Written questions by Obese-Jecty.

What assessment he has made of the potential merits of (a) expanding the Defence Employer Recognition Scheme and (b) replicating that scheme to cover emergency services personnel.

The Defence Employer Recognition Scheme (ERS) encourages employers to pledge, demonstrate or advocate support to defence and the Armed Forces community, and align their values with the Armed Forces Covenant. ERS now comprises 8,000+ employers which represents an increase of approximately 550 employers from last year. With the scheme performing well, there are no plans to expand it. As emergency services personnel are not within the remit of the Secretary of State for Defence, there are no plans to replicate the scheme to cover them.

With reference to page 131 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, updated 8 July 2025, what progress he made in improving the (a) physical and (b) digital infrastructure of Defence Medical Services.

The Defence Investment Plan will set out how the Ministry of Defence (MOD) will deliver the vision of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) over the next 10 years, including confirming the funding available to improve the physical and digital infrastructure of Defence Medical Services, together with medical evacuation and medical stockpiles. The SDR commits the MOD to establish a ten-year physical infrastructure plan for Defence medical by February 2026, including options for medical infrastructure drawing on the NHS and private finance.

What the full scope is of Project Cortisone.

The vision for Programme CORTISONE is to deliver a sustainable, integrated, cohesive and enduring information capability to support the delivery of evidence-based medical and dental health and healthcare outputs. The scope of Programme CORTISONE to March 2028 is outlined below: An electronic healthcare record (EHR) capability for Primary healthcare, dentistry, intermediate care and mental health, in fixed overseas locations (FOSL) and deployed (air, land and sea) settingAn occupational health application capabilityA high-level design and ecosystem for interoperability within MOD and with NHS England, devolved nations and NATOProvision of data management for flat files, images and documentationProvision for data management and exploitation to support Defence Medical Services (DMS) and Defence Statistics across the DMS and operational data spaceLaboratory Information Management capability in the deployed settingPre-hospital and emergency, trauma and evacuation EHR capabilityReach back consultations for deployed operationsTriaging and remote consultations for FOSL

With reference to page 121 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what rank commands the National Cyber Force.

As announced in the press release dated 16 October 2023, The National Cyber Force is commanded by a 2 star Military Officer, or a Civil Servant at SCS2 level. Currently, Commander National Cyber Force is Air Vice-Marshal Tim Neal-Hopes OBE.

What progress his Department has made in completing the Power Improvement Project refit of the Royal Navy Type 45 fleet.

I refer the hon. Member to the answer given by my noble Friend, the Minister of State in the Ministry of Defence (Lord Coaker), on 20 January 2025 to Question number HL3859 in the House of Lords: Completing the Type 45 Power Improvement Project (PIP) work is dependent on the availability of ships to undertake the upgrade, balanced against the Royal Navy’s (RN) current and future operational commitments. PIP conversions have been aligned to the routine Class Upkeep cycle, which has been optimised where feasible to accelerate delivery and increase availability. This has enabled an increase in the number of ships undergoing PIP Upkeep in parallel at HM Naval Base Portsmouth, where historically there was only a single Type 45 in Upkeep at any one time. Class availability is now maximised to ensure that the RN has been able to fulfil all its operational commitments.

With reference to recommendation 38 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 8 July 2025, what progress he has made in delivering an integrated frigate force comprising of (a) crewed, (b) uncrewed and (c) autonomous platforms via a new partnership with industry.

The Royal Navy has made significant early progress in delivering an integrated frigate force comprising crewed, uncrewed, and autonomous platforms, in line with Recommendation 38 of SDR 25. This initiative is central to our future Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability and is being pursued through a new, dynamic partnership with industry. The Type-26 Frigate remains the cornerstone of the RN’s crewed anti-submarine warfare capability plan and will be at the heart of the future fleet. The Atlantic Bastion programme operates with T26 at its centre and will secure the North Atlantic against subsurface threats for the UK and NATO. We have initiated trials of several uncrewed surface and sub-surface systems with the intent that uncrewed systems will integrate with Type 26 and other fleet assets.

