Thank you, Minister, for appearing in front of the Committee. Would you like to introduce yourself? Perhaps Dr Dixon can introduce himself as well.

I am Hamish Falconer, the Minister for the Middle East.

I am Rob Dixon, the director for middle east and north Africa in the FCDO.

July marks one year since the publication of the Committee’s report on Israel and Palestine. This session is a follow-up on the recommendations issued to the Government and to find out more about the current situation in the middle east because, although we wrote the report a year ago, so much has happened since then. There is a certain amount of reference to the report but you will obviously understand that we also want to refer to the current situation. Q1 I will start with some of that. In the Government’s response to our report, you agreed to many of our recommendations and I wondered how many of them you were tracking progress against. Clearly some of them happened immediately—the recognition of Palestine and the whole initiative in relation to peace—but we made a number of other recommendations that we believe that you agreed you would deal with. We are not sure how many of those you have actually been able to progress.

I am happy to speak recommendation by recommendation. You know that we accepted some of them but not all of them. On those we accepted, I think we have made reasonable progress. I can imagine there may be some that you wish to press me on in particular. I am very happy to go into the detail if that would be useful.

Sure. Sorry; I do not mean to catch you out. The one I am thinking about particularly—because not only does this Committee feel strongly about it but the previous iteration of the Committee wanted the same thing—is the recommendation for a hostages envoy. The Government highlighted the Prime Minister’s response from PMQs on 16 July 2025, where he said that the Government were “working at pace” on the appointment of a hostages envoy. A year on, is there any update?

There is. I am slightly keen not to steal the sandwiches of the Foreign Secretary, who I think is before you next week and is keen.

Okay. We will ask her.

I can confirm that an appointment has been made, arrangements are well in place and I know the Foreign Secretary is looking forward to giving you a fuller update next week. But I recognise it has taken us some time to get the right appointments and the right arrangements in place. I am satisfied that we do now have the right appointment and the right arrangements; the Foreign Secretary will be able to walk you through them next week.

On things that are taking a long time, I would like to also ask you—and you will not be surprised to hear this because I ask you about it a lot—about the ban on goods and services to settlements and the ban on the sale of goods to the UK. We have a trade agreement with Israel wherein Israel is entitled to tariff preferences, but the west bank is excluded from that. Presumably, for the purposes of that trade agreement, the UK is able to distinguish between settlement goods and non-settlement goods, so why can we not just continue that when it comes to a ban on goods from the west bank?

That is obviously a very important issue. Is it helpful if I set out a little bit about some of the difficulties that we believe are involved, both in the current arrangements and going further, and what some of our partners have done? I will then give you as straightforward an answer as I can.

I think my question was that, specifically: if we can do it on a trade deal, why can we not do it otherwise? The next question is: has anybody told you it cannot be done? Has anybody told you that it can be done? Why is it that other countries think that it can be done but we are taking so long to do anything?

The difficulty, both with the current arrangements and any suggestion about changing them, is that, although very clear provisions are in place in our trading arrangements both with green line Israel—the area that is internationally recognised—and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, there is a reasonable concern that there may not be full adherence with that distinction, particularly by the settlers living in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. We can all see the rhetoric in Israel about the status of Judea and Samaria or greater Israel, depending on the language used. There is a concern both in the British Government and other Governments—

Let me just cut across you, because, when it comes to the trade deal, you say that you have a risk-based approach to verify the origin of imported goods, which sometimes requires enhanced documentation. You are dealing with this issue on trade.

We are dealing with this issue. I hope I was clear in front of the Chamber last week that I am working in detail on this question. I am not saying for one second that it is impossible. You asked me directly, “Can it be done?”, and I believe that it can be done. There are three questions in my mind. One is enforceability—there are enforceability issues because this is a complex area and everyone who has sought to implement a ban of this kind has faced enforceability issues. There is an effectiveness issue. I worry about over-compliance, and in any measure that we take in the Foreign Office or in HMG, you can have unintended consequences. There have been a number of concerns raised, which I am sure you will be aware of, about what the unintended consequences of further bans or sanctions may be. There is also an issue about making sure that if we put in place further measures, we are absolutely sure that we can then enforce those measures. For reasons that will be obvious to the Committee, there are a huge number of Israeli politicians, organisations or entities, many of whom we have now sanctioned—

We have sanctioned two politicians.

We have sanctioned two Ministers, and we have done four rounds of sanctions. There clearly exists within Israeli society people who do not accept the green line distinctions that we do. If we put in place measures—as I say, we are doing advanced and detailed work on those questions—I want to make sure that they can be enforced effectively.

The Department for Business and Trade has been doing this for a long time, since we had the trade agreement with Israel, not with the west bank. Are you saying that it is not effective or that it is not possible to copy what it has been doing? There is precedent with the trade deal that we have with Israel.

You all will have seen this in the Chamber; there are reasons why we might believe, particularly at the moment, that there are elements of Israeli society that would seek to circumvent the distinction we make between Occupied Palestinian Territories and their views about that territory. We have arrangements in place both because of the DBT provisions and the HMRC enforcement that underpins it, but obviously I respond very much when hon. Members raised with me concerns about whether that enforcement is happening fully. I am also conscious that if I take further measures, I must make sure that they are enforceable.

Do you think that there are lessons to learn from the way in which we stopped trade with Crimea when it was occupied? We stopped trade with Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk—we have done that recently. Obviously, now we have stopped trade with Russia completely, but there was a time when we continued trading with Russia but not with occupied territories. Surely, there are lessons to learn from that. If we can do that in Russia, and other countries can do that with Israel, why can’t we?

Across all our regimes there are lessons to learn horizontally. We learn a lot from implementing any new measure. There are obvious reasons why we would be more anxious about unintended consequences in relation to Israel than we would in relation to Russia. As you said, we have gone yet further since the Crimea measures and taken yet further measures against the Russian economy, not just in relation to Russia but elsewhere too.

Are you saying that if the Israelis were to seek to get round our laws, we would have problems?

To be really clear, I was saying just now that there are legitimate and reasonable concerns from the British Jewish community that, if we were to take steps that were crude and untargeted, that could have unintended consequences on the lives of a community who are already under considerable pressure. I do take that seriously for obvious reasons. What I am saying is that, in any measures that we take internationally, it is good, for reasons of values, principles and signals, to do things. But I also want to make sure that our methods can be properly enforced, and I am conscious, from our wider experience, of the kind of difficulties we might encounter. Obviously we will try to work through those.

Surely the value is this: we recognise Palestine and we recognise Israel clearly. We see that they are two separate countries. We do not wish to trade with occupied territories—we have made that clear. If the Israeli Government compromise that by not paying attention to our rules, and there are consequences for Israel as a result, that is not our fault. That is the Israeli Government’s fault for trying to get around our laws. Surely that is the right approach.

Anyone who tries to get around our arrangements and our laws would obviously face the consequences of that. That does not remove, for me, the responsibility to try to make sure that any further steps we take are carefully crafted.

May I ask you about one other topic? It is about the conflict and security monitoring unit, which I understand has 26,000 different instances in its database of things that have happened in Palestine, Gaza and Lebanon. I understand that the funding for that has now stopped or is about to stop. There is also the stopping of the work of the international humanitarian law unit. As I understand it, the Prime Minister has told us that that work will be done by a different team under the restructuring. Given that both of those units are being closed, who is taking on responsibility, because the union tells us that nobody else is?

