Welcome to today’s session of the Business and Trade Committee, as we commence our hearings into the free trade agreement with India. We expect and hope that the treaty will be debated in the House in January. Our goal as a Committee is to report to the House early in the new year so that the House has something to reflect on. Murray, I will start with you. Could you tell us what has happened to Jaguar Land Rover’s sales in India now that the free trade agreement has been agreed? There was no implementation plan with the deal and we are conscious that that may have had an impact on your business there.

It is quite hard—among the rest of trade flows, pluses and minuses—to isolate exactly what is down to the deal and what is down to wider economic effects there. We do not see a wholesale change day-to-day, but I think it does highlight one area of concern that we have, which is not necessarily against the India FTA; it is in more general terms, and it is more pertinent to high-value goods. When a tariff rate changes quite substantially, the impact on the customer will be to hold off to see the new rate being implemented, and that is a challenge for your existing sales and volumes in the market. Our concern is the long ratification period: how long it takes to implement deals on high-value goods. In this instance, on a finished vehicle being shipped out of the UK to India, there is about a 110% duty. That will come down to 50% in the first implementation year, so there is quite a sizeable difference, which is positive in the long term.

Quite a lot of duty on Range Rovers.

It is a huge amount, and of course the savvy customer will be aware of that.

What is your best guess for when those tariffs will become available to Indian consumers?

At some point we will have to decide ourselves what we do. That will be relative to the rest of the market as well. I would have thought it will be in the middle of next year. If we see a good wind with the ratification of that trade deal being implemented, we will try to pass on the reduction as soon as possible.

Jonathan, do you have similar issues?

It is obviously going to be different for whisky because buying a bottle of whisky is a very different proposition from buying a car. What we see—I will quote from SWA figures—is that export value to India in the year to Q3 2025 is up 16%. That is part of a very healthy trend. We have seen an increase in the value since 2019 of 49.5%. That is before the deal kicks in. I would absolutely agree with Murray that we are interested in seeing swift ratification. Therefore we understand there must be proper parliamentary scrutiny, and we are very encouraged to know that there will be a debate in early January because we would like to see the deal in force so we can start fully taking advantage of it.

I should declare something of interest, in that my sister works for Pernod Ricard. I will start with you, Jonathan. Obviously you have touched on the fact that the potential here is enormous. Is there a danger that because of India’s federal system, although we have a very high-level deal with the national Government, there might be barriers in the way at the lower state level? The states seem to have quite a degree of autonomy.

May I touch on two things there? When we look at the private market projections, there is robust compound annual growth, including in the high-value segments, which are important for us. However, it is important to be cautious, in that India is not the answer to everything. It will take a while for the tariffs to come down. Yes, there are concerns at state level; we have two concerns at state level. One is about excise taxes, if excise taxes are put up to compensate for the tariffs coming down, because excise taxes are a big source of revenue for Indian states. We have a raft of other issues, including price controls in many Indian states. In Telangana, for example, we have a backlog of $337 million for the whole alcohol industry because it controls the retail sectors. We are getting good support from DBT to try to resolve that. I would be guardedly optimistic about this. When you look at Indian states, they are a bit like US states. They are major economies in their own right. That is an opportunity for UK commercial and political engagement, not just at a federal level for UK nations and for UK city mayors. Therefore we see opportunities and we are urging DBT to continue its efforts at state level. However, we also recognise that as an industry we must continue our efforts and build alliances with Indian spirits companies, so that they have a common interest with us in seeing those barriers tackled. We must make the case—particularly on excise—that if you lower excise taxes, evidence suggests that states will raise more revenues.

Do you think the UK Government are tackling this issue, are aware of it and are trying to work with you on this?

DBT certainly has a programme to tackle state-level issues.

The evidence that we have received during this inquiry suggests that there are 4,618 non-tariff measures. We have this new phenomenon of quality control orders, as well as the autonomous excise pricing controls and licence requirements at US state level. That sounds like a thicket—an absolute jungle—of regulation that we must try to cut through, but you sound fairly confident that we can cut through that thicket.

