The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Dr Rosena Allin-Khan, Dame Siobhain McDonagh, David Mundell, † Sir Desmond Swayne

† Baker, Alex (Aldershot) (Lab)

† Chowns, Dr Ellie (North Herefordshire) (Green)

Cocking, Lewis (Broxbourne) (Con)

† Costigan, Deirdre (Ealing Southall) (Lab)

† Dixon, Samantha (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government)

† Franklin, Zöe (Guildford) (LD)

† Hatton, Lloyd (South Dorset) (Lab)

† Holmes, Paul (Hamble Valley) (Con)

† Joseph, Sojan (Ashford) (Lab)

Juss, Warinder (Wolverhampton West) (Lab)

† Kyrke-Smith, Laura (Aylesbury) (Lab)

† Lewin, Andrew (Welwyn Hatfield) (Lab)

† Murray, Katrina (Cumbernauld and Kirkintilloch) (Lab)

† Rushworth, Sam (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)

† Simmonds, David (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)

† Smart, Lisa (Hazel Grove) (LD)

† Yemm, Steve (Mansfield) (Lab)

Kevin Candy, Lucinda Maer, Ben Sneddon, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Thursday 16 April 2026

(Afternoon)

[Sir Desmond Swayne in the Chair]

Representation of the People Bill

New Clause 16

Annual statements on foreign donation risks and independent investigations

“(1) Part 4 of PPERA 2000 (control of donations to registered parties and their members etc) is amended as follows.

(2) After section 66 (Declaration by treasurer in donation report) insert—

‘66A Annual statement on mitigation of foreign donation risks

(1) The treasurer of a registered party must, in respect of each calendar year, prepare a statement setting out the steps taken by the party to mitigate risks relating to donations originating from a foreign nation.

(2) The statement must be delivered to the Commission alongside the party's statement of accounts for that year.

66B Annual independent investigation of donations by foreign-owned UK entities

(1) A registered party must, in respect of each calendar year, arrange for an independent investigation to be conducted into any donations received by the party from a foreign-owned UK entity.

(2) A report of the independent investigation must be submitted to the Commission by the treasurer of the party within six months of the end of the calendar year to which it relates.

(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about—

(a) the appointment and qualifications of an independent investigator for the purposes of this section;

(b) the definition of a “foreign-owned UK entity”; and

(c) the required contents of the investigation report.

(4) Regulations under subsection (3) are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.’”—(Zöe Franklin.)

This new clause requires registered political parties to produce an annual statement detailing how they have mitigated risks relating to donations from foreign nations. It also requires parties to commission an annual independent investigation into donations they receive from foreign-owned UK entities, with the findings submitted to the Electoral Commission.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 17

Payments from foreign state broadcasters to politicians and candidates

“(1) Schedule 7 to PPERA 2000 (control of donations to individuals and members associations) is amended as set out in subsection (2).

(2) After paragraph 6 insert—

‘Prohibition on payments from foreign state broadcasters

6A (1) A regulated donor must not accept any payment, remuneration or other financial benefit, whether or not on commercial terms, from a prescribed foreign state broadcaster.

(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations proscribe a foreign state broadcaster for the purposes of this paragraph where the Secretary of State considers the broadcaster is acting on behalf of, or producing propaganda for, a foreign power.

(3) For the purposes of this paragraph, a payment or benefit includes, but is not limited to, remuneration for appearing on, hosting, or contributing to broadcasts or programmes.’

(3) Schedule 1 to RPA 1983 (parliamentary elections rules) is amended as set out in subsection (4).

(4) After rule 8 (consent to nomination) insert—

‘Declaration of past earnings from foreign state broadcasters

8A (1) A person is not validly nominated unless the person makes a declaration stating whether they have received any past or current earnings, payments or benefits from a foreign state broadcaster prescribed under paragraph 6A of Schedule 7 to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.

(2) The declaration must be—

(a) in the prescribed form,

(b) signed by the person, and

(c) delivered at the place and within the time for the delivery of nomination papers.’”—(Zöe Franklin.)

This new clause prohibits politicians (regulated donors) from receiving any payment from prescribed foreign state broadcasters. It also amends the parliamentary election rules to require candidates (including incumbent MPs) to formally declare any past earnings from these entities in order to be validly nominated to stand for election.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 19

Repeal of voter identification requirements

“(1) In the Elections Act 2022 omit section 1 (voter identification).

(2) In the Elections Act 2022 omit Schedule 1.

(3) Schedule 1 to RPA 1983 (parliamentary elections rules) is amended as follows.

(4) In rule 37 (voting procedure), omit paragraphs (1A) to (1G).”—(Zöe Franklin.)

This new clause repeals the provisions of the Elections Act 2022 that introduced the requirement for voters in Great Britain to produce photographic identification at polling stations. It is linked to Amendment 22.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 22

Report on electoral online harms

“(1) Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Electoral Commission must publish a report on the prevention of electoral online harms.

(2) For the purposes of this section, ‘electoral online harms’ includes —

(a) abuse and harassment of or threats directed towards elected representatives, candidates, party campaigners and election officials, or

(b) incitement to violence against any such individuals,

but not does not include mockery or insult, save where it forms part of a campaign of harassment.

(3) Any report published under subsection (1) must contain—

(a) an assessment of the risks of electoral online harms, and

(b) proposals to put in place systems to mitigate those risks including through amendment of the Online Safety Act 2023.

(4) Before publishing its report under subsection (1) the Electoral Commission must consult—

(a) OFCOM, and

(b) the National Police Chiefs Council.”—(Dr Chowns.)

This new clause would require the Electoral Commission to publish a report containing an assessment of the risks of online electoral harms, and proposals to put in place systems to mitigate those risks.

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 23, in clause 80, page 100, line 35, at end insert— “(ha) Section (Report on electoral online harms)”.

I will briefly speak to the new clause, because it is important, and has clearly garnered support from a large number of Government MPs—indeed, the second signatory is the Chair of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah). The new clause is quite reasonable; it simply would require the Electoral Commission to publish a report setting out its assessment of the risk of electoral online harms. As we have already discussed in Committee, there is clear evidence of electoral online harms, so it would be useful to ask the Electoral Commission to produce such a report to set the risks out clearly and the measures it intends to take to address them. I will not press the new clause to a vote. I am open as to whether this necessarily needs to be in statute or simply in Government guidance, but it is an important element of improving the safeguards against online harms in our electoral system. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

I thank the hon. Member for North Herefordshire for her comments. We have seen this over the last couple of elections in ’19 and ’24, and we are going to see it again in local and national elections: our regulatory framework is not keeping pace. As far as I am aware, there is no electoral framework—I would love to hear from the Minister on this—for anyone to systematically map the risks posed by deepfakes and associated online issues. Voters deserve to make free, informed choices, not tainted by some of the things that are seen online. I hope that the Government will take this forward.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. The Government do not believe that the new clause is the right or effective way to address these concerns, although we acknowledge the seriousness of the issue that our hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes Central (Emily Darlington) is raising. The new clause would risk blurring regulatory boundaries between two rightly independent regulators. The Electoral Commission and Ofcom have distinct statutory roles, with Ofcom responsible for regulation and enforcement of online safety duties on services. Requiring the Electoral Commission to make proposals for amending the Online Safety Act 2023 would cut across that, and risk duplication in an area where clarity is essential. Secondly, the Electoral Commission already has the power under section 6 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 to produce and publish reports on matters relating to elections where it considers that appropriate. We therefore do not consider it necessary or proportionate to mandate a further statutory report. I would also note the risk of duplication with the recent Speaker’s Conference report, which examined these issues and included evidence from the Electoral Commission. The Government welcomed the conference’s findings, and our response was published on 5 March. Under the Online Safety Act, Ofcom is the independent regulator responsible for overseeing the risk-based framework, including publishing codes of practice and requiring the largest services to provide transparency reports about their systems and processes for addressing online harms. That framework provides an appropriate basis for regulatory oversight and platform accountability. The Online Safety Act also places clear duties on services that host user-generated content to tackle illegal content online, including illegal abuse, threats and incitement of violence. Ofcom is now implementing and enforcing that framework, and the Government will work closely with Ofcom, the Electoral Commission and law enforcement through existing arrangements. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for North Herefordshire to withdraw the new clause.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. Clause, by leave, withdrawn. New Clause 24 Repository of digital political advertising “(1) The Elections Act 2022 is amended as set out in subsection (2). (2) After section 61 insert— ‘Part 6A Repository of digital political advertising 61A. Establishing a repository of digital political advertising (1) The Secretary of State must, by regulations, make provision to require the Electoral Commission to establish a repository of paid-for digital political advertising. (2) Any regulations made under subsection (1) must— (a) provide for the repository of political advertising to be publicly accessible; (b) specify that a provider of a Category 1 service within the meaning of the Online Safety Act 2023 must ensure that prescribed information relating to such advertising is submitted to the repository as soon as reasonably practicable, and, in any event, within 72 hours; (c) set out the types of information to be prescribed; and (d) provide for material in the repository to be transferred to the National Archives for preservation after a certain period. (3) Before making any regulations that make provision for the matters under subsection 2(c), the Secretary of State must consult— (a) the Electoral Commission; (b) the Information Commissioner’s Office; and (c) OFCOM. (4) Any regulations made under subsection (1) must be laid before and agreed by both Houses of Parliament.’” —(Paul Holmes.) This new clause requires the Secretary of State to bring forward regulations to require the Electoral Commission to establish a publicly available repository of political advertising. Brought up, and read the First time. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 26

Critical election incident protocol

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within twelve months of the passing of this Act, publish and lay before both Houses of Parliament, a Critical Election Incident Protocol (‘the Protocol’) for the purpose of responding to incidents that present a significant risk to the integrity, security or public confidence of elections.

(2) For the purposes of this section, a ‘Critical Election Incident’ means any event, threat or activity that poses a substantial risk to—

(a) the integrity, security or administration of an election;

(b) the ability of the public to freely participate in the electoral process; or

(c) public confidence in the fairness or legitimacy of an election.

(3) Before publishing the Protocol, the Secretary must consult the following on its contents —

(a) relevant civil society organisations,

(b) relevant experts, and

(c) relevant regulators.

(4) Any Protocol published under subsection (1) must include—

(a) the establishment of an oversight body comprised of such senior ministers and officials as the Secretary of State considers appropriate;

(b) the establishment of an advisory body of civil society and experts with relevant expertise as the Secretary of State considers appropriate;

(c) criteria by which Critical Election Incidents are identified and the Protocol is triggered;

(d) categories of severity of Critical Election Incidents based on their severity; and

(e) details of differentiated responses to Critical Election Incidents for each of the categories identified under subsection (d) which would be necessary and proportionate.

(5) Any Protocol published under subsection (1) must be compatible with the United Kingdom’s human rights obligations including but not limited to the right to freedom of expression under article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

(6) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report on the operation of the Protocol—

(a) one year after the publication of the Protocol under section (1) and annually thereafter; and

(b) within three months of any occasion on which the Protocol has been used.

(7) Any report published under subsection (5) must include—

(a) a description of activities undertaken in under the Protocol, subject to any necessary limitations relating to national security or ongoing investigations;

(b) information about consultation with the established oversight and advisory bodies;

(c) an assessment of the impact of the Protocol on human rights and democratic participation.

(8) Any report produced under subsection (1) must be sent to the Housing and Local Government Committee of the House of Commons.

(9) In this section, references to Housing and Local Government Committee shall—

(a) if the name of that Committee is changed, be taken (subject to paragraph (b)) to be references to the Committee by its new name;

(b) if the functions of that Committee at the passing of this Act with respect to matters relating to Protocol become functions of a different committee of the House of Commons, be taken to be references to the committee by whom the functions for the time being exercisable.”—(Dr Chowns.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The new clause would require the Government to establish and publish a transparent protocol for responding to election information incidents and place that protocol on a statutory footing. That is important, because there is currently no clear, publicly accountable mechanism in the UK for informing voters about serious information incidents during election periods, such as co-ordinated disinformation campaigns or foreign interference. Although there may be internal processes, under the radar, in Government, those are not transparent, they lack clear triggers for action and they are not subject to democratic oversight. Their absence creates uncertainty about how and when the public would be notified if there were such attacks or threats to the integrity of an election. That potentially undermines trust, and leaves voters without information and potentially exposed to unchallenged misinformation at critical moments during an election. We can all recognise that that is a growing threat. The new clause would address that gap. It would establish a clear, publicly accessible protocol that would set out how, why and when election information incidents would be identified, assessed and communicated to the general public. The rise of disinformation has shown that co-ordinated online campaigns, bot campaigns and so forth can spread very rapidly during election periods, and can influence public perception before corrective action is taken. I will not name particular electoral processes, but we can all call examples to mind. It is a problem that we lack a transparent framework for dealing with public notification when such incidents occur. Other democracies have taken steps in this regard; most notably, Canada has already introduced a formal mechanism to respond to these risks. That highlights the gap in the UK. We should look at international best practice on this issue. We should be trying to stay ahead of—or at least catch up with—the threats that our democracy faces, as fast as possible. The new clause is clearly directly related to the Bill, so I would welcome the Minister’s response. To clarify, I do not intend to press it to a vote—I should have mentioned that it was tabled by the hon. Member for Milton Keynes Central—but I move it because it raises an important issue that is crucial to the safety of our elections.

