capability. While we do not comment in detail on aspects of Defence capability that could be useful to adversaries, I can say that Defence is increasing the digitisation of the intelligence cycle and the information, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) process. It is also increasing digital integration of the intelligence cycle to allow the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to better meet both today’s threats and optimise our capabilities for modern war fighting. The MOD continues to focus on integration across Government and with international partners to make us better aligned to address state threats and nontraditional actors which facilitates a renewed focus on warfare capability development. We continue to invest in intelligence hubs which bring together a range of centralised intelligence capabilities, allowing for the faster, more agile passage of intelligence. Defence is also implementing the new Military Intelligence Services, which will maximise existing intelligence capabilities across the MOD.
How long HMS Ambush has not been operationally deployable.
I cannot provide specific detail regarding the operational deployability of HMS Ambush as disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of any relevant forces.
With reference to page 127 of the Strategic Defence Review, published on 2 June 2025, what progress he has made on increasing funding for into Defence Intelligence to build its (a) capability and (b) capacity.
Defence is taking forward a large range of projects and programmes aimed at improving defence intelligence capability. While we do not comment in detail on aspects of Defence capability that could be useful to adversaries, I can say that Defence is increasing the digitisation of the intelligence cycle and the information, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) process. It is also increasing digital integration of the intelligence cycle to allow the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to better meet both today’s threats and optimise our capabilities for modern war fighting. The MOD continues to focus on integration across Government and with international partners to make us better aligned to address state threats and nontraditional actors which facilitates a renewed focus on warfare capability development. We continue to invest in intelligence hubs which bring together a range of centralised intelligence capabilities, allowing for the faster, more agile passage of intelligence. Defence is also implementing the new Military Intelligence Services, which will maximise existing intelligence capabilities across the MOD.
With reference to the data tables accompanying the National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority Annual Report 2024-25, published on 11 August 2025, if he will make an assessment of the potential impact of MOD Centre arbitration funding decisions on (a) St Kilda, (b) the Falkland Islands and (c) Gibraltar in the context of the Marshall programme.
Following Ministry of Defence Centre arbitration funding decisions on (a) St Kilda, (b) the Falkland Islands and (c) Gibraltar, Air HQ will clarify the requirements and ensure that any potential impact to those locations, in the context of the Marshall programme, are mitigated.
With reference to page 23 of the National Security Strategy 2025, CP 1338, published on 24 June 2025, what steps his Department is taking to help tackle piracy through Diego Garcia.
For operational security reasons, we cannot give details about specific activities or measures. We perform a variety of maritime security tasks to counter a wide range of threats from illegal fishing, terrorism, piracy and hostile state activity. We do this in cooperation with key allies and partners in the region.
With reference to page 106 of the Strategic Defence Review, what progress he has made in developing long-range precision missiles capable of being fired from a carrier deck.
Project VANTAGE has recently been established as the maritime element of the UK’s One Way Effectors (OWE) programme, which are long-range uncrewed systems. VANTAGE is an iterative programme, with the first phase focussed on demonstrating OWE launch from a Royal Navy vessel. If successful, VANTAGE will look to exploit the demonstration in a core programme from a range of Royal Navy Vessels, including the Queen Elizabeth Class Carriers. Subsequent phases of VANTAGE will focus on spiral development of the capability, keeping pace with evolving threats and counter OWE systems, as well as the potential of a modular construct, with interchangeable launchers, effectors, munitions and sensor packages which would require minimal change to shipping to accommodate OWE.
How many Royal Air Force Poseidon P-8 aircraft have not been airworthy for more than 12 months.
There have been 2 occasions when a Poseidon MRA1 has not flown for more than 12 months due to maintenance: · ZP804 - 06/03/2024 to 04/09/2025· ZP807 - 12/07/2023 to 13/09/2024 This was mitigated through routine fleet management and maintenance planning frameworks.
Is he will set out the (a) delivery and (b) in-service date for each Type 26 frigate.
The Type 26 programme remains on track to meet all user requirements and deliver eight world-class anti-submarine warfare frigates in time to replace the anti-submarine warfare Type 23s. All ships are expected to enter service between 2028 and 2035. Type 26 Frigates will allow the Royal Navy to continue to play a leading role in the anti-submarine theatre of the North Atlantic, providing a crucial output to both NATO and the Joint Expeditionary Force.
With reference to page 127 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what progress he has made on establishing a single defence intelligence enterprise.