I am realistic. India is always going to be a tough market, but a market with tremendous opportunities, and it is a market with win-win opportunities. We see this deal as good for the Indian whisky industry, because the tariff cuts will affect imports of bulk. Bulk whisky is used as an ingredient in Indian whisky. Indian whisky is one of the world’s fastest-growing categories, so it is good for both sides. Tackling issues at state level will not happen overnight. It will not simply be a matter of the UK Government lobbying; it is a matter of Indian states listening to business. I would hope to see healthy competition between Indian states as they seek to improve their business environment as part of the ease of doing business agenda.

Some of the evidence we have seen is also quite optimistic about the potential for gin exports. Is that your view too?

Yes. It is a much smaller market. It is about a 20th of the size of the whisky market, but we see opportunities there in the premium segment, which is where we specialise.

There is a one tariff code for bulk whisky that does not appear to have been untariffed. Is that correct?

That is true. That is a snag in the deal. It is a technical issue that we think we can resolve with the Indian Government.

Yes, thank you for the question. I will just give a bit of context in terms of existing UK exports of pharmaceutical goods to India. The UK exports about £26 billion-worth of medicines globally. The Indian market accounts for about £127 million of that, so you can see it is a small fragment, despite the size of the Indian market, of around 0.5% in total. For AstraZeneca in particular—of course I can only speak for AstraZeneca today rather than the whole sector, although I suspect that many of my peers in other large firms will share similar sentiments—we have sales globally of around £11 billion a year. For India, it is in the range of £2 million to £3 million, so again a very small fraction of this. Prior to the deal, the Indian Government operated around a 10% tariff, blended, on pharmaceutical goods, with some additional taxes coming through their GST system. Those reductions will of course be beneficial, particularly for those companies that have a large section of the market in India in disease areas, including infectious disease. But AstraZeneca does not export very much, so those tariff reductions will not make a huge difference to our overall posture in the Indian market.

Our major concern was to maintain our SPS arrangements so that we did not lower our standards of domestic production here and open ourselves up to lower competition. We would say that the deal that has been put forward has achieved that, so that is something that we do welcome. The lowering of the lamb tariff quota from 33% down to zero is again something that, at a headline level, is very welcome. The export health certificates that we must achieve to be able to export lamb into India are very complicated and probably impossible at the moment. That is where people on the ground—our agri-food attachés—are incredibly important at trying to open up those markets. On paper we have a deal in place, but turning that into a reality that benefits the members that I represent is what we need to do on the ground. Those agri-food attachés around the world are paramount to unlocking the opportunities that exist. On dairy, we have lowered our tariffs for imports from India without achieving any access into the Indian market. That is a missed opportunity. They are the world’s largest dairy producer, but they are not self-sufficient. There was a real opportunity there, particularly for some of our specialist cheesemakers, to access the Indian market. That is where there is still an opportunity to try to go a bit further. On the other hand, on sugar, we are very supportive of the position that the Government have taken around sugar, because the sugar industry there does have Government support, particularly at times of excess, and that is deemed to breach WTO rules. Opening our market to Indian sugar would have been very detrimental, so we welcome the steps the Government have taken with the Indian trade deal. Unfortunately, they just increased the autonomous tariff quota last week, increasing tariff-free exports from 260,000 tonnes to 325,000 tonnes globally. They did a good job on the Indian deal. They then undermined that by increasing the ATQ and exporting our investment overseas, which is counterproductive.

In general terms, maybe it is only 6,000 vehicles, but we have complete knockdown operations operating in India, so I am pretty sure that the numbers we ship as CKD will not be within those numbers. Our ability to transact in the Indian market is a bit higher than that, albeit not dissimilar to AstraZeneca. We exported £17 billion-worth of goods last year; £50 million of it was to India, so a fraction of that. It is still quite difficult to assess the long-term prospects and exactly what route we will take to get there, but the direction is very clear. It is positive. If I come back to your earlier point: where does it fall a bit short? Given the fact that the UK and Indian automotive markets are not really competing, it is quite complicated in its execution. For internal combustion engines, quotas are driven by engine cubic capacity and there is a wrinkle in the system whereby, for the sake of three cubic centimetres in an engine, the quotas are in the wrong bucket. I do not think we are going to be able to iron that out.

It is 3 litres, and JLRs are 2997 cc. The spirit was there, but the formal execution will fall short of it, unfortunately.