These are important issues, and I thank the hon. Member for raising them. Earlier today, I described the work of the Joint Elections Security and Preparedness Unit, which exists as an enduring function to protect our elections and our democracy; that includes monitoring for mis and disinformation. The JESP election cell brings together Whitehall Departments, law enforcement and intelligence agencies as well as key stakeholders to agree monitoring thresholds and response options where necessary. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology is a core member of JESP’s election cell, as is the Electoral Commission.

At this stage, the Government have no plans to introduce a critical incident protocol for the purpose of responding to incidents that represent a significant threat to the integrity and security of, and public confidence in, elections. Any gains in public confidence and informed debate achieved through greater transparency on how the Government responds to information incidents must be balanced with national security concerns. Broad knowledge about internal protocols, escalation thresholds, command structures or the bodies involved in responding to threats to the integrity of our electoral processes, including through information threats, could expose or enable insights into the UK’s security posture, capabilities and response mechanisms. That could assist hostile actors in identifying vulnerabilities or understanding how the Government would react in specific scenarios, thereby creating a real possibility of undermining national security and muting the effectiveness of our response. I am certain that that is absolutely not the intention of my hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes Central.

Where we judge that the public should be informed, we will take clear action to do so. The work of JESP and the wider Government response, as well as law enforcement and intelligence agencies and the Electoral Commission, makes sure and will continue to make sure that elections in this country remain free, fair and secure.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. Clause, by leave, withdrawn. New Clause 30 Cap on political donations “(1) Part 4 of PPERA 2000 (control of donations to registered parties and their members etc) is amended as follows. (2) After section 54B (Declaration as to whether residence etc condition satisfied) insert— ‘54C Power to set cap on political donations (1) A registered party must not accept a donation from a person if the value of donations from that person during the course of that calendar year exceeds the maximum amount specified by regulations made under subsection (3). (2) Where a registered party receives a donation which would cause the limit for the purposes of subsection (1) to be exceeded, the amount by which the limit is exceeded is to be treated for the purposes of this Act as a donation received from a person who is not a permissible donor. (3) The Secretary of State must by regulations specify the donation limit for the purposes of subsection (1) within three months of the day on which this act is passed. (4) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament. (5) Before laying a draft statutory instrument containing regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must commission an independent review of the level of the cap on political donations. (6) The review must consider and make recommendations on the level of the cap in light of— (a) the prevailing economic conditions; (b) the effect of the cap on democratic participation and political competition; and (c) any other matters the Secretary of State considers relevant. (7) The Secretary of State must appoint an independent person or panel with relevant experience to conduct the review. (8) The person or panel appointed under subsection (7) must— (a) consult the Electoral Commission and any other persons the person or panel considers relevant; and (b) prepare and publish a report of its findings. (9) The Secretary of State must lay the report under subsection (9)(b) before both Houses of Parliament as soon as practicable after receiving it. (10) No later than three years after a report under subsection (10) has been laid the Secretary of State must commission a new review under subsection (5) for the purposes of determining whether the cap under subsection (1) should be amended.’”— (Zöe Franklin.) This new clause requires the Secretary of State to set an annual cap on permissible political donations from a person, following an independent review to be conduct every three years. Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 54—Proposals for a Royal Commission on political donations and campaign expenditure— “(1) Within three months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish proposals for the establishment of a Royal Commission to consider— (a) the merits of a cap on political donations, and the level at which such a cap should be set, and (b) the effectiveness of existing limits on campaign expenditure, including the appropriateness of the time period during which those limits apply. (2) Proposals published under this section must include proposals for the Royal Commission’s— (a) terms of reference, (b) membership, and (c) funding.” This new clause requires the Secretary of State to publish proposals for a Royal Commission to consider a cap on political donations and the effectiveness of existing campaign expenditure limits. New clause 58—Review of how limits on campaign expenditure could apply on annual basis— “(1) The Electoral Commission must conduct a review of how campaign expenditure limits could apply on an annual basis for political parties, candidates and third parties. (2) The review must consider how annual campaign expenditure limits could— (a) promote transparency and fairness in elections; (b) limit the risk of foreign interference in elections; and (c) be implemented in a proportionate manner without undue impact on political parties, candidates and third parties. (3) In conducting the review, the Electoral Commission must consult the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission and the Ethics and Integrity Commission. (4) The Electoral Commission must publish a report of its findings no later than 6 months after the day on which this Act is passed. (5) The Secretary of State must, within 6 months of the publication of the report, lay before both Houses of Parliament, a response to the report. (6) The response to the report must contain proposals informed by the Electoral Commission’s report.” This new clause would require the Electoral Commission to conduct a review of how campaign expenditure limits could apply on an annual basis for political parties, candidates and third parties, and for the Government to respond to the report and bring forward proposals based on the Electoral Commission’s findings. New clause 65—National limits on campaign expenditure by political parties— “(1) PPERA 2000 is amended as follows. (2) In paragraph 3 of Schedule 9 (parliamentary general elections)— (a) in sub-paragraph (2), for ‘£54,010’ substitute ‘£37,600’; (b) in sub-paragraph (3)(a), for ‘£1,458,440’ substitute ‘£1,015,100’; (c) in sub-paragraph (3)(b), for ‘£216,060’ substitute ‘£150,390’; (d) in sub-paragraph (3)(c), for ‘£108,030’ substitute ‘£75,200’; (e) in sub-paragraph (4), for ‘£54,010’ substitute ‘£37,600’. (3) In paragraph 2(1) (d) of Schedule 8 (exclusions), after ‘the party’ insert ‘other than those who are employed wholly or mainly for the purpose of an election campaign.’” This new clause lowers the national campaign spending limits for political parties and includes campaign staff costs within their scope.

The new clause, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Manuela Perteghella), goes to the heart of this basic question: who does our democracy serve—voters or those with the deepest pockets? It would introduce a cap on political donations from any one individual or entity each year, with that cap set following independent review and approved by Parliament. It would ensure that the level is kept under regular review so that it remains appropriate over time. At present, there is no upper limit on political donations in the UK, which is a striking gap in our system that allows vast sums to be given by a single donor, creating the risk of disproportionate influence by an individual. Already, too many people across the UK look at our politics and see a system that appears to be tilted towards those with wealth and access. They question whether decisions are made in the public interest, or in the interests of those who can afford to make the largest contributions. That is unsustainable, and it undermines our democracy. My hon. Friend wishes to be clear that the new clause is not about stopping people supporting political parties; it is about drawing a reasonable line to ensure that no individual or organisation can dominate political funding simply because of the scale of their resources. There is also a clear issue with integrity and security. While there are rules on permissible donors, there remain loopholes that allow money to be routed through UK-registered companies and complex structures, which creates a real risk of foreign or opaque influence on our politics. A cap alone would not resolve that problem, but it would significantly limit its scale. The new clause seeks to take a careful, balanced approach to the issue. It does not impose an arbitrary figure, but instead requires an independent, evidence-based review to recommend the level of the cap, considering economic considerations, democratic participation and political competition. It would place that decision firmly within a transparent and accountable process. Ultimately, elections should be decided by voters persuaded by the strength of arguments, the quality of ideas and the credibility of leadership—I do not think that any member of the Committee would disagree with that. They should not be about the scale of financial backing. If we allow money to operate without meaningful limits, we undermine the fundamental democratic principle that every voice should carry equal weight. I do not wish to press the new clause to a vote, but I would like to hear the Minister’s thoughts on it. With your permission, Sir Desmond, I will also speak to new clause 54, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Hazel Grove. The Committee has established that, unfortunately, public trust in political funding—and sometimes in democracy itself—is at a very low point. With donations in the millions from a handful of wealthy individuals, spending wars between parties and loopholes that undermine the spirit of the rules, there is a public perception that politics can be bought and that elections can be won through the donations of the few. I think we would all agree that that is not a place we want to be. New clause 54 calls for a royal commission to look at the evidence properly and make recommendations, which would allow for a level of independence and cross-party process. The current system allows single donors to give millions to a party, which raises legitimate questions about whose interests are being served. There are limited financial provisions on long campaigns; significant money is spent well before the official period begins and the limits do not catch that. The Liberal Democrats have long called for greater transparency in political spending; the real-time disclosure of donations, a cap on political donations and annual expenditure limits sits squarely within that agenda.

I will speak to new clauses 30 and 54, tabled by the hon. Members for Stratford-on-Avon and for Hazel Grove respectively, which both deal with the important topic of a cap on donations. I will then speak to new clauses 58 in my name and new clause 65 in the name of the right hon. Member for Oxford East (Anneliese Dodds), which both deal with limits on campaign expenditure, as the two topics are closely related. First, as the hon. Member for Guildford just set out, there is a very strong case for having a cap on political donations, which the Government have recognised to some extent in promising to take forward the Rycroft recommendations on instituting a cap on donations from British citizens living abroad. However, on the broader question of donations from any British voter, the issue of the total amount of donations, and the number of very large donations, has significantly increased over time. The public widely recognise the extent to which political parties—some, in particular—are reliant on funds contributed by a small handful of very wealthy donors, and it is a rightly a cause for concern for a large majority of them. As the public understand, that carries the risk that individuals with very deep pockets can potentially have a disproportionate influence on our politics. Back in 2011, the Committee on Standards in Public Life produced a report addressing precisely this risk, the problem of increased reliance on significant donations, and recommended a donations cap. That was 15 years ago. The problem has only become more and more significant since then, as we have seen just within the last year with several donations in the many millions of pounds to one political party. This is clearly a problem and a risk to our politics—and a risk that has been recognised worldwide. As I understand it, about half of countries globally and well over two thirds of European countries impose some sort of limit on donations. The UK was one of I think 22 signatories to a UN resolution in December 2025 that identified the risk of corruption in politics from large donations and called for countries to consider instituting a cap on donations. It would only be consistent with our signing that UN resolution for us to take action on this ourselves. Philip Rycroft, if I may quote directly from page 29 of his report, identified this problem too. He talked about his worries that the lack of year-round spending limits on campaign expenditure plus the lack of limits on donations could lead to an “arms race among political parties and actors to out-raise and out-spend their competitors.” Although he felt that this issue fell beyond his remit, he pointed out that it was “something that could be usefully debated during the passage of the Representation of the People Bill”, so I am very glad that a number of colleagues have tabled amendments to allow us to discuss it and to hear from the Government. This proposal is widely supported by a large number of individuals and organisations that submitted evidence to this Committee—the Electoral Reform Society, Transparency International, Spotlight on Corruption, Open Britain and a whole range of others—and by a number of academics who specialise in this area: Sam Power, who gave evidence to us, Alan Renwick and a number of others. Transparency International points out: “Other comparable democracies have sought to curb the corrosive influence of big money in politics by setting donation caps…Canada caps donations to political parties at CA$1,750 annually; France caps donations to political parties at €7,500 annually and €4,500 for presidential campaigns; Italy’s cap is €100,000…and Australia has introduced AU$50,000 caps per donor per year, due to apply from July 2026.” This proposal has been recommended by the Committee on Standards in Public Life, as I have said, and by the Hayden Phillips review, and it is supported by a majority of voters. YouGov polling published in December 2025 showed that 67% of UK voters say that there should be a cap of £50,000 or less, or indeed no private donations at all—some people feel the system should be dealt with like that. I will briefly pre-empt a point that I suspect the Minister will raise in her response, the fact that some other countries have greater state funding of politics. A balance has to be struck. My case is not that there should be no ability for voters to contribute to politics; arguably, that is an important part of the democratic process. The problem is that in a democracy, in which by definition one person has one vote, money can buy huge amounts of influence that outweigh and hugely influence many of those votes. If a party has received many millions of pounds just in the past six months, it is not surprising that it will have a capacity to spend that in the non-regulated period in a way that is highly likely to influence voting. There is therefore a strong case for introducing some sort of annual donation cap now. Transparency International advocates for that being £50,000 a year. The CSPL, I believe, advocated for £10,000 a year, although that was 16 years ago; if we multiply that by inflation, it is about £15,000 a year now. Others have talked about £100,000 a year, which would bring the cap in line with the system that the Government have already committed to putting in place for donations from British voters overseas. There is clearly a problem with the distortion of our political system caused by the influence of big money, big donations in politics, and we have a crucial opportunity, in the passage of this Bill, to take action to address it. On many of the other issues that we have talked about—company donations, the influence of foreign money, crypto donations—I have repeatedly drawn a connection with the need for a cap on all political donations, because those things cannot be completely divorced. We will not be able to address the issues that concern us in relation to the distorting effect of money on our politics if we do not implement a cap on political donations. I look forward to hearing from the Minister on that.

Turning to expenditure limits, new clause 58 would require the Electoral Commission to conduct a review, within six months of the passage of the Bill, into making campaign spending limits apply annually rather than just in the weeks and months before an election, and to do so in consultation with the Speaker’s Commission and the Ethics and Integrity Commission. The new clause asks the Electoral Commission to consider the fairness of elections, the risk of foreign interference and how to make any measure proportionate. It is a gently drafted new clause; it does not commit the Government to doing anything really harsh now, but it recognises that the complete absence of year-round spending limits effectively ignores the fact that election campaigning, political campaigning and the influencing of voters happen year round.

I have seen specific examples of political parties gaming the system of the restrictions on campaign spending during the regulated period by spending shedloads of money just in the week beforehand. But that is not the only problem we face; we also face—this is why it is important to talk about it in relation to the cap on donations—a situation where one individual can give £9 million and another can give £4.5 million. That money can and will be spent to influence voters with no restrictions on campaign spending. That will inevitably have a huge impact on the voting choices of electors. Having recognised that spending influences voter decision making—that is why we have spending limits during the regulated period—we need to recognise that it is time to catch up with the reality that political campaigning happens year round.

