Written questions by Obese-Jecty.

With reference to page 136 of his Department's document entitled Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 2 June 2025, what progress his Department has made in appointing a board member with responsibility for infrastructure to all Front Line Command boards.

Each Front-Line Command contains a director level post who represents infrastructure both on their board, and within the central Ministry of Defence senior infrastructure board. As part of defence reform, the infrastructure operating model and senior boards composition, will be examined to ensure they meet the Strategic Defence Review commitments.

With reference to page 134 of his Department's Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 2 June 2025, what progress he has made in identifying where operational infrastructure does not meet requirements under force development plans.

Defence maintains risk registers and capability assessments across all defence lines of development, this includes infrastructure. The defence investment plan will cohere current capabilities and future Strategic Defence Review deliverables, Those capabilities and deliverables will be prioritised against force plans the prioritisation of the above includes examination of both risk and capability assessments.

He will list the Ministry of Defence sites that have been released for disposal under the Defence Estate Optimisation programme since 5 July 2024 and (a) have been sold and (b) remain unsold.

All Ministry of Defence disposals, and the planned disposal dates, are already listed on the House of Commons Defence Disposal Database. This includes three Defence Estate Optimisation disposals since July 2024, and the remaining phases of a further two sites.

By when the (a) Defence Support and (b) Defence Digital will move to the National Armaments Director group.

Defence Support was integrated into the National Armament Director (NAD) Group as of 1 April 2025. Defence Digital moved into the (NAD) Group on 1 July 2025.

With reference to page 46 of the National Security Strategy 2025, published in June 2025, CP 1338, what progress he has made on increasing the ability of the UK to pool defence capital with allies.

We are working with partners on a series of potential opportunities to pool defence capital with allies, including through multilateral initiatives, aggregating defence demand, increasing European interoperability and standardisation, enhancing cooperation through the EU's Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument and exploring other international mechanisms.

With reference to page 42 of the National Security Strategy 2025, published in June 2025, CP 1338, in what ways the defence industrial base will be redefined to include (a) academia, (b) dual-use civilian-military companies, (c) financial services, (d) technologists and (e) trade unions.

The Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) (published on 8 September 2025) sets out our approach to redefining the defence industrial base. In order to adopt a whole of society approach to keeping the UK safe and boosting economic growth, our definition must reflect the deep range of partners and expertise both within our traditional defence sector and those in adjacent sectors. The DIS (section 1.3.2) therefore redefines the UK defence industrial base to include academic institutions (including dual-use civilian-military companies), UK-based companies, banks and other financial services companies, goods and services firms, technologists and technology firms, and trade unions and their members.

With reference to page 41 of the National Security Strategy 2025, published in June 2025, CP 1338, what progress he has made on (a) identifying, (b) protecting and (c) cultivating other sovereign capabilities that are foundational to the UK’s (i) industrial base and (ii) long-term competitiveness.

The Defence Industrial Strategy (published on 8 September 2025) outlines a dynamic, defence and innovation-focused industrial base, emphasising the growing importance of ensuring UK sovereignty, operational advantage, and freedom of action. It sets out the Government’s commitment to strengthen the defence sectors that are essential for national security and supply chain resilience, as well as those with the greatest economic growth potential. The detail of these sectors is set out in section 1.3.3 of the Defence Industrial Strategy. The Defence Investment Plan will set out in more detail how we will support the UK’s long-term economic growth and competitiveness through our investment choices.

With reference to page 109 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, when the enhanced recce-strike capability via Project ASGARD will be (a) operational and (b) shared across defence.

I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave him on 8 September 2025, to Question 73577, which remains extant and explains the current position for the Army’s project ASGARD. The next iteration of ASGARD, focused at Corps level operations, will be tested in Quarter 2 2026.

With reference to page 43 of the National Security Strategy 2025, published in June 2025, CP 1338, what progress he has made on building at least six new (a) munitions and (b) energetics factories.

