Welcome to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee session on the Peter May review of the Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery. Joining us virtually, we have with us Peter May, the independent reviewer of the corporate effectiveness and cultural health review of the ICRIR. Thank you very much for joining us today, Peter. Can you provide an overview of your review’s findings and the issues requiring the most urgent attention?

Thank you for the invitation and your question, Chair. It may be helpful to the Committee if I set out one or two things by way of background for the review. First, I was commissioned jointly by the Northern Ireland Office and the Independent Commission to undertake this review, and I was asked to complete it by the end of February 2026. You will have seen the terms of reference make clear that this was not a section 36 review; it had a more specific remit. For example, I did not look at investigative practice, which would in any case be outside my skillset. As you have highlighted, the focus was on corporate effectiveness and culture. The other point I would make is that this was not a detailed audit. I did not go into individual cases or issues and seek to reach conclusions on them. I heard from a wide range of people across the organisation, and I am confident that I was given all the information I asked for during the review. People were honest and open in their engagement with me, and I am very grateful for that. On the detail of your question, my report draws out the key issues under a series of chapter headings. It seems to me that there are some structural challenges facing the commission, some of which emanate from its founding legislation, and they are not straightforward to address. I know further legislation is being developed and is before Parliament. There are areas to address in relation to corporate governance and finance, and I have made a number of recommendations regarding those, but they are some of the areas that I think could be addressed most straightforwardly, and I know some progress has already been made. I should state that I am a member of the oversight group looking at implementation of the recommendations, and I am currently an adviser to the chief commissioner, Sir Declan Morgan.

Are you happy with the progress that has started on the implementation of the recommendations? Are you content?

I think good progress is being made. There are still some challenging areas that will take more time to address fully, but I am clear that there is a will, led by the chief commissioner, to implement those recommendations. I see mobilisation across the organisation and some good progress. I know you will be hearing later from representatives of the commission, who can give more detail on the precise number of recommendations that have been completed. I was just running through the different headings, and the final heading was around culture. Again, I make a number of observations around both culture and communication. Together with the overall structure and governance of the organisation, those two areas are the most substantive and time-intensive to address. There are no quick fixes. It takes a concerted effort and time to make progress in those areas. I should say that my report also draws out strengths in the organisation. More individuals than had been anticipated have come forward to ask that their cases be reviewed. Levels of engagement are strong. There is a strong shared sense of mission among the staff of the commission at a high level, and the people I met were very able and engaged. There are some real strengths to build on. All organisations face challenges as they grow, and particularly this one, as it is operating in a politically challenging environment. There was a need to take steps to enhance the performance of the organisation, but I do think that progress is being made.

That is good. We understand that this is politically challenging. Are you confident that all stakeholders in the ICRIR and the NIO are aware of their responsibilities to make sure that your recommendations are implemented?

Yes, I think so. I think that there is a widespread and general determination to make progress on the recommendations.

Good morning, Peter.

Good morning.

I think it is positive and encouraging that, as you mentioned, you were commissioned jointly by the ICRIR and the NIO—that this was not an “us and them” endeavour but something that was commissioned jointly. This is a simple question, but it gives you the opportunity to talk about your findings more productively. Perhaps you would like to focus on the positive aspects of your report that were not the sole focus—or indeed the focus at all—of the media attention post publication. Are there elements of your findings that you would like to draw out at this early stage of our session?

Thanks, Gavin. I will say a little more to flesh out the answer I gave the Chair just now. As I said, more individuals have brought forward cases for the commission to address than was expected. That is a real positive, but it of course means that the commission will need additional resources to be able to deliver against its mandate. That has been one of the areas of tension because at this stage the outline business case is not yet resolved, so it is not yet clear to those responsible, particularly for the investigations within the commission, whether they will have all the resources they need to deal with the cases that have been brought to them. I also drew out that I think there is within the commission very good engagement and a very strong focus on engaging with individuals, families and survivors in a way that meets their needs, as well as a strong trauma-informed approach. That is important, and it has been welcomed by those the commission engages with. As I said, I think the sense of mission is strong. One of the things that attracted many people to join the commission was their sense that this was one of the key outstanding issues that needed to be addressed in Northern Ireland society in order to allow progress to be made, and they were determined to be a part of bringing that about. As I said, a lot of the people I met are very able and committed to that purpose. Those would be the strengths that I would want to draw out, Gavin.

The feedback that we have heard from families who have engaged with the commission is positive. They feel they are treated respectfully, and that they are engaged in a positive endeavour. From your long professional experience as a civil servant, and someone involved in governance and the creation of new bodies, could I just ask you to reflect on the fact that the commission was established with a skeleton staff, has grown in two years to be a commission of more than 280 staff over three sites which is engaging with more than 300 legacy cases, while the entirety of its existence is under constant political and public scrutiny and there is parliamentary procedure on potential successor legislation? In your history, can you think of a comparator to the creation, establishment and functioning of a body under such scrutiny and legislative drama?

That is not something that I have paused to reflect on. There will have been organisations that had some of the same challenges. The police ombudsman, for example, was set up perhaps a little more than 25 years ago and would have faced similar challenges. The commission is not entirely without parallel, but those things create a challenging environment. A number of people in the commission told me that they were not sure whether to go live because they did not feel they were completely ready, yet they did not want to let down any individuals who had expectations, so they proceeded and have then had to run to catch up a bit in some areas. That remains an issue in some specific matters. Yes, I think it is unusual, but it is probably not completely unparalleled.

Thank you very much for your report and for coming before us today. Did the scope and objectives of the review enable you to go far enough in uncovering the challenges at ICRIR and therefore bring about the change needed to address them?

Thank you for the question. Terms of reference for an independent reviewer determine the scope and scale of the review, and I certainly tried to maximise the area that I would look at, because it seemed to me that to look at corporate effectiveness, you needed to look at all the factors that might contribute to whether the commission would operate effectively or not. I am not talking here about the investigative practice; I am talking about how the commission would operate as an organisation. I have made some recommendations in chapter 2, for example, that go beyond the narrow bounds of corporate governance to reference the importance of a shared understanding of what resource requirement is needed to carry forward all the cases. I also recommend ensuring that the right level of investigative expertise is available to the board and the chief executive to support the oversight that they need to have of the whole organisation, and so on. Inevitably, the question is always the other things that I did not find, but I am confident, based on the really widespread engagement I had, that people felt able to raise all the issues that they had. It was sufficiently broad for the purposes it was set out to have.

Did you have access to everybody that you needed to and to all the information you required? Are you satisfied with that?

Yes—I received a significant amount of written material. I met all the senior leaders in the organisation and individuals and groups outside of that who asked to meet me. I went to each of the three sites and held site meetings that were deliberately designed to allow anyone who wanted to raise things with me or catch me in the corridor if that was more appropriate to do so. I would have had engagement with a very substantial number of the commission’s staff during the review.

Was the timescale appropriate? Did you have enough time to get into the issues? You said that your recommendations have been deliberately kept to a minimum; is that just in terms of prioritisation?