As set out in the Strategic Defence Review (SDR), work to establish a single defence intelligence enterprise under the banner of 'Military Intelligence Services' (MIS) is continuing. Key stakeholders across Defence have been consulted, and draft proposals have been developed. This work has been executed through the existing structures of the Intelligence Function, which has already delivered enhanced coherence across several activities. The SDR sets out the requirement for further integration under the MIS, and the enterprise continues to develop as planned. Work on the Defence Intelligence Charter is ongoing, and Defence is aiming to publish the Charter by the end of 2025 however its publication will be coordinated with a wide range of Defence Reform activity and SDR delivery and thus is subject to change with dependencies across both. The Ministry of Defence's existing intelligence capabilities, incorporating Defence Intelligence (DI), PJHQ Joint Intelligence (J2), UK Special Forces J2, and Royal Navy, Army, RAF and Space Command intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance organisations) will operate under MIS with functional leadership provided by DI.
With reference to page 128 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what progress he has made on establishing a single counter-intelligence unit by November 2025.
There has been a concerted effort of stakeholder engagement across Defence, alongside partners, to ensure the Department is ready to establish a new Defence CI Unit (DCIU) to tackle the threats we face. There are a number of internal decisions to review, and I will make an announcement on the intelligence recommendations from the Strategic Defence Review, including the DCIU by the end of the year that will strengthen our mission to be secure at home, and abroad.
With reference to page 31 of the National Security Strategy 2025, CP 1338, published on 24 June 2025, whether he made progress on enhancing the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force with France at the France-UK summit in July 2025.
The July 2025 UK-France summit saw a complete overhaul of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) into the Combined Joint Force (CJF) with significant changes to structure, focus, coordination mechanisms and leadership. This is outlined in the Lancaster House 2.0: Declaration on Modernising UK-French Defence and Security Cooperation press release of 10 July 2025.
With reference to page 36 of the National Security Strategy 2025, CP 1338, published on 24 June 2025, whether he has made recent progress on developing capability under the defence partnership with India.
Defence Partnership India was formally launched in India at Aero India in February 2025. Since its inauguration there have been advancements in a range of capability areas across the air, maritime and land domains, as can be seen through the recent announcements from the Prime Minister’s visit to India earlier this month. For example, the Indian Army will procure THALES Lightweight Multirole Missiles through a Government-to-Government arrangement between our countries and both Prime Ministers were pleased to confirm the intent to finalise the Inter-Governmental agreement on cooperation in developing maritime electric propulsion systems to Indian Naval Platforms.
With reference to page 34 of the National Security Strategy 2025, CP 1338, published on 24 June 2025, what the themes will be of each of the next three six-monthly foreign and security policy dialogues.
The Government pledged in its manifesto to pursue a new relationship with the EU to strengthen European security, support growth and reinforce NATO. The recently released Strategic Defence Review (SDR) further reiterates this commitment and recognises that international partnerships are crucial for the UK’s security and prosperity. The Government delivered on this commitment at the UK-EU Summit on 19 May where we agreed a new and ambitious Security and Defence Partnership (SDP). Implementation of the SDP is a joint effort with the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office and is progressing. Since May, my Rt Hon Friend, Defence Secretary John Healey has held discussions with the European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, where they discussed their ambition to explore the potential for enhanced UK-EU cooperation under SAFE. In October, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary will both meet with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, Kaja Kallas, for the first UK/EU foreign and security policy dialogue under the SDP. In addition, Ministers and officials from across Government have held consultations with their EU counterparts on a range of issues, including but not limited to, tackling irregular migration and hybrid threats. We continue to work with EU counterparts to strengthen dialogue and mutually beneficial cooperation across the range of issues covered in the SDP, including maritime and space security. As the Defence Secretary has previously said to this House, this Government will ensure that any UK commitment– whether financial or non-financial – will provide value for the UK taxpayer and supports our defence goals. We will continue to prioritise engagement and cooperation on the issues that are most important in helping to safeguard European security and prosperity – all in support of this government’s NATO First defence policy.
With reference to recommendation 22 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what progress he has made on strengthening Europe’s collective industrial base.
The UK recently launched its Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) which reaffirms our belief that close cooperation with our European allies is essential. We remain clear that, in order to effectively deter and defence against increased aggression, we need to strengthen our shared defence industrial base to ensure Europe is able to secure the critical capabilities needed at the necessary speed, scale and value for money. As part of these efforts, we have set out our ambition to explore the potential for enhanced cooperation through the EU’s SAFE instrument. We have also re-set our bilateral relationships with France, helping to strengthen the European complex weapons industrial base through Lancaster House 2.0, and with Germany, strengthening the land combat industrial sector, through the Trinity House agreement. While the new UK-Norway defence partnership, including the Type 26 procurement, will sustain 4.000 jobs in the UK.
With reference to page 110 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what funding he has provided for (a) attack drones, (b) surveillance drones and (c) counter-drone-systems.
Drones and counter drone systems are integral to the modern way of warfighting, exemplified in the lessons gleaned from the war in Ukraine. The Strategic Defence Review announced an increase in autonomy investment of £2 billion in this Parliament, taking total Defence investment in autonomy to circa £4 billion. The funding provided for attack drones, surveillance drones and counter-drone systems will be announced as part of the Defence Investment Plan in Autumn 2025.