Welcome to the International Development Committee. I am sitting in today for our Chair, Sarah Champion. This session has been organised in the wake of the Committee’s visit to the region being postponed. We are very grateful to all our witnesses for stepping in at short notice. We very much understand that there may be topics that you do not wish to speak about on the record. If that is the case, we are open to private written submissions from you. We are aware that some of the information shared will be distressing; if anyone would like to take a moment out before rejoining the session, that is fine. Once again, thank you to our panel for joining us today. Sam will start the questions.

Thank you, everyone, for being with us. Allegra, we have met before, in Bethlehem, but my first question is for Ori, and is a simple starter. Could you give us a brief update on recent developments in the West Bank?

First, thank you all for having me. I am Ori Givati, director of international relations at B'Tselem, the Israeli centre for information on human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. When we are looking at the West Bank, we are seeing an overall assault against Palestinians by Israel in all realms of life. We are talking about killings, displacement, demolitions, roadblocks. Before I go into the details, it is very important to understand that Palestinians in the West Bank live under constant threat. That was the case since ‘67, but it has been way more so since October ‘23, when things escalated significantly in terms of Israel’s conduct against Palestinians. I will go over some details. Since October ‘23 over 1,000—almost 1,100—Palestinians have been killed in the West Bank either by Israeli forces or by settlers. The vast majority of them—over 1,000—were killed by Israeli forces and a few dozen by Israeli settlers. We are talking about minors. I want specifically to mention Sam Abu Haikal, a seven-month-old baby who was killed just a few days ago in Hebron after his family were shot by an Israeli soldier while driving in their car in the city. That is just the most recent assault on a completely innocent Palestinian family; it is definitely not the first one. Just in 2026 so far, 11 children have been killed in the West Bank.

When something like that happens, is there an investigation? Is the official position that this was a rogue IDF soldier not following orders? Or is there no consequence?

Today, in the West Bank and generally, when we talk about Palestinians being killed, either by settlers or by soldiers, there is no accountability. Maybe sometimes, for the record, they will say that an investigation was opened, but we are not seeing any accountability. That is only the beginning of the issue, because the overall infrastructure in the West Bank—the way that Israel controls the territories and the way it supports settler violence against Palestinians, with outposts and so forth—creates this environment that provides not only zero accountability but the conditions in which all this will only grow. When soldiers and settlers see that there is zero accountability for actions against Palestinians—whether it is attacking their agricultural lands, their livestock or Palestinians themselves, including a seven-month-old baby—it is only natural that the phenomenon will just keep growing constantly. Israel is doing zero to investigate those issues and it actually creates the infrastructure for the situation to grow, as we have seen in the numbers for decades now, and even more so since October ‘23. I have talked only about killings; I will move on to the issue of displacement. Since October ‘23, over 61 Palestinian communities have been fully displaced by Israeli policies. The main one is the violence of settler militias. We are seeing—I am sure you have all seen it—constant, daily attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinian communities. We are talking about attacking agricultural lands and burning down homes and fields—olive groves and so forth. We are talking about attacking vehicles and, of course, all the way to what we just discussed, which is attacking Palestinians themselves. First of all, these attacks are well organised and planned, and they are part of a very clear programme that a few years back would have been under the table. Now, we can all see the statements of the Israeli Government and the leaders of the settler movement. These attacks are meant to create, and succeed in creating, an environment for Palestinians to simply understand that they are left to their fate, with zero protection, and have to leave. That is exactly what happens when there is no enforcement, of course, and even more so when there is full support and infrastructure for this to continue. Over 61 communities were displaced in this way. Now, when area C is almost fully emptied out of these communities, we see a significant increase in the urban areas—areas A and B—of the same phenomenon. When the settlers and the state understand that they succeeded very well in their mission to ethnically cleanse area C, their next goal is areas B and A, and that is exactly what we are seeing, with a huge increase since the beginning of 2026. One other thing that is very important to understand is that the displacement is not only by settlers; almost 40,000 Palestinians were displaced from refugee camps in the beginning of 2025 by military operations. There has been destruction of civilian infrastructure—roads, homes and so forth—by the military. It is very important to understand that the attacks of settler militias that cause displacement are just one very significant element of an overall programme. We are seeing it in every type of Israeli conduct in the West Bank. To summarise, today we are seeing this kind of coercive environment that Israel is creating. It creates a situation where Palestinians in the West Bank, no matter who they are, where they are or what they are going to do, are under constant threat. It does not matter whether you are driving in your car, you are in your own home in Hebron or you are in a rural village in area B or C, you can be attacked by settlers, by soldiers or by both. The situation keeps escalating.