With reference to page 127 of the Strategic Defence Review, published on 2 June 2025, what progress he has made on tackling barriers to interoperability between defence and the UK Intelligence Community.

Collaboration with partners across Government, including the UK Intelligence Community (UKIC), is essential to Defence outputs-both in routine activity and on operations. The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) sets a clear ambition to strengthen collaboration and interoperability, enabling delivery of the Integrated Force and the Digital Targeting Web. Defence is already interoperable with Government partners and capable of sharing data and intelligence. However, there are further opportunities to improve. To address this, multiple programmes are ongoing which aim to enhance interoperability and remove barriers to information sharing. These initiatives vary in maturity but are already being adopted across the MOD and UKIC and delivering measurable benefits.Additional work is underway to modernise data-handling approaches across National Security, leveraging technological advances to enable machine-speed sharing where appropriate. Combined with the MOD's broader technology modernisation programmes, these efforts will deliver improved capability, interoperability, and resilience across Defence and Government partners.

With reference to recommendation 32 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 8 July 2025, which Departments are involved in the implementation of the nuclear deterrent.

I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave on 7 September 2025 to Question 70755 to the hon. Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge).

With reference to page 11 of the National Security Strategy 2025, CP 1338, published on 24 June 2025, what recent steps he has taken to prioritise NATO in defence planning.

In line with the Strategic Defence Review, the UK has put NATO at the heart of our force development. This is evidenced by UK operational and force design for our Euro-Atlantic security being driven by NATO's plans and capability targets, as set through NATO's Defence Planning Process.

With reference to page 106 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, published on 8 July 2025, when the multi-role ocean survey ship will be deployed to counter threats to critical undersea infrastructure.

The Royal Navy is acting under the direction provided in the Strategic Defence Review 2025 to lead and co-ordinate work to protect critical undersea infrastructure. This includes new investment capability options for platforms and sensor suites to counter threats. Options for new investment to support critical undersea infrastructure protection are in the Royal Navy’s submission into the Defence Investment Plan, which will report in due course.

With reference to page 34 of the National Security Strategy 2025, CP 1338, published on 24 June 2025, what recent progress he has made on strengthening the interoperability of carrier strike groups with Italy.

Italy is an important partner of the United Kingdom, demonstrated in the context of Carrier Strike, through our memberships of NATO, the F-35 Lightning II programme, and the European Carrier Group Interoperability Initiative (ECGII). Interoperability has been strengthened during the ongoing deployment of the UK Carrier Strike Group (CSG) on Operation HIGHMAST, during which HMS PRINCE OF WALES worked alongside the Italian Navy’s ITS CAVOUR CSG in the Mediterranean Sea in May 2025. Combined training activity emphasised UK-Italian CSG interoperability and integration across all domains, including UK and Italian F-35B jets flying sorties by day and night, and the opportunity for Italian Navy F-35Bs to land on, and launch from, HMS PRINCE OF WALES. Further combined training opportunities to strengthen UK-Italian CSG interoperability are planned during the UK CSG’s return passage later this year.

With reference to page 89 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what additional resource the Royal Navy will be granted to take a new (a) leading and (b) coordinating role in securing undersea infrastructure.

The Royal Navy is acting under the direction provided in the Strategic Defence Review 2025 to lead and co-ordinate work to protect critical undersea infrastructure. This includes new investment capability options for platforms and sensor suites to counter threats. Options for new investment to support critical undersea infrastructure protection are in the Royal Navy’s submission into the Defence Investment Plan, which will report in due course.

With reference to page 78 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what progress he has made on developing a single Integrated Global Defence Network.