A number of experts have commented on this issue. The Joint Committee on National Security Strategy, which has been cited a number of times in this Committee, reported just last month:

“The risks of foreign financial influence apply to non-election periods just as much as regulated electoral periods—perhaps even more so, given the lower levels of transparency requirements and public scrutiny.”

Those are the Committee’s words, and clearly it agrees that this issue needs to be considered. In January, the Electoral Commission told Parliament:

“Outside of election periods, influencing party and government policy is likely to be another attractive target for foreign influence.”

I have already cited the Committee on Standards of Public Life; the Hayden Phillips review—this is going back some time now, but that just highlights that it is not a completely new issue—said:

“As campaigning is continuous, it would be logical for the limits on campaign spending to apply on a continuous basis as well.”

In the past 19 years we have seen a huge change, particularly through the spread of social media and online campaigning, which makes it vital that we deal with this issue vital. People such as Sam Power specifically highlighted that in evidence to this Committee. Will the Minister recognise that this Bill provides a crucial opportunity to bring forward limits to campaign expenditure that apply year round, not just in the regulated period?

Finally, new clause 65, tabled by the right hon. Member for Oxford East talks about national limits on campaign expenditure and essentially proposes to reduce the campaign expenditure limits, which were increased under the Elections Act 2022. Philip Rycroft mentioned the problem of an arms race between parties spending ever more. Initially, the whole idea of setting campaign expenditure limits during the regulated period was to encourage parties not to spend too much. However, if the limits are high, parties will inevitably end up spending right up to them, if they have the financial capacity.

Together, these proposals for a cap on donations, lower limits on expenditure and limits applying year round—or at the very least for the Electoral Commission to do a review, as per my new clause—would be critical safeguards for our democracy. They would go some way towards recognising the reality that currently, big money has a huge, damaging, distorting and anti-democratic effect on our politics.

New clause 30 seeks to place a cap on the amount a person can donate to registered political parties in a calendar year. The Government aim to strike the right balance in relation to political donations to protect against foreign interference and improve transparency, while also ensuring that legitimate donors can continue to fund electoral campaigning. This new clause goes a step too far in restricting legitimate donations and could significantly limit parties’ ability to raise sufficient funds to communicate their views to the electorate—an essential part of a healthy democracy and effective election process.

Will the Minister give way?

I would prefer to press on; the hon. Lady will be able to respond later. To better protect against those who seek to covertly undermine UK elections, we are instead strengthening rules and closing loopholes at all stages of the political donations process. I have described the measures in some detail earlier today: “know your donor”, the three steps for foreign companies, and the consideration we are giving to the Rycroft review. A cap is not being placed across all donations because currently the majority of funding for political parties in the UK comes from private, corporate or other organisational sources. State funding accounts for around 10% of the total income of UK political parties. There is no public or political appetite to increase the level of state funding. I urge hon. Members of this Committee to reject this new clause. New clause 54 proposes that the Secretary of State shares plans for establishing a royal commission to consider the effectiveness and merits of political expenditure controls and, in particular, a cap on political donations. A public inquiry is an extremely costly and lengthy process. Instead, we have already sought to ensure that our democracy is strengthened by considering recommendations from authorities and expert bodies in this area, including the Electoral Commission, the Committee on Standards in Public Life and the National Crime Agency. Those risks and recommended solutions were taken forward and set out in our strategy for modern and secure elections, published on 17 July last year. Those commitments are now set out in full in this Bill. To ensure no stone was left unturned, the Secretary of State commissioned the independent Rycroft review to see where we could strengthen our laws and what could be recommended to protect against covert funding and foreign interference. I therefore hope that the hon. Member for Hazel Grove will withdraw new clause 54. The purpose of new clause 58 is to require the Electoral Commission to conduct a review of the feasibility of a cap on annual expenditure by political parties, candidates and third parties, and then for the Government to issue a response containing proposals informed by that review. The Government agree that transparency and fairness are vital principles to be upheld in elections. Further, it is of the utmost importance to limit the risk of foreign interference. We are committed to ensuring that we have robust systems to protect the UK from foreign interference, and this Bill reinforces electoral legislation against foreign interference. The commitment of the hon. Member for North Herefordshire to fairness and transparency in elections has been clear throughout the parliamentary process, and I share that commitment. The Government note the recommendations of the Rycroft review and will respond to those measures in due course. New clause 65 would substantially cut national spending limits for political parties and would, for the first time, bring most campaign staff costs within scope. National spending limits were intended to strike a careful balance, allowing parties to communicate effectively with voters across the country while preventing money from dominating elections. In practice, parties generally campaign within the cap, which operates as a ceiling rather than a target. Those limits were set by Parliament in 2000 and have been uprated over time to maintain their real-world value. Periodic uprating helps avoid eroding parties’ ability to communicate effectively with the electorate, so is consistent with the original policy intent that Parliament approved. The proposal to include campaign staff costs would represent a significant change to the regulatory framework, introducing additional complexity in how parties define roles and apportion costs. There is not currently clear evidence of a problem with this arrangement. The Government note the issues raised about the level of the spending limits, including those highlighted by the independent Rycroft review. As Members know, we are considering those very carefully and will respond in due course. On that basis—and to allow that work to be completed first—I invite the hon. Member to seek to withdraw the new clause.

I have three quick points. First, the Minister implied that any limit on donations is unacceptable to her. That seems a very extreme position for the Government to take. Is that really the Government’s position in responding to new clause 30, tabled by the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon? The Minister seems to be taking that position, yet that new clause does not specify a particular level but that a cap should be set after a review, which is itself regularly reviewed. That seems a very reasonable approach. Does the Minister not recognise at all even the theoretical possibility that large donations can skew our politics? I would find that an extraordinary position for the Government to take. Secondly, this seems to be completely inconsistent with the fact that last year the UK and at least 59 other countries co-sponsored a resolution passed at the Conference of States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption that calls on states parties to consider limitations on donations “with a view to combating corruption”. The Government have already recognised that large donations into the political system carry a risk of corruption. I do not expect the Minister to put a number on the table today, but to be consistent, would the Minister please take this away for consideration alongside the other issues that have come out of the Rycroft review? It is clear through this Bill Committee process that we need amendments to come forward that are not just driven by Rycroft, but also by some of the issues that Rycroft himself has highlighted as relevant yet outwith the specific terms of reference of his report—certainly including caps on political donations, expansion of the regulated period and reform of political advertising. Thirdly, there is the point about how politics in the UK is largely funded through private company and trade union donations—I tried to pre-empt this, but the Minister did come back with it as well. I have not at any point argued for more state funding of politics—that could be a separate debate, but I am not arguing that. By discussing the arguments in favour of a cap on donations, together with the arguments for stronger limits on expenditure, I am arguing for a politics in which money skews politics less overall. We can surely recognise that if one person can contribute—for the sake of argument—£9 million to an organisation or political actor then that will inevitably have a hugely skewing impact on our politics. Do the Government really not recognise that? Will the Government really not take any steps to limit political donations and that skewing and pollution of our politics?

Does the Minister wish to respond further?

No. I simply stand by my previous comments.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 31

Access to Elected Office Fund (England)

“(1) RPA 1983 is amended as follows.

(2) After Section 90D insert—

‘90E Access to Elected Office Fund (England)

(1) The Secretary of State must, by regulations, require the Electoral Commission to establish a fund to be known as the Access to Elected Office Fund (England) (“the Fund”).

(2) The purpose of the Fund is to provide financial assistance to disabled candidates standing for election in England, including providing assistance to meet any additional campaign costs incurred by the candidate as a result of their disability.

(3) Regulations under this section may specify—

(a) criteria for eligibility for financial assistance;

(b) types of expenditure for which financial assistance may be provided; and

(c) the value of financial assistance available to an individual candidate.

(4) Before making any regulations under subsection (1) the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) disabled people;

(b) political parties;

(c) relevant charities and civil society organisations; and

(d) the Equality and Human Rights Commission.

(5) For the purposes of this section, “disability” has the meaning given under section (6) (disability) of the Equality Act 2010.

(6) Any regulations made under this section must not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.’”—(Zöe Franklin.)

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to require the Electoral Commission to establish a fund to provide financial assistance to disabled candidates standing for election in England, thereby bringing England in line with Scotland and Wales who have existing statutory funds.

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 34—Commencement of Section 106 of the Equality Act 2010— “The Secretary of State must, within three months of the day on which this Act is passed, lay an order under section 216 (commencement) of the Equality Act 2010 to commence section 106 (information about diversity in range of candidates, etc.) of that Act.” This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commence section 106 of the Equality Act 2010 within three months, which would require political parties to publish information on the protected characteristics of candidates in parliamentary elections, elections to the Scottish Parliament and to the Senedd. New clause 35—Electoral Commission: Publication of information about diversity in range of candidates— “(1) PPERA 2000 is amended as follows. (2) After Section 13A (reimbursement of costs by Scottish Ministers etc.) insert— ‘13ZAA Collection and publication of information about diversity in range of candidates (1) The Commission shall collect information published under section 106 (information about diversity in range of candidates, etc.) of the Equality Act 2010. (2) The Commission shall publish the information collected under subsection (1) in an accessible form at such intervals as the Commissioners consider appropriate.’” This new clause would require the Electoral Commission to collect and publish in an accessible form diversity information required to be provided by political parties under section 106 of the Equality Act 2010.

New clause 31 would require the Secretary of State to use regulations to ensure that the Electoral Commission established a fund to help disabled candidates meet additional disability-related campaign costs in England. Historically in England, the access to elected office fund and the EnAble fund provided funding for practical support and reasonable adjustments to remove barriers for disabled candidates standing for election. That could include help with communication, transport or personal assistance, not general campaign costs. The interim £250,000 EnAble fund was launched in 2018. It involved a two-stage approval process, with an independent panel of experts on disability as well as the political groups of the Local Government Association. In total, 41 candidates were awarded funding and 45% of those were elected. In the 2022 Scottish local elections, 46 people got support from a similar fund available in Scotland; of those, 22 were elected. Based on those numbers, I would suggest that the types of funds that provide support make a tangible difference. However, the English fund was discontinued in 2020 and, although I understand the Government have indicated that they wish to do something about that, it has not yet been reinstated and an alternative has not been put forward. That leaves a distinct inequality between the different nations of Britain—Wales and Scotland both have funded schemes; England does not. Representation in politics is crucial, whether here in Parliament or in our council chambers across the country. The House of Commons Library estimates that 25% of the UK population is disabled, with 24% of working adults stating that they are disabled. A truly representative parliamentary House would have 156 MPs indicating that they have a disability, yet only 12 declare themselves as having a disability—less than 2% of Parliament. According to the Local Government Association’s 2022 census, approximately 15% of local authority councillors in England declared a disability or long-term health condition. Essentially, we are consistently not returning a set of councillors or MPs that is truly representative of the people we seek to serve. In my view, that is a wrong that needs to be corrected. Establishing a new fund in England to provide that support is absolutely crucial. That change is supported by Elect Her, Centenary Action, the Jo Cox Foundation, Unlock Democracy, the Fawcett Society, the Disability Policy Centre and others. This Bill is the opportunity to right this wrong. I would welcome hearing whether the Minister agrees with the new clause. I hope that she will but if she does not, will she outline how the Government plan to support candidates with disabilities and to address this glaring disparity between the nations? We really must do better when it comes to representation of people with disabilities in our politics. The other new clauses are also important; they continue the theme of ensuring that our democracy is truly representative of the people we serve. New clause 34 would require the Secretary of State to bring section 106 of the Equality Act 2010 into force within three months of Royal Assent. New clause 35 would place a duty in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, which is the main law governing political parties, campaign finance, donations and so on, requiring the Electoral Commission to publish the information in an accessible form. It would also give Ministers the power to require registered political parties to publish anonymised information about the diversity of the people coming forward as candidates—for example, information about protected characteristics among applicants, selected candidates and elected candidates. This duty applies only so far as it is possible to publish characteristics while, of course, retaining the privacy of the people it is referencing. For a long time, we have as a nation talked about ensuring that that information is made available. In March 2026, the Minister for Equalities, the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra) stated: “The Government is committed to commencing section 106 of the Equality Act 2010, requiring registered political parties to publish anonymised data relating to the diversity of their candidate selections…officials are currently exploring when and how to commence the provision under section 106.” She said that there would be an update “in due course”. That was then repeated in the House of Lords. That statement took place a while ago, yet we have not seen any movement as yet. Again, I personally feel that this Bill gives the opportunity to enact that section of the Equality Act. I would therefore like to hear from the Minister whether she supports the amendment and, if she does not, when the Government will bring into force section 106 of the Equality Act.

I will speak very briefly in support of the three amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Guildford, which highlight really important issues. It seems extraordinary, really, that we have such inequality between England, Wales and Scotland in relation to support for disabled candidates. Clearly, with such huge levels of under-representation of disabled people in our politics, it is imperative that support is put in place to try to rectify that. I fully support the call for the reinstatement of the access to elected office fund.

I appreciate that the main focus of these amendments has been around disability. However, I was proud of the work that my party did in Government to try to improve the diversity of candidates, particularly in local elections. Has the hon. Member given any consideration to the broader concept of diversity in terms of candidates? We know that disability can present some specific challenges, but one of the issues for political parties is about engaging those much wider communities, from which sometimes very few people feel willing to put themselves forward as candidates. Does she have a view about that that she would like to share with the Committee?