Sam, will you ask our other guests to introduce themselves before giving their own brief synopsis?

Sure. I emphasise “brief”, because we have quite a lot of questions that will go into some of the details. We are really just looking for an overview the direction of travel and the recent developments in the West Bank.

It is nice to see those of you who I have met before. My name is Allegra Pacheco. I am chief of party for the West Bank Protection Consortium, which is one of the largest humanitarian assistance programmes in area C of the West Bank. Area C makes up 60% of the West Bank. It is under full Israeli control and also where all the settlements are. I want to thank the UK Government for their support of the consortium over the years and for renewing the support this year. Just in two sentences, the kind of assistance that we provide is life-saving and emergency. When there is a house demolition, we provide a new shelter. When water lines are cut down, we help provide water supplies. We also help communities to stay where they are—to continue to live and have their livelihoods where they are. Of course, we also engage in legal support, which is critical in this framework. I am happy to talk a bit about the situation or, if you prefer, Itay can introduce himself and then you can come back to me.

Yes, let’s do that. Will you introduce yourself, Itay? I am just conscious that quite a lot of the questions will get into the nitty-gritty, and we will end up running out of time for them.

Thank you all for having us this afternoon. My name is Itay Epshtain. I am the special adviser on international law and humanitarian principles to the Norwegian Refugee Council. I am happy to take your questions.

Thanks, all. I am going to bring Janet in briefly before Brian.

Ori, the constant threat that you mentioned sounds terrifying. I just want to ask about the seven-month-old baby. How was that baby killed?

Thank you—that is very important. I just saw some documentation on that before I got into this meeting. The family were driving in their street in Hebron. They are from the Tel Rumeida neighbourhood. They saw a soldier on the road, and he just shot the car. It is very, very—I don’t know if surreal is the right word, but it is just a reality where this kind of thing can happen. Basically, an Israeli soldier stopped their car and shot at them. That is what happened. Both parents were injured and the baby was shot in his head and killed on the spot.

Allegra, I am going to start with a simple question, which you may want to elaborate on, and on which we have already heard quite a lot. Then I want to go into some detailed questioning. First, to what extend does settler violence continue across the West Bank?

Perhaps I can give the settler violence figures and a few more, but I have come out of two important meetings in the occupied territories today where a lot of new information and trends were presented. Overall, the situation is increasingly dangerous for Palestinians, and socioeconomically it is deteriorating dramatically. In that context, if we look at settler violence—which is a big tree in the forest but is not the forest—we have seen a dramatic increase in incidents. There has been a sixfold increase since 2020. Twenty years ago, when we still had occupation and settlers, approximately 1.3 communities were attacked every week; right now, we have 280 communities attacked regularly and about six incidents a day. In addition, very importantly, this is not random violence, as it is portrayed by some Israeli officials. As my colleague just said, it is targeted, directed and planned. How do we know that? The settlers say it themselves. Many of us monitor the WhatsApp groups and the media of the right. It is hard to say, but unfortunately the goal is to empty out these communities of Palestinian presence, take over the land and build more outposts and settlements. It started in the C areas. Those are the areas where all the settlements are, and they saw the Palestinian presence as interfering with territorial contiguity for the settlements, for road planning and so on, and for the expansion of settlements. It is true that many of the communities—we are talking about more than 6,000 people—have been fully transferred or pushed out. Now that many of these communities have been emptied, the movement of the violence is towards the more Palestinian-populated areas—the B and A areas. They will not stop. For them this is ideological. It is motivated by a total takeover of the land and making life unliveable for Palestinians to encourage what they call voluntary migration. The model for displacement is Gaza. Gaza has become unliveable and the situation there is dire. Between the army and the authorities, they have limited the living space in Gaza to a very small amount. In the West Bank, the limitation—the shrinking of Palestinian liveable space—is caused by a combination of the Israeli authorities, the army and the settlers. In 2025 we saw the greatest displacement since 1967, between the refugees that my colleague mentioned—over 33,000 of them—and the number of Palestinians who were pushed out of their communities, mostly by settler violence but also by other coercive factors, whether house demolitions or obstacles to access and movement. We have seen a dramatic increase in the number of obstacles blocking Palestinian movement from 647 on average to 925.

You can go into whatever detail you want to on this next question, but I appreciate it may be difficult, in which case you may want to put it in writing. Does sexual violence play a role in settler violence?