Having been on the receiving end of reports with many hundreds of recommendations, I know that sometimes they can get in the way rather than help people to focus on what really matters. For example, where the commission was already planning to do things, I did not feel that I needed to make a recommendation to reinforce that. At various points of the review, I indicate that I support the need for action in those areas without actually making it a formal recommendation. The timescale was reasonably challenging, but as I said, I felt by the end of it that I was not uncovering new issues that I did not have time to explore. Of course you might flesh out more of the challenges with more time, but I was comfortable enough to take it forward in the time available. If I had felt the need for more time, I would have asked for it, but I would perhaps have produced a more substantive interim report first.

Thank you.

Thank you very much for giving evidence today. I want to look at some of the internal matters: the corporate effectiveness and financial stewardship. Your report was critical of the corporate effectiveness of the ICRIR on many fronts; which of the issues that you identified poses the greatest challenge to the effective functioning and the reputation of the commission if it is not resolved?

Thank you for the question. The report tries to draw out the specific incidences that caused challenge. The board and the NIO, as the sponsor Department, were being faced with a number of surprises, and both felt that those surprises were happening more frequently rather than less frequently. That could be mischance or coincidence, or it could be a sign of some wider problem. Either way, the result was that trust and confidence were being reduced both at board level and in the sponsor Department. That is the fundamental issue that needs to be addressed to enable the commission to operate effectively. I flag in the review that there was a new finance director—now not quite so new—in post, who I felt was tackling the issues in a good way, and I know that a significant number of the corporate governance and finance recommendations have been implemented. For me, there is less of a red flag against that area now than there was when I conducted the review in January and February.

I was going to go on to the finance director and whether you thought that was a red flag; I am quite heartened by your response that it is a move in the right direction. You also recommended the creation of a finance committee. What do you see as the main benefits of the new finance committee?

The opportunity I saw that the finance committee would provide would essentially be to create a financial strategy for the commission. The commission is actually not that complicated a body at its root, because its primary function is around the investigation of cases and the corporate structure needed to enable that, but the new legislation, by introducing inquisitorial proceedings, for example, adds a further complication to the financing, where individual judges will determine, as I understand it, how cases will be taken forward. Drawing together all the finance issues—not just today’s finance issues, but taking a medium to long-term view, particularly once the outline business case is resolved—is the organisation fundamentally on track to deliver its remit in line with the OBC, or will there be further challenges because cases take longer than expected or there is litigation taken by individuals that impedes the work of the commission from what had been planned? Having that committee, and it feeding into the board, was a means of providing a clear line of sight for the board as to where this was, not requiring all board members to do it together but rather for them to be able to review that financial strategy. That is what I had seen as the opportunity for that committee.

On the budget, you recommended that 15% headroom be built into the annual managed expenditure budget to reflect the demand-led nature of the work. How did you arrive at that figure?

Thank you for that question. Let me first say something about the reason for the recommendation. It goes back to the inquisitorial proceedings I mentioned and, for example, the need for the commission to have a forensic contract to look at all forensic opportunities. Those all create potential in-year challenges when you have a very firm, set budget. The reason why the Treasury agreed that the demand-led aspects of the commission’s budget should be done as annually managed expenditure rather than a departmental expenditure limit was to recognise that it was demand-led work, yet the budget was being set as though it were a DEL budget rather than an AME one, so I suggested some headroom. I cannot claim there is any particular science behind the 15%; I used my expertise from my time as an accounting officer to consider what might be reasonable to expect as a challenge within the year. I also want to be clear that this is not a means of allowing the commission to spend whatever money it wants or to overspend at will. The outline business case would set out the total amount that the commission should spend overall. This is a question of profiling which year the budget should fall into, rather than adjusting the overall budget. To be clear, it is not about encouraging or allowing financial laxity; it just is a means of ensuring that, where individuals have come forward, they can have realistic expectations that work will be taken forward as soon as possible. If the budget gets in the way of that, it becomes very challenging.

Thank you.

Let me declare an interest: I worked with Peter for a number of years. I want to make that transparent. Peter, your report noted that culture was the element most remarked on during your meetings with staff, and you made a number of recommendations. Are you confident that the culture of the current organisation can be changed?

Yes, absolutely. All organisations are capable of changing their culture. I recognised in my earlier remarks that this is a new organisation. One of its strengths and challenges is that it has drawn people from many different backgrounds: from policing, other investigative backgrounds, the civil service and legal backgrounds. Those people will all arrive at the organisation with slightly different expectations or experiences of how organisations work. My observation is that because the commission was running hard to meet the needs of the initial cases that had come in, it probably had not spent the time it needed to work out its own culture and what approach was going to be acceptable and desirable within the organisation, and to go through a process in which people felt engaged and understood what that meant. In my experience, when people have been through a good process like that, it sticks. In any case, there is then a ready means by which, if people do step outside that, they can be held to account on that basis.

Do you think there was also a public expectation that did not allow senior leadership at the time to establish that culture, because so much was expected of them when the organisation was initially stood up?

That may be a question better put to them than to me. It is quite difficult to know the experience of senior leaders from before I came to do the review. By shining a light on this area, I was indicating that more time needed to be spent on it. In my view, it is fundamental to the commission’s long-term success that it has strong underpinnings within the organisation, alongside the good work being done with individuals coming forward from outside it.

You have talked about the individuals who have come into the organisation. Your report notes that a number of ICRIR staff are currently seeking other roles or secondments, and that reflects the cultural health of the organisation. Have you any suggestions as to how that high turnover of staff is affecting the functioning of the commission?

I think it is affecting the commission in a number of ways. One of my recommendations is in relation to the staffing of the finance function, which is almost entirely being staffed by contract staff rather than by substantive employees. Work is ongoing and some significant progress has been made to try to address that, but that creates a risk in terms of corporate knowledge and the functioning of the finance function. Other challenges are a bit more difficult to meet, because an organisation the size of ICRIR is always going to have its expertise vested in one or two individuals for a range of different things like procurement, records management, data processing or whatever. As a result, if those one or two individuals happen to leave, you are left with a gap. The organisation needs to be nimble in its understanding of its potential vulnerabilities and have some contingency plans in place. To be fair, I have seen evidence of where short-term measures have been put in place to meet those sorts of problems, but it was perhaps less obvious to me when I was there in January and February that that thinking had already been done.

Thank you, Mr May, for giving evidence to us. In response to your report, the Secretary of State said: “It is for ICRIR Board to take whatever steps are necessary and appropriate”, but of course some of the steps are not within its power, because they are structural; they are to do with the underlying legislation. You have identified that, particularly with regard to financial governance, there is a problem with the commission chair, and that the chief executive and non-executive commissioners are responsible for that governance, yet the decisions are made by the commissioner for investigations. Those problems appear to be compounded by the new Bill; what would you say about that?

The current structure of the commission has a number of different seats of authority within it—the chief commissioner, the non-executive members, the chief executive and the commissioner for investigations—and all have separate roles. I believe that not enough has been done to clarify roles and responsibilities across those various senior leaders. That has made it easier for some of the challenges to emerge than would otherwise be the case. As I read it, the new legislation does try to address some of those issues, but it may create others.

Can you give some examples of how it has addressed them positively?