I might turn to Dr Dixon in a moment to explain how the internal arrangements of the Foreign Office are structured now. When we came in, there were a range of different ways in which those questions were looked at. There have since been two changes: one to where the unit sits, which I will ask Dr Dixon to explain. I can confirm again to the Committee that we continue to make the kind of IHL assessments on which so much of our policy rests. Then there is a more specific instance. We had a third-party contractor providing open-source analysis and monitoring for us. That contract came to an end, but I want to reassure the Chair that we are not reliant on third-party contracts for officials to give Ministers proper advice against the legal tests that we worry about.

It isn’t just that—at some stage there must be a reckoning. There will need to be an international hearing into any breaches of international humanitarian law, and we will have a responsibility, along with many other countries, to provide evidence. My concern is that the closure of those units might mean that we lose some of that evidence.

I might ask Dr Dixon just to talk about the arrangements internally.

The skills, capability and capacity that we have had hitherto in the international humanitarian law unit have been preserved and moved over into another team—

What team is that?

It is being moved into the export licensing team—ECJU—so that, as we look at export licences, we also have embedded within that team the expertise on international humanitarian law. We also get from that continuing capability the ability to look at, on a periodic basis, Israel’s continued compliance, or otherwise, with international humanitarian law. The capability has very much been retained, as have the skills and a number of those individuals, but it has been moved into a different team as part of the wider restructuring going on within the office at the moment.

Just for the sake of completeness, and then I will let other Members ask questions, because many want to do so, I have asked only about goods going out. Presumably you are also looking at goods and services going in. That means finance and insurance for things such as the settlements. Are we also looking at stopping that, as opposed to what we are doing at the moment, which is giving general advice to companies not to do it?

I am obviously not in a position to make a further announcement this afternoon. You asked me in the Chamber last week about some of the other measures taken by European countries. Those are, I think, exclusively focused on goods. I am, of course, focused on services as well, not least because of the discussions we have all had over recent weeks, which include things such as insurance, advertising, property and so on. I am conscious that any goods measure is going to miss some of the areas in which concern has reasonably been expressed in recent times.

Thank you.

Yesterday you made a public statement about Dr Hussam Abu Safiya, the director of Kamal Adwan hospital. He has been in Israeli detention for 18 months, held without charge. His lawyer has said that there is a tangible danger to life. We know that his case is not isolated. UN experts have told us detention and torture of Gaza’s medics is part of an ongoing destruction of its healthcare system. I read this morning they are using the term medicide, which is a feature of genocide. You said you have raised the case again with Israeli authorities. What exactly has been their response?

This case is concerning both for the gentleman in question, who has been detained without charge as you say—

A doctor.

A doctor, and he is entitled to basic rights that we believe in anywhere and everywhere. But his case is, as you say, not isolated. There is a range of cases which we have raised with the Israeli Government repeatedly, which I have myself raised repeatedly, where no satisfactory update or answer is provided. That gives rise to a wider worry for us. When I first became the Middle East Minister two years ago, I believed that the Israeli justice system was sufficiently rigorous and independent from Israeli politics that steps could be taken to ensure, in most cases, that justice and accountability could be seen. That has obviously been a concern now, not just for Palestinians but for others as well. Three British nationals were killed in the World Central Kitchen incident. I have repeatedly raised, at every single available level and on every available opportunity, justice and accountability for British aid workers killed in the course of their duties having coordinated extensively with the IDF before doing so. Whether it is in relation to Dr Safiya or the World Central Kitchen case, there is an obvious and growing concern that the independence of the accountability mechanisms in Israel is proving to be woeful.

Thank you for continuing to press for his and other aid workers’ and medics’ and professionals’ release, but what possible response could the Israeli authorities provide you with? Strongly worded letters or our representations are not being met. What options do you now have left to further press for his release?

To be clear, what options do we have—we seek of Israel what we seek of all our partners, which is basic rule of law standards. We particularly raise those issues in relation to British nationals, as you would expect, but where even our friends and allies fall short of the standards that we would expect, we would continue to raise that diplomatically. If you are asking me do we have levers or options to insist on his release, or that he be charged, or that he see his lawyer more regularly, no we don’t. That is not the way that the international treaties are framed, but we will raise our voice on these questions of justice and accountability whenever we feel we must.

Earlier this year I wrote to you about the Israeli death penalty law and the system of legal apartheid that Palestinians are facing. You said in your response to me that the Government are “deeply concerned by the reports of mistreatment of detainees” and you went on to talk about the 1949 Geneva conventions. Since 7 October 2023, the ICRC has not been able to visit any Palestinian detainees in Israeli places of detention. That includes detainees like Dr Abu Safiya. Do you agree that in its treatment of detainees, Israel is very clearly violating international humanitarian law?

We have called repeatedly on the Israelis to provide access to the ICRC. The ICRC has a vital role. Where they are provided access, it makes it much easier to argue that that access must be true across both or all sides of a conflict. I am worried, as someone who spent a considerable part of my adult of life in places where conflicts are ongoing, that the access of the ICRC and the basic norms of international humanitarian law are being increasingly unadhered to. You asked me what my assessment is. We assessed shortly after arriving in Government that there was a real risk that the Israeli Government were in breach of international humanitarian law. That risk has not got any better over the last two years.

So what is our response to such excessive and systemic violations? If we have sanctioned Ministers, what is our response for this?

We talk often about what further measures the British Government will take in response to concerns, which often could be described as concerns about international humanitarian law. I think the underlying thing that I have said to this Committee every time I am before it, and that I say to the House every time I am before it, is while the situation remains as bleak as it is, while it has not changed, we will continue to take measures. Now over the two years I have been the Middle East Minister, at different times we have discussed different measures—whether it is the sanctions you referred to, the settlement goods that the Chair just raised with me, issues about settler violence. We will continue to take measures until the situation changes.

You have said “increasingly concerned” about breaches of IHL by Israel. If there were to be a league table of countries you were concerned were potentially breaching IHL, how many countries would be above Israel?

I think that is an impossible question to answer on the fly. There are, as I referenced earlier, many features of the Israeli system of Government that are admirable. It is admirable that they have public scrutiny. It is admirable that they have a judiciary that, even this week, is becoming an irritant to their Government. We, as the British Government, do not always agree with the findings of our courts, but it is incredibly important that those separations remain.

I did not ask if they are a democracy or not; I asked about breaches of IHL.

In the summer of 2024, we tried to set out as clearly as we could why we made the judgment that there was a risk of breaches, but on almost all of the questions that we presented to Parliament, there has been little comfort subsequently. I would have taken much more comfort if, in some of those incidents we are discussing now, we had seen material progress—or if I had some answer for the families of the World Central Kitchen incident about what the Israeli system has done to ensure they get justice. Answers have I none, so my concerns are obviously raised as a consequence.

I interrupted you, Uma.

That was a great question, Chair. Minister, I have a final question for you, in the same vein. The UK is penholder on the UN security council resolution 2286 demanding the protection of wounded and sick individuals, medical personnel and humanitarian workers during armed conflict. We have seen doctors rounded up in Gaza during military operations and being subject to detention. I have given you one very prominent example, but this has happened to more than 500 healthcare workers. What steps are the UK taking to pursue meaningful accountability, including in our role as penholder?