The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) committed to invest £1.5 billion in an 'always on' pipeline for munitions and to build at least six new energetics and munitions factories in the UK this parliament. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is currently developing a plan to deliver this commitment alongside our wider Defence Industrial Strategy, delivering long-term investment to boost UK growth and generating skilled UK jobs and export opportunities. The MOD is carefully considering arrangements for 'always on' and for new energetics and munitions factories including their potential locations, and more detail will be set out in due course. Work is ongoing in respect to the new factories and further announcements will be made in due course.

With reference to page 133 of his Department's Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 2 June 2025, what progress he has made in conducting a holistic assessment of defence infrastructure requirements.

As part of the Defence Investment Plan Defence has cohered the totality of the Defence Lines of Development for current capabilities and future Strategic Defence Review deliverables. This includes infrastructure for which the front-line commands and delivery agents have made a holistic assessment. Those capabilities and deliverables will be prioritised against force plans.

What assessment he has made of the scale of the damage to Loch Long caused by radioactive water from the burst pipework at HMNB Clyde.

There has been no unsafe radioactive material released into the environment of Loch Long at any stage. The Royal Navy frequently engages with regulators who report there is no significant impact on the environment or public health. Appropriate preventative measures are in place to reduce safety risk, and the events reported reflect the rigorous monitoring that is carried out to ensure that any issues are identified and dealt with. His Majesty’s Navy Base (HMNB) Clyde complies with international best practice as recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Nuclear safety at these sites is independently overseen by the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR) and the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), who have robust powers to address concerns and recommend changes where necessary. These structures ensure that nuclear safety is treated with the seriousness that it requires.

With reference to page 109 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, which (a) units and (b) formations comprise the UK contribution to NATO’s Strategic Reserve Corps.

The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps provides the UK’s Strategic Reserve Corps Command HQ with associated Corps level enablers and subordinate formations. This includes, HQ 3 (UK) Division, HQ 1 (UK) Division, 1st Aviation Brigade, 16 Air Assault Brigade Combat Team, 7 Light Mechanised Brigade and an armoured Brigade. The Army’s modernisation programme is in the process of delivering and enabling a growth trajectory that is being communicated with NATO.

With reference to page 27 of the National Security Strategy 2025, CP 1338, published on 24 June 2025, what recent progress he has made on meeting the NATO Alliance-wide resilience objectives.

The UK sees national and collective resilience as an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and is committed to NATO Article 3, which requires Allies to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. The Government's work to deliver against NATO's seven baseline requirements for resilience is being delivered through the Cabinet Office-led Home Defence Programme, in which Defence has a leading role. As set out in the National Security Strategy and the Resilience Action Plan, this coordinates civil and military preparations across the whole of government to ensure that all sectors are prepared for and able to respond to the most catastrophic risks.

With reference to page 117 of the Strategic Defence Review, published on 2 June 2025, what progress he has made on developing Space Domain Awareness.

A key mission for UK Space Command is to develop capability to enable Space Domain Awareness (SDA) to safeguard our capability and understand potential adversary intent. UK Space Command has worked with the UK Space Agency and Met Office to establish an integrated military and civilian National Space Operations Centre (NSpOC). The NSpOC coordinates SDA capabilities, across multiple sites. UK Space Command is also the regional coordinator of the Meridian Cell as part of the Joint Commercial Operations (JCO) Initiative, which brings together partner nations, industry, commercial and civil to support global SDA collection. UK Space Command also includes command of the No 1 Space Operations Squadron, which monitor’s the space domain to protect on-orbit assets of the UK and its allies, as well as No 2 Space Warning Squadron, at RAF Fylingdales, which provides world-leading Missile Warning and Space Surveillance and Tracking to allies and partners. Most recently, a £65 million deal with CGI UK will deliver the Borealis command, control and data processing system will help the UK military and the UK Space Agency to better monitor and protect satellites, through new software which compiles and processes data from multiple sources, more quickly, to monitor space. The Government have also partnered with the United States and Australia in delivering the Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability programme, a set of three global radar sites which will enable detection, identification, and tracking of objects in deep space.