Thank you for that question. We just put out a report after extensive field research and interviews with communities that have been displaced. We surveyed men and women, and we found that there is a pattern of the use of sexual violence by settlers as part of this programme to push people out of their communities. It is geared towards women and men, girls and children. The patterns towards women include a lot of sexual harassment, a few assaults, groping, indecent exposure, verbal sexual harassments and intrusion into domestic spaces—we are talking about very conservative communities. Towards men, there has been enforced nudity and illegal detentions when settlers are detaining people. A few cases of sexual assault have been reported—some of that has appeared in Israeli newspapers—and there has been sexual and verbal harassment, and threats towards the women in front of the men. We are very concerned. This is from my experience of going around these communities; I will be all the way in the south, and the next day I am in the north, and I hear about the same instances of violence—the same patterns. They are by different people, but the methods are the same. Some 70% of the communities that we interviewed said that the harassment and attacks against women and children were the decisive factor that forced them out. The reason for that is not only the attacks, but the fact that—I hope this is one of the key messages that you will take away—Palestinians have no protection in the West Bank. They are extremely vulnerable. The Israeli army, as an occupying power, should be protecting, and it isn’t—we can go into that. The Palestinian Authority can’t come into these C areas by the Oslo accords, so they don’t have the Palestinian Authority to protect them. The international community has not provided a formal international presence to protect these communities, even though occupation is an international problem—it is not a bilateral Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Finally, Palestinians don’t have the right to self-defence. When the settlers come into the very modest shelters that they live in and the head of the household tries to push the settler out, the head of the household can be arrested for assaulting a settler or could be shot or killed by the settlers. All those instances have happened. It is the lack of protection, safety and security where they live that forces people to leave and flee.

Thank you. Are you able to send us a copy of the report that you mentioned?

Yes.

The next question is: what is the ongoing impact of settler violence and forcible transfer on Palestinian families in the West Bank? I think that you have answered that, in a way, but you might like to elaborate.

Yes. Briefly, so that my colleagues will also have time to contribute, the impact is dramatic because these are land-based communities. When they are thrown off their land and flee for their lives, where do they go? We provide a tent, a water tank and a latrine, but they lose the land and their livelihoods, whether they are herders or farmers. We have made devastating findings about the dramatic loss of livelihoods—up to 70% or 80%—the psychological impact, the break-up of extended families, which are enormous support elements, and the impact on women losing their homes, households and household economies, as well as on the children: quite a few are not in school or miss school and exams. The question is always, “Where do they go when they’re displaced?” Well, they are all over the place, in the shrinking areas where it is possible to live. We have seen multiple displacements because there aren’t many safe places for these communities, especially to bring their herds. Many of them sell off their herds and then they have no support and are dependent on humanitarian assistance. We have to put this in the socioeconomic situation in the West Bank, which is really devastating. Poverty has doubled. The number of people dependent on aid has gone from 350,000 to 900,000 because of the Israeli withholding of Palestinian funds. The PA, in terms of providing services to these communities, is operating on only 10% of its capacity. Again, there are mostly no coping mechanisms for these communities other than the international aid, which is also shrinking and quite limited. Of course, as we know, humanitarian aid is really a band-aid on the hole in the dam. We need something much more aggressive and on the political level to change this situation.

Allegra, thank you. I have a couple of brief follow-ups from Members. The scale of what you have described is truly shocking. I will bring Janet in first before going to Monica.

Allegra, when you answered my colleague’s question you spoke about sexual violence. You mentioned girls and children, but only really spoke about women and men. Was there any sexual violence towards children—girls or boys?

Yes. We have gathered incidents, and we have heard of children being attacked on the way to school. That is a continuum; that happened even before October 2023. It is very difficult now to try to arrange bussing and vehicles because that is expensive and, again, the PA does not have the funding. We have also had girls—young women—attacked on the way to college or on the way to the high schools. I was with a women’s group and we asked them, “What is it that you need?” One woman spoke up and said, “I need a bodyguard. Actually, I need two—one on each side—so that when I walk to the main road to catch a bus to the university, I have people to protect me.” Those are the major incidents that we have been informed of. Also, there is the indecent exposure that we have heard a lot about. Some of these communities live near natural springs, so the settlers come, undress and go in the springs and walk around, and the springs are right in the middle of the community. That is something quite common that we have also heard about.

It is very bureaucratic in the occupied territories. There is a whole legal system of rules and regulations, some of them from the Jordanian times, but many of them have been amended by the Israeli military, and now there is the application of Israeli law in the occupied territories, which is annexation. The ICJ talked about that; Itay can go further. We are talking from the micro to the macro. On the micro, when people get demolition orders, lawyers can come and try to challenge those orders to help people stay as long as they can—again, because it is their right to live and have a non-discriminatory planning system in the West Bank. Then in cases of communities that are displaced, for example, they can tell the court to apply international law and give them the right to return to their homes. Forcible transfer is a grave breach of international law. We have had five Israeli court decisions that said, “Yes, they should return,” but it left it to the army and the police to implement, and that was problematic: none of them were able to return in safety and dignity.