The pattern of incidents in relation to hospitals is well known. We have raised it repeatedly and directly in multilateral forums. As you know, we took a different position in relation to the ICC and the ICJ than the Government that preceded us, so we removed the block on the ICC process going forward. For the question of specific crimes against doctors or anybody else, it is right that those international mechanisms, or indeed Israel’s own accountability mechanisms, take place. It is impossible for us to prosecute a case from the UK about what is happening in Gaza, for obvious reasons, but these issues remain right at the heart of the day-to-day deliberations of the Foreign Office. We see the reports that everybody else does; indeed, we see even more. I have met NHS doctors who have returned from Gaza. I have heard, in detail, the testimony on the difficulties of providing even the very basics of healthcare in Gaza. I imagine the Committee may want to ask me about some of the medical evacuation work, which we are continuing, later. But one of the reasons why that work is so important is because of the restrictions and the difficulties facing doctors in Gaza.

What is the UK Government's position on the Gaza peace plan?

The 20-point plan is absolutely vital. It is the way in which we can navigate these terrible scenes. We support it; it includes many vital provisions, including in relation to phase 1, that need to be implemented, not least in relation to the free flow of aid into Gaza. It includes, particularly in the higher numbers in the plan, really important signposts to a more peaceful future, including a two-state solution and a Palestinian state following the reform of the PA. We think the 20-point plan is absolutely vital. I imagine, Mr Foord, you may come on to some areas where we have not taken a full part, such as the Board of Peace, which we have not joined, but I would not want that to take away from the fullness of our support for the 20-point plan—it is the route out.

You mentioned the Board of Peace. In what circumstances would the British Government join the Board of Peace?

It is a legally binding treaty, but this House, understandably, has very significant considerations of scrutiny about those kinds of questions. We have all seen the nature of the Board of Peace arrangements, but we did not judge them appropriate to join. We will return to the House if our minds change about that, but we have no plans.

What was it about the Board of Peace that made you come to that conclusion?

I encourage you to read it yourself, and you can probably draw your own conclusions about why HMG decided not to sign.

I am asking you, as a Minister of HMG.

I do not want to be drawn. Others, including close friends and partners of ours, have joined the Board of Peace, so I do not want to be drawn. I have been clear what our decision was, and I have tried to provide a rationale for that decision, but I am not that keen to get drawn into a line-by-line critique of an arrangement that others have joined.

If we were minded to join the Board of Peace, would there be a debate in Parliament first?

I cannot say, Chair, as you know, how Parliament would decide to deliberate about something. Let me tell you that I am under no illusions about the likely strength of feeling in the House of Commons, and indeed elsewhere, were we to consider such a thing. The Government would, I am sure, not wish to proceed anywhere near that without testing the views of Parliament.

Thinking about the Gaza peace plan, what aspects of it do you consider to have been successful?

We have to be straightforward about the fact that while very considerable suffering remains in Gaza, the ceasefire has led to a significant reduction in violence. That is not to say that the situation is perfect in Gaza, far from it. We read reports every day of the suffering that is still faced, but we must not elide in any way how much worse it was when the conduct of hostilities was so much more active, with so many more people being killed and so much more being destroyed. There are what we would describe as two sets of phase 1 issues in the 20-point plan, which are necessary to get much further into it, and on which we would have wished to see more progress. One is aid into Gaza, with still not enough getting in and children, among others, suffering as a consequence. The other phase 1 issue is the disarmament of Hamas, on which too little progress has still been made. We remain focused on those questions.

When you compare the situation now to that 18 months ago, and you describe it as being so much less violent now than then, it is all relative, isn’t it? I mean, 738 Palestinian civilians were killed between 10 October 2025 and 10 April 2026, according to the UN. I wonder what you consider to have been the shortcomings of the Gaza peace plan.

What we want to see from the Gaza peace plan is a significant increase in the quantum of aid getting into Gaza. There is often a discussion about the number of trucks, but the real question underlying that is also about the quality of aid. When we were talking about healthcare provision earlier, it is vital that the right equipment, medicines and personnel can get in, in order to provide the care that is necessary. We also want Hamas to engage seriously in a disarmament process, which must involve a path to governance of Gaza for Gazans. We support the work of both the Palestinian Authority and the NCAG, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza. It was welcome news this week that Hamas has said that it will no longer play any role in the governance of Gaza. It has stepped back formally, but what we now need to see is an arrangement in Gaza that can provide for the needs of Gazans. We still see horrifying footage, many days of the week, of the outstanding need for considerably more aid, security and dignity for the people of Gaza.

In May, you talked in the House of Commons Chamber about the humanitarian restrictions on aid being imposed by Israel and that they really must end. What has the FCDO—what have you—been doing to bring about an end to those restrictions?

We have repeatedly lobbied the Israeli Government on those questions. We have done so directly. We have done so in company. We have raised it with our friends and partners who have close relations with Israel. There has been a large-scale effort, not just by the UK but by many in the international community, to try to ensure that the aid required for Gaza gets in, and there are still very considerable outstanding frustrations with the Israeli Government, given their conduct.

With UK aid cuts, we have seen a ringfence to preserve for conflict areas in the world. Palestine is one of those. I wonder if that ringfence—that preservation of UK aid—pertains to Gaza in particular, or whether that is Palestine in the round. Is it specifically about maintaining UK aid to Gaza?

It is intended to ensure that we can continue to play our full part in Gaza. Obviously, should needs in the west bank or elsewhere increase, we would respond to that as well, but yes, it was primarily driven by concerns about the situation in Gaza. The needs there have been much higher than in any other part of Palestine.

We made considerable contributions last year. My expectation is that we will contribute within the same range again this coming year. As the Minister said, should the need change in respect of the west bank, we have that flexibility across the programme, but the overwhelming proportion of the programme is devoted to Gaza.

In October last year, US CENTCOM—Central Command—set up a Civil-Military Co-ordination Centre, and there were some reports at the beginning of May that that might close. I just wondered what you know about the potential closure of the Civil-Military Co-ordination Centre. If it were to close, what might follow in its place?

We have heard the same speculation, but nothing has materialised yet. We have continued to stay in close contact with the CMCC all the way through to get a better understanding and to try to influence the flow of humanitarian goods into Gaza through that, but as yet I think it remains speculation as to what will happen with the future of the CMCC and whether there will be a change to the wider international arrangements.

One of the recommendations in the Committee’s report on Israel and Palestine was to recognise the state of Palestine. There was disagreement within the Committee about immediate recognition, and I was personally concerned because it was unconditional, with no requirements placed on Hamas to disarm or on the Palestinian Authority to engage in governance reforms or hold elections. I wonder whether you could set out what impact you think that recognition has had on making tangible progress in the region to move towards a two-state solution.

Since I was last in front of the Committee we took the decision to recognise, and yet for all the reasons that we have just discussed, the situation in Palestine still remains very, very bleak for so many Palestinians. None the less, I think recognition was both the right thing to do and an important thing to do, because the prospect of two states is ultimately the very kernel of the idea that will get us from the terrible situation that we are currently in into a more secure and more stable region. I think every effort that has been taken to seek to circumvent that central issue has not succeeded. I recognise the degree of anxiety that people feel that the UK has recognised a Palestinian state, and yet in so many practical elements that Palestinian state does not exist. One of the most important things that we did, as a country with a long association with the region, is set out that not only do we believe that a two-state solution is necessary, but we will take the practical diplomatic action to recognise both of those states. I hope that soon we will be in a position where both states are real entities—where a Palestinian state can provide for the Palestinian people and where we can see two countries side by side living in peace and security. The fact that we have not made the progress I would have liked to have seen in the last year was probably not unanticipated. When we took the decision to recognise, it was in part because we could see that that prospect was slipping ever further away. We were seeking to protect a path to two states. I hope that we make progress soon, but even if we do not, I think it is still none the less the right thing to give the Palestinians and the region hope that two states can still exist.