It remains to be seen, because we are not entirely sure whether we will be shipping complete units or whether we will make further use of our CKD facilities there. If it were another country and we did not already have a manufacturing presence, it would be a problem. I am unsure of how that would affect other exporters from the UK who do not, but they might have larger capacity engines or be in the right space, but given—

It could be substitutional volume in there. On EVs, there is a price threshold as well. That looks to be better configured but, again, price is an odd thing to anchor it on, given there are many different types of prices that can be gamed within the system. I think this is a point I would make equally to the Indian and the UK teams: we are two industries that are not really in competition with each other, so we have rather overcomplicated the execution of it, which is unfortunate.

If you had said to me when I joined Pernod Ricard in 2021 that we would have a deal agreed in 2025, likely to come into force in 2026, which cut the 150% tariff down to 75% on entering into force and then went down to 40% after 10 years, with no restrictions on price and no quotas, I would have been incredulous. Obviously you said things can always be better. You always want tariffs to be as low as possible. For example, with the US, we want to go back to the zero tariffs we had before. However, this is a good deal, and we pay tribute to the negotiators on both sides who have achieved it and to the two Governments who worked for it. It is important—we are not party political—that there has been a cross-Government, cross-party consensus on this.

Tom, can I just check a couple of things that came through to us in evidence? India gains full access to the UK dairy market. Is that correct?

Yes.

And UK dairy exporters will continue to face a tariff of over 30%?

That is absolutely right. If we look at the figures for dairy exports now, I think India is importing about $60 million-worth of dairy products. We are the seventh largest exporter, which is $2.2 million. It is relatively small, but there is massive scope. As the country develops, demand for dairy products increases. We see growth in the Indian market. That is where the gap is for us. We welcome the defence of pork, chicken and eggs, but on the offensive side, we have given them access to our market with no increased access to the Indian market. That is where there was an offensive opportunity.

This is the third free trade deal in a row where we do not have reciprocal access on dairy. Is that correct?

That is absolutely correct. It is that compound impact that is the very real risk here. It is like we are saying our dairy sector does not deserve any sort of preferential treatment; all we are looking for is reciprocal access the other way. To lower the Indian tariffs and not to get access the other way with reduced tariff access into India is a missed opportunity. It is the compound challenge. When we are in the middle of negotiations with the US, its negotiators can see what has happened in the last three negotiations, and they will be pushing incredibly hard for access for US dairy products. We must make sure that we get beneficial access back the other way or we stand firm and say no. At the moment it feels like our dairy sector is one that we are willing to sacrifice to try to get other sectors over the line.

I think the phrase that you used in evidence to us was deeply “disappointing”.

Our dairy sector would be more than deeply disappointed. I think they see it as a huge missed opportunity. We were extremely optimistic about dairy within this trade negotiation. We thought there was real scope for improved access into the Indian market. Instead what we have done is not get any improved access and we have negotiated away access to our own dairy industry. It feels like dairy is the sacrificial lamb to try to secure access for other sectors. We have seen that with the US trade deal. It feels like the dairy sector has been used here as a bargaining chip. We cannot continue to do that if we want to drive investment in our food system here and have a sustainable and resilient food industry for the future.

What is your theory on what is going on here? Why does this keep happening to UK dairy?

At the moment, India is not a big exporter of dairy. I think if you are sitting there as a negotiator today, India does not feel very offensive in the dairy sector. It does not feel like it is going to be particularly high risk and in year one it is not. But what happens in year 10 as the Indian economy continues to develop, as producers start to adopt more science and become more productive and they have a surplus? What happens at that point? What we are looking at here is the short term rather than the longer-term protection of the industry. In the short term they are not a threat, but it is where that will be in 10, 15 or 20 years’ time. With the investments our members are making today, if they are investing £500,000 to make sure that they mitigate their environmental risk, that is a 20-year investment. They are looking at this through a very long-term lens and we need our negotiators to think about the same long-term horizon when they are looking at the impact.

The lack of tariff concessions on beef and pork was also cited by others as concerning. You had a slightly different view on this, I think.

Particularly on pork. We felt that there was a risk with poultry and pork products, particularly around standards of production. Our welfare standards here are second to none, but particularly in comparison with India, so there was a very real risk that any concession to gain better access to India would have resulted in a concession back the other way. We were quite happy to uphold our standards of production within this deal and not to compromise on our animal health and welfare standards. That meant we did not get access in poultry or in pork, but we also have not conceded access to a product that is arguably cheaper to produce because they do not meet the same standards.