The Integrated Global Defence Network (IGDN) has completed the first phase of its development by merging the Directorate of Overseas Bases and the Global Defence Network of Defence Attachés and Advisors into the IGDN HQ, dually lead by a 2 star military director and an SCS2 civilian director, with 3 star military oversight. The network will now continue through to the second phase of its development through a series of projects, including the SDR-directed Network Review of Defence’s global footprint, which will include engagement with the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office.

With reference to page 90 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what progress he has made on devising a strategy for the protection of critical national infrastructure by the (a) MOD Guard Service and (b) UK intelligence community.

The protection of Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) is an important pillar of work in the Home Defence Programme. This work is led by the Cabinet Office and aims to develop a cross-Government plan to strengthen the nation’s security, preparedness, and resilience in order to deter threats to and defend the UK homeland. Defence continues to play a significant contributory role with partners and the private sector to protect CNI from a full spectrum of threats. The UK already has an existing strategy for protecting CNI which includes a partnership between intelligence agencies, and components of the UK Intelligence Community (UKIC), such as the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). The Ministry of Defence (MOD) Guard Service (MGS) provides unarmed security services for MOD sites. The MGS are just one of the MOD policing and guarding organisations that could contribute to the protection of CNI under the cross-Government plan.

With reference to page 90 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what progress he has made on establishing a programme of exercises to test plans for response to an armed attack on (a) the UK and (b) NATO allies.

The Government regularly performs exercises on its ability to respond to an armed attack on the United Kingdom and our NATO Allies. The Ministry of Defence works closely with the Cabinet Office and the Home Office to test and strengthen national resilience and home defence arrangements. These exercises enhance coordination between the Armed Forces, civil authorities and emergency services, ensuring the UK remains prepared to respond swiftly and effectively to any armed threat. In addition, NATO has an extensive set of plans outlining how to respond to an armed attack on any Ally, including the UK. These exercises enhance Allied interoperability, validate defence and deterrence strategies, and reinforce the credibility of NATO's collective defence posture. The largest of these exercises is the STEADFAST series, NATO's most extensive and comprehensive exercise programme. Last year, Exercise STEADFAST DEFENDER 2024, the largest NATO exercise since the Cold War, involved around 20,000 UK personnel.

Under what agreement the UK operates the Naval Support Facility in Bahrain.

The Naval Support Facility in Bahrain operates under an arrangement reached with the Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain in 2014.

With reference to page 120 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what proportion of the National Cyber Force’s capability is dedicated to (a) defence and (b) other national security priorities.

We do not routinely comment on operational matters or the operational prioritisation of the National Cyber Force due to reasons of national security.

With reference to page 109 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what progress he has made on establishing an enhanced Standing Joint Command.

Since the publication of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR), the Standing Joint Command (SJC) has undertaken a series of workstreams to begin delivery against SDR intent. This includes the publication of a new operational framework, the delivery of a series of table-top exercise with Government partners and a review of future workforce requirements. The work to establish an enhanced SJC remains ongoing but has already made tangible progress.

With reference to page 110 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what progress he has made on ensuring the Army’s contribution has kept pace with innovation in electromagnetic warfare.

For reasons of safeguarding operational security, I am unable to provide details relating to electromagnetic warfare.

With reference to page 120 of the Strategic Defence Review 2025, what change is required within the CyberEM domain to achieve a tech-enabled Integrated Force.

The aim to achieve a tech-enabled Integrated Force was a central tenet of the SDR and will require change across all domains. The Military Strategic Headquarters (MSHQ) will drive the change, with the National Armaments Director Group (NADG) responsible for delivering a strong and secure digital backbone. Cyber and Specialist Operations Command (CSOC) will continue to be the 4 star Command responsible for the protection of Defence networks, platforms and infrastructure, in partnership with the Single Services, industry and partners across government. The newly established 2 star Defence Cyber and Electromagnetic Force, as part of CSOC, will ensure the authorities are in place to respond rapidly to both threats and opportunities in the CyberEM domain.