I think that the concern was about timing and how to maximise the influence that we could have from making that decision. A report by The Jewish Chronicle set out that high-level communications between the UK and Israel are non-existent. What is your assessment of the impact, if any, from the decision to recognise the state of Palestine on UK-Israeli bilateral relations?

In speaking to this Committee, I cannot escape the obvious acknowledgement that the relationship between myself and my Israeli counterparts, and indeed between other Ministers in the British and Israeli Governments, are obviously not strong at the moment. Even before I came before this Committee last time, I had announced to Parliament the intention to sanction two Israeli Ministers. It was obviously foreseen that doing so would end up having an impact on the character and nature of our relationship with the Israeli Government. I think those were necessary steps and they have now also been taken by other countries. As I said in the Chamber last week, I hope, following the Israeli election, that we find it easier to talk to our Israeli counterparts and that there is more of a common view between Britain and Israel about what needs to happen next, what rights should be afforded to the Palestinians, what progress needs to be made on the 20-point plan and the very considerable areas of common interest, whether that is in relation to the regional threat of Iran or other things. However, I cannot escape, in answering the Committee, a pretty straightforward assessment that my relationship with the Israeli Government has got worse over my time as Middle East Minister.

Thank you. I just wanted to ask a few questions around funding that goes towards the Palestinian Authority. Could you set out how much Government funding has been given to the PA since the election back in July 2024 and what conditions or performance benchmarks might be attached to that funding?

On the specifics, I might turn to Dr Dixon so that I do not mangle the numbers.

We can give you further details on the specific lines of activity, but there are a number of areas where we contribute to the Palestinian Authority, particularly around healthcare provision and core salary for members of the Palestinian Authority. You will recognise that the Palestinian Authority is under significant pressure as a result of the suspension of transfers of revenues and tax receipts. Therefore, we, along with others in the international community, have stepped in to provide some of that core funding. There are a number of areas, and I am sure you may come on to this, where we do not provide funding. Those are areas where there has been controversy in the past around education and curricula, for instance. We are very clear that we do not put money into the Palestinian Authority in those particular areas. There are clear parameters, but much of our money is focused on the core provision for keeping the Palestinian Authority functioning.

To clarify, from my own understanding, are you saying that there are certain things you may or may not fund, but that there are not any conditions in relation to the funding that you do give?

We have quite a wide-ranging relationship with the Palestinian Authority in terms of the conversation around the reform and change that we want to see. As part of that programmatic relationship there are expectations about how that money will be used and clear monitoring of that. There is then a wider conversation and support for the process of reform within the Palestinian Authority. There are also areas where we do not contribute core funding.

Have you ever withheld or reduced funding because you feel that conditions have not been met, or has that not occurred?

We have, yes.

Can you give a specific example?

Where we felt that there has not been rapid enough progress on issues that are important, we have chosen not to make further disbursements. It is worth setting out that, for our relationship with the Palestinian Authority, we signed quite a wide-ranging MOU in early 2025, which had a series of reform expectations in it. There are other arrangements, too, that press on particular areas. I have had a number of exchanges in the House with some of your colleagues about the education curriculum reforms. The European Union has been leading a programme going year by year through the curricula to try to make sure that any antisemitic references are removed. I am grateful to your colleagues for sending me examples of concern where they think that the process has not been adequately thorough. As part of the special high-level UN conference on Israel-Palestine last summer, a set of further commitments was set out by the PA President to the French and Saudi co-chairs of the conference—both a commitment to reform and commitments about what a future Palestinian state would look like. From our perspective, there are other multilateral arrangements, like the European one, of which we are not a direct part but of course we support our European friends in their efforts around education reform, just as we support our American friends in their particular effort to contract auditors, for example, in relation to the welfare system of the Palestinian Authority. That has been the subject of very considerable controversy, which I am sure you will be familiar with. We have our own arrangements in the MOU, and we are also aware of the commitments made by the PA itself to the two chairs of the UN body, so there are a range of areas in which commitments have been made. But I can hear from your question that you want a specific breakdown, and I will provide it to you in writing.

That would be really helpful. Thank you. I want to pick up on a couple of the things that you referred to. You referred to the welfare policy, also known as the PA’s “pay for slay” policy. When was the last time you raised that directly with the Palestinian Authority? Also, to follow on from Dr Dixon’s answer, can I confirm that no UK taxpayer money is directly or indirectly supporting those arrangements?

On your first question about when we last raised welfare reform, it would have been a maximum of six weeks ago. I raise it very regularly with my Palestinian counterparts; I will see them again next week, and I am sure we will discuss it again. On the question about education, I am pretty sure that that is the case. [Interruption.] It is a yes to your second question.

In relation to “pay for slay”, I was saying: does no money, directly or indirectly, go to it?

No. You will probably be aware that there is now a contracted US firm that will be conducting a full audit of the PA welfare system, to try to address some of the concerns to which you have alluded.

You have talked about audits, and in written answers you have referred to an independent audit of the PA’s reforms. Can you give us an update on the progress of that audit and any of its findings?

The audit that I have just referred to is specifically about the welfare system. It is a US programme. As I recall, it started relatively recently; I do not know quite when it is due to wrap up. Dr Dixon, do you know when it is due?

I cannot recall.

As I say, it is not an HMG initiative; it is a USG initiative, so it will be for them to determine which way they want to share the findings. I will provide you with any update I can when I write to you about the other funding.

I just want to follow up on my colleague’s question. You characterised the relationship between UK Ministers and the Israeli Government as being very bad after the sanctions. Would you say that the UK’s influence on Israeli actions in the west bank, Gaza and Lebanon has materially changed in any way, shape or form, prior or subsequent to the decision to sanction? The relationship may be slightly worse, but has it changed our ability to influence any outcome or change the behaviour of the current Israeli Administration in any way?

I would not characterise—I think I was being asked about Ministers, so in my answer I focused particularly on sanctions, as it affected two Ministers. But I would say that the whole time I have been the Middle East Minister, which is the whole time we have been in government, there have been serious differences between the British Government and the Israeli Government. I think those differences are the seed of the disagreement, not necessarily the measures themselves. For example, I would not say that before I announced those measures in Parliament my relationship with my Israeli counterparts was on an upward trajectory. There was already a very deep disagreement, which was clear from a whole range of decisions that we had taken up to that point. You ask me the slightly impossible question about how our influence over the Israeli Government has changed over that period. When I became the Middle East Minister, it became obvious that even the previous Government, who did not take many of the measures that I have described in this session, were clearly struggling to have influence over the Israeli Government. I was not in Parliament at the time, but I am sure that my colleagues who were here will remember the appearance of Foreign Office Ministers before Parliament, and there was clearly deep disagreement even then. Whether our influence over Israel has particularly diminished over these two years is a very difficult question to answer. We have had significant disagreements, and the depth of those disagreements has made co-operation and collaboration quite difficult.