The next question is for Ori, if I may, but the rest of you may want to answer as well. How have Bedouin communities been affected by settler violence?

In the West Bank, especially in area C, some communities would define themselves more with Bedouin tradition and culture, and some less. It is very similar in effect. Probably one of the most prominent Bedouin communities you hear about is the community of Khan al-Ahmar. That is in East Jerusalem, and one of the most significant Bedouin communities that are under constant threat of expulsion. It is important to mention that specifically, because Minister Smotrich announced in a recent statement that he intends to displace and demolish the community of Khan al-Ahmar. If that place is displaced and demolished, that will play a huge strategic role in Israel’s goals of ethnically cleansing the West Bank, because that space is a very important connection with the huge settlement of Ma'ale Adumim in Jerusalem. Geographically, politically and economically, it will simply create a crack all through the centre of the West Bank that will make it almost impossible to connect between the north and south. You mentioned the Bedouin community, so I have to mention something about the legal question before I pass on to my colleagues. It is important to understand that the legal infrastructure in the West Bank and Israel is designed and operated to allow and create the circumstances to entrench the occupation and ethnic cleansing of the West Bank. There are no real legal protections for Palestinians—definitely not in practice. It is very important that organisations and people are trying to somehow find ways to help individual communities and people—that is crucial, of course—but the system is designed to do the opposite. That is why we are seeing what we have seen in the last few decades.

Ori, I will return to the question of legal and economic pressure in the other direction. I appreciate that the Foreign Secretary is making a statement on this question as we speak, so I will not expect you to be able to comment on the specifics of that, but would trade restrictions on Israeli companies based in the West Bank in general be an effective tool for the UK Government to wield in principle?

On this question, I believe that we are at a point where we have seen the gravity of Israel’s policies, and not only on the West Bank. We have declared and defined a genocide in Gaza. We are talking about horrific treatments of Palestinian detainees, including very hard sexual violence, as I am sure you all saw, and the ethnic cleansing of the West Bank, as we are talking about today. The tools implemented today by the international community, including the UK Government, are not even nearly close to addressing the gravity of the situation. I am not saying that what has been done is not important—it is very important—but at the stage we have reached today we believe that we should be using every possible tool to stop everything we are talking about. That is my comment on that.

Thank you. I certainly hope that some of the steps announced today will be welcome, but we would very much welcome your written feedback on those as well, following this session.

Itay, can you briefly explain what the E1 settlement plan is?

Before I do, I will just step back for a moment. In July 2024, the International Court of Justice found Israel’s presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories to be unlawful. It did so on the basis of grave breaches of peremptory norms of general international law. That should not be left as an abstraction. Those are the prohibitions on the acquisition of territory by force, including annexation. It is the suppression of the Palestinian people’s rights to self-determination, permanent sovereignty, political independence and the basic rules of international humanitarian law, including two significant prohibitions: one on the destruction of property, and the second on the introduction and planting of your civilian population in occupied territory, and the displacement and forcible transfer of the protected indigenous people of Palestinian territory. This is a legal determination: Israel has to end its unlawful presence in occupied Palestinian territory unconditionally and as rapidly as possible. This is the blueprint of Israeli practices that manifest themselves in the E1 settlement expansion plan. It is meant to permanently acquire and annex Palestinian territory to suppress a contiguous, permanently sovereign and economically viable Palestinian state. That is the stated intention of Israeli officials when they further these settlement expansion plans in strategically and politically significant places that will prevent the establishment of a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem. They are means to an end, as we have already alluded to this afternoon. The destruction of property and the obstruction of humanitarian relief, including relief provided by the West Bank Protection Consortium that the NRC leads, is state-controlled and directed settler violence. It is not a rogue phenomenon. This is not just the criminality of individuals; this is state controlled and attributable to the state. You ask whether Israel is going to hold them to account, but it is Israel that should be held to account for inducing settler violence and settlement expansion, not in terra nullius but at the expense of Palestinian communities. There are Palestinian hamlets and Bedouin communities dotted across the Jerusalem periphery, including in E1, that would be forcibly transferred if the settlements expanded. With European colleagues, I was visiting E1 this morning, and we saw what Israel proposes as an adequate relocation site for these communities: it is the Jerusalem municipal garbage dump. It was smouldering when we were there from the burning of municipal trash. This is what Israel, including Israel’s constitutional court, the High Court of Justice, endorsed as a solution to avoid accusations of a serious breach of international law—the forcible transfer of these communities. Again, the idea of E1 is to allow Ma'ale Adumim—the fourth largest settlement—to expand by tens of thousands of settlers to entrench Israel’s unlawful presence. We should reflect not just on this reality, but on what can be done. Last September, the UK endorsed the New York declaration and action plan at the UN General Assembly in New York, which included an international mechanism of reparations that would allow Palestinians who have been displaced restitution and a return to their communities. You have heard from Allegra and Ori about the multiple communities that have been forcibly transferred. The plan would also provide monetary compensation for damages through the destruction of their properties, the obstruction of their livelihoods and the denial of humanitarian relief. The UK could be a major contributor to the establishment of an international reparation mechanism. At the end of the day, that would matter more than statements to Palestinian victims of Israeli policies, including the expansion of E1.