I absolutely do—indeed, that is what the next two amendments are specifically about. That clearly should be the next step; the provision was put in place in the Equality Act, so it is just about commencing something already there under section 106 that would apply to reporting on diversity with a range of protected characteristics, not just in relation to disability. I completely agree that our politics should be representative of our population as a whole; we should all be challenging ourselves constantly, as individuals and as parties, to ensure that we are doing everything possible to address under-representation of certain groups. The lack of representation of women is particularly brought into focus by the fact that it is now nearly 100 years since the franchise was fully extended, yet women are still seriously under-represented in this House—and even more under-represented in local politics nationally. But there are many other dimensions of under-representation; while the first amendment relates specifically to support for disabled candidates, the next two amendments relate to that much wider spectrum. That is crucially important.

New clause 31 would require the Electoral Commission to establish a fund to provide financial assistance to disabled candidates standing for election in England. It is the Government’s ambition to see more disabled people in public office, and we know that some disabled people still face additional financial barriers when contesting elected office. To address that, we are currently developing a new fund to support disabled election candidates with the disability-related extra costs they can experience, to enable participation on an equal basis. We put the lived experience of disabled people and lessons learned from previous funds at the heart of our work to develop that new fund. We have engaged with a wide range of stakeholders, including MPs and disabled local councillors. We have heard how ensuring ongoing support is important to providing the reassurance people need to plan for the long term, as it can take a number of attempts to get elected. The Government are able to provide that type of support without this amendment, as they have done in the past, with the access to elected office fund from 2012 to 2015 and the EnAble fund from 2018 to 2020. As part of our work to develop the new fund, we are considering how design elements might better support longevity, retaining the flexibility needed to ensure that the fund provided is fit for purpose. Given the ongoing work that the Government are doing in this area to establish a fund, I gently ask the hon. Lady not to press the new clause. I now turn to new clause 34. The Government are committed to improving representation in politics. We encourage increased diversity in Government and political candidates, and have taken action to address that. Section 106 of the Equality Act 2010 is an uncommenced provision that would require registered political parties to publish anonymised data about the diversity of their candidate selections, in accordance with regulations. The Government are committed to commencing section 106 of the Equality Act. However, careful consideration needs to be given to how it might be implemented, the supporting regulations and whether any phasing might be needed in implementation. Officials will consult with stakeholders, including political parties, in due course.

One of the issues that this proposal creates is that if we are seeking to assess the accessibility of politics for candidates from a range of backgrounds, we need to know not only about those who make it through and are nominated as candidates, but about the broader range of the public from whom those candidates are drawn. It is fairly standard, in terms of equalities impact, to understand from that data who is not making it through that process. Has the Minister given any consideration to how that concern might be addressed, beyond simply gathering the data? That may not tell us who was simply not able to make it through the process and get to the point of being nominated as a candidate in the elections covered by section 106.

The hon. Gentleman highlights exactly why further consultation is needed. This is a complex issue, and it needs to be discussed with all the major and minor political parties to explore how candidates are encouraged to come forward and the ways in which we can support political parties to become more diverse. I hope he accepts that response. I turn to new clause 35. The Government really are committed to better representation, and we have taken a variety of actions to address that. As I have mentioned, section 106 is uncommenced, and we are committed to commencing it with careful consideration and at the appropriate time. I therefore ask the Committee to reject the new clauses, as that process is already in progress.

I hear what the Minister is saying, and I am really pleased that the Government are undertaking that process, but what concerns me is that we go through sets of elections again and again without consistency across the nations. Some in our nations are supported to stand so that have a more representative democracy, while others—here in England—are not. I am willing to withdraw my new clause, but I would appreciate it if the Minister committed to sharing a timeline. More importantly, will she commit to making information more available publicly—certainly to organisations working in this space and MPs—about what is happening about a fund to support candidates with disabilities? The same applies to my new clauses about section 106 of the Equalities Act. One of the reasons why the new clauses had to be tabled is that, although the Government have said things on the public record, they have not shared what is happening behind the scenes. This is a matter of public interest. I will not press the new clauses to a vote, but I would appreciate it if the Minister came back on those queries.

I will write to the hon. Lady and provide as much information as I can.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. Clause, by leave, withdrawn. New Clause 33 Impact of the Act on trust in elections (1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish and lay before both Houses of Parliament a report into the impact of the Act’s provisions on trust in elections. (2) Any report made under subsection (1) must make proposals on any further measures required to increase trust in elections. (3) For the purposes of this section, “trust in elections” includes public confidence in the fairness of elections, the voting systems used, and the representativeness of election results. (4) In preparing the report, the Secretary of State must consult— (a) the Electoral Commission; (b) the Scottish Ministers; (c) the Welsh Ministers; (d) the relevant Northern Ireland department; and (e) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”—(Zöe Franklin.) Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. As has come up repeatedly in the Committee, trust in elections is in a very difficult place at the moment. As MPs, we really need to consider how we can address the lack of confidence that the public have in our political system and, frankly, in the voting system that is used and whether the results feel representative. While we continue to face a flood of foreign money and powerful actors working to undermine our social fabric and interfere in public life, we must make sure that we are improving the public’s confidence in the face of those threats. The requirement to consult the devolved Governments is essential, as this law would apply across all four nations, and trust deficits are not uniform. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland must have a voice in assessing the impact in devolved elections. The Government are already taking very welcome steps in the Bill to modernise elections, and we have the opportunity to make further reforms. One of the most powerful causes of disillusionment within politics is a sense that people’s votes just do not count—that they turn up on polling day and their voice simply disappears into a system that does not reflect it. We believe that any serious review of representativeness has to grapple with that, and that any Bill looking to reform our elections should consider how to change that perception and the voting system to better reflect what or who people are actually voting for. The Bill presents an opportunity for the Government, but we believe they are grasping it only in part. We need to recognise that the threat is real and urgent. Mis and disinformation and the concentration of power in the hands of too few are undermining public trust. The new clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Hazel Grove seeks to address that. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s comments.

I rise to speak against new clause 33, which we contend is overly restrictive. While the hon. Member frames the new clause as a shield for democracy, in reality it is a recipe for bureaucratic paralysis and a dangerous encroachment on the natural administration of our elections. I refer to the reporting mandate mechanism in new clause 33, which demands that the Secretary of State publishes a report on “trust in elections” within just 12 months. That is a purely subjective academic exercise masquerading as policy. Trust is not a metric that we can legislate into existence; it is a subjective measure. By forcing the Government to constantly review public confidence, we are effectively inviting the Secretary of State or Ministers to politicise the very foundations of our voting system. That may be the intention of the hon. Lady, but I contend that it is just another mechanism for parties who disagree with our voting system to carp on about it every year. I say to the Liberal Democrats and to other parties that might want new clause 33 to go ahead that we have tested public opinion on new voting mechanisms. As I have said on other Bills, it should be for the Government of the day to put forward changes to the voting system and electoral law in this country. New clause 33 mandates consultation with Ministers across all devolved nations and the Electoral Commission before a report can even be published. While I respect our devolved partners, we have to accept that it is the policy of Governments in at least two jurisdictions to have different voting systems. In fact, we have different voting systems in those devolved Administrations. It seems to me that the hon. Lady is trying to propose a veto by committee structure. If we try to measure trust in politics, First Ministers and Governments will each put forward different views on whether trust has been measured. How do we measure trust? We can poll, and look at local and national election outcomes.

Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that voting is an act of trust?

The Minister is absolutely right. I am a democrat. I believe that every hon. Member on the Committee has the backing of their constituents, albeit not by a margin that the Liberal Democrats, Greens, or other parties, might favour because they want to change the voting system. Each and every member of the Committee won more votes than each of their competitors. That is an act of trust: our constituents elected us under the system that was provided to them. That is the greatest measure of trust that can be portrayed in a result: securing a number of votes to win that election under the guidelines. I think we are opening something of a Pandora’s box and, if I may say so, entering cloud cuckoo land if we get to a stage where this Parliament is mandating to measure public trust. There are organisations that do that. We have polling companies: in my view too many of them, and too many opinion polls—and that view is not just because the Conservative party are not in front in those polls at the moment. I find it difficult to support a requirement on the statute book for a report on the impact of the Act on trust in elections.

Does my hon. Friend note, as I do, that the international gold standard for the conduct of elections is set by the Venice Commission: a group of academics and people with political experience from countries across the democratic world who meet to consider measures including voter identification, the conduct of polls, the transparency of electoral material—all those different matters. When I asked the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government whether the Government had considered the input and latest reports of the Venice Commission, it was clear that the Secretary of State had not even heard of the Venice Commission. That is an example of something that would, to a degree, undermine trust and confidence in elections. As my hon. Friend is setting out, the outcome of any poll depends very much on who asks the question, how they ask it and of whom they ask it. Given that the new clause simply cannot set that out in statute, it does not add value to the Bill.

I agree with my hon. Friend. I honestly believe that the new clause does not add any value. It does the reverse. Indeed, the report that would be published within 12 months of the Bill passing could reduce trust in politics. Trust is subjective. We all have different opinions. Let us say that the Bill passes with this new clause and, 12 months after the next local elections or general election, there is a report on trust in elections. There are so many different opinions on the criteria outlined in the new clause that the Government would be reporting on, that there will be many people who disagree with the Secretary of State’s report, thereby undermining trust in the democratic process, whichever side of the coin they are on—on proportional representation, on first past the post, on the Electoral Commission, on the way in which parties were funded and on the way in which they campaigned. A general election itself is the ultimate arbiter of trust in politics. This is one of the stranger new clauses that we have seen. I do not say that personally to the hon. Members for Hazel Grove and for Guildford, but we should be rolling back legislation. All the way through our consideration of the Bill, the Liberal Democrats and I have called on the Electoral Commission to do more, but we have also called for the Electoral Commission to have the right resourcing to operate the mechanisms for which both we and the Government, in different respects, have been calling. The new clause will add more bureaucracy and more reporting, and it will undermine trust in the electoral system, which is already—I absolutely accept—in a very delicate state. However, the Minister is absolutely correct. The elections, as undertaken, and the results of the elections, as determined by the democratic will of the people of this country, are the result of trust. There are many organisations that can measure trust; I do not think that it is up to the Government to measure it. It is up to Governments to lose elections if they are not trusted, and it is up to Governments, or the Opposition, to win them if they are trusted. That is the way that things should stay.

This Bill is about building trust and confidence in our electoral system. Regarding many of the reforms in the Bill, within a year of Royal Assent—the timescale within which the hon. Member for Guildford, who tabled the new clause, has suggested the report should come—they either will not have come into force or might not have had sufficient time to bed in and achieve their aims. Therefore, any assessment of impact at that stage could be premature, could risk producing misleading conclusions, and—as the hon. Member for Hamble Valley so eloquently put it—could reduce trust. For these reasons, we do not believe that there would be sufficient benefit in drafting and publishing such a report. However, I would like to reassure Members that the Government are committed to robust monitoring and evaluation of the Bill, and we anticipate that that will show us whether the policies that are being introduced have achieved their aims, including—where relevant—relating to trust. We earn trust and I will reiterate my point that voting is an act of trust. None the less, the Government are working hard to generate more confidence in our already trusted electoral system with this Bill. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 36

Statutory guidance on suspected breaches of the Ballot Secrecy Act 2023

(1) Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Electoral Commission must prepare draft guidance for Returning Officers on enforcing the provisions of the Ballot Secrecy Act 2023.

(2) Once the Commission has prepared draft guidance under this section, it must submit it to the Secretary of State.

(3) Within 28 days of receipt the draft ballot secrecy guidance, the Secretary of State must lay before each House of Parliament a copy of the draft guidance, either—

(a) in its original form, or

(b) in a form which incorporates any modifications that the Secretary of State considers necessary.

(4) If the draft guidance incorporates any such modifications, the Secretary of State must at the same time lay before each House a statement of the Secretary of State’s reasons for making them.

(5) If, within the 40-day period, either House resolves not to approve the draft guidance, the Secretary of State must take no further steps in relation to the draft guidance.

(6) Subsection (5) does not prevent new draft guidance from being laid before Parliament.

(7) If no resolution of the kind mentioned in subsection (5) is made within the 40-day period—

(a) the Secretary of State must issue the guidance in the form of the draft laid before Parliament,

(b) the Commission must arrange for the guidance to be published in such manner as it considers appropriate, and

(c) the guidance comes into force on such day as the Secretary of State may by regulations appoint.

(8) The Commission—

(a) may from time to time prepare draft revised guidance under this section, and

(b) must prepare draft revised guidance under this section if directed to do so by the Secretary of State.

(9) References in this section (other than in subsection (1)) to guidance or draft guidance include revised guidance or draft revised guidance.

(10) In this section “the 40-day period”, in relation to draft guidance, means—

(a) if the draft is laid before one House on a day later than the day on which it is laid before the other House, the period of 40 days beginning with the later of the two days, and

(b) in any other case, the period of 40 days beginning with the day on which the draft is laid before each House,

no account being taken of any period during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which both Houses are adjourned for more than four days.

(11) Returning Officers must have regard to guidance issued under this section in exercising their functions.—(Paul Holmes.)

This new clause would require the Electoral Commission to prepare, and Parliament to approve, statutory guidance to Returning Officers on the enforcement of the Ballot Secrecy Act 2023.

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 25, in clause 80, page 100, line 35, at end insert— “section (Statutory Guidance on suspected breaches of the Ballot Secrecy Act);” This amendment is consequential on NC36.