We have not necessarily maxed out on the opportunity that may be there.

There is an opportunity there. Getting fresh poultry into India is always going to be challenging just in terms of the proximity of the marketplace, so I think you are going to be looking at frozen product into India, and then you have to think about carcase balance. The opportunities are important, but I think there was a threat to our production standards here. Upholding our production standards within trade and core standards of production is what we would like to see implemented so that we do not undermine our domestic standards with imports of products produced to lower standards.

Murray, you talked about the risk of a chilling effect on car sales because we are not clear about ratification timetables. We have also taken evidence that the quota system is quite complicated. Is there anything else you need to add to that story?

It is just about encouraging officials to work closely with industry as they are formulating these deals. We have had some co-operation. We would never expect them to be experts in the whole raft of things that the UK is exporting, so leaning on industry to help understand those nuances is my plea for future deals, so we do not let the wrinkles that have come into this one happen again in the future.

The quota system is first come, first served?

Yes, it is.

Is that administered by the UK Government or the Indian Government?

I do not know the answer to that one.

Do the Government know the answer to that, do you think?

I am sure they do, yes.

Some issues have been flagged with us when it comes to a first come, first served quota with the United States. This is obviously a much smaller quota of 37,000 rather than 100,000, admittedly over many years. Are we not going to run into the same kind of problems that car exporters are pointing to when it comes to the US?

I am not anticipating the same issues. While it is first come, first served, there are a lot of subdivisions within the quota, so engine size and capacity; the year that it sits in from the effective implementation date; and also price banding. While it is first come, first served, the ability for somebody to step in and hoover it all up judiciously early on is not there within the construct of this one.

The SMMT has flagged with us the risks of a new fuel policy that India is developing and that too could function as a non-tariff barrier. Is that something that you are concerned about?

We are always concerned about non-tariff barriers. On the fuel issue, which is not particularly related to the UK, I do not believe that it is particularly important. There is a problem across the industry, with the water standard in India, in creating the fuel in the first place and the effect that it has on the engine. But I do not see that particularly in this case. We are always worried about non-tariff barriers, such as luxury car taxes and things like that, but again, that is not particularly India-related. We see it in another couple of areas, and that is where we need that constant dialogue between exporters and Governments to make sure that we are identifying those things that crop up as possible non-tariff barriers and they are being addressed.

Is there an additional risk of other barriers at state level that concern you?

Not that we are tracking now. Just because of the new nature of how we have set up our operations in India, we are more interested in that sort of federal-level taxation system rather than the state level.

I represent Dumfries and Galloway, which is the land of milk and slurry. Should my farmers be worried, Tom, because we are going to see an influx of paneer and we are not going to see much Galloway cheddar going the other way? How serious a risk is this?

Immediately, the risk is low. On the face of it, next year and the year after, I do not think we are particularly concerned. It is the 10-year time horizon for India that we are worried about, but it is also the precedent we have now. We have three trade deals that are all liberating our dairy market without getting a lot of access back the other way. Look, we grow grass very well in this country and nowhere better than where you are. We have a competitive advantage in producing dairy products. There is a real opportunity here to drive our export growth around the world and we need a Government that is going to see the offensive opportunities that exist within the dairy market. There is a great opportunity here that has been missed. If we are not going to be able to unlock opportunity and access to the markets, reducing the tariff the other way removes any opportunity in the future because there is no negotiating around dairy now with India. Why do they need to come back to the table when they have access to our market?

Do you think that ship has sailed, effectively, and there is not an opportunity to—

There may be other negotiating chips, but what are they going to be? We would like access to their apple market, which sounds quite niche, but they import most of the apples that they consume within India. There is an opportunity there, but we are not going to get apples and dairy. What else is it that they are going to be negotiating back the other way? The principle of reducing or removing our tariffs without any reciprocal access back the other way is one that has weakened our ability to stand up for our dairy sector.

You talked about the SPS deal and the chapter that is there. You seem quite confident that that safeguards UK agricultural standards. Are you confident that a good job has been done?