I think it clarifies things. The new Legacy Commission, based on the draft that I have seen, has a commissioner and a chief executive, and the investigative function is vested in directors who report to the chief executive, so there is one clear line of accountability within the organisation rather than multiple accountabilities. To go back to the point about the new legislation, it envisages two co-directors for investigation and vests in them a number of things they need to do jointly. Inevitably, that can also increase the risk of disagreement. I want to be clear that in talking about the legislation, past or present, I am looking at it entirely through the lens of how the organisation might work in practice based on my experience as an accounting officer and a permanent secretary. I am not looking it in the context of the wider political debate about legacy, important though that is. I know that the British Government have reached an agreement with the Irish Government that has informed the legislation and I am not looking to interfere in that work. I am just highlighting that there are areas that need to be addressed. Some of this may be about risk management. Recommendation 2 talks about providing the board with the investigative expertise needed to oversee the investigations work. One of my other recommendations talked about the headroom for AME; that is not least in response to the new inquisitorial proceedings that increase the risk to an accounting officer. A judge is responsible for how many lines of inquiry will be pursued in relation to an individual case, and that will generate financial consequences that it will be very difficult for a chief executive or commission to seek to artificially reduce because of budgetary constraints in any given year. So the provision of headroom is another way of managing that risk. As I said, my report was written of a particular time, and it may be that thinking on the legislation is developing. I am not clear about that.

I realise that you do not want to get involved in the legislative process, and that is not your role, but given that we have an opportunity, now that the Troubles Bill is before Parliament, are there any issues with the Bill as it is now written that you think might be addressed by structural changes that will help the independent commission?

I am not sure it is my place to start offering thoughts on how the legislation could be changed—

It would be interesting to hear, though.

What I have done is to highlight the areas where I think there is risk. That is around the two co-directors and how the chief executive and the commission can oversee the work in relation to inquisitorial proceedings for a finance and corporate governance purpose. Those are the sorts of areas that I think provide risk. There are different ways of managing that. They could be managed through legislative change or administrative risk management in different ways, such as I tried to highlight to you in response to the earlier question.

Thank you very much. Witnesses: Sir Declan Morgan, Peter Sheridan, Josephine Kelly and Holly Clark.

Welcome to the continuation of our session. For our second panel, joining us online, we have Sir Declan Morgan, ICRIR chief commissioner; Peter Sheridan, ICRIR commissioner for investigations; Josephine Kelly, ICRIR director of finance and corporate services; and Holly Clark, chief operating officer for the Northern Ireland Office. Thank you for joining us this morning. Sir Declan, what is your reaction to the findings in Peter May’s review and to what he told us in the earlier session?

My colleagues and I have been working closely with Peter May since he produced the report. We have accepted all his findings and we are working with him to ensure that we implement them with the intent he wanted. I want to say that the decision to engage in this report was made by the board. Around the end of last year, issues around culture—issues, we felt, of disrespect—came to our attention. Therefore, at the December board meeting, we decided that we should do a proper examination of the issues to ensure that we could deal with them. We wanted to talk to our sponsor Department to make sure that it was happy not only with where we were going but with the breadth of what we wanted to do, because we were aware that there were issues around governance and finance, which we had come across as a board in any event. After that discussion, we jointly decided that we should extend the investigation into culture and governance and finance areas. That was because we wanted to ensure, first of all, that we protected our staff. There is no excuse for disrespectful behaviour in our organisation. I commend the people who came forward about that and thank them for doing so, because it is not easy to take steps like that. We are also grateful to Peter for helping us to identify the actions that we need to take, which we have since committed ourselves to doing. There are 19 recommendations and although, as Peter said, some will take some time, others are relatively quick wins, such as setting up a finance committee. Broadly, we have made very considerable progress, to the point where we treat 11 of them as effectively completed, but with continuing review. The eight others are ongoing.

Thank you for that, Declan. Our legacy inquiry identified a significant lack of confidence in the commission among many victims and survivors. In a way, the review risks deepening that mistrust. What would you say to those who were already reluctant to approach the organisation?

I suppose I would start off by talking about those who have approached the organisation. There has been a strong positive reaction from both the individuals and the support organisations that have worked with us. It has always been incredibly difficult to get trust on legacy across the community and across all interests, and I accept that any form of report that casts any kind of shadow over the organisation will always have some effect. But in terms of the people who are with us, the principal concern has been to understand that their cases are not affected and are still ongoing. We have not had any sense of people dropping out, deciding that they did not want to proceed or anything of that kind. I think, and have always thought, that in the end it will be product that will make the difference in terms of getting wider buy-in. That is why there is importance in beginning the process of getting the reports out. We have five reports so far, which have come from the investigators, into the findings side, some of them very recently. One of those reports has already been through findings; we have done everything that we need to do on it, and it is now in the representations process. That should mean that, within a matter of weeks, that report will be published. We have four others that we are working on where, again, we expect to see product from those by the end of the summer. I have been talking to Peter in the investigations side, with whom I have been working very closely indeed to achieve these outcomes. We are confident that we will have reports in double numbers that are at least in the representations process by the end of this year, and that some of those reports will actually be published and available. That is what will make a difference to bringing people in.

Sir Declan, when you are speaking about Peter, could you say whether it is Peter May or Peter Sheridan?

I am working with both, but in that instance I was talking about Peter Sheridan. Sorry about that.

Thinking of the issues that Peter May described in his report, can you outline which, in your view, are a result of the legislative framework you are operating in, and which are a result of leadership and management issues?

Undoubtedly, if you take the first part of it, there are things that we do not have. There are powers that I do not have. Although I can designate members of the investigation team with the powers of a police officer, that is different from having the powers of a police force. For example, if I needed directed surveillance, I do not have the power to do that. I do not have access to information from Ireland, even though I have written a number of letters about murder cases that I require information on. I do not have a fixed forensic capability, which is very important, particularly in early cases. I still have not got complete access, in the way that I need, to what is called high-side information and how I would see all that intelligence.

Perhaps my question was too broad; we are aware of some of the deficits in the legislation, but I want to focus on your understanding of which of the issues are a result of leadership and management.

Some of this, for me, and I said this to people at the time, is a classic early-stage system under strain, where demand outstripped projection at every level from the beginning. When Sir Declan and I started, there were seven of us in the room, and we barely had a desk or an office. The view in Government was that you would probably get about 40 cases in the first year—there were 60 cases in the first month, and some of them were the most challenging cases during the troubles. We started off with seven of us; we have now got to 280 staff and, as Peter May said earlier on, that brings a whole mixture of cultures into an organisation. So you are recruiting at pace, and what you saw was what I call a two-speed tension. There are two fundamentally different institutional imperatives operating simultaneously. In other words, if you take from my side of the business—the operation side—it is demand-led, with victims and survivors who are coming to us about events from 30, 40 or 50 years ago, and they are already frustrated about being let down by Government and investigations in the past. Many of them are elderly. Many have been promised answers before and been failed. Then there is the moral weight that drives pace. I could see that investigators who absorb the weight of victims’ experiences speak with an intensity when they come back in, because they are short of resources and short of forensics. On the other side, you have corporate staff, who are equally committed to this commission and to victim survivors, but they are constraint-led because they have a budget—the authorising officer has a budget. The human resource work to recruit people takes about eight or nine months. As Sir Declan said, when we needed to vet people, a new Government came into place, and we all had to take a back seat while vetting happened for the new Government. So it took a considerable period of time—probably up to a year—before we started to get any sense of resources into the organisation. So what you got is what people describe as a toxic culture. I describe it as people under stress, with countless victims coming in, and people doing their level best in the organisation—you will have heard the old adage—to fly the plane and build it at the same time. We were not a mature organisation that failed to maintain standards; we were a start-up organisation that was expected to perform as a mature organisation from day one under a demand that outstripped every projection.