New clause 36 would require the Electoral Commission to prepare and Parliament to approve statutory guidance to returning officers on the enforcement of the Ballot Secrecy Act 2023, and amendment 25 is consequential on the new clause, as I am sure Committee members will know. As I have said before, given that legislation to change elections comes around so rarely, I believe that this Bill is a huge opportunity to tighten up the systems we have. We should engage people to look at what could be the most significant Bill on the machinery of elections in a generation. The Government have admitted that: they are reducing the age of enfranchisement, changing how people can register and updating the rules on political finance. Given that we have a patchwork quilt of interpretation at polling stations, it is absolutely right that the Government look to issue statutory guidance on the enforcement of the Ballot Secrecy Act to returning officers. That is particularly relevant, as independent volunteers at polling stations reported concerns over family voting in the recent byelection in Gorton and Denton, on which there was a police investigation.

Returning officers and elections staff across the country also have different interpretations of some of the things that we see at every general or local election. Every party interprets the regulations by which we are governed differently in the various areas, across the thousands of polling stations in this country, and election officials often interpret what is right or wrong in different ways. For example, during local elections in my Hamble Valley constituency, Eastleigh Liberal Democrats often set up a table with a Liberal Democrat tablecloth inside the polling station to say hello to people. On some occasions, I have raised that with the people in charge of the polling stations, some of whom will get them out—quite rightly, under my interpretation of the law—and some of whom will not. I report that, which I would argue is a breach of the Ballot Secrecy Act.

Family voting—which we know exists, despite some people saying that it does not—is a breach of the Ballot Secrecy Act. It is not unreasonable to expect the Government to look again at whether our polling stations and ballot processes are working when making legislation such as this Bill. For example, should the tables in our polling stations be divided into quarters, which allows people to look over at how others are voting, or should we look at implementing an American system, where we disguise tables, so that people are reassured that their votes are being cast in secret, as they should be under UK legislation?

My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. A consistent theme that has emerged from his points, and from the evidence and debate in this Committee is that we can have all the rules we like, but enforcement is a major challenge. In particular, it highlights inconsistency. Because there is an element of vagueness in the law, it is sometimes left to the individual clerk of a polling station, with or without good advice from a returning officer or electoral officer, to try to determine the appropriate course of action. Hence, people breaching the law would be kicked out in some places, but not in others. Does my hon. Friend agree that it is essential that we get the detail correct in the Bill in order to ensure greater consistency, and therefore trust and confidence, in the practice of elections across the country?

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. At the moment, on polling days, the law is interpreted differently at different polling stations—I am using polling stations as an example because the most interaction we have with voters is when they cast their ballot, and they should be pleased to do so. Going back to the example of my constituency, different counts and polling stations have different interpretations of the distance at which it is acceptable to display a poster. I have been in situations where down one road, they are allowed right up to the door, and even in the station in some cases, and in other areas they are not allowed in the car park. That is all based on interpretation. The new clause seeks to ensure that we have uniform electoral guidance. That would be produced by the Electoral Commission, which, as the Minister outlined, is an independent organisation that is being asked to take on more responsibilities to assess, approve and give out statutory guidance to returning officers. Most people drive to and park at polling stations on their journey to vote, and candidates and tellers— I believe in telling, because it gives people interaction with the political parties before they cast their vote—often wait outside. Can any Member say that, in the last election they participated in, there was a uniform code as to what they saw at each polling station? I would say no. Election staff do not have that central guidance to say what should and should not happen. Often, when candidates report inconsistencies, because there are inconsistencies it is much harder to prove that a breach has happened. In the discussions we have had this afternoon, each and every political party has wanted to ensure that our democratic process is tightened up, whether that is from foreign interference, cryptocurrency donations or donations from this country, and whether we want new people to be able to vote, or want people to give ID to vote—all of those things are contained in the Bill.

To bring my hon. Friend back to where he started, what is so striking about what he is saying is that the moment when the voter goes to the polling station is the key interaction that most people have with our democracy. The debates that we as politicians are interested in, about the sources of electoral finance and the eligibility of different people to come and vote, while important, are not as salient as what is going on in the mind of the voter at the point they cast their ballot. Their ability to do that with complete faith in the integrity of that process is critical. Does he agree that it is even more saliant to make the point that this review and update are necessary, because for the voter that represents the front door or the window on politics, and that then influences all the other issues that have been brought up by Members?

I agree with my hon. Friend. To ironically, yet seriously, relate this to the previous new clause we discussed, I would argue that having a uniform code of guidance where voters are given assurance that everything is run in the same way would rebuild trust in our democracy, the Government and the process. My hon. Friend is absolutely right that the difference between us sad political operatives, who look at electoral law and whether everything is being run okay, and the average voter on the street—a term that I hate—is that people out there either have not thought about the fact that there are local elections or do not think about the machinery of how a ballot is run. When they approach a polling station and have difficulty, the trust that they have in the integrity of the system is damaged. Having the reassurance that the Government, regardless of political colour, are looking to give an independent body powers of review, perhaps after every general election, would add to trust and the feeling that there is competence in the voting system. As we go through the journey of the voter, I know for a fact that there is the odd conspiracy theory about pencil versus pen—some places people can vote by pen, some places by pencil, and people say that their vote could be rubbed out if they vote by pencil. I happen not to subscribe to that theory, as our election staff are people of integrity. But even that is not clarified under central returning officer guidance; if it was, it would allow people to have confidence. People often look at how others vote in polling stations. I hate to break the news to you, Sir Desmond, but they do. When we stand at a polling station, and a person is voting just there—for the benefit of Hansard, I am indicating that there is another desk to the right of me—we can see how they are voting. That breaches the trust that we need. I say to the Minister, who I know is going to reject this new clause because so far the Government have not conceded on much, that if we are all democrats then we should not be afraid of assessing whether our elections work. We have a groundbreaking piece of legislation—I am sure when we get to Report stage, the Minister will now say in the Chamber, “the shadow Minister said this is groundbreaking legislation”. It has its bad points and very good points, but I accept that it is groundbreaking—but it could be even more groundbreaking. It could be the key piece of legislation that builds the integrity of our election system, which as the hon. Member for Guildford outlined, is extremely delicate at the moment.

This is one of the most important parts of the debate we will have on this Bill. Most of us, as politicians, will have experienced a voter telling us on the doorstep that they would be willing to vote for our party but that they lack confidence in the secrecy of the ballot, because they know that the ballot paper issued has a serial number on it that could in theory be tracked down later to establish how they voted. Does my hon. Friend agree that when we look at electoral behaviour, the turnout in, for example, local elections, has been consistent for 100 years, and that debates around trust have not been as material to people’s willingness to vote as trust in politics in general, because confidence in the ballot, and the sense of what is at stake in those elections, really matters? That is really a question of politics, rather than, as earlier amendments suggested, a question of trust. Does he agree that the significance of this is about ensuring the integrity of the process by which democracy happens, as opposed to a wider debate that reflects our political views about that process?

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. This is not about whether one political party—or one party in government—is more trustworthy than the other; we leave that to the voters. This is about trusting in the integrity of the voters. He is absolutely right that the greatest influence and first right of every citizen in this country should be their ability to participate in the democratic process, pick their Government and pick the elected representatives who stand up for them, but there needs to be integrity. My hon. Friend is right to outline that this should be seen not in a party political way, but in a process way. The new clause would contribute to that aim by giving powers to the independent Electoral Commission, which, as the Minister reminded us in the previous sitting of this Committee, is governed by Parliament, not the Government. This is a step that the Minister could take, seeing that they are very keen to give the Electoral Commission increased power. This new clause is crucial and non-partisan, and it would allow us to have a tangible effect on the trust in and integrity of our system. Nobody is bigger or better than the system that we have, but that system can be improved, and we should not be shying away from allowing ourselves to improve it, no matter who is in government, to make sure that every time that a voter walks into a polling station, they know that their vote will be cast in the most secret and best way possible. I hope the Minister will look kindly upon the new clause, although I am sure she will not. I look forward to her remarks in response.

Ballot secrecy is extremely important. The shadow Minister has talked about family voting. I am deeply disappointed and concerned by the implicitly discriminatory accusations made by some parties in relation to family voting in recent weeks. I wish we saw as much passion about the far greater threat to our democracy posed by the skewing effect of huge donations. Conservative members of the Committee made no contribution in the discussion on caps on donations or limits on expenditure earlier this afternoon, but have devoted considerable airtime to this particular topic. I ask all of us to consider: what is the greatest threat to the integrity of our political system?

There is a crucial distinction that I am interested in with the hon. Member’s reflection on—

Order. I am sure that it would the hon. Gentleman’s greatest pleasure to address the Chair, particularly when I am in it.

My apologies, Sir Desmond. I was seeking the hon. Member’s views on what happens at the point of casting a vote, which is where all of us exercise our equal democratic freedom. We have a vote each, and we cast it in the same way in a process that needs to have integrity. There is no guarantee that any amount of expenditure will influence a voter in a particular way if they feel that that is wrong, and each of us as voters exercises that judgment equally and freely under the law. The amendments we have been so keen to spend some time on are about the integrity of and confidence in that process, under which every single voter is equal in the power they exercise in a democracy.

I think that I have made my point. Let us consider what the greatest threat to the integrity of our democracy is. I am concerned about the ways that concerns such as those articulated in these amendments have been weaponised by some political actors, so I will abstain if they are pressed to a vote.

New clause 36 and amendment 25 would place a new legal duty on the Electoral Commission to produce guidance for returning officers on how to enforce the offences introduced by the Ballot Secrecy Act 2023. I stress at the outset how seriously the Government take all forms of electoral fraud or coercion, including family voting. It is illegal and unacceptable, and polling staff should feel confident to challenge and report any incidents. However, I have serious concerns about these amendments. It is essential to point out that the commission can already issue guidance, and it already provides extensive guidance for returning officers. Putting the requirement into legislation would set a new precedent, allowing Parliament to direct how the commission produces its guidance in the future. The Commission’s independence, as we discussed earlier, is central to public confidence in how elections are run. Because the amendments would require Ministers and Parliament to approve or even change the guidance, there is a real risk that people would see that as political interference and involvement in something that should remain an operational matter for the commission. The extra approval steps could also delay clear guidance for returning officers. If Parliament rejected the draft guidance, the commission would have to start again, creating uncertainty for those responsible for enforcing ballot secrecy. For those reasons—concerns about independence, ministerial involvement, added complexity and the precedent they set—the Government cannot support the amendments.

The hon. Member for North Herefordshire made some comments that, I think, questioned my integrity in making my speech.

Not the hon. Gentleman’s integrity—his judgment.

The hon. Lady says it is my judgment. It is interesting that I am being accused of weaponising an issue because of one aspect where I think there is an imbalance, or a different interpretation of ways of overseeing voting at polling stations. First, that is a subjective term—

On a point of order, Sir Desmond. The House will note that I did not accuse anybody in particular of weaponising an issue. I observed that the issue had been weaponised.

The hon. Lady has made her point, and it is on the record.

The hon. Lady has made her point, but she said that Members were weaponising issues. Seeing that I was the only Member speaking to amendments tabled by the official Opposition and in my name, I think that we can take her meaning as read. It is interesting that, in looking at possible infringements of an equal right to vote, the hon. Lady focused on family voting. I focused on many other things, including whether we should ask for an independent review of whether the secrecy of the ballot is being maintained by an independent organisation. I mentioned family voting once. I mentioned the activities of political parties at polling stations. I mentioned whether the desks should be looked at differently.

Order. There is a danger that we are being repetitious.

Forgive me, Sir Desmond. I do not think that has necessarily been unique to me on this Committee, but I will draw my remarks to a close. I am being challenged over my intentions in tabling the amendment. It was well intentioned, but it has been said that it is about just one thing and that it is weaponising an issue, which it is not.

I am keen to avoid being accused of being repetitious in any circumstances. Does my hon. Friend agree that the key strength he is advocating for is the integrity of the ballot as the guardian against all these issues? If we have a secret ballot that we can trust, all the issues of corruption, undue influence, family voting or whatever they may be are managed appropriately. If we fail to ensure the integrity of the ballot, things become irresponsible.

Order. That is definitely a repetition of points that have already been made.

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention, which I of course endorse. Some remarks have intimated that we have not commented on other aspects of the Bill. All I will say is that I welcomed the comments made by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire on cryptocurrency, and I said to the Liberal Democrats’ spokesperson that I would look to support them on some aspects of capping electoral finances. I think we need to be very careful when we speak. I will push the new clause to a vote and we will vote in favour of it, because anybody on the Committee who is scared of an independent review of whether our system works should not be hiding away from the people who vote for them. Question put, That the clause be read a second time.

New Clause 37

Language of campaign materials

“(1) During the relevant period campaign material must not be promoted or published in a foreign language.

(2) A person is guilty of an offence if the person causes campaign material to be promoted or published that falls within subsection (1).

(3) For the purposes of this section—

‘campaign material’ means imprinted election campaign material published by political parties and candidates, whether in hard copy or digital format;

‘foreign language’ means a native language of any foreign country outside the British Islands, other than English;

‘relevant period’ means the period specified in period as specified in section 90ZA of the RPA 1983.

(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine;

(b) on summary conviction in Scotland or Northern Ireland to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.

(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection () to prove—

(a) that the person took all reasonable steps, and exercised all due diligence, to ensure that the campaign material was not promoted or published contrary to subsection (1), and

(b) that the contravention arose from circumstances beyond the person’s control.”—(Paul Holmes.)