At a headline level, yes. We have the ability to regulate or legislate within the WTO rules for standards, so I think there is the opportunity there. They do have access to products and antimicrobials that we would not use here. That is an area that we are concerned about, particularly because we have made such strides to reduce our antibiotics and our antimicrobial usage over here.

In shrimp in particular, is that right?

I cannot comment on shrimp. Shrimp is not an area that I have to represent.

We will rely on our written evidence in that case.

The SPS chapter does not have such binding commitments, and dispute settlement seems to be a bit of a grey area. Also, there isn’t any sort of working group to drive practical improvements on animal and plant health, which again you touched on. Do you think that is a mistake? Do you think the SPS element is weakened by that?

My understanding is we could regulate SPS matters in that area if we see fit within the scope of WTO. It is whether we will ever use that, because effectively it is another trade barrier being put in place at a time where we are trying to reduce trade barriers. We do have the opportunity, I understand, but how likely is it to be used? We have this challenge with a lot of our imports from around the world, which is that they have access to products that we do not have access to here. We have taken a decision that we do not want to use ABC pesticides, but they are still using them in other countries. Sometimes that is for environmental protection, so all we are doing is offshoring our environmental risk to other parts of the world. Sometimes it is for operator exposure, so is it perfectly okay for the operators in India to be exposed to a chemical that we have decided is harmful? That does not feel like it is how we should be regulating in a modern world—accepting that it is okay for other people to carry that risk for us or for other environments to carry that risk. We see that repeatedly, particularly around plant protection products. It brings us back to our domestic system here. If we could regulate and impose core standards of production that we expect imports to achieve, we would have a level playing field. Uniquely, we have aligned with the WWF and RSPCA to co-ordinate to ask for core standards of production to be implemented within the UK so that trading standards must meet those standards. At the moment we see a real challenge in that we are offshoring our production to other parts of the world that have lower standards than we have here.

The WTO is effectively a backstop then. The WTO deal effectively exists already before the FTA comes in, but you think it is just an emergency brake?

It feels like it is an emergency brake and I would question the willingness of any Government to use it. The day that we have to challenge that means that we are incredibly concerned about the standards of production and the products they may be utilising to produce the food that we may be importing. That is a bigger risk to the safety of our reputation and the food that we are consuming in this country, and that is something that we would never want to expose ourselves to.

I do not think it is necessarily going to be around the standards. I think it will be around the reputation of the British product, which standards come into. The Union Jack still opens markets around the world because of its reputation, because of the provenance and the standards that underpin it. I think there is real scope there to look at the offensive side of our food exports in general, but particularly dairy products, and say, “What is it that we do very well in Great Britain?” Dairy and dairy products is one of those. Where DBT could really support us is that the AHDB—our levy body—invests about £8 million a year now in export growth. We have had a long-standing ask to have match funding for that levy to develop exports around the world. By showing an ambition for how we can develop the value of our food exports and the markets, we can open the door with that provenance. The story that we can tell from here is a very big opportunity.

Tom, I want you to crystallise the risk that I think you are pointing to. There are no binding dispute resolution procedures in this deal. We can rely on domestic regulation, but we do not have a formal dispute resolution on SPS. Are you telling us that there is a risk that lower-standard food could come into the UK because of this deal—more than there is today, for example?

Yes. I am afraid that is a simple answer, yes, because the products that we have deemed we do not want to use within our food system here can still be used within the Indian food system, and so within their production systems, whether that be pesticides or antimicrobials, they have access to those products that we do not have. Some of that is because we want to fight resistance and other times it is because we have deemed that those products are not fit for purpose or should not be utilised within the food system. We will have access to importing some of those products.

That sounds like quite a big problem.

Any developing economy is going to be in a different place at a different time from where we are as a developed economy.

Sure, but why are we letting it in?

This is where we must look at risk, isn’t it? The dispute mechanism would be a way of dealing with the risk element. The backstop of the WTO arguably is a way of dealing with the risk, but the WTO does not function properly and the timeframe to implement any challenges there is so long that it is going to be a long, drawn-out procedure.

What are the consequences going to be for our attempt to negotiate a high-quality SPS deal with the European Union if we now have a food system in which we have just opened the door to food with second-class standards?