I think you are characterising them as teething issues in terms of growth. I think we are all sympathetic to the deficits in the legislation, but we just want to get an analysis from each of you. Holly, would you mind answering the same question and talking about the issues related to leadership and management, rather than the deficits in the framework.

I think it is clear that there were some leadership and management issues, particularly in relation to the culture. I am pleased to see that they have been gripped since the report came out. We are all working together to make sure those recommendations are implemented. Of course, we are sympathetic to the teething issues and the journey the commission has been on, but I think the Secretary of State was clear when he saw the report and when he met each of the board members individually that he was very disappointed and concerned about some of the reports that were coming out about the culture. We have new legislation coming through Parliament, which you are well aware of, and there are some changes in that, which we think will help the new Legacy Commission going forward in terms of accountability and new structures. We have the benefit now of a period of transition, where we can work closely with all the individuals on this panel to make sure that that is a smooth transition and that we are ready for the new legislation and what that brings.

Josephine?

I started in January, so I cannot comment on the period before Christmas. I do see very committed individuals all working together. I think the whole issue of resource and that stretch created some of this environment. But I can see a team wishing to work together, and it is incumbent on all senior leaders to work together for the benefit of the organisation.

Last but not least, Sir Declan, what is your analysis on the same question?

Can I say, first of all, that I am a bit uncomfortable about calling these teething issues? I do not think they were teething issues for the people on the receiving end of them. There was a considerable amount of courage involved in terms of the people who did come forward to speak to Peter May, and I have great respect for them, because all our staff are committed to the project, as he said in his earlier evidence. I think frustration has been at least a part of it. We had an assessment of what we needed to do the job. We have half the staff, half the resource, that we need to do the job. We are waiting to see how and when we might be able to correct that. It is over two years on that we find ourselves in this situation. Understandably, that does create frustration, and that is certainly a contributory factor. But that cannot be an excuse for conduct that ended up making people feel disrespected. That is my point. Peter is right about the fact that there are also frustrations because we cannot do the things we want to do in relation to Ireland, in particular, and to powers. In terms of the future, we have been working hard on the issue of resource for nine months or thereabouts, principally in the OBC, but it is sitting with Treasury at the moment and it is not at all clear to me when it is coming forward. One of the frustrations is that the Bill itself is taking the time that it is. Regrettably, that leaves a degree of uncertainty both within the organisation and, to some extent, outside—people are not prepared to come in until they know which way the organisation is going.

Sir Declan, are you the person to take forward the recommendations in the Peter May report, given that you were in the leadership role during the period examined?

I have obviously had to ask myself that question. It was the board that decided that we needed to do something. It was the board that appreciated that something was going wrong within the organisation. And the board has been clear that it recognises the impact that some of these things—the culture issues, but also the governance and finance issues—have had. Part of the difficulty or issue here is that the board has got itself involved in things within the organisation that perhaps as a board it would not ordinarily have had to do. The state of the organisation, I think, led to that. The board as a whole is committed to doing this. I think the board also has the respect of the organisation, because the senior leaders, in particular, have gone out to our staff. We have engaged in open sessions with them. We have taken questions and sought to answer them truthfully and fully, and I think that has made a positive impression. So my answer is that I believe that I can deliver the change that is required.

Sir Declan and Peter, you have both mentioned the frustrations due to the lack of engagement from the Irish Government and how that played into the frustrations within the organisation. Do you want to unpack what an unsettling impact that has? We got told that the Garda have set up their own establishment unit. Some of us are aware that they are not engaging either. Do you believe that that played into some of the culture and other difficulties within the organisation?

I think, Robin, what it has done is affected the way in which the organisation has been able to develop. There is a group of cases that have not come to us, because the victims and survivors feel that they will not get answers to their questions unless Ireland is going to play its part in providing information. There are people who have come to us, and there is a requirement for information from Ireland. For those people, it is incredibly frustrating to find that their case is not able to proceed in the way it should have, as a result of the failure. If Ireland’s position is that it is not going to do anything until the new Bill is in place, it becomes extremely frustrating that we are going to be left in this situation and having to deal with people who face quite considerable delay before important aspects of their case can be investigated. That inevitably is going to create frustration.

Just to put some figures on it, Robin, I have eight letters requesting information in relation to 10 deaths that I have heard nothing back about. It is probably further complicated by the fact that there are a number of referrals from the south of Ireland about incidents that happened in the south of Ireland that have come to the commission. Obviously, I cannot progress those without that assistance.

Holly, from an NIO point of view, what is your reaction on hearing that?

We are aware of these issues and are talking to colleagues in ICRIR closely about them. Obviously, we welcomed the Irish Government’s own legislation being published. I think it was a landmark agreement in the framework document, which sets out the commitments that both Governments have made in relation to the sharing of information. We are in regular touch with our counterparts, both at permanent secretary level and at Secretary of State level. We appreciate that we are in a difficult position while we wait for the legislation to progress, but we are monitoring it closely and talking to colleagues on a regular basis about it.

Peter said he had eight letters that were not responded to. A Garda unit has been set up, but the phones are not being answered. You can understand how that feeds into the frustration in the organisation.

I can, yes, and that is the kind of thing we are raising with our counterparts on behalf of ICRIR.

Thank you for coming to give evidence today, and it is good to see you again, Sir Declan. I would like to give you an opportunity to answer something that has been said to me by a number of stakeholders: despite your many qualities, a judge is not the right person to run an organisation—it requires a different skillset. A judge is an individual primarily, not someone experienced in running an organisation. How would you answer that charge?

I do not necessarily disagree that the skills of a judge are not by any means the only skills that you require to chair and run an organisation. For that reason, I have been very supportive from an early stage that the new Bill should ensure that the chair is chosen for their skills as a chair, rather than their expertise as a judge. I think there is a role, though, in this organisation for the skills of a judge, particularly in the inquisitorial proceedings and in the signing off of reports. My view has always been that my role under the new legislation should be split, so that one half of it is the non-executive role of the chair, and the other is the executive role of an independent judge who will essentially manage any other judges who are brought in, in order both to sign off investigation reports and to deal with inquisitorial proceedings.

With the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill seemingly not progressing as it should in this Parliament, will that cause any problems for your organisation, Sir Declan?

Yes, it is going to raise two very considerable issues. The first is the issue that has already been discussed in relation to Ireland, but it is also going to raise the issue of our getting the resources that we need in order to do the job. The outline business case relates to the new Bill. The financial commitment that would be made under the outline business case is not going to be available to us while the new Bill continues to be debated. The longer it stays there, the more difficult it is both for our governance team and for the investigative team to work out on an ongoing basis what resource we have to do the cases and how, if we do not have enough resource, we are going to prioritise within the various groups the way that we can do things. The third thing is that Ireland’s engagement with this is set to be predicated on the new Act being in place, so for us to be able to progress, we need that there.