Thank you very much. Allegra, did you want to add anything?

A lot of the issues that I have raised are really the trees, not the forest. Settler violence, settler expansion, house demolitions and forcible displacement are the trees. They are big trees, and life is becoming unliveable for Palestinians, but the big issue—this gets to what can be done—is that, as Itay says, this is state sponsored. It is funded and politically supported. It is manpower—person power—supported. There are tax benefits. The whole Israeli system supports this forest, so the question is: what can be done to address the big picture—the full picture? Sanctions against individual settlers is one tree. I am a human rights lawyer, so I know that accountability for violations of international law as a principle is very important, but it is one tree. A ban on settlement products is another tree. The question is: are we going to keep trying to address these individual policies, or is it time to address the whole picture and figure out what can bring an end to the full support of this policy and have things go in the opposite direction, to support self-determination? As the ICJ advisory opinion said, the occupation has to end. That is not a slogan; it is now legally based. The next question is: what fills in the void when the occupation ends? Those are the questions and policy issues that should be addressed and thought about. It may seem unrealistic at this time, but we are never going to get there unless these things are addressed and there is accountability for all the obstacles to achieving self-determination and a viable Palestinian state.

I am happy to answer that question, but I think my colleagues on the panel could answer it even better.

Sure, I can start, and feel free to add. When we say that the settler militias are funded by the state, we are talking about every single element of these attacks, from the support and provision of the legal and financial infrastructure to construct the outposts and settlements that they usually live in, to providing them with vehicles. Smotrich is very proud that he recently provided dozens of little quad bikes that are documented many times as part of attacks against Palestinian communities. The roads, of course, must be fully supported and usually also funded by the state, because no small entity can fund a road and pave it without the support of the state. That is one element when we talk about funding—basically, every part of the infrastructure. I just want to add to what was said: the thing that is missing, in my opinion—in our opinion—about how the international community and the UK Government see it, is exactly that. It is not even support. Even when I say the words “support of Israel” I feel like I am misrepresenting the level of it. They operate as one. It is not that Israel supports the settlers. Let’s put it in harsher words: Israel supports the settlers in exactly the way that the settlers support Israel, because the goal is exactly the same. They operate as one machine. It was always like that, but in recent years, the gravity of the situation changed. It is all out there; we are seeing it. We are seeing the videos and the statements. It is truly hard to describe in words, and I am sorry that your trip was cancelled, because you would have seen it. Now, I live in London, but I used to live there—I have not mentioned that. I would take a group like your Committee to the West Bank and we would sometimes see an incident here and there. Of course, things were terrible, don’t get me wrong, but we would not always see settler violence in front of our eyes. In recent years—since October ’23—every single time I have taken a group like this one to the West Bank, I have seen at least one example of attacks against Palestinians, either by military or by settlers, at different levels and in different forms. In February, I was over there for one visit—just for one day—to a Palestinian village called Fasayil. I saw settlers come with a huge truck of rotten dates and just pour them in the entrance of the village and leave. These kinds of incidents happen a lot; I just saw that one with my own eyes. We all hear about everything that is very well documented and extremely violent. You often see—and it happens a lot, too—videos of Palestinians being very violently attacked by settlers. This is happening on a daily basis. There are not always videos and it does not always get to the news, so we do not hear of the dozens of small—I say small, but it is not really small—other forms of violence that happen, and that maybe are not well documented or do not look good enough for the news websites. Right now, as we speak, there are incidents like this happening. I am part of an online group that gets constant updates from Palestinians and activists, and it does not stop. Every day there are hundreds of messages; I am not exaggerating. Even with everything I just said, I feel like I am misrepresenting the gravity of the situation.

Thank you, Ori. It is devastating. To turn to the humanitarian side, I will bring in Brian.