We have done that with Australia. We have done it with New Zealand—not to such a degree—but things like some of the herbicides and plant protection products that are utilised within Australia are different. Some of those that we have deemed we are not going to use here because of environmental damage they are still utilising in Australia. If you look at the deal that we have just done, and expanding the ATQ on sugar, that sugar will be grown using products that we do not have access to here. To a degree, some of this is already happening. That does not mean it is acceptable going forward. We have to decide what we want UK food production to stand for. What is it that we are going to hang our hat on and say, “This is why we are so proud of domestic production”? Let’s stop undermining it. Let’s stand up for the things we believe in as a society and make others meet our standards of production.

However, you are not telling us at this stage that you think it will compromise negotiations with the EU going forward?

It has not been flagged yet. That is a concern, to be honest with you. We can come back to you with further evidence if we believe it is a concern.

We will ask the European Commission when we see it in January.

Mike, in what ways do you think the IP chapter fails to meet your expectations or hopes?

As a sector, we have made quite a few requests asking the Government to negotiate on IP. There are three primary areas that are worth highlighting. One is on regulatory data protection, where India does not operate a commensurate system to what we have in the UK, and to a certain extent goes against at least the spirit of the TRIPS agreement at WTO level. The second area is patentability. We see some challenges within the system of being able to apply and be granted a patent. Also we face a system in India where there is a pre-grant opposition process, whereby any individual can continually raise an opposition to a patent before it is granted. That can obviously slow down that grant process and eat into the time you have to launch that product and get it on to the market. The third area is enforcement. We see some differences between the national agencies and the state-level agencies in terms of how they enforce the rules. In some instances, you can see state-based actors providing a grant to other companies to make manufacturing licences for products that are still within patent. That clearly poses a risk to the value of that patent as well. Those three areas are certainly the biggest ones we have concerns with and unfortunately they are not addressed as part of the deal.

The Government have said that the IP chapter goes beyond India’s precedent in FTAs. How do you think it works and do you think it undermines the pharmaceutical industry in the UK?

On your first point, it is fair to say that through those working groups that have been established there has been some more meaningful dialogue about the fair and proper application of the Indian patent regime, which has been helpful to a certain extent. As I say, the opportunities in those much larger, more impactful areas were missed as part of the negotiation. In terms of the impact on the UK domestic industry, as I mentioned in the previous answer, our exports to the Indian market are already pretty small. While reducing tariffs and other taxes is of course beneficial, the biggest missed opportunity is on the IP regime and, in the absence of any further changes to that, it will not mean any material uplift in the amount of exports from this country to India.

Do you think it will make an impact on the number of imports from India to the UK?

Interestingly, in a similar way to what Tom was describing, Indian pharmaceutical companies now have pretty good access into the UK market. You would certainly see there is some discrepancy there in terms of the very strong rules that the UK obviously operates on IP and whether they are applied to those Indian companies, but that not being reciprocated for UK companies in the Indian market. There is a philosophical point there about the extent that it undermines, but on a practical level, the level of exports is too small to quantify it in a meaningful way.

Can I just check if there are any other broader concerns about intellectual property protection, Jonathan, from your industry?

They are much less than pharmaceutical. The Scotch Whisky Association established a GI in 2009. We do have cases of products that use Scottish symbols and names, which would be against the GI rules, and we test them through the court system. The problem with the court system is it takes too long, but that would not be solved by this FTA.

Murray, anything from the auto industry?

Not with India, no.

Mike, just to sum up, you are saying that this deal does not give us any big new opportunities for UK life science exports to India?

That is a fair characterisation, yes.

Does it exacerbate risks of intellectual property theft?

No, I do not think it exacerbates risks. It is more the missed opportunity of being able to deliver those meaningful changes that would have improved the environment for pharmaceutical companies operating in India. There are additional measures that could be taken too, for example, on good manufacturing practice and the mutual recognition of that. There are also still some dual sampling techniques that go through—a bit like the EU deal, where we have batch-testing duplication—which could have been dealt with as well to improve the system and make everything a bit more streamlined.

Is that it, do you think, when it comes to trying to knock down tariff barriers with India? Do you think there is another chance for the Government to come back to this or are you and others in your industry now basically just giving up hope on that?