Holly, this is extremely frustrating for us as parliamentarians. What is the NIO doing?

Declan has set out the concerns really clearly, and we share them. We are ready for Committee stage, and we continue to press for the importance of the Bill continuing its passage through Parliament.

Thank you all for being with us. Holly, to what extent do you think the review had the correct scope and objectives? Was there sufficient detail in the 19 recommendations for them to be deliverable?

I think the scope was right in covering the issues. It certainly covered the range of issues, either the particular challenges or concerns we had observed or where ICRIR had explained things they were hearing about cultural behaviours that were not acceptable. I think the terms of reference covered off those two sides—corporate capability and culture—quite well. I think the range of recommendations gives a very clear plan in respect of the work that ICRIR and the NIO need to take forward to make sure that ICRIR can function properly and appropriately. I guess I would say that some of the recommendations are not in themselves the end of the story. For example, on the setting up of a financial committee, just because it is set up on paper, with terms of reference, does not mean we can tick the box and all relax. It is about what that financial committee is going to deliver. What assurances are needed, and what expertise can it continue to grow within the organisation? That is where the relationship between the NIO and ICRIR is going to continue to be important. I think we have grown into more of a partnership over the past couple of weeks and months, and that is giving us the assurances we need and helping ICRIR to grow in confidence.

You spoke earlier about your organisations working together. How is that going generally? Are there still any frustrations?

I think it is going quite well—I am trying to see the faces of the others on the call to see whether that view is shared. We meet very regularly at all levels, and that is really quite important. We meet at a junior level, in respect of quite technical issues such as FOIs or data protection-type questions, all the way through to the senior level, with Sir Declan, the permanent secretary and me discussing the strategic direction. It is important that ICRIR maintains its operational independence, which of course it does, but it has helped that we are now in this partnership space. We all have the same shared aims of making ICRIR successful for families and victims, and we have a plan to enable us to do that.

So there are no frustrations with how it is currently.

There are always slight frustrations; nothing is ever perfect. Maybe on the pace of delivering some of the recommendations—I am sure a couple could be improved. I think you have heard that the OBC taking the time it is taking is a source of frustration. We are working really closely with the Treasury on that to try to get us through the process as quickly as possible.

Which of the recommendations are progressing quickly and which would you like to progress more quickly?

Financial stewardship is critical for the credibility of the organisation, and getting the OBC signed off, so I see that as a major priority. But for an organisation to be successful, the culture needs to be right, and it is obviously harder to quantify the point at which you have succeeded in that. That will be a harder one for us to manage. We have talked with the organisation about doing pulse surveys over a period of time, so that we start to build up an evidence base of how things are feeling inside the organisation. If you have a happy workforce, things generally seem to work better. We are also continuing to monitor the number of vacancies in the Department. You have heard that that is where some of the frustrations lie, and about how that can impact the culture and its effectiveness, so that is an important area for us to focus on as well.

I am going to concentrate on some of the findings in the May report, which highlighted that the ICRIR has spent £60 million since it was founded. Josephine, do you consider this to be good value for money, given that no case has concluded its investigations and findings stages yet?

You are correct about approximately £60 million having been spent. But look at it in this way: this is about an investment. Between £15 million and £20 million was about looking at buildings, systems and processes to get the commission established. That is allowing us to move into delivery. Yes, we have staff costs, and will continue to do so, but we also had early set-up costs, which we needed to give us the equipment and the buildings, and to get going with the commission. You heard earlier that we were a start-up. We needed to operate from somewhere, and that is where there is early expenditure—that type of money. We are now moving into a delivery phase, as you heard, with about four or five cases coming through the system. That will continue to grow.

Holly, what are your views on that?

My views are similar to Josephine’s, to be honest. We always need to make sure that we demonstrate good value for money, that we work within the frameworks and processes, and that we have a really close relationship with the Treasury. I think that goes to some of the delays with the OBC, where we have been trying to provide that robust narrative and evidence base going forward to describe what the future funding state and budget of the organisation need to be.

Sir Declan, under the previous senior leadership arrangements, why did employees who elevated issues have to wait “a very long time” for a response, or never heard back?

I think that comment was made in relation to what is called the senior leadership team. The senior leadership team is, essentially, the team that meets in the commission’s leadership team. It is a part of the executive team. It is not something that I attend or chair, because of my role on the board. Obviously, it was a concern that that was happening. Is there an explanation? I think there might be. Going back to your first question, you asked how it could be that so little product has been achieved, despite the expenditure. Had 40 cases actually come through in the first year, we would have spent less, and we would probably have produced product much more quickly—

Forgive me, Sir Declan, for interjecting. This is not so much about—to use your phrase—“product” out the door. The substantive question is more in relation to the employees who elevated issues, not so much the internal financials that we discussed previously.

As I indicated, I am grateful to them for what they did on the Peter May investigation. It was also because of concern that we as board members were picking up from employees that things were not right, that we decided as a board that we were going to engage in this. I agree it is not acceptable that our staff should have found that when they needed an outcome from their senior leaders, they were not getting it. That is something that the senior leadership team within the commission’s leadership team needs to deal with. I am sure that they are dealing with it.

You made an important point about the £60 million. Declan cannot issue any reports until I have finished investigations. To give you a sense of the quantity of the work that is part of that £60 million to date, we have had almost 300 referrals from individuals to the commission. That includes, as I said previously, the Guildford pub bombings, the M62 coach bombing, the Enniskillen bomb, the Shankill Road bomb, La Mon, Teebane, Claudy, Kingsmills, Warrenpoint, Canary Wharf and the Baltic Exchange, as well as a range of individuals who came to the commission. The Metropolitan police, on average, deal with about 100 to 125 murders a year, and the PSNI somewhere in the region of 16 to 20. We are far in excess of that. The murders that happen for the Metropolitan police are largely single-incident events—someone stabbed someone in the street, or domestic violence—and the same for the PSNI. It is normally one victim; the evidence is fresh, and there; the forensics is there, at the scene; limited historical disclosure is involved; and progression to the CPS, or the PPS here in Northern Ireland, happens very quickly. That is very different from legacy investigations. I have 123 live investigations at the moment. Some of the money that you are talking about is spent on doing those investigations thoroughly before I hand them over to Declan. Legacy investigations involve multiple fatalities across linked incidents. They are part of a campaign that went on for 35 years. The evidence is decades-old, incomplete or contested. The PSNI alone have 44 million documents—Jon Boutcher handed me the keys and said, “There’s the haystack. Go and find your own needle in it.” The investigations include extensive intelligence and state material that you will not find in contemporary murders in the Met or the PSNI. So there is a persistent intensity in those cases from the start of investigations to the end. Doing this job properly requires me to invest time, effort and energy to discover the truth for people from multiple organisations, including the security service, the PSNI, the MOD and a range of others. If the premise is that it is £60 million and not a report out the door, that £60 million is invested at the minute in me getting the best evidence, information or truth for the victims who have come to the commission in the most substantial way that I can.

Peter, has the commission’s leadership been too preoccupied with firefighting, as the report suggests?