This new clause would ban election materials published in a foreign language by political parties and candidates during the short campaign. It would not ban campaigning in native languages of the British Islands such as in English, Welsh, Cornish, Ulster Scots, Irish, et al. Nor would it prevent campaigning via the likes of BSL or Braille.

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a second time. This new clause is vital. I would say that, because we tabled it, but it aims to repair some of the imbalance in the tactics that we have seen in recent elections, and to give every voter a level playing field to participate in voting in an equal way. The new clause relates to the language of campaign materials. It would provide that: “During the relevant period campaign material must not be promoted or published in a foreign language.” By that, I mean the short regulated campaign period. If a person were found guilty of an offence because they caused “campaign material to be promoted or published that falls within subsection (1)”— in other words, in a foreign language—they would be liable on summary conviction “in England and Wales, to a fine” or “in Scotland or Northern Ireland to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.” I want to be clear why we have tabled the new clause. We are all politicians who campaign in our constituencies, but we all know that politics is becoming more divisive in the messages that certain parties are putting out there. An election leaflet in the Gorton and Denton by-election was written in Urdu. It said: “Give the Muslims a voice. Punish Labour for their views on Gaza. Vote Green.” Notwithstanding that that is a divisive statement to make, the Green party actively and purposely made it to prey on the vulnerabilities of a community that are not as involved in British society as they should be, and get them to vote Green on one issue: foreign policy and the Labour Government’s decisions on Gaza. Every Government’s first duty to this country is to keep their citizens safe. Regardless of what we think about Gaza, or any one issue, that is the Government’s No. 1 duty. On foreign policy, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary have undertaken those responsibilities. They do that every day. That is what the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary are supposed to do. When campaign materials are published in a foreign language to exploit communities that should be much more involved in British society than they are, that is exploitation for political gain. That skewed the result of the by-election in Gorton and Denton. Let me be clear that I am not contesting the result of that election. My party was never going to win it, so if anybody wanted to intervene on me and say, “It’s because you got a measly 6%,” that would be entirely true. But let us face it: not everybody in that constituency could see what the Green party was saying to those communities about Gaza. The constituency is very diverse; it has a big white working-class community and a big ethnic minority community. I say it again: that was exploitation of one community on one issue, and the Green party was guilty of doing that.

My hon. Friend has spoken eloquently about the Green party’s shocking behaviour in the Gorton and Denton by-election, but does he recall the evidence that we heard on our first day in Committee from Tower Hamlets? That gave us all cause to reflect that this is not simply about a shocking recent issue involving the Green party; it has been a long-standing concern in our politics. If we want to ensure that everybody has equality of access to our democracy, we need to make sure that we get this right. Using the established languages of our nation is a key part of that.

I agree with my hon. Friend. That is one example, but we know there have been issues with electoral integrity in Tower Hamlets. Previous Governments stepped in in Tower Hamlets because there were breaches in relation to some of the election materials that were going out. My contention is that every voter, no matter where they come from, should be able to have the same access to campaign materials. It is not unreasonable that digital and physical election materials should be on an equal footing in the short campaign—people can do otherwise at any other time—when emotions can be high, polls can be tight and parties are campaigning very hard. The Government are moving towards trying to encourage translation anyway. The Secretary of State released a social cohesion strategy that is supposed to make every citizen in this country feel or identify as British, and feel safe and at one in this country. The only way we can do that is by increasing funding for translation services and encouraging people, and sometimes forcing people, to learn the languages of this country. Those are English, Scottish, Welsh or the other registered languages in the British Isles. That is not unreasonable. The Government clearly do not think that it is unreasonable, because in the social cohesion strategy they actively promote it. All I am trying to do is make it official that people should be reading their election materials in one of the official British languages.

My great grandmother was not a native English speaker; her first language was Scottish Gaelic. In North Lanarkshire, according to the 2022 census, 483 people speak Gaelic in the home, and over 2,000 speak Urdu in the home. The hon. Gentleman suggests that the new clause would make things equal for all, but would it not make things more equal for one, rather than the other?

No, it would not. I have a lot of respect for the hon. Lady; we get on, and I believe we are both in this for the same reasons. My explanatory note is very clear about what the new clause would protect, and where it would not have an impact. It states: “It would not ban campaigning in native languages of the British Islands such as in English, Welsh, Cornish, Ulster Scots, Irish, et al. Nor would it prevent campaigning via the likes of BSL or Braille.” So no, because that is officially known as a minority language within the British Isles. We have been very careful to ensure that people in Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland, and those who read Braille or rely on sign language, will not be excluded by the new clause. Communities that are not learning English should be able to read the English through translation services, which are encouraged by the social cohesion strategy. We also have to think about the other side: many people living in multi-ethnic communities receive leaflets in a foreign language, and they cannot read what is being said by a party. That is not a level playing field in the voting system, and I think it is wrong. We have seen examples where that has been used in an exploitative way in recent months, and there is no doubt that we will see it used in an exploitative way in future. That happened in Tower Hamlets, it happened in Gorton, and it will happen again. If the Minister will not support the new clause, will the Government look at how to streamline the voting system in this country, so that we have, at least, guidance on languages? She may say that it already exists, but we need to toughen the regulations to prescribe, or describe, how parties should treat British languages versus foreign languages. I look forward to her Minister’s response on new clause 37.

I am going to rise above the party political aspects of the shadow Minister’s comments, but I want to engage with his extraordinary claim that communicating with people in their mother tongue is, in some way, exploitation. He expressed concern about the inclusion of diverse communities in our country. He talked about social cohesion, but what he is proposing is essentially a nativist policy. As was highlighted by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld and Kirkintilloch, Gaelic speakers are accepted but Urdu speakers are not. I fundamentally disagree. Of course, as a country we should provide support to assist people to learn English, but we should not force them, as the shadow Minister argued. If they are not yet fluent, it seems perfectly reasonable—in fact, clearly helpful for inclusion and participation—to provide election materials in the language in which they can be best understood. Indeed, that is what returning officers do. Election officers provide information in multiple languages, so why should parties and candidates not also be free to do so? Let me quote from the guidance for returning officers on the Electoral Commission’s website: “Some voters may need assistance in another language because of their limited English (or English or Welsh) language skills. You should consider what support you are able to provide to those voters in your area, such as providing translations of the polling station notices.” In Gorton and Denton, the polling station provided information in multiple other languages. The effect of the new clause would be exclusionary and discriminatory, and I strongly oppose it.

New clause 37 would ban the use of foreign languages in campaign material during the regulated period—it would make it a criminal offence. A primary purpose of the Bill is to encourage more people across society to engage and participate in our democracy. The new clause would not serve that purpose. It is not for the Government to prescribe the languages that campaigners are permitted to use to engage voters who come from a wide range of diverse backgrounds across the constituencies we represent. It is certainly not for the Government to criminalise the use of certain languages. Various electoral and non-electoral offences protect against malicious forms of campaign material, which is, in essence, what the hon. Member for Hamble Valley was talking about. For example, it is an offence to publish or distribute threatening, abusive or insulting material that is intended or likely to stir up racial hatred. It is also an offence to improperly influence someone to vote in a particular way or refrain from voting. That would include, for example, a leaflet that threatened to make use of force or place undue spiritual pressure on a person in order to induce them to vote in a particular way or refrain from voting. Those offences apply regardless of the language used in the campaign material. The Government have no plans to regulate the use of foreign languages in campaign material. We are seeking to minimise barriers to participation while safeguarding the integrity and security of elections. The measures in the Bill are intended to restore faith in our politics and ensure that the UK continues to be a thriving and diverse democracy. The new clause is entirely incompatible with those intentions. I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.

I wholly accept the Minister’s comments; I did not expect that she would be looking into this. I acknowledge the comments made by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire, too. She used the example of returning officers. They are filling things in and conducting a process; they are not using foreign languages to exploit a section of our society against a policy or a party in this country with which they happen to disagree. That is the clear and distinct difference, and that is the example that I used in moving the new clause. Her example is about the process; my example is about using foreign language to exploit a political message in an advantageous way. That is why I tabled the new clause, and I wish to press it to a vote.

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

The hon. Gentleman has concluded his speech, but the hon. Lady is entitled to speak again if she wishes.

The hon. Gentleman seems to say that the making of any political argument that he disagrees with is exploitation. That is ridiculous. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 41

Electoral Commission: civil penalties and enforcement

“(1) PPERA 2000 is amended as set out in subsection (2).

(2) In Schedule 19C, in paragraph 1, after sub-paragraph (1) insert—

‘(1A) When deciding whether to impose a fixed monetary penalty under this Act, the Commission must have regard to whether the penalty will—

(a) change the behaviour of the offender;

(b) eliminate any financial gain or benefit from non-compliance;

(c) be appropriate for the particular offender and regulatory issue;

(d) be proportionate to the nature of the offence and the harm caused;

(e) restore the harm caused by regulatory non-compliance, where appropriate; and

(f) deter future non-compliance.’”—(Paul Holmes.)

This new clause would put the ‘Macrory principles’ for regulators on to a statutory footing as regards the Electoral Commission.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 42

Overseas electors: reform to voting process

“(1) The Secretary of State, must, by regulations, make provision to enable overseas voters to vote in person at a United Kingdom Embassy, High Commission or consulate at United Kingdom parliamentary elections.

(2) For the purpose of this section, an “overseas elector” is a person who fulfils the requirements for an overseas elector in section 1 (extension of parliamentary franchise) of the RPA 1985.

(3) Regulations made under subsection (1) may amend provision made by or under any other Act as necessary.

(4) Any regulations made under this section must not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.”—(Paul Holmes.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State make provision by regulations so that overseas electors can vote in person at United Kingdom embassies, consulates and high commissions for United Kingdom parliamentary elections.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 43

Electoral Register: British Nationals Abroad

“(1) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, introduce a system to give overseas electors the option to register to vote when they renew their British passport online.

(2) Any regulations made under subsection (1) must be made under the affirmative procedure.”—(Paul Holmes.)

This new clause would allow the Secretary of State to regulate to introduce a system to allow overseas electors the ability to register to vote when they renew their passport online.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 44

Report on proposals to support the extension of the franchise to 16- and 17- year-olds

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on proposals to support the extension of the franchise to 16- and 17- year-olds under this Act.

(2) The report published under subsection (1) must include consideration of proposals to—

(a) promote awareness among relevant persons of the extension of the franchise; and

(b) make any necessary changes required to strengthen civic education in schools and educational settings available to relevant persons.

(3) For the purposes of this section, relevant persons are children and young people who—

(a) are enfranchised as a result of section (1) of this Act; or

(b) are entitled to be registered as a parliamentary or local government elector before reaching voting age as a result of section (3) of this Act.

(4) The Secretary of State must lay the report before both Houses of Parliament.”—(Zöe Franklin.)

This new clause requires the Government to report on proposals to support the extension of the franchise to 16 and 17 year olds, through promoting awareness or making changes required to strengthen civic education.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 45

Permissible electors to include overseas electors with previous tax residence etc

“(1) Section 54 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (permissible donors) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (2)(a), at end insert ‘(but this is subject to subsection (2ZA))’.

(3) After subsection (2) insert—

‘(2ZA) An individual registered in an electoral register who at the date of a donation qualifies as an overseas elector in respect of a constituency is only a permissible donor for the purposes of this Part if—

(a) the individual was at any time resident in the UK for tax purposes,

(b) the individual has a Unique Taxpayer Reference, and

(c) the individual holds funds or assets that may be charged to tax in the United Kingdom that are at least equivalent to the value of the donation.

(2ZB) For the purposes of subsection (2ZA)—

(a) whether a person qualifies as an overseas elector is to be determined in accordance with section 1A of the Representation of the People Act 1985;

(b) whether a person was at any time resident in the UK for tax purposes is to be determined in accordance with Schedule 45 to the Finance Act 2013.’”—(Zöe Franklin.)

This new clause limits permissible donors who are overseas electors to those who have previously been resident in the UK for tax purposes, have a Unique Taxpayer Reference and holds funds or assets that may be taxed in the UK which have a value of at least the amount to be donated.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 46

Power of Electoral Commission to require disclosure from financial institutions

“In Schedule 19B of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (investigatory powers of Commission), after paragraph 1 insert—

‘Power to require disclosure from financial institutions

1A (1) The Commission may give a disclosure notice to a financial institution requiring the institution—

(a) to produce, for inspection by the Commission or a person authorised by the Commission, any documents which—

(i) relate to the income and expenditure of an organisation or individual to which paragraph 1 applies, and

(ii) are reasonably required by the Commission for the purposes of carrying out their functions; or

(b) to provide the Commission, or a person authorised by the Commission, with any information or explanation which relates to that income and expenditure and is reasonably required by the Commission for those purposes.

(2) A financial institution to whom a disclosure notice is given shall comply with it within such reasonable time as is specified in the notice.

(3) In this paragraph, “financial institution” has the same meaning as in Schedule 6 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (see paragraph 6 of that Schedule).’”—(Zöe Franklin.)

This new clause gives the Electoral Commission the power to require information from a financial institution relating to the income and expenditure of political parties and associated individuals.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 47

Commencement of section 9(2) of the Political Parties and Elections Act 2009

“(1) Within three months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must exercise the power in section 43(1) of the Political Parties and Elections Act 2009 to bring into force section 9(2) of that Act (declaration as to source of donation).