I expected that I might be asked about the advisory opinion. [Interruption.] By the Chair, but also by any Committee member. As you have said, we have repeatedly set out substantive views on elements of the advisory opinion. Since the advisory opinion came out, we have taken the very substantive decision indeed to recognise a Palestinian state. I have reread the report that you issued following your previous inquiry and my appearance before you, and we have taken many steps in relation to the substantive questions of recognition, sanctions and everything else. We have probably been more tardy on this one. It is a non-binding advisory opinion. We have taken a whole range of steps, which did not require expressing a further view about the advisory opinion, but I am very conscious that my answer is still overdue, and I hope to give you one very soon. I know we have considered this for some considerable time. There is impatience from the Committee and from the House as a whole for an answer, and I understand that.

I do not want to talk about legal advice, for reasons that you will understand.

I am so sorry to cut in. Last time, you said that you needed “a bit more time” and that you would consider it carefully “with the rigour and the seriousness that it deserves”. You say “a bit more time”; you are going to need to give us an idea. It has been a year. Are we talking a week, a month or another year?

I certainly recognise that another year—

I know you recognise that we are upset about it. I know you recognise that we are getting impatient, but could you just give us an answer?

I am afraid that I am not in a position to give you an answer on what our full view on the advisory opinion is today. I know you will require an answer very soon if we are not to have more of these further uncomfortable exchanges.

We required an answer a year ago. Will we get an answer from the Foreign Secretary, when she appears in front of us next week, as to when it will be? I am not asking for the reply now; I just want to know when we are going to get it. How much longer will it take? It has been more than 700 days. We are a country that adheres to international law; we pride ourselves on that. We have got this opinion from a very important international court, and we are just going, “La la la la la.”

I will certainly tell the Foreign Secretary that you will be keen to discuss this in the next week.

Well, I tried.

That is such a good question, because you cannot possibly look at what is happening in Gaza or the west bank, where we have taken step after step after step, and we have done so not alone but with wide company—and yet, and yet. We see images of children with rodents crawling across their face. We have had repeated accounts of significant malnutrition. A whole range of questions on accountability remain unanswered. I would love to say that if only there were some other UN body, UN provision or international legal provision, this problem could be solved, but I fear that at its heart is the incredibly difficult, but not impossible, problem of persuading both the Israeli Government and indeed the Palestinians to move to a more stable and secure route for each other. That is incredibly hard to do when the depth of our anguish rightly reflects the depth of anguish in Palestine, which is immeasurable. Across my wider patch, I see atrocious situations getting worse and worse, often with much less attention than this one. It all adds to a sense that the international system is not able to enforce the rights of Yemeni children, Gazan children or those people in the west bank who have had their property and their livelihoods completely destroyed and now see absolutely no accountability at all. It falls to diplomacy to try to ensure that people who conduct that kind of activity face some sort of consequence. I know the frustration felt by so many of our constituents is that, despite speeches such as this, they still see terrible images on their TVs.

I have considered envoys, both in relation to Israel- Palestine and in relation to other parts of the middle east. Different countries organise themselves in different ways. For example, the United States has quite a lot of envoys at the moment; we tend to rely more on heads of mission and Ministers. I was not satisfied, when I reviewed the case for having an envoy, that it would materially increase our ability to influence one of the areas. One of the most important things that I have done during my time as Middle East Minister has been to reflect the strength of view in Parliament and the country on these questions. That would be much harder to do were I not as closely associated to Parliament as I am, both by being a Minister and by being a Member myself.

We have talked quite a lot about the increase in violent settlements and the increase in settlements in general, and we have imposed four waves of sanctions relating to that. But to answer your question directly and specifically on the E1, Britain considers the E1 a specific escalation in settlement. It is a measure clearly and directly intended to make a Palestinian state impossible. As I said in my response to the urgent question yesterday, should the Israeli Government advance with it, we and our friends and allies would take tangible action in response.

What does “tangible action” mean? To be fair, Minister, you have talked about tangible action for at least six months—“We are going to take tangible action”—and we still do not see any.

I am sure you would acknowledge, Chair, that we took tangible action in the sanctions just three weeks ago.

Is that what you are talking about, then: more sanctions?

What we talked about specifically at the Head of Government level, in a statement with 11 signatories, was that, should companies seek to take part in the E1 tender process—Dr Dixon will update me if I have got this wrong, but it is rumoured although not yet confirmed that it will be put out for tender in advance of October, which is when the Israeli elections are forecast—there will be consequences across those 11 countries for doing so. I do not want to say in great detail what those consequences might be—each of the 11 countries will have different provisions, and you have heard me say many times why I do not want to speculate on sanctions or other measures in advance of taking them—but we are trying to signal as clearly as possible to those who might be a material part of an E1 project that there would be consequences not just here, but across 11 countries.

I have by no means given up on the idea that the E1 project will be stopped. I think that there are many, many voices in Israel itself who see what a disaster the E1 project would be for Israel, let alone for Palestinians or for the region, so I still have hope that the E1 project will be stopped. I recognise the increasing concern caused by the rumours—I think Dr Dixon will confirm that they are rumours, not yet a formal publication by the Israeli Government. Dr Dixon indicated assent.

But I recognise that if they do formally publish tender dates, that will increase the concern. I remain hopeful that the project can be stopped, because it is absolutely existential for the question of a two-state solution.

I watched the testimony and found it incredibly powerful, all the more so given how moderately it was expressed by them both.

Absolutely, yes.

I have spoken to representatives of the Christian community, including over the Christmas period—I think you heard particularly about restrictions during the Easter period.

At Christmas I had similar conversations. What I thought was particularly beautiful and moving about the testimony you heard was the particular character of Jerusalem, not just to Christians but to a wide range of faiths, and the way the witnesses discussed the status quo and the careful underlying arrangements, including the involvement of Muslim families and so on. That was incredibly moving. The reputation of Israel suffers huge damage overseas when those arrangements are put in question in the way that you heard so movingly last week. It is enormous. I have raised it repeatedly with the Israeli authorities, as have my officials. We have done that directly and in concert. [Interruption.] I think Dr Dixon is drawing my attention to the leaders’ statement of 22 May, when we raised these issues at a leadership level, including the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s custodianship over the holy sites of Jerusalem, which I know your two witnesses raised with you last week.

Minister, some of the Committee were in Lebanon a couple of weeks ago. I am interested in your take on the situation there, and what you think the Israeli actions—the bombings, the clearing of parts of southern Lebanon—have done to Hezbollah’s influence. What, if anything, has it done to improve Israeli security? What has it done for the domestic political situation in Lebanon? What is your view on the situation there?

I am grateful to the Committee for travelling to Lebanon; it is an absolutely vital country, where we have deep and long links, and I know you met with a wide range of senior leaders in Lebanon.

We were really grateful for the access we got to very senior people, and I would like to put on record how grateful we are to the Foreign Office for facilitating it. I appreciate that it is not an easy country for us to visit, but I think we got a huge amount out of it, so I want to put on record our thanks.

Thank you. The Committee will have formed its own view, but my view is that this Lebanese Government are the best prospect for Lebanon that we have had in some considerable time. We know the depth of challenges that Lebanon faces. It is terrible for Lebanon that Lebanese Hezbollah have such wide influence. I believe that that influence can and must be rolled back. The Lebanese Government have made a series of very important statements and taken steps to try to reverse the influence of Hezbollah. We must not be Pollyanna-ish about this. There are still very considerable miles to go before Hezbollah are anything other than a significant influence in Lebanon, but I think the Government of Lebanon are taking the right steps to try to reduce their influence. They call, rightly, for a full ceasefire with Israel. They are trying to pursue that through what is sometimes called the Washington track, which the US Government are overseeing. It is absolutely vital that that track makes progress, and progress means a proper ceasefire, so that the population of southern Lebanon can live without the fear of very widespread strikes. I have been to that area myself; the British Government have provided support to the Lebanese armed forces to be able to control that area properly. It is a legitimate concern that Lebanese Hezbollah have fired upon Israel, particularly northern Israel, repeatedly from that area. It is right that the Lebanese armed forces take control of it and ensure that Lebanese Hezbollah cannot do so, and that they are disarmed. But the route to that outcome is supporting the Lebanese Government, and I know that you heard from them directly at all levels—President, Prime Minister and so on—about what they think they need in order to get that business done.