I described at the very beginning of this that it is a classic example of a system under strain. I remember in the change from the RUC to the PSNI, with Patten, some of the early-stage strain that you saw in the organisation. The maturity was not there. The tone of any organisation is set by the top of it, and we don’t step away from that; that is our responsibility at the top of the organisation. But as Peter said, there is a lot of good work going on in the organisation. I would be surprised if you asked somebody to look into any organisation and they did not find things that you could change or do better. We have no difficulty; we were the people who asked for that. We asked for it because we wanted to hold a mirror up to ourselves to see whether we were the best organisation that victims and survivors could find if they came through the door. That is why we did this. I am confident that, where we fell short in terms of the tone—and we did fall short—that can be better in the future. It is already. Declan and I spend time with all the staff, in both Belfast and London, and a lot of the staff do not see this—that is not how they perceive it when they come to work. It is not the environment that they see in their day-to-day job. At the leadership level, there are undoubtedly challenges, tensions and stresses, which caused human beings to become more challenging with each other. To some people, that felt disrespectful, but I am confident—

Sorry for interjecting, Peter. Can you just explain to me that last comment about some people experiencing it in different ways, in terms of how the frustrations were manifesting themselves?

People who are investigators feel and absorb the weight of victims as they go out and talk to them and hear their cases—victims who are frustrated that they have not had answers in 30, 40 or 50 years. When those investigators come back in, and the senior investigators come back in, they want more staff, because how are they going to progress this? The other side of the organisation is budget-led and constraint-led. It is not that people don’t want to do this, but the chief executive is accountable—she cannot break the budget—yet the frustration on the other side is, “We want to make progress for those people who have come through the door. We don’t want them to be waiting another five or 10 years.” It is human nature, and you see it in your own Committees and in Parliament. Those conflicts happen with people. Does it make it right? Should it happen? No, but that is human nature. I am confident that, through all this work and through some of the work that we have already engaged in since the report came out, people will start to understand that it is not necessarily that you are challenging the person; you might be challenging the issue. Sometimes, on the other side, people think that you are being challenged as the individual, where others are challenging issues. Creating those understandings is critical. People talk about culture, but culture is simply about how we work together. That is what this is about. Sometimes you put a label like “culture” on this and people don’t understand. You could ask 10 people, “What do you mean by culture?”, and they will give you 10 different answers. What culture is about is how we learn to work together better, and how we deal with some of the challenges that inevitably come in any organisation.

Good morning to you all. Peter, after that last exchange, I will direct this question to you in the first instance, because you are talking about the requirements of leadership and a leader’s role in setting culture and direction. Peter May’s review reported concerns that the leadership team and the culture in the ICRIR are “toxic”, “divided” and “disrespectful”, and that there is a “silo working” mentality. Do you accept that characterisation?

What I think he said was that there were some people who said, or at least there were one or two comments that people made that said, the culture was toxic. I ask myself, “What do you mean by toxic?” It is that stressful working environment that people find themselves in. I think Peter was right in terms of those clashes that happened at the senior leadership level—undoubtedly, they happened. Could they have been done better and more respectfully? Absolutely, they could. I think people recognise that. In the world of the investigators, however, that is not how people saw it in the organisation; Declan and I heard that time and again from staff. That is not to take away from those staff who experienced it; we have to recognise that some staff experienced it, so we have to take that on board and make sure that collectively, whether it is at senior leadership level or otherwise, we change that. Neither Declan nor I nor Josephine is here to distribute responsibility elsewhere; it is our responsibility. We see it, we recognise it and we have apologised to those staff who felt that way. I have tried to create an understanding of why some of this happened. It is not a mitigation, but I have tried to create some understanding of the tensions in an early-stage organisation.

Is it your position then, Peter, that you accept that the characterisation of it being “toxic”, “divided” and “disrespectful” was shared with Peter May by one or two individuals, and you accept that for those directly involved, that may be how they feel, but you say that is different from it being the culture of the entirety of the ICRIR? Is that your position?

Yes, that is probably true. There were over 100 people who spoke to Peter for his report and many of them had more positive things to say to him. But inevitably, when you do these types of reports, you look at what needs to be improved and what needs to change in an organisation. We have 70-odd staff in London. It is not their experience. They say they enjoy working and coming to work, and the same at the Belfast end.

Okay. Sir Declan, do you accept the characterisation of it being “toxic”, “divided” and “disrespectful”?

My approach to this is maybe slightly different. There were people within the organisation who experienced that and they experienced it, as I think Peter has indicated, as a result of being aware of clashes between senior leaders about the way in which the organisation was conducting its work. Looking back, you always ask yourself the question, “Are there things that we could have done differently that might have had a different effect?” I think Peter May was right in his evidence to you earlier that one of the things that we maybe did not focus on—that we did not focus on in the way that we should have—is recognising that we had an organisation with different cultures in terms of the employees. We also had three different sites, each with its own culture. With hindsight, we could have done better at ensuring that there was understanding between the governance side that Peter has talked about—who, in my view, are not there to restrain but to facilitate—and the operative side, who are there to do things. I think we could have done better in terms of making that relationship work in a positive way. I think the effect of it not working was, in some cases, to leave people feeling as Peter May described.

Josephine, you indicated earlier that you joined in January this year, and therefore probably just a number of weeks before the conclusion of the Peter May report. How would you characterise that work environment when you entered it?

Since I joined, I have found people very supportive in equipping me to undertake my role. Whether it was within any part of ICRIR or, indeed, the NIO, people have been very supportive in providing me with information about systems and processes. But clearly, from speaking to staff who were in the commission prior to Christmas— indeed, I have spoken to Peter May—that was not the reality for some, and I think we have to recognise that. I would also say that culture is absolutely the responsibility of the senior team. We set the tone of the organisation moving forward culturally. It is also something that you cannot do just once; you have to work at it all the time. You can see the difference in the staff numbers from the very start of the organisation; we have grown those numbers and we intend to grow them further with the conclusion of the OBC. That inclusive workforce is something that we all have to be really committed to. We will be split over a number of sites, and we all have different roles, so it is something we are going to have to continually work at. Every organisation has to do that, and that starts with the senior leadership team.

Whose job do you think it is? Who is responsible for changing the culture and for responding positively? Is it a collective endeavour or is there somebody responsible for its implementation within ICRIR?

It is definitely collective; we are all senior leaders together. We do have a director of HR and culture who is putting in place training and processes, so there are individuals with particular roles, but culture is about all of us; we all have responsibility. We all have a responsibility for how we turn up to work and how we interact with each other. You heard earlier about communication; communication up and down the organisation, and creating that culture, is a collective responsibility.

Sir Declan, in this endeavour, as chief commissioner, is it your responsibility to ensure a change of culture, so that these circumstances do not arise again, or do you believe that that is an executive function?

No. I think that, as the chair of the organisation, I have to be satisfied that the mechanisms that we are putting in place are going to address the issue, and particularly the issue of different cultures in different parts of the organisation—in a way, it is not different cultures that bothers me so much as different values. We have to ensure that everybody is united on the values and understands what that means in terms of engagement between people carrying out different tasks. I have to be responsible for one of those, but I certainly feel responsible for ensuring that we deliver positive outcomes in relation to this. That is why I am working closely with Peter May. We meet every week. It was very important to ensure that Peter was involved in the delivery of the recommendations, as well as actually indicating the problem, because we need to ensure that we understand the intent behind everything that Peter raised, and that we implement the things that are going to make the difference.