(2) This section comes into force on the day on which this Act is passed (and section 80 is to be construed accordingly).”—(Zöe Franklin.)

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to exercise the power to commence section 9(2) of the Political Parties and Elections Act 2009 which inserts section 54A into the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, which requires declarations to be provided as to the source of donations.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 48

Offences relating to election expense returns: reduction in threshold

“(1) The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 83 (declaration by treasurer as to return relating to campaign expenditure), in subsection (3)(a), for ‘knowingly or recklessly makes’ substitute ‘knows or suspects, or has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that he is making’.

(3) In section 123 (declaration of responsible person as to return relating to referendum expenditure), in subsection (4)(a), for ‘knowingly or recklessly makes’ substitute ‘knows or suspects, or has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that he is making’.”—(Zöe Franklin.)

This new clause reduces the threshold for two offences in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 so that where false declarations are provided in relation to election expenses an offence is committed if they have reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting that they are making a false declaration.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 49

Declaration as to source of donation: reduction in amount

“In section 54A of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (declaration as to source of donation)—

(a) in subsection (1), for ‘£7,500’ substitute ‘£500’;

(b) in subsection (2)(B), for ‘£7,500’ substitute ‘£500’.”—(Zöe Franklin.)

This new clause would require any donation above £500 to be accompanied by a declaration as to its source (rather than the current minimum of £7,500).

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Question negatived.

New Clause 50

Penalties for false declarations

“(1) Schedule 20 to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (penalties) is amended as follows.

(2) In the entry for section 54A(5) (making a false declaration as to source of donation), in the second column, for ‘1 year’ substitute ‘3 years’.

(3) In the entry for section 83(3)(a) (making a false declaration to Commission when delivering return), in the second column, for ‘1 year’ substitute ‘3 years’.

(4) In the entry for section 123(4)(a) (making a false declaration to Commission when delivering return), in the second column, for ‘1 year’ substitute ‘3 years’.”—(Zöe Franklin.)

This new clause raises the maximum penalties for submitting false declarations from 1 year’s imprisonment upon conviction on indictment to 3 years’ imprisonment upon conviction on indictment.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 51

Annual report regarding foreign interference in political funding

“(1) The Electoral Commission and the National Crime Agency must each produce and publish an annual report about—

(a) the risk of foreign interference in relation to controlled donations, and

(b) the adequacy of any systems designed to address risks of foreign interference in relation to controlled donations.

(2) The Electoral Commission and the National Crime Agency must send a copy of the report to the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State must lay it before Parliament.

(3) In this section—

‘controlled donation’ means—

(i) a donation to a registered party, individual or members association that is subject to Part 4 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, and

(ii) a donation to a candidate or their agent that is subject to Schedule 2A of the Representation of the People Act 1983;

‘foreign interference’ includes the commission of a relevant electoral offence to which section 16 of the National Security Act 2023 applies (foreign interference in elections).”—(Zöe Franklin.)

This new clause would require the Electoral Commission and the National Crime Agency to make annual reports about the risks of foreign interference in the UK’s political finance system and the adequacy of systems in place to address those risks.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 53

Electoral Commission: pre-investigation decision notices

“(1) PPERA 2000 is amended as set out in subsection (2).

(2) In Schedule 19B, paragraph 3, subparagraph (5), at end insert—

‘or;

(b) relevant to determining whether to start an investigation.’”—(Zöe Franklin.)

This would enable the Electoral Commission to require information before launching a formal investigation.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:

New Clause 54

Proposals for a Royal Commission on political donations and campaign expenditure

“(1) Within three months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish proposals for the establishment of a Royal Commission to consider—

(a) the merits of a cap on political donations, and the level at which such a cap should be set, and

(b) the effectiveness of existing limits on campaign expenditure, including the appropriateness of the time period during which those limits apply.

(2) Proposals published under this section must include proposals for the Royal Commission’s—

(a) terms of reference,

(b) membership, and

(c) funding.”—(Zöe Franklin.)

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to publish proposals for a Royal Commission to consider a cap on political donations and the effectiveness of existing campaign expenditure limits.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

New Clause 59

Offence of misleading the public by candidates in parliamentary elections

“(1) A person standing as a candidate in a parliamentary election commits an offence if—

(a) they act with the intention of misleading the public or are reckless as to whether their act will do so, and

(b) they know, or ought to know, that their act is seriously improper.

(2) For the purposes of this section an act is seriously improper only if—

(a) it meets the condition in subsection (3), and

(b) a reasonable person would consider it to be seriously improper, taking account of all the circumstances of the case.

(3) The condition mentioned in subsection (2)(a) is that the act—

(a) involved dishonesty that was significant or repeated (whether by means of falsehood, concealment, obfuscation or otherwise) in respect of matters of significant concern to the public, or

(b) caused, or contributed to causing, harm to one or more other persons, or had the potential to do so.

(4) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine (or both),

(b) on summary conviction—

(i) in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both),

(ii) in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both), and

(iii) in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both).

(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to show that they otherwise had a reasonable excuse for their act.

(6) In this section—

‘candidate’ in relation to an election, means a candidate standing nominated at the election or included in a list of candidates submitted in connection with it;

‘the public’ means the public in the United Kingdom.”—(Dr Chowns.)

This new clause creates a new offence of misleading the public by candidates in a parliamentary election campaign.

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 61—Code of Conduct for Political Campaigning— “(1) The Electoral Commission must prepare and publish a Code of Conduct for Political Campaigning (‘the Campaign Code’). (2) The Campaign Code must set out principles and guidance relating to political campaigning and must in particular include provisions relating to— (a) honesty in political debate and reasonable efforts to not mislead voters, and (b) the avoidance of intimidation, harassment or abusive conduct. (3) In this section ‘political campaigning’ means any conduct, communications or other activity which can reasonably be regarded as intended, directly or indirectly, to influence public support for, or opposition to— (a) a registered political party, (b) a candidate or prospective candidate at a general election, by-election, local election or mayoral election, or (c) an outcome in a referendum. (4) Before preparing or revising the Campaign Code, the Electoral Commission must carry out such consultation as it considers appropriate and must in particular consult— (a) representatives of parties appointed to the Parliamentary Parties Panel in accordance with section 4 (parliamentary parties panel) of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, and (b) such other persons as the Electoral Commission considers appropriate. (5) The Electoral Commission may revise the Campaign Code from time to time, and subsections (1) to (4) apply to a revised Campaign Code as they apply to the original. (6) Electoral advertising as defined in this Part is regulated under the Electoral Advertising Code of Practice and subject to enforcement by the Electoral Advertising Code Committee. (7) This Part applies in relation to elections and referendums for which provision may be made by an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament.” This new clause would establish a Code of Conduct for Political Campaigning. It is connected to NC62 to NC64. The reference in this new clause to “this Part” is a reference to a new Part which would be formed of NC62 to NC64. New clause 62—Electoral Advertising Code of Practice— “(1) The Electoral Commission must prepare and publish an Electoral Advertising Code of Practice (‘the Advertising Code’). (2) The Advertising Code must include principles and guidance relating to electoral advertising and must in particular include provisions relating to— (a) ensuring the accuracy of factual claims, (b) the need for relevant and reliable evidence to substantiate factual claims, (c) the need to clearly identify the political party affiliated with an advert, (d) transparency in the use of artificial intelligence, and (e) issuing prompt public corrections to address mistakes. (3) In this section ‘electoral advertising’ means any factual claims in marketing communications, whenever published or distributed, whose principal function is to influence voters in a local, regional, national or international election or referendum. (4) Before preparing or revising the Advertising Code, the Electoral Commission must carry out such consultation as it considers appropriate and must in particular consult— (a) the Electoral Advertising Code Committee, (b) representatives of parties appointed to the Parliamentary Parties Panel in accordance with section 4 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, and (c) such other persons as the Electoral Commission considers appropriate.” This new clause would require the Electoral Commission to produce an Electoral Advertising Code of Practice. It is connected to NC61, NC63 and NC64. New clause 63—Electoral Advertising Code Committee— “(1) The Electoral Commission must establish an Electoral Advertising Code Committee (‘the Committee’). (2) The functions of the Committee are— (a) to advise the Electoral Commission on the preparation and revision of the Advertising Code, (b) to adjudicate on alleged breaches of the Advertising Code, and (c) to oversee the operation of and monitor the effectiveness of the Advertising Code. (3) In exercising functions under this Part, the Committee must have regard to the importance of freedom of political expression and open democratic debate, and will not determine matters of political opinion unless they fall within the scope of factual claims in electoral advertising. (4) The Committee is to consist of— (a) a Chair, (b) a member nominated by the Electoral Commission, (c) a member nominated by the Advertising Standards Authority or its successor body, (d) a member nominated by the Office of Communications, and (e) a member nominated by the United Kingdom Statistics Authority. (5) Nothing in this Part limits the powers of the bodies identified in subsection (4) under any other enactment. (6) The Chair is to be appointed by the Electoral Commission following a fair and open competition conducted in accordance with the Public Appointments Code, with a majority of independent members on the assessment panel and a senior independent panel member. (7) The appointment of the Chair requires the consent of the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission, which must not be unreasonably withheld or delayed. (8) In making the appointment, the Electoral Commission must have regard to the need to secure the independence of the Committee. (9) A person appointed as Chair holds office— (a) for a single non-renewable term of five years from the date of appointment, and (b) in accordance with terms and conditions (including as to remuneration and pension) specified by the Electoral Commission. (10) The Chair may resign from office by giving written notice to the Electoral Commission. (11) The Electoral Commission must pay to the Committee the sums determined by the Chair as appropriate for, or in connection with, the carrying out of the Committee’s functions. (12) The Secretary of State must, within the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, carry out a consultation on a levy on registered political parties’ election advertising spend for the purpose of funding the Electoral Advertising Code Committee. (13) In carrying out the consultation, the Secretary of State must consult— (a) the Electoral Commission, (b) representatives of registered political parties, and (c) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.” This new clause would require the Electoral Commission to establish an Electoral Advertising Code Committee. It is connected to NC61, NC62 and NC64. New clause 64—Status of the Campaign Code and enforcement of the Advertising Code— “(1) Persons engaged in political campaigning must have regard to the Campaign Code. (2) A registered political party must prepare, publish and keep under review a code of conduct relating to its political campaigning. (3) A code under subsection (2) must be consistent with the Campaign Code and must in particular include provisions relating to— (a) honesty in political debate and reasonable efforts to not mislead voters, and (b) the avoidance of intimidation, harassment or abusive conduct. (4) The following persons, when engaged in electoral advertising, must comply with the Advertising Code— (a) registered political parties, (b) members of the House of Commons, (c) members of any local authority in any part of the United Kingdom, (d) members of the Greater London Assembly, (e) candidates or prospective candidates at a United Kingdom general election, by-election, local authority election, Greater London Authority election or mayoral election, (f) recognised third parties within the meaning of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, and (g) election agents within the meaning of the Representation of the People Act 1983. (5) The Committee may, by written notice, require a person to provide information or documents reasonably required for the purposes of investigating a suspected breach of the Advertising Code. (6) A person must comply with a requirement under subsection (5) unless the person has a reasonable excuse. (7) If, on an application by the Committee, a court is satisfied that a person has failed to comply with a requirement under subsection (5), the court may make an order requiring the person to provide the Committee with— (a) information referred to in the notice, and (b) other information which the court is satisfied the Committee requires. (8) Where the Committee considers that electoral advertising is inconsistent with the Advertising Code, it may take the following steps which it considers reasonable to secure compliance— (a) issuing a notice requiring the person responsible to amend, withdraw or substantiate the advertising within a specified period, (b) publishing a formal finding of non-compliance on its website [and in the repository of political adverts], (c) requiring the publication of a correction, clarification or updated version of the advertising with similar prominence where practicable, (d) notifying relevant online services or publishers and requesting prompt suspension or removal of advertising during the regulated period, and (e) referring repeated or serious breaches to the Electoral Commission to impose civil sanctions in accordance with its powers under Schedule 19C to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. (9) In deciding whether to impose a civil sanction under subsection (8)(e), the Electoral Commission must have regard to— (a) the findings and recommendations of the Committee, and (b) any enforcement action taken in relation to the same conduct under any other enactment. (10) Where the Electoral Commission imposes a civil sanction following a referral from the Committee, it must publish a notice setting out— (a) the nature of the breach, (b) the sanction imposed, and (c) the reasons for the sanction. (11) A person on whom a civil sanction is imposed under subsection (8)(e) may appeal in accordance with the appeal provisions under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. (12) Failure to comply with the Campaign Code or the Advertising Code does not of itself give rise to criminal liability.” This new clause is connected to NC61 to NC63.