If I could go back to one question that has not been covered and I think is quite important, Itay, could you give us a figure for the number of Israelis that are anticipated to move into the E1 settlement?

Over the years, there have been different spatial plans that have gone through the Israeli-imposed spatial planning system. The recent figures are anywhere up to 25,000 additional settlers. This is a substantial increase. The last census for Ma'ale Adumim, whose expansion is in E1, was under 50,000. It is a considerable expansion. If I may, what are the enablers of this expansion and of maintaining Israel’s unlawful presence? We have to look in the right places. Look at the state budget, allocated through central Government and the various line ministries, and through the local governments and regional and local councils of settlements. They fund settlement expansion. They subsidise settlements. It is not exclusively the export of goods and services. They contribute to the sustaining of settlements. They disrupt political order, but they are enabled by the Israeli Government. The same goes for settler violence. Settlers are either integrated into or auxiliary to the Israeli armed forces, through territorial defence units or security co-ordinators who are on the payroll of the Israeli Ministry of Defence, or rather the additional Ministry of Defence under Minister Smotrich. They are paid, empowered, armed and trained to conduct violent incursions into Palestinian communities, which drives their displacement. Ultimately, from the perspective of international law, all these questions have to be answered through the attribution of these wrongs to the state responsible. As humanitarians, we do not necessarily prescribe what would be the most effective response to bring Israel into a mode of compliance with international law, but we have to start with the right analysis: all of these wrongs are attributable to the state and the way it is subsidising, including this immense growth in the footprint of settlements.

Itay, we get that, thank you. To follow up on that last question—I think this is pretty obvious, but it would still be nice to hear from you—how will the E1 settlement affect displacement across the West Bank?

I think Allegra could speak more expertly to the impact on the nearby Palestinian communities, but it is very clear from the plans that have been deposited and approved that if this settlement is expanded where there are currently Palestinian communities that we serve through the West Bank Protection Consortium, they are destined to be forcibly transferred.

On the micro level there are at least 18 Bedouin communities and other communities that would end up being forced out by E1, but we have to look on the macro level. The only north-south traverse in the West Bank—the only highway that takes you from the south to the north—runs through this area. Israel is planning to block that route and create another convoluted road system. They are spending a lot of money on what they call the “Fabric of Life” road, but they are actually creating a very unsafe road—there are objections now being submitted—through other Palestinian populated areas, just creating more traffic than exists now and narrowing the options for Palestinian traverse across the whole West Bank. There is the political issue of breaking up the north and the south, but also of the road system. Roads are very important. They have commercial and socioeconomic impacts, an impact on access to services, and so on—you can go down the list. Also, where is the money coming from? It is from the Israeli Government. There is a $2 billion road network now being expanded throughout the West Bank in a five-year plan for Israeli settlement roads. That is all from the Ministry of Transport and the Government.

Allegra, when we were there a year ago we saw just that, so thank you for helping us to document it. Let me move on and ask this: what effect has the ban on UNRWA had on the situation across the West Bank?

I used to work at UNRWA but I do not work there now, and I think there might be UNRWA colleagues testifying later. I would ask how the reduction of protection by UNRWA has affected Palestinians, because that is very important. In area C there are many registered refugees not living in camps. Many of the Bedouins are registered refugees from ’48. It used to be that the INGOs would turn to UNRWA to help them any time there were protection issues. UNRWA was sort of the liaison to the Israeli authorities. It had a whole protection team that had very good and strong relations with the Israeli military authorities and the liaisons. That has disappeared; they are not there any more. When October 2023 and all these forcible transfers happened, and all the communities were calling us and saying, “Help us, help us,” our normal thing was to go to UNRWA, which would then go to the Israelis, who would then come and stop the settlers; that was gone. That is what I meant by the lack of protection: the mechanisms are gone and the people are on their own.

Thank you very much. Itay, this may sound a ridiculous question but please have a go at answering it: does Israel have any legal grounds effectively to have banned UNRWA?