Can you outline your confidence in such a change being attained?

Yes; I am satisfied. Everything that I have seen indicates to me that we will be able to make this happen, with the help of Peter and others. I think it will also require Peter and me, and other senior leaders, to spend considerably more time engaging with our staff and giving them reassurance, but also listening to what they have to say to us.

Sir Declan, just a slight pivot before I move on to Ms Clark: you know that the draft legislation is before Parliament, and that there are scores of Back-Bench amendments, particularly from members of this Committee, and a huge range of Government amendments set to be published. Do you think there is sufficient shared understanding between ICRIR and the NIO of what is required from the current legislation and the changes proposed?

I think we have a high-level understanding of what is proposed, but we will need to see the detail of where the Bill gets to. We cannot make any assumptions on the detail of the Bill. It does create its own problems in terms of how we deal with this interim period, which has turned out to be considerably longer than any of us had anticipated.

Are you satisfied that the changes you require are being advanced by the Northern Ireland Office? More particularly, is there something that you have asked for that is not being delivered?

No, I am satisfied that we have had positive discussions with the Northern Ireland Office in relation to facilitating the powers that Peter has asked for. I am satisfied that the Secretary of State is working hard with his opposite number in Ireland. I still want to see the outcome of that, because—I have said this before and I will say it again—we have information disclosure protocols with sensitive agencies in the United Kingdom that enable us to see the material. It is then up to the relevant authorities to decide what can and cannot be disclosed. That will be subject to review within the United Kingdom courts. We need a similar process in Ireland if we are going to do this properly. That will, again, require supervision—in that case, by the Irish courts—if there are national security interests. It is important that we as an organisation have the facility of looking at the unredacted material to see what the case is really about. I am not sure that the facility and correspondence between what we do in the United Kingdom and what we do in Ireland is yet clear.

Thank you, Sir Declan. Ms Clark, are you clear that the Irish are going to legislate in a way that would allow and facilitate access to ICRIR to sensitive information that has thus far not been forthcoming?

I am confident with what is in the framework documents, and I am confident that we have an excellent working relationship with the Irish Government. I would not want to prejudge anything that is going to happen in their legislation, like we cannot prejudge the amendments that may come forward in our legislation, but we are committed to making the commission work. Having Irish input into that from the Garda is obviously essential, so we will be continuing to work towards that.

I beg your pardon, but there is nothing in the framework document that suggests the level of access to information that Sir Declan has just outlined.

No, but there is a commitment to information sharing that we are actively working with the Irish Government on.

Do you have more detail than the five or six paragraphs on the last page of a 10-page document on the framework?

I cannot give you more detail today, but I am happy to write on the subject.

We would appreciate your writing to us. I would just indicate to you that for four months, when I was raising the issue of An Garda Síochána and the Irish Government not facilitating requests from ICRIR, all the Northern Ireland Office ever said was that it was engaged in positive discussions. The Northern Ireland Office was never open in the response that we got. It took Helen McEntee, the Irish Minister, to assert bluntly that there would be no information sharing until a conclusion to the interstate case. I would appreciate your writing to us and giving us more detail than what is in the framework document, because there is nothing in that framework document that would answer the questions that Sir Declan has just outlined.

I will take that back to the Department.

I have a question for Declan. You said that, as the chair, you regularly meet with Peter May. Does Peter May meet with others from the senior leadership team on a regular basis, and would that be appropriate in your mind?

Yes, he certainly has engaged, from time to time, with other members of the senior leadership team. I have encouraged him—we have discussed it in our weekly meeting—to reach out to those other leaders in relation to the things that they may be able to help with. He has reached out to Josephine, and to HR and other areas. His role is very much hands-on in ensuring that we achieve those outcomes.

To pick up on one of your answers, Sir Declan, how would you characterise a positive outcome for applicants to ICRIR?

The objective, Paul, is in a sense quite simple. We want to ensure that all those who have waited so long for answers about their loved ones feel that they have had all the information that can possibly be given to them, and that they have been made fully aware of all the relevant elements. The purpose of that is not to ensure that those people can put it behind them; it is to assure them that they have done all they can to find that information, and to some extent to ensure that a burden is lifted, particularly in relation to intergenerational issues, where people feel a burden to deliver something. This is about taking that burden, at least to some extent, off their shoulders. That is, in every case, what we are seeking to do.

That is an excellent response, if I may say so. Given what you say, is the culture of ICRIR too legalistic? I have spoken to you in the past about why there is not more discussion of restorative justice. Is one of the underlying problems that, while the outcome is absolutely excellent, the approach is more legalistic: criminal and civil remedies rather than restorative justice?

I understand the point. We obviously have processes in relation to most of our cases, but there also has to be a degree of flexibility. We have had circumstances where we discussed and worked cases and then, in discussion with the individual involved—I am thinking of one case in particular, where the individual found it all extremely traumatic—agreed that the case should be withdrawn because he had had as much as he could take from the investigation without doing damage to himself. We have recognised that we have people who are looking for engagement and apologies in relation to those who have been engaged in what they have done, and we are open to examining that. We are not closing the door, because we have to be thinking all the time about how we take away the burden of responsibility that so many people feel in relation to this. There may be different ways of doing it, and we have to seek to facilitate that where we can.

Moving on to the question I was going to ask, the report identifies tensions in the current structure with regard to financial responsibility. You heard Peter May’s response to my question earlier. Do you agree that the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill, as currently drafted, has helped to address some of those tensions?

Sorry, the tensions between—?

Between the fact that the chief executive and the non-executive commissioners are responsible for financial governance issues, but do not have investigatory experience, while decisions on where the money is spent are very much part of Peter Sheridan’s role as commissioner.

One thing about the new structures that will require some degree of informal or formal direction is the way in which the relationship between the chief executive and the directors is going to work. The Bill is predicated on the proposition that that the chief executive will have to have considerable understanding of the way in which the investigative team can carry out its work. They will also have to have parameters in place as to how the work will be split between the two directors. Is this a case of two directors with equal functions, or do you provide some types of case to one director and a different type of case to other directors? I think that is what Peter was talking about when he said that there were uncertainties about the way in which that would work. The structure tends to suggest that the chief executive will have more understanding of the financial implications of what the investigative team is doing, but it is not clear to me how that issue between the two directors will work in financial terms. If you get big cases, they are expensive; if you get small cases, they are not, but you might get more of them. Working through all of that is going to require a degree of engagement between the executive team and require strategising on the part of the new board as to how they work that forward. There is a lot of work to be done there.

Josephine, are you confident that is something that ICRIR can do? Is there anything you need from the legislation that is not there now? Are you confident that you can deal with it at an administrative level?

On things like the delegated budgets and the finance committee, there are structures other than the legislation that need to be developed. You have heard that the finance committee has been set up, and it is about to have its second meeting. We need properly delegated budgets that are reported through the finance committee up to the board and to the Northern Ireland Office to see if there are pressures. We are going to explore the 15% AME issue further because, as was stated, things could arise during a financial year in relation to forensics, or additional cases could come in that require more funding in-year. When you are trying to land the organisation on a pinhead of a financial figure, that is tricky for any accounting officer, but when you are trying to do it with a demand-led service, that is even more difficult. Interaction with the sponsor branch and looking at the 15% AME cap are ways of doing that moving forward, as was suggested in the Peter May review.