The Government agreed with the recommendation in our report a year ago that the UK should be lending assistance on nation building, as it is an area of expertise. Can you outline what exactly we are doing and what impact the Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon is having on our ability to operate, or what the forecast is for Lebanon’s ability to be a robust nation state in control of its own borders?

Since I was before you last on this question, we have taken quite considerable steps. We are now one of the largest donors in the world to the humanitarian situation in Lebanon, such is the depth of our concern about the pressure that the country is being put under. Since I appeared before you last, I travelled, as I said, into the south Litani sector, right to the border with Israel, as part of a programme of trying to expand the influence of the Lebanese armed forces to the maximum extent, to reduce the influence of Lebanese Hezbollah to the maximum extent. There are various important programmes that are part of that, including support to refugees, education provision and so on, but one area that has been most remarked upon in the British-Lebanese relationship has been our support to the Lebanese armed forces, and particularly to their deployment to the south. That deployment is not easy, given the repeated incursions by Israeli forces and the large-scale destruction of Israeli fire in southern Lebanon, and we have made our view about that crystal clear to the Israeli Government. There must be a ceasefire, and the Lebanese Government must be supported to deal with Lebanese Hezbollah. It cannot be done cross-border.

You mentioned the attempts by the Lebanese armed forces to take control of, or be responsible for, security in southern Lebanon. From our meetings there, my reading was that the approach of the armed forces was, by necessity, to withdraw in the face of Israeli incursions. What assessment have the British Government made of the indications, were the Lebanese armed forces to come into direct hostile conflict with Israeli forces?

For reasons the Committee will be familiar with, I do not want to get drawn into an overly detailed commentary on the military balance or what would likely happen if the two forces clashed. I would say that a clash between the two forces is not only deeply not in Lebanon’s interest, but deeply not in Israel’s interest. It is understandable that communities in northern Israel are worried about strikes on Israeli territory by Hezbollah, but the only entity that will be capable of sustainably removing Hezbollah, disarming Hezbollah and ensuring that it has no influence over the lives of its neighbours is the Lebanese Government; it is the Lebanese armed forces. It is in our interest, and in my view it is in the Government of Israel’s interest, that the Lebanese armed forces are supported to be the strong, legitimate and sole arbiter of the use of force in Lebanon.

UNIFIL’s mandate is coming to an end at the end of this year, on 31 December. Is the UK involved in any way, shape or form in the preparation of a replacement or of a new mandate? Is the UK considering expanding its presence beyond the support we are giving at the moment?

As you would expect, we are a part of those discussions in the United Nations, and we are in discussions with our allies about what future arrangements should exist pending that date you said.

We have a situation where the UK is pouring money into Lebanon to help support the Government. There are a huge amount of displaced people internally, and on top of that there are the Syrian refugees. We are lending support, training and expertise, and we are building stuff for the Lebanese armed forces. At the same time, UNIFIL is coming to an end, and Israel seems to have complete freedom to operate in southern Lebanon and further, should it wish to—it is bombing the capital, Beirut. What is the endgame here? How do we get away from this situation where we have a country not in control of its own borders just at the point at which it has finally built a stable Government that is representative of all parts of its community? Everything seems to be undermined, and we cannot be a constant and forever stream of money and support. How does this play out? What is the endgame that you envisage?

May I add to that? We have talked about the role of defence and of the Lebanese army, and about a potential replacement for UNIFIL in terms of providing security. When we were there, there was also the issue of how southern Lebanon was going to be rebuilt, by whom and with what money. One of the more off-the-wall ideas was that Hezbollah might be the one empowered to rebuild. I think that was squashed—it is certainly not what the Lebanese Government wanted—but there were suggestions from elsewhere. There are two jobs: providing security but also rebuilding, which is really important. Presumably, the Lebanese Government need to be responsible for that too and have it badged as, “The Lebanese Government are doing this.”

The endgame must be Lebanese sovereignty. The opportunity now is for a Lebanese Government to take full control of what happens within in its own borders and to be a reliable and stable neighbour to everybody around it. I would not have predicted this at the outset of my time as Middle East Minister, but there is a real opportunity in Lebanon’s region for greater security and stability. What happens in Syria and in Lebanon is closely interrelated. There is an opportunity, I think, for both countries to move on from the very difficult and many deep recent scars from their past. The way to do that, as I say, is through the Lebanese Government. In answer to your question, Chair, about who should be the chief driver of reconstruction in the south, there are of course international discussions about how such reconstruction might be funded, but the key mover in any question of Lebanon’s future must be the Lebanese Government.

Minister, you have talked about some of the breaches of international humanitarian law that caused the partial arms embargo. We have seen lots of evidence, in witness statements from former members of the IDF, lots of UN reporting and the like, of things like the indiscriminate killing of civilians based on their age and sex, the deliberate destruction of thousands of homes for no military purpose, the use of Palestinians as human shields, the targeting of health workers and journalists and the permanent displacement of civilians—you will be familiar with all those things. On top of the arms embargo, what changes in defence co-operation happened between the UK and Israel as a result of your assessments?

The assessment we made in 2024 of breaches of international law binds not just the Foreign Office but every part of the British Government. What do I mean by “bind”? I mean that what we said to Parliament at the time—what the then Foreign Secretary said—was that it was out of concern that there was a risk that UK action might be involved in what Israel was doing, which risked a breach, that we would therefore take no part. That means that, just as we no longer provide any arms or ammunition to the Israeli Government that could be used in Gaza or Lebanon, our military provides no assistance that could be used in Gaza or Lebanon—and indeed in the west bank and other places. There has been considerable disinformation online about that question, as if it were only me and the two Foreign Secretaries who have been bound by the announcements to Parliament. No, the whole British Government are bound by the announcement to Parliament, and a number of steps have been taken in other parts of the Government, including the Ministry of Defence, to make sure that they are compliant with that.

So there are no UK personnel in Israel working alongside the Israeli Government on things outside Gaza or anything like that?

We have personnel in the region—in the CMCC, for example, which the Chair referred to—working to try to ensure better outcomes, but there are no personnel involved in the conduct of hostilities, whether in Gaza, Lebanon or anywhere else the IDF is taking part.

What are our personnel in the CMCC doing?

There are two things to say. First, they are embedded in the CMCC to get a better understanding of the nature of restrictions and the nature of joint planning between the US and other international partners in terms of day-after arrangements for Gaza. We have had personnel, both civilian and military, in there to get better visibility of that and to try to influence some of that planning—that has been helpful. In addition, obviously we have long-standing and ongoing activity to support the Palestinian security forces, which involves UK military trainers, to bring up the capability of the PSF, with the aim that it will be a capable security force across the west bank and, in time, as we hope and aspire for the Palestinian Authority to be able to return to Gaza, a credible Palestinian security force on the ground there, but that clearly is some time away.