How many days HMS Daring has spent (a) at sea and (b) under repair since coming into service in 2006.

The Ministry of Defence provides Royal Navy Surface Fleet readiness data to the House of Commons Defence Committee on a six-monthly basis. The most recent release of readiness information can be found at the following website: https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/49270/documents/262458/default/ HMS Daring entered service on 31 July 2010 and has delivered effect on operations since. As with all Royal Navy vessels, during her in service period there have been periods of “planned” unavailability including DARING’s Propulsion Improvement Programme (PIP) which commenced in October 2021, completing in January 2023. Since her return to His Majesty’s Naval Base Portsmouth, HMS DARING has been re-generating and has received several capability upgrades.

With reference to page 131 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what progress he has made on establishing a Sponsored Reserve model.

The Defence Medical Services (DMS) is exploring the potential for a ‘Sponsored Reserve’ model or equivalent to increase medical Reserve numbers, with more personnel held at readiness. The DMS is engaging with industry providers to inform this work and will assess the benefits of employing Sponsored Reserves to DMS and consider options for capability and specialty-based contracts.

With reference to page 88 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 8 July 2025, what progress he has made on inviting leaders of FTSE100 companies to attend defence courses.

The Ministry of Defence, in collaboration with the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, has initiated the implementation of the commitment outlined on page 88 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025. As part of this initiative, senior executives from FTSE100 companies are being invited to participate in defence education courses, as part of an initial offer to industry partners.

With reference to page 4106 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 8 July 2025, what recent progress he has made in improving the Royal Navy’s detection capacity.

The Royal Navy is integrating existing, novel and commercial sources of data to detect activity at sea into a new Global Decision Support System (GDSS) that will transform the Royal Navy’s world leading Maritime Domain Awareness capability. These streams of activity when drawn together will deliver decision advantage to Operational Commanders, and front-line units.

How many category (a) A, (b) B, (c) C and (d) D incidents have taken place at RNAD Coulport since 5 July 2024.

I cannot provide specific detail for the events as disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of any relevant forces. However, I can assure the hon. Member that none of the events listed caused harm to the health of any member of staff or to any member of the public and none have resulted in any radiological impact to the environment. The table below shows the number of Nuclear Site Event Reports (NSERs) at Coulport recorded between for the most recent financial year. These are shown according to agreed categorisation: Nuclear Site Events- 2024, 22 April 2024 - 31 December 2024Category ACategory BCategory CCategory DBelow ScaleCoulport009251 Nuclear Site Events- 2025, 01 January 2025 - 22 April 2025Category ACategory BCategory CCategory DBelow ScaleCoulport00490 In line with Industry Good Practice and in common with other defence and civil nuclear sites, His Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde has a well-established system for raising NSERs. NSERs are raised to foster a robust safety culture that learns from experience, whether that is of equipment failures, human error, procedural failings, documentation shortcomings or near-misses.

What assessment he has made of the implications for his policies of recent Nuclear Site Event Reports on (a) equipment failures, (b) human error, (c) procedural shortcomings and (d) near-misses.

I cannot provide specific detail for the events as disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of any relevant forces. However, I can assure the hon. Member that none of the events listed caused harm to the health of any member of staff or to any member of the public and none have resulted in any radiological impact to the environment. The table below shows the number of Nuclear Site Event Reports (NSERs) at Coulport recorded between for the most recent financial year. These are shown according to agreed categorisation: Nuclear Site Events- 2024, 22 April 2024 - 31 December 2024Category ACategory BCategory CCategory DBelow ScaleCoulport009251 Nuclear Site Events- 2025, 01 January 2025 - 22 April 2025Category ACategory BCategory CCategory DBelow ScaleCoulport00490 In line with Industry Good Practice and in common with other defence and civil nuclear sites, His Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde has a well-established system for raising NSERs. NSERs are raised to foster a robust safety culture that learns from experience, whether that is of equipment failures, human error, procedural failings, documentation shortcomings or near-misses.