If we were speaking before September 2025 I think I could have given you the arguments that would inherently limit Israel’s discretion to reject the presence of impartial humanitarian organisations, including UN agencies such as UNRWA, but where we are now, you do not have to turn to me; you have to turn to an authoritative source of law: this has been adjudicated by the International Court of Justice in the advisory opinion issued in September 2025. It is very clear that Israel has an obligation, as an occupying power, to agree to and facilitate the presence and activities of impartial humanitarian organisations. That includes UNRWA and ourselves, as international non-governmental organisations funded by the UK and other member states. There is legal finality on that question. Israel had an opportunity to, and indeed did, present its counter-arguments before the court, and in succession they were all dispensed with by the court, including Israel’s invocation of generalised security concerns. That is a recurring theme that has come up in connection with not just UNRWA but many other local and international civil society organisations: that somehow Israel can invoke security to give them extensive powers that are arbitrary, capricious and ultimately unlawful. The court said, “If you have valid security concerns, they have to be evidence-based and anchored in a particular rule of international law; you cannot invoke them in the abstract,” but that is exactly what we see Israel do. It uses this to shield itself from scrutiny and criticism and to take on coercive powers that it does not have in relation to the presence of humanitarian actors. The short and simple answer is: no, Israel is not entitled to do that. It has a duty to facilitate the presence of humanitarians. As a member of the United Nations it has an obligation to co-operate with the United Nations. UNRWA is a subsidiary of the General Assembly. All those are obligations that it is in breach of.

Okay. Are there any organisations capable of filling the void left by UNRWA?

Allegra, I don’t know whether you want to come in on this. We are genuinely trying, but it is a challenge. It is also subject to limits on funding, access and facilitation by Israel, including the deregistration scheme—or rather the state of registration of INGOs.

I will speak from my personal background, having worked at UNRWA for quite a long time. UNRWA services all the refugees in the West Bank. We are talking about major, major services: about 50 schools, health services with 1 million visits a year, social subsidies, waste collection in all the camps—there are 19 refugee camps. It is so expansive. I used to be one of the liaisons between UNRWA and the military, and a common line that I would hear from the Israeli side was, “We appreciate UNRWA for the stability that it provides in the West Bank because of these services.” The PA is not able to fill in the gaps, so without those services, many kids would be out of school and the health system would be worse—especially early childcare. UNRWA has one of the highest rates of vaccination in the Middle East. In that sense, it is a hallmark of social stability within the Palestinian communities in the West Bank.

Thank you, Allegra. Can I move us on? We are coming up to time, and we have certainly heard echoed in other sessions those words about the role of UNRWA and the void that has been left. I will bring in Monica for a few brief questions.

Again, we need to put this in the right context. We have five international NGOs working in our consortium; they are all legal. The illegality is the deregistration by Israel of four of the five organisations. All these organisations are registered in the Palestinian Authority. The Israeli Supreme Court effectively ruled a few weeks ago that that registration is enough for these INGOs to operate in the West Bank. That almost—I wouldn’t say 100%—greenlights our argument that we are legal, and that we are going to continue to deliver services. We are legally registered, and under international law, we are obligated—there is a humanitarian imperative—to deliver these services. Given that framework, we face obstacles. We have a lot of national staff and, like most Palestinians, it is not easy for them to get around. There are access and movement obstacles. We face dangers from settler violence. We have taken actions to mitigate those vulnerabilities, but we are not near closing down or even limiting our activities. We adjust, adapt and continue to deliver. What we need is for the international staff to get visas. Even in the INGOs that have been registered, almost all have not got visas yet. Everything is delayed. We are not getting rejections; we are just getting no answers. The international staff are not able to come in and stay, so that is a big issue. The work in East Jerusalem is a challenge because Israel has annexed it. But overall, in the West Bank, unlike in Gaza, we are still able to have access to supplies and goods, so we are able to provide to the communities. The last thing I would say is that banking is a bit of a challenge, but again we have found ways to overcome those challenges too.

Two things. One is that our presence is dependent on the fact that we have been invited by the state of Palestine to provide relief and that is the legal basis for our presence in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and Gaza. I think that Israel is determined to obstruct impartial, independent, principled humanitarian relief because it is a tool of furthering forced displacement, forcible transfer and the acquisition of territory in the West Bank. It is a tool of deprivation and acquisition of territory in Gaza. The aid and protection that we are able to provide, even under the extreme circumstances of the last two and a half years, is something that Israel openly opposes because it defeats a plan of disenfranchisement of the Palestinian people. It is politically motivated. I think that we should also anticipate and expect that this will escalate in the lead up to the Israeli general elections in September or October. We are going to see more of this rhetoric and action that impairs the ability of neutral third states like the UK that fund much of this humanitarian relief scheme and ourselves to provide it. We should expect more of that. This is where we should remain principled. Our presence there is at the invitation of the state of Palestine and that is the legal basis for our continued operations. Israel has a duty that has been adjudicated to agree and facilitate our presence—a duty that it is not meeting. Who would hold Israel accountable for these serious violations of international law? That is a question that we need to turn back to you and many esteemed colleagues in parliaments across Europe: what can be done to hold Israel accountable?

