The UK's trade sanctions regime

Status / emerging findings

• Government admits no precise data on percentage of strategic export control items subject to licensing; will introduce new end-use control legislation to close gaps
• 99.6% of Russian imports stopped, but significant diversion routes remain: fish products routed through China, oil derivatives refined abroad then re-imported to UK
• PJSC Transneft (controls 80% of Russian oil pipelines) only sanctioned in ninth package after four years, delayed by market-stability concerns rather than operational oversight
• 12 high-risk diversion jurisdictions identified (Armenia, Kazakhstan, and others), but enforcement strategy reactive rather than preventive
• Tension surfaced between government's cautious, internationally-coordinated pace and MPs' demands for unilateral, faster action

Why it matters

The UK's ability to degrade Russia's war economy depends on closing loopholes that currently allow billions in sanctioned goods and oil derivatives to reach Russian markets via third countries.

Tone arc

Started procedural with government defending incremental strategy; turned sharply adversarial after exposure of enforcement data gaps and four-year delays on major assets like Transneft; MPs challenged whether coordination-driven caution prioritises market stability over sanctions effectiveness.

Key witnesses

Sir Chris Bryant MP (Minister for Economic Security, Arms and Export Controls), Anna Deibel-Jung, Joanne Cheetham, Esther Blythe, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office officials