The new clause, tabled by the hon. Member for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland (Luke Myer), proposes creating a new offence of misleading the public by candidates in a parliamentary election campaign. We are witnessing a proliferation of disinformation with a concurrent rise in distrust among the public. A recent survey by Ipsos MORI found that just 11% of the UK public trust politicians to tell the truth. That is clearly problematic and, unlike in advertising, finance or medicine, there is no legally enforceable standard of requiring truthfulness from those who hold or seek public office. Ministers are not allowed to lie, but, under the current situation, candidates can. This lack of accountability does, unfortunately, create an incentive to deceive. As the old saying goes, a lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is still putting on its shoes. This legal vacuum has, unfortunately, enabled far-right figures to weaponise disinformation. It has enabled foreign powers to covertly manipulate elections and policy, and manipulation of voters through false factual claims has changed the landscape of the nation. There are already examples of that, including Brexit and campaign tactics in previous elections. New clause 59 aims to protect voters from political deception by holding parliamentary candidates accountable for acts intentionally designed to mislead the public or manipulate voting in their favour. A similar measure is already provided for in the Government’s Public Office (Accountability) Bill. That creates a new offence of misleading the public, which will cover public officials. The parallel measure in new clause 59 will ensure that candidates are included in a similar provision and cannot use deliberate deception to win public office. As it happens, the Welsh Government have recently introduced equivalent legislation to create an offence of deliberate deception by candidates. Westminster would not be acting alone, and the new clause would provide consistency across Britain. This would not be a law to punish genuine mistakes, misspeaking and so forth, or to restrict legitimate political rhetoric. It would not cover manifestos, as a manifesto is a statement of intent. It would not create a new area of law, but merely extend it to plug the gaping loophole of political deception by applying existing legal principles. The new clause includes safeguards to ensure fairness, such as a high legal threshold for wrongdoing and a defence for those acting with reasonable excuse. Its phrasing ensures that the threshold for wrongdoing is high. It applies only to conduct that is “seriously improper,” so it targets deliberate misinformation campaigns, major false claims that could influence voters and manipulative or dishonest campaign tactics that are falsely used to steer voters towards a particular decision. There is overwhelming public support for this measure. A petition on this issue has more than 200,000 signatures, and polling by Opinium shows that 72% of voters support it. Further research by Survation found that a majority of voters in every single party is in favour of it. This measure would go some way to help repair trust in our politics, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response. I will briefly speak to new clauses 61 to 64, tabled by the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Bromborough (Justin Madders). New clause 61 would introduce a code of conduct for political campaigning and put that on a statutory footing. There is already widespread agreement that we need a code of conduct for political campaigning—that was a recommendation from the Speaker’s Conference last year. The Government have committed to establishing a code of conduct for campaigns following that recommendation, and the Electoral Commission has absolutely welcomed this. I draw colleagues’ attention to one of the evidence sessions at the Speaker’s Conference last year, in which Labour’s executive director of governance and legal highlighted the question of whether the code of conduct should be statutory. He said: “A code might be helpful in setting a public benchmark of acceptable behaviour…ultimately, you would probably want it to be enforceable in some way, and then the question would be, is it appropriate to put that on a statutory footing? Is there a possibility of agreeing something?” I ask the Minister to consider that we have an excellent opportunity to put it on a statutory footing in this Bill to ensure that that code of conduct, which is so widely recognised as being absolutely necessary as per the recommendations of the Speaker’s Conference, has the force of primary legislation behind it. New clause 62 is about an electoral advertising code of practice. We have already discussed issues relating to electoral advertising, and I have shared with the Committee my huge concerns about the regulation of online political advertising in particular and the urgent need for a real-time political adverts library. This new clause is more general. It is frankly unclear why ads for commercial products are held to greater account than ads that move votes and affect election outcomes. Fundamentally, that seems weird, unequal and deeply problematic. The organisation Reform Political Advertising has been campaigning very effectively, long and hard, in this area. In the 2024 London mayoral election, for example, it trailed a factual accuracy code, which seven London mayoral candidates, including Sadiq Khan and the Green and Liberal Democrat candidates, signed up to, and others supported. International precedent also exists. Regulation of factual claims in electoral advertising has been in place in New Zealand for several decades, with cross-party support.

For the benefit of the Committee, will the hon. Lady briefly set out who—it could be a body or an individual—would be the appropriate judge of factual accuracy? I am sure all political parties have been on the receiving end of the famous Lib Dem bar chart, which says, in tiny letters underneath, “Survey of 10 people we asked in the pub last night.” It could be argued that it was factually accurate, based on that very dubious source. How will we ensure that, where there is some dispute about the facts, there is a sufficient degree of independence in arbitrating that question?

I refer the hon. Gentleman to the very next new clause on the selection list, which engages with precisely that question. In addition to New Zealand, there are similar rules about the regulation of political advertising in Australia. On the question of who will adjudicate, there is currently no independent body with the power to adjudicate on the truthfulness or accuracy of non-broadcast political advertising. That is an issue. Provision has been made in the new clauses for a separation: the code of practice would be established by the Electoral Commission and the oversight of the decision making—the adjudication—would be done by a different body. The 2020 report by the Lords Democracy and Digital Technologies Committee, “Digital Technology and the Resurrection of Trust”, called for a regulatory committee on political advertising that would involve relevant experts from the Advertising Standards Authority, the Electoral Commission, Ofcom and the UK Statistics Authority, who would co-operate through a regulatory committee on political advertising. Political parties would then work with those regulators to develop a code of practice, along with appropriate sanctions, that restricts fundamentally inaccurate advertising during a parliamentary or mayoral election or referendum. The Lords Committee recommends that that regulatory committee should adjudicate breaches of the code, and that is effectively what new clause 63 would put in place. “What then would happen about sanctions?” I hear hon. Members ask. Well, that takes us on to new clause 64, which again creates a separation. It would establish an enforcement framework and enable the Electoral Commission to impose civil sanctions for breaches of the advertising code, basically according to a ladder of increasing seriousness. I warmly recommend the new clauses to the Government and the Committee. Despite the rapidity of my speech, given the shortness of time, the way that advertising can distort our politics is a crucial issue. I very much hope that the Government will warmly consider the issues, alongside all the other ones that they will hopefully come back to us on at a later stage.

New clause 59 would create a new offence of misleading the public in a parliamentary election campaign, which could be committed by candidates in election campaigns. Unfortunately, that approach risks turning the courts into political fact checkers. It risks undermining public confidence in the judiciary and would create significant freedom of expression concerns. In line with the recommendation from the Speaker’s Conference, we will work with the Conference, the Electoral Commission and political parties to develop a campaigning code of conduct that is fit for purpose and reflects the need of candidates across the political spectrum. I also draw the hon. Member’s attention to section 106 of the Representation of the People Act 1983, which makes it an illegal practice to make or publish a false statement of fact in relation to the personal character or conduct of a candidate the effect of which impacts the election result. I will speak to new clauses 61, 62, 63 and 64 together. These new clauses would amount to a significant expansion of the regulatory framework governing political campaigning and electoral advertising. They would introduce a statutory code of conduct for political campaigning, a statutory electoral advertising code and a new electoral advertising code committee to oversee, adjudicate and enforce compliance with the advertising code, funded through a levy on political parties. We welcomed the recommendation from the Speaker’s Conference to develop a code of conduct for campaigning. We are working with the Speaker, the Electoral Commission and political parties on an approach that is fit for purpose, and that works across the broad range of candidates and campaigners. That work is already under way. Ahead of the May 2026 elections, the Electoral Commission has published a first set of advisory principles for campaigning respectfully and safely. The published principles already address key issues that these new clauses try to address. The Electoral Commission has also made it clear that these principles are the start of that work, rather than the end of it, and, after the May elections it will assess how the principles operated in practice, and use that assessment to inform development of a fuller code of conduct. A non-statutory approach offers the best opportunity for the code to be developed collaboratively, with strong cross-party engagement and sufficient flexibility to ensure that it remains meaningful, and can be refined in the light of experience and developments in campaigning practice over time. It would be better to allow that work to continue and to be evaluated in practice, rather than to prescribe the content and process for an evolving set of codes in the Bill. New clauses 62, 63 and 64 would place regulators in the position of adjudicating factual claims made in the course of political campaigning, an area that is inherently contested and closely connected to political opinion. Although safeguards are included, there remains a real risk of regulatory creep, drawing independent regulators into disputes around policy or political arguments, which can be rebutted by rival campaigners and scrutinised by the press as part of the normal course of political debate. Any reforms in this space must be considered carefully and developed in consultation, in order to ensure that changes to the regulation of political advertising are proportionate, protect freedom of expression and maintain public confidence in the independence and impartiality of regulatory bodies. Therefore, I respectfully ask the hon. Member to withdraw new clause 59.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. New clause, by leave, withdrawn.

On a point of order, Sir Desmond, may I seek your guidance? I know that the hon. Member for North Herefordshire said earlier that, for reasons of time, she did not wish to go into sufficient detail. Can you just confirm to the Committee that we have two further full days of consideration, which are already in everybody’s diaries? I know that the Government Whip declined my suggestion of an adjournment earlier; however, Members should not feel constrained in fully setting out the concerns that they have or the issues that they wish to raise about the Bill, given that—as I understand it and as I have just said—we still have a further two days of consideration available to us.

I can only confirm that there are four more sittings over two days—Tuesday and Thursday of next week. New Clause 66 Electoral Commission: Power to institute criminal proceedings in England and Wales or Northern Ireland “In Schedule 1 to PPERA 2000, leave out sub-paragraph (2)(b).” —(Dr Chowns.) This new clause would remove the prohibition on the Electoral Commission from instituting criminal proceedings in England and Wales and Northern Ireland. Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The new clause would remove the prohibition on the Electoral Commission’s instituting criminal proceedings in England, Wales and Northern Ireland—a capacity that the Electoral Commission previously had, which was removed by the Elections Act 2022. We currently have a bizarre situation where any individual or organisation other than the Electoral Commission can make a private prosecution against breaches of political finance law but the Electoral Commission cannot. That gives rise to a criminal enforcement gap, which is not helped by a lack of investigatory and prosecutorial lead capacity, especially for UK-wide offences. Other similar regulators in the UK can bring criminal proceedings in areas under their auspices, so there is a real question: why not the Electoral Commission? I note that Philip Rycroft dealt with that question in his report and recommended an alternative approach. I have tabled the new clause as a probing amendment to ask the Government to provide more clarification. If we are not going to give these powers to the Electoral Commission, who should take the lead? The status quo is clearly not working. There is an alarming lack of prosecution in this space, going back quite a number of years. The net effect is essentially that people can escape from prosecution. If it is not going to be the Electoral Commission, we need much more investment in the capacities and powers of the police. I understand that we have a situation where the police might not feel that investigations are necessarily in their interest, because the fines that can be charged are not proportionate to the huge amount of police time that might be required to investigate the issues. I would like to hear from the Government how they will address the clear gap in the capacity of the system overall to initiate criminal proceedings on breaches of electoral law. An obvious solution would be to put it through the Electoral Commission. I recognise that Philip Rycroft has a somewhat different view. Will the Government please explain their view?

New clause 66 would remove the prohibition on the Electoral Commission bringing criminal proceedings in England, Wales and Northern Ireland that was introduced in the Elections Act 2022. To be clear, the Electoral Commission has never brought criminal prosecutions, even prior to the changes introduced by the Act. It has a wide range of investigatory powers and is able to impose a variety of civil sanctions for certain offences. The Bill already extends and strengthens those powers to promote more robust and proportionate enforcement. Where criminal investigation and prosecution is required or thought appropriate for certain offences, the Commission refers those cases to the police and the relevant prosecuting authority, who are experts in this domain. The Government recognise the importance of ensuring that electoral law is enforced effectively, and that there is there is public confidence in the system of regulation governing political finance. That is why we commissioned the Rycroft review. As the hon. Member for North Herefordshire pointed out, the review looked specifically at criminal enforcement arrangements and concluded it entirely appropriate that criminal investigations are handled by the police, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland. The review noted that it would be unnecessary and potentially counterproductive for the Electoral Commission to have a prosecutorial role; it would require significant investment in specialist expertise that might be deployed only sporadically. Furthermore, although the Electoral Commission must enforce electoral law without fear or favour, it must also engage constructively with campaigners to help them to comply with the rules. Rycroft noted that it would be difficult for the Electoral Commission to maintain that constructive regulatory role with political parties if it were also pursuing criminal prosecutions. Given the review’s findings on this issue, we do not think that any changes are needed to the Electoral Commission’s role. We will respond fully to the Rycroft review in due course and consider whether any other legislative changes are necessary in line with its findings. I request that the hon. Member for North Herefordshire withdraw the new clause.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. Clause, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 75 Power to make consequential provision Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Clauses 76 to 81 stand part. Government amendment 21.

I turn to the final clauses in the Bill, which make general provisions and are standard practice for a Bill. Given the hour, I do not intend to go through each of the remaining clauses individually and will move them formally. As I have stated, they are standard practice and necessary provisions. We have also already debated and accepted new clause 14, which Government amendment 21 relates to. I therefore urge Members to accept all of these general provisions, as well as the consequential Government amendment 21. Question put and agreed to. Clause 75 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 76 to 79 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 80 Commencement Amendment proposed: 33, in clause 80, page 100, line 15, at end insert— “(1A) Part 1 does not come into force until the Secretary of State has laid a report before both Houses of Parliament that reviews why the age at which it would become legal to vote in parliamentary general elections should differ from the following— (a) the age of majority in the Family Law Act 1969; (b) any minimum ages specified in law which the Secretary of State considers appropriate to review.”—(Paul Holmes.) This amendment would prevent Part 1 of the Act coming into force until the Secretary of State had undertaken a review of the consistency of the age of majority with the age of voting set out in this Act. Question put, That the amendment be made.

Clause 80 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 81 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Title

Amendment made: 21, in title, line 9, after “purposes;” insert

“to repeal provision about the designation of a strategy and policy statement for the Electoral Commission;”.—(Samantha Dixon.)

This amendment is consequential on NC14.

Bill, as amended, to be reported.

Committee rose.

Written evidence reported to the House

RPB52 Open Britain (further submission)

RPB53 Association of Colleges

RPB54 Fairness Foundation