Has there been any impact in our co-operation with the Israeli defence industry?

I am sure the decisions that we took in relation to arms licences were viewed widely in the Israeli defence industry. What decisions they may subsequently have taken as a consequence is a matter for them. There is no escaping the fact that the measures that we announced in 2024 were far reaching and will have had a significant impact.

There is lots of concern among UN agencies and human rights organisations that the IDF is using the same tactics in Lebanon that we had serious concerns about in Gaza. There are reports of 10,000 homes being destroyed. According to the WHO, close to 150 aid workers have been killed, and more than 1 million civilians have been forcibly displaced. Will we be taking further action in terms of our military relationship with the Israelis, considering that these clear breaches of international humanitarian law are continuing?

I think I have already set out why the steps that we took in 2024 were binding on the UK military and the Ministry of Defence in relation to Gaza and to Lebanon and elsewhere. As I set out to the Committee earlier, we will continue to take steps more broadly as long as the situation remains as dire as it is in the middle east, but I am not going to make any MOD announcements.

But no specific changes have happened after the conduct of Israel in Lebanon that has been seen this year.

The changes to our defence posture were already made before Lebanon, but I would want to get a Ministry of Defence Minister to return to you if you want to talk in more detail.

One question we are always asked by the public is whether we are getting to the stage where Israel can behave with impunity. Israel does things and then nothing seems to happen as a consequence. I appreciate that it is difficult but, just to back up what Alex is saying, Lebanon is “and this”. There is whatever has happened in the west bank and Gaza, and then there is Lebanon too. Are there not additional measures that can be added?

Of course. Israel’s continued breaches are flagrant. They are publicly advertised—there are more journalists in Lebanon to report on them. Does that not show that the steps that we have taken so far have not been effective? Does the sense of impunity that the Chair talks about need some sort of response?

This is the question that haunts me every day of the job. There are consequences for what Israel does. We have discussed many of them over the course of this afternoon. I have come to Parliament numerous times since I last appeared before you to announce further measures. So there are consequences, but do those consequences lead to a change in behaviour? In some cases, demonstrably not. In some areas, like in relation to Lebanon, we have more concerns about the conduct of the IDF now than we did when I was before you before. I would not want to give the Committee the sense that we did what we did last summer or the summer before, and that was it. We continue to take steps and there continue to be consequences. But I accept—I feel it from my own constituents—that there is a huge frustration. When people see this on their television screens and read about the horrors being inflicted on people in the middle east, they want more to happen. They want more to change, and I recognise that that demand will remain until the situation improves.

Just to confirm, there have been no changes in our defence relationship with Israel after the announcements that were made in 2024?

No, there have been changes in our—sorry, let me be really clear, because it depends on when you are describing, the period of Lebanon that you are most interested in. We took a series of decisions in the summer of 2024. There was a conflict between Israel and Lebanon in 2024, and at the end of 2024 that led to a ceasefire. Israel has returned to Lebanon in greater numbers since that point. Over the course of that trajectory, there have been a number of measures taken. I have focused particularly on arms export licences, because that is the broadest set of measures that we have taken and it has determined the nature of the relationship, particularly in relation to the defence industry and the Ministry of Defence. Other Ministry of Defence measures have been taken in relation to Israel. It was discussed at the time that RCDS places were no longer provided to members of the IDF—I can’t quite recall the exact date that we made that announcement—and there have been other announcements too. If you wanted to focus particularly on the responsibilities of the Ministry of Defence, I am sure a Ministry of Defence Minister would be happy to talk in the finest detail about that. But broadly, the Ministry of Defence’s posture is set by our overall foreign policy. I have set out the changes in our foreign policy over this period. In relation to Lebanon, the situation has changed quite dramatically since 2024. In the winter of 2024, for example, we hoped there would be a process of disarmament of Hezbollah led by the Lebanese armed forces, which would have led to much more progress than we have seen so far. Unfortunately, we have seen both considerable destruction in southern Lebanon and continued Hezbollah firing into Israel.

When we were in Lebanon, we went to the International Red Cross. We also talked to the Lebanese Red Cross, which runs all the ambulances in Lebanon. It is all done by volunteers, and two of the volunteers were killed when going into the south of Lebanon in marked ambulances. Those are people who just give their free time to try to help their fellow citizens. We found it very difficult to understand how on earth that had happened.

We have supported the Lebanese Red Cross financially, and I have met those very brave volunteers. I met them before the incident that you refer to, and I find it unbelievably heartbreaking.

Just young people.

Young people. I met them in a command centre in the south. They were a group of incredibly inspiring, slightly exhausted young people, all flopped around on sofas after months of trying to look after their countrymen who had been badly affected. The idea that two of them were killed in the course of their duty subsequent to that meeting is a real agony for me.

On the issue of returning residents, there is a huge risk of unexploded ordinance in southern Lebanon. The Mines Advisory Group is doing important work in Lebanon to warn people about the risks and to clear the land. I know that the FCDO has a long-standing partnership with MAG and with the Halo Trust—we heard evidence from them a while ago. What are the UK Government doing to offer support to MAG in its work in southern Lebanon, in particular, and would you look into supporting it further?

You are right to highlight the excellent work of both those organisations and the pernicious effect of unexploded ordinance in civilian areas. When I was in Lebanon, I announced a significant uptick in our humanitarian aid. I will have to come back to you, unless Dr Dixon knows; we have basically delegated the precise decision making on the most effective way to support southern Lebanon to the humanitarian team in country, but I will write to the Member with an update on whether any of that funding has been allocated to de-mining.

I will ask some questions about Syria, and I draw the Committee’s attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests because I visited Syria last week. Chair, I might tell you that Dr Dixon and I were not just diplomats together in Israel; we were neighbours in Jaffa in a much easier time for the UK’s relationship. During our visit to Lebanon, we met the excellent Syria team in our embassy, who are doing great work. When I was at the Syria Britain Business Council conference last week, it was clear that there are significant opportunities for the UK to support the Syrian Government’s reconstruction efforts in energy, education and services, but some people felt that we were being held back from taking up those opportunities because we do not yet have an embassy open. Notwithstanding the attacks today and last week, what is your timeline for when we might have a more formal presence back in Damascus?

I want a formal presence back in Damascus as soon as possible. You allude to the strikes today in Damascus, which I deplore. That underlines the complexity of it. Our relationship with Syria is important and long standing. As it happens, we have both a residence and an embassy in Damascus but, for various reasons that I will not bore you with, they are not operable at the moment. I want to return to having British diplomats in Damascus as soon as possible. There is a discussion with the PUS about making sure this happens as quickly as possible.

I hope the Committee will get to visit soon to see what I have seen. I should put on record that Invest Northern Ireland had also supported this conference and sent someone there—it was good to see one bit of the UK taking up the opportunities. When we were in Syria, President al-Sharaa announced his 70 appointees to Parliament. What assessment have you made of that, and what role are we playing in helping to build an inclusive Syrian polity?

As I have said to the Committee before, an inclusive Syria is not just critical; it is essential. Syria is a place with a number of different communities, all of whom will need to see themselves represented in the new arrangements. It is welcome news that the national Assembly is on its way to full formation. I had a brief exchange with my colleague, the Syrian Foreign Minister, about it in recent days. We are seeking to support the new Syrian Government in ensuring that there are arrangements at all levels so that all communities in Syria feel welcome, respected and part of that new Syrian Government. But the national Assembly is also very important indeed, and there is clearly an effort being made to ensure in those appointments that a broad range of Syrians is represented, including women, which is absolutely vital.