Sticking with the Legacy Commission as it is structured under the new Bill, am I right in my understanding that there is nothing we need to change? Is the structure, as drafted, sufficient? Do you have any demands or wants?

There is nothing in the Bill that I would make any suggestion about, at this point in time.

Would anybody else?

Paul, I would just like to make it clear that the Bill, at the moment, does not include access to powers—the police powers that Peter talked about. That is absolutely essential and will have to come through by way of an amendment.

That is a structural issue about how you govern, but I understand that point. I was going to ask about the Irish Government, but Gavin has asked many of those questions. Declan, you told the Committee for the Executive Office about the proposal for a disclosure protocol. Can you explain what that is and where we might be going with it?

We have an example of it on our website. Essentially, it is a document that sets out the expectations, on our part and that of the agency with which we are dealing, about the way in which the disclosure process will work. It broadly records that the commission is entitled to see all the relevant documentation, sensitive and otherwise. There is then a process in the Act for deciding whether or not there is any problem with the publication of some or all of that material. The Act provides that in cases in which there has been some non-disclosure for national security reasons, that can be examined by the courts and the relevant victim or survivor. That happens across the piece in relation to all the organisations—sensitive organisations, police organisations, military organisations and so on—within the United Kingdom. It is what gives, and is designed to give, victims and survivors confidence that everything has been looked at. If we end up in a situation where information from Ireland does not match that standard, the risk is that the people we are talking about will feel that the burden is still there, because they will feel that there is still material that has not been seen by people who need to see it in order to come to final decisions. From my perspective, that is why being able to see correspondence, in terms of access to the materials, is so important. If we cannot lift that burden for those people, we will have failed. It will have been a pointless exercise, in my view.

Are you having those discussions with the Irish Government or Irish authorities?

The present position in Ireland is that until they see the colour of the Bill, they are not playing ball. They have been very pleasant about it. I talk informally to Irish officials if I happen to see them at an event and the Garda commissioner was very welcoming to Peter and myself when we went down to see him. However, the line is clear from the Government that there is still an outstanding case and that until they see the final shape of the new legislation, we will not be getting the co-operation that we need.

Thank you.

Just to give the timeline: there was a chief operating officer in place who was responsible for financial roles from May 2024 until mid-August 2025. We then started the process for Josephine’s appointment. However, we probably did not start it early enough, partly because we had not anticipated that the previous finance director was going to go and the period did not seem sufficient for us to get a permanent outcome. We had a temporary finance director in place from the beginning of September 2025 until the middle of December 2025. Josephine then came in on 1 January. That is where the three came in. Bringing in a temporary finance director is always a problem because they will not have any institutional memory or knowledge of how things were done. There was not any form of handover between the outgoing financial director and the temporary one coming in, nor was there a handover between the temporary one going out and Josephine coming in. That probably made life more difficult than we would have wanted it to be. We need to learn a bit more in terms of ensuring that if, for one reason or another, key people are moving on or away we are very effective in thinking about how we go about replacing them and securing institutional memory.

I have not paused any cases at all. There is one that a family member has asked us to pause, but that is at the request of individuals. Like with any investigation, if we are looking at forensic material or I have to send section 5 requests out to another agency, it may mean that not every case is worked on every day. That is just the nature of it—it is the same in policing terms; you move and shift resources about. At this minute in time, none of the cases are paused; we try to work on all of those cases at some level and engage with families to tell them we are doing that. Obviously, if you have more resources, you can do more things. If we keep getting cases at the current level, which is somewhere between seven and 12 new cases every month, particularly given the size of some of them, we are inevitably going to build up a backlog. We did some work on this in March. I have worked with the College of Policing, the DPP in Northern Ireland, the CPS in England, and the senior investigating officer. I went to see the former national lead—the SIO—at Grenfell, and I went to see the Manchester Arena SIO to get a sense of what the investigative model might look like in this. We built an investigative model that said to us that we need six syndicates to do that level of cases—that was in March ’25. This year, when we reworked it, we said we needed nine. The NIO then put together an independent review team who agreed on the level of syndicates that were required to do the work; it said seven, with digitalisation. I am not sure how quick that digitalisation, AI and so on will happen in this world, but we are working on it. As Sir Declan said earlier, we are at half the resources, so inevitably we will start to create a backlog. When I picked up these cases at the start, there was an individual whose case lay with the police ombudsman for 16 years, and we do not want to get into that world with this. An enormous amount of work between us and the NIO needs to happen to be realistic about what we can do and what we can deliver.

They are not. The thing to be aware of is that, because we are the organisation that we are, vetting is part of the process we perform to bring people into the organisation—you have to be vetted. The lead time between doing the recruitment, going through the vetting process and people then handing in their notice takes time. We look at getting an amount of resource staff in through temporary agencies to fill gaps, but ideally right across the organisation you need permanent staff. Agency is good for short-term bursts or projects, but having the bulk of your staff as permanent is what we are all striving for throughout our different directorates. In relation to my area of finance and corporate services, there were a number of people who had come in through secondment from other Government Departments and were coming to the end of that secondment period. There have been periods of time where there has been a gap before we have either been able to secure temporary or permanent resource. One of my first tasks when I arrived in January was to look at the finance and corporate services structures and to get in a recruitment timetable, write job descriptions and get out to market. At this point in time, I have had four different recruitments across estates, information governance and data protection as well as two in finance that have been going through those processes. Indeed, there will be more to come over the next number of months. The organisation has gaps, and I know that is also true in other areas. We continually need to look at where at our risks are. If we are aware that a secondment is coming up, we need to make sure that there is a recruitment under way well in advance, taking into effect the—[Inaudible.] We have a syndicate model where we have different areas of expertise, but as far as investigations, that part of the organisation absolutely needs resource if we are going to cope with the demand of the reporting requirements for the individuals that have come forward, and the need to do this job properly right across ICRIR.

Absolutely. Credit to Josephine since she has come in and led the team there. Obviously, we have our work plan to work to, which helps to set that financial strategy that Peter May talked about in his session. The vacancies that have been described are still a risk that we are all alive to. We are working hard to make sure that we bring in the right staff with the right level of skills. But I think that we have a much more frank, open and honest relationship with each other now, which means that Josephine would feel comfortable escalating any issues or concerns at a really early stage. That will help us all to manage them better.

Thank you very much. Holly, when will there be a further statement on the appointment of a chair for the separate review of the ICRIR, which is required under section 36 of the legacy Act 2023?

We are committed to doing a section 36 review and laying the report in Parliament before April next year. We are just working to identify the independent chair of that review and will then report that to you as soon as possible. We were hoping it was going to be before the summer.

How will Peter May’s review relate to that?

It will be slightly different. The section 36 review is about the performance of the functions in particular. Where Peter May’s review did not go into the investigative side, this review very much will—the investigative, the findings and the process. It will also look into all the statutory functions that the ICRIR has in much more detail and make an assessment of how it is performing. It will be important for us to get that review and understand if there are any changes that need to be made. Those changes will probably not be legislative, but more with regards to internal management changes and process changes that will help the commission work better. We are committed to the review, and we will be writing shortly.

Thank you very much for your time.