I think, as others have alluded to, as the Indian market continues to evolve and mature, and as we see the growing size of that middle-class market within India, you will get growing calls within that market for the Indian Government to allow access to these innovative products to come in, but I cannot see any immediate way of the UK Government being able to solve that. That is obviously something that the Indian Government are going to have to take a decision on themselves. However, through these working groups that have been established, we hope that dialogue can continue. Of course the industry will support the Government in any way we can to hopefully get those changes happening in the future.

My last question is on implementation. A big focus for the Committee’s work next year will be on how we turn these free trade agreements into sales. What are the priorities that you would give to DBT when it comes to implementing this free trade deal with India? Murray, do you want to kick off?

It is the optimisation of the reporting. One of the bits that is an unknown concern to us—particularly around after-market sales and parts, as well as completed units built in the UK and the complete knockdown units—is what the reporting burden is going to be to access the FTA and how easy that will be for business to execute. It is just to make sure that that has stripped out as much bureaucracy as possible so that it meets the requirements and does not become a sort of cottage industry in its own right.

Yes. You are not too worried about actually getting stuff through the border?

Not too worried.

Tom.

For us, it is about getting stuff through the border. The export health certificates can be a real barrier. With lamb, there is a big opportunity with the reduction in tariff, but the export health certificates mean it could be just about impossible to get into the marketplace at the moment. We would like to see the export health certificate updated to be in line with the operational certificates that we have with other trading partners around the world. We are also going to need to make sure that we have the people on the ground with the expertise to have the dialogue to understand the technical barriers that can help navigate through those technical barriers. I have mentioned agri-food attachés already, but for us they are key personnel in trying to turn the reality of the deal into something that can stimulate trade.

Yes. Are you worried about whether sufficient agri-food attachés are going to be provided, given the 20% cuts to DBT headcount?

They sit within the DEFRA team, but we are worried. We believe the 16 people on the ground have already helped develop access this year for over £100 million-worth of exports. There is clearly a return on the investment that we have there, but it is people who make trade deals work. The trade deal can be negotiated as a headline, but unless we have the people on the ground, we will not be able to make the trade deal work, which is critical for us.

Thank you. Jonathan.

I would just flag one piece of work that needs to be done before it enters into force. For the UK and Indian customs systems to talk to each other, UK customs needs to build an authentication portal so UK companies can preregister before submitting origin applications. As Pernod Ricard, we are working with colleagues in UK customs to make sure that happens. That is clearly an important part of getting the system up and running before it can enter into force.

Thank you. Mike.

As I mentioned, through those working groups that have been established, including via the innovation chapter, encouraging the Indian Government to relook at their regulatory data protection would be an absolute key one for us in going forward and implementing the deal. Secondly, we need some sort of mechanism to operate between those national-level authorities and the state-based authorities when it comes to those patent challenges that I mentioned. It is about being able to ensure that when a state wishes to grant a patent for licensing, manufacturing or otherwise for a product that already has an existing patent, that is informed in a timely way to the national Government and is communicated to the UK so that we can all be informed and it is transparent.

That is a good list. When it comes to the debate in Parliament, is there anything else you want to flag for parliamentary attention next year?

If I can come back to you on the first come, first served basis, you made a point on India and the US. From the US point of view, the first come, first served in the quota was based on existing trade. The UK was already exporting roughly 100,000 cars. There is no growth opportunity, so first come, first served essentially means that if somebody that was not exporting to the US uses their UK-installed capacity to start exporting to the US, that has to come at the expense of somebody who was already, which is going to be a net loss to the UK economy if that happens. Why are we not concerned about India? It is a growth opportunity and that is for companies to go and compete for that market. That is not a problem.

Yes, that is clear. I would certainly back that, but as a Committee obviously you want to look at all the nooks and crannies of the deal, but the growth opportunity in India is massive. Tom, you said it is a developing economy. Well, yes and no: it is going to be the world’s third-largest economy within a decade. If you look at the range of sectors in India and the skills base, it is absolutely right that we should have this deal and we see huge opportunities.

I would just add that the way that the officials communicated with us through the processes that have been put in place through confidentiality agreements was extremely helpful and valuable for us. We would like to see that continue and indeed evolve a bit further, so that we can have even more timely and direct access to the negotiators as they are discussing with their Indian counterparts.

The point is well made. Perfect. Thank you very much indeed for your evidence today. That concludes this panel.