I think maybe 14 out of the 70 were women. We also met the brilliant female Minister of Social Affairs and Labour, who is also responsible for returnees. What are we doing to help Syrians return to their country?

I have to say that we met people in Lebanon who have been there for 14 years. In particular, we met a group of mothers who said they did not think they could go back until they felt that there was security and schooling for their children.

Perhaps I can give you a sense of what we are doing in Syria on some of these challenges, which will perhaps give confidence to people that they might go back to Syria. Our programmes in Syria are designed to do a number of things to support livelihoods, including in the agricultural sector and elsewhere. One of the biggest challenges that the Syrian Government face, among the wide range of challenges they face, is the economy. The more that we, along with other international partners, can do to support entrepreneurialism in the economy through small-scale projects and large-scale reforms of the economy, the more we can try and kickstart the circumstances in which people will go home and, over time, give the Government the ability to drive change elsewhere in society. The second area that we are heavily focused on is education. Lastly, there is security sector reform and parts of the political process that we have been working on with other international partners, including the US, to support greater integration of communities and groups from across Syria into the security sector and the Syrian security forces. That is as well as, and in parallel to, what we have been seeing on the political side through Parliament as well.

The Minister raised the much more difficult issue of British children left in camps in Syria, and asked what we might do about that. What are your thoughts right now?

The question of these camps in Syria is enormously complex, as I know my hon. Friend is aware. There has been a very significant change in the circumstances in relation to a few of these camps, with a number of them having passed into the control of the Syrian Government. Obviously, we are in close dialogue with everyone in control of any camp where we think there are British children or indeed British nationals. There are a number of former British nationals who are part of those camps, who were dual nationals and who had their citizenship removed by the previous Government. There was a quite complex process, often involving litigation, around those cases. As the Committee will know, I take my consular responsibilities, particularly to children, very seriously. I do everything that I can to ensure that British children, wherever they are, whether they are in camps or elsewhere, get the attention and care that they need.

They are not coming home. I have a constituent who is there. She has had her British citizenship taken away. She had two British children; she now only has one, because one of them died. The boy is growing up, and when he gets to 12, he will not be seen as a child there, although we may see him as one. What is going to happen? He will be a British grown-up boy, as far as they are concerned. We do not seem to be doing anything. She is just stuck. She is not going to go home. She is not going to go to the camp in Africa where she was born. She wants to go back to the place where she was brought up and spent all her life before she was trafficked. She now has a boy who is in limbo with her. If she has done anything wrong, she should be tried, but no one seems to want to try her for anything that she may or may not have done.

I am not familiar with the case. Perhaps we can discuss it.

The Committee is interested in the work of the British Council and soft power. What is your assessment of what the British Council is doing in the region, and particularly in Israel and Palestine, at the moment? I know it is a hard power problem, but what are they doing that has been helpful?

As you know, the British Council is active across the region with a variegated offer, from English language training to skills and employment—everything from tech through to other skills. It makes an important contribution. It has its own challenges, but it is part of our wider effort across the region. It is very closely integrated country by country in what we are doing. We are making sure that we are doing everything from expanding our security and political relations and contributing on humanitarian and development to using the council as a significant tool of what we are doing across the region.

We had Ann Snow—a very impressive woman—in front of us in her last week as the UK representative in Syria. No one has replaced her yet. When might that happen?

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on Ann Snow’s time as envoy. She has been an excellent diplomat, and we are very grateful for her service. She has a replacement lined up, whom I know. I am aware of them and they are a very good diplomat too. I am not in a position to announce her replacement, but I will make sure that the Committee is aware as soon as the news becomes public. It will not be a long gap.

Great. Unless anyone has further questions, I have one. We wrote to the Foreign Secretary in May asking, among other things, if media reports that redundancy letters have been sent to the FCDO’s Iran crisis team were true. The response we got from you last week was: “The restructure process is designed to minimise the need for potential redundancy as far as possible. The process focusses on prioritising retention of core skills the FCDO will need in the future. The FCDO remains confident that core skills and capabilities will be retained as a result of this restructure exercise.” I just wondered what that meant.

I might ask Dr Dixon to set out the latest in the process, but as I understand the situation, there is a restructure process within the Foreign Office, which has meant that all staff have had offers of redundancy available to them. It is not specific to the Iran unit, but Rob—Dr Dixon, sorry—is in charge.

Rob is better.

I was also a diplomat alongside Rob. He will be able to provide a clearer answer, given he is responsible for the unit.

The office as a whole is going through this 2030 restructuring, driven in part by financial pressures, but also by an ambition to position the Foreign Office for the longer term. In the specific case of Iran, we have worked to protect the size, skills and capabilities of the Iran unit. I am sure you will recognise that, in the context of the current crisis, we have strengthened it to ensure that it is on a stable footing going forward. We have also brought colleagues in from across the office to enable us to deal with a really complicated crisis, which has involved everything from consular activity through to challenges for us and our allies in the Gulf, and indeed through to the contribution we make on the diplomatic response to the end of the conflict. All of that is about the kind of flexibility and agility that we are trying to build into the office through the FCDO 2030 exercise. We have absolutely protected the Iran unit because of the frontline work it has been doing.

Is it the same size as before, or is it bigger?

I can give you the fuller details, but it is broadly the same size. We have also brought in additional capability to support us through a very complicated—

Yes, there is this idea that you can do a surge during a crisis. I understand that, but it is the core group—the Iran unit—that I am interested in.

That is correct. Essentially, we have protected the skills and capabilities we need to deliver during the crisis.

I do not really know what that means. How many people are there? Is it the same number as before, or are there fewer or more in the Iran unit?

Perhaps we can talk about that offline, with your agreement, Minister, because there are sensitivities around the work of the Iran unit. We have kept the size of the Iran unit broadly the same, within one or two slots, as was the case before we went into the FCDO 2030 exercise.

Okay, how about this? Can you answer this question? When you say you have kept the Iran unit “broadly the same”, does that mean broadly the same but a bit bigger, or broadly the same but a bit smaller?

The office as a whole is having to make considerable savings—

So smaller.

The directorate has done the same. The Iran unit has made a smaller contribution to that exercise, but nevertheless we have ensured that it has not had to reduce anywhere near as much as other parts of the business.

I do not think that has been fully decided yet. You will forgive me, but I am not as close to the latest detail of the arrangements for the G20. I do not think we have decided yet.

Perhaps pass on to the 0Foreign Secretary that we will be asking her about that. Edward?

This is less of a question and more of a point, Chair.

Go on—make less of a question and more of a point.

The frustration around questions about the Iran unit is emblematic of a bigger problem the Committee is having in trying to get a straight answer about the restructuring and what the FCDO is going to look like in terms of priority areas, units and responsibilities. I am not expecting either of you at this point to answer that here, but at some point it would be really helpful for the Committee, which is responsible for scrutinising the FCDO, to understand what it is going to look like.

We would therefore like to see the FCDO budget in good time before the Foreign Secretary gives evidence, so that we can ask her questions. Are we seeing her on Thursday?

We have still not seen the annual report. We are told it exists and is about to be published, but if it is published on the day we see her, that will not be much good. The day afterwards would be even less good. Again, would you mind checking, because we do want to know? Thank you; that’s it. Thank you ever so much for coming and for your time. We really appreciate it.