On our organisation, I would add a few things on top of everything my colleague has just said. First, when we talk about Palestinian organisations, Israel is committing a way harsher restriction and is declaring some Palestinian human rights groups as terrorist groups. One of them recently shut down as a result of this declaration. DCI Palestine—Defence for Children Palestine—a great organisation that did very important work to protect Palestinian children, was declared a terrorist group. When we talk about our organisation, and the Israeli human rights community in general, we must also remember that Israel is employing two different types of assault or attack against our operations. The first is the legal avenue: trying to promote legislation to limit funding, taxing funding and so forth, and also portraying us as foreign agents using different legislation even though we are of course a fully Israeli organisation. That is one angle—the legal part. A second angle that is very important to understand is the delegitimisation in society. Israeli human rights groups are under a constant delegitimisation campaign that has come from the Government for over a decade. That is causing hate and risk to our staff members from the society itself. Several right-wing, ultra-nationalist groups are part of the NGO force or arm of that campaign by the Government to delegitimize the work. That is very important to understand as well. We are an Israeli and Palestinian organisation and 50% of our staff are Palestinians, with many of them operating in the West Bank. Our Palestinian staff members based in the West Bank are at the most risk as a result of all this and everything that Itay and Allegra described. One of the reasons for that is that Israel has basically emptied the ability of organisations to operate in the West Bank. That leaves the few that still operate under a significant and higher risk than in the past. I do not have much comment about Aryeh King’s specific actions. It is just an example of the type of people who rule Israeli decision making, specifically in Jerusalem or at a state level, in the Government with Ministers or Members of the Knesset. That is just one example of the type of people who currently rule the country. With that, I would say that there is policy that allows him to conduct and lead. It is not only the individual person, but the overall structure that allows him to be part of it.

I am not sure where we are up to in the Knesset with the taxation law on NGOs, which could hit 80% of foreign funding of NGOs. In our own Parliament today, it is very welcome that we are finally taking steps to stop British charities funding settlements, but what is happening with that law? Has it come through and had an impact on the funding of NGOs doing the sort of work that you do?

Specifically on that legislation, the situation right now is that it is paused at a certain stage, but it is very close to being finalised. At the moment, it will be a decision of the Government whether they want to pass it or not. If they decide to pass it, it will be very easy for them to do so. The only reason they have not yet passed it is the international community, which we know has implemented significant measures to stop it from passing, but we have no reason to believe that the legislation will not pass tomorrow. That is the situation. Like Itay said, when we get closer to the general election, it is complicated bureaucratically. The Government might move forward with it, or right after the elections. That is the situation that we are in.

Ori, broadly speaking, how should the UK Government respond to the situation in the West Bank? Specifically, what more evidence would the UK Government need, in your view, before they accept the ICJ ruling that Israel’s actions towards Palestinians in the West Bank amount to forcible transfer?

A few things about that. First, the most important element, which we have been going around in this whole meeting, is to understand that while some measures that are being taken, like the ones that we are taking today, are of course a good step in the right direction, we must have an understanding that this is fully planned. Israel is fully responsible for the situation in the West Bank, Gaza and its own detention centres—we have to connect all those. We should not think that that is a different Government; the same Government who committed genocide and is still committing genocide in Gaza, now harass over 9,500 Palestinian detainees, as we are speaking, torturing them. That Government also commit ethnic cleansing here in the West Bank, while we are speaking. All that is the same Government. That is a very important understanding to start with. Once we understand that, it is very clear that the time has come to implement and use the tools that will make Israel understand that it cannot continue to do that. Until that understanding is translated into the appropriate tools that will respond to the gravity of the situation, I think it is hard to think why we would see any change. I will not comment on a specific measure or tool. We all know, by the way, what those tools are, so we need political will rather than thinking together about the tools.

Itay, I put the same question to you about what more evidence the UK Government might need before they accept the ICJ ruling.

One thing I think that we can contribute is to correct a wrong assumption that advisory opinions are not legally binding, or that they do not speak to legal obligations. I must confess to having those conversations with legal services, not just in London but in many other capitals. It is true that by form, an advisory opinion provides advice to the requesting audience, to the General Assembly, but in this case, both the 2024 advisory opinion about the unlawfulness of Israel’s presence and the obligations of it and third states, and the 2025 opinion with respect to the presence of humanitarian organisations, speak to serious violations of peremptory norms of general international law, which we have spoken about today. They create obligations not just of non-recognition—Israeli wrongful acts must not be recognised as lawful—but that those acts must not be aided or assisted. Nothing that Ukraine or any other country does should entrench Israeli wrongdoing and its unlawful presence. It is about a duty to co-operate and to work together towards bringing Israel's presence to an end, unconditionally and as rapidly as possible. It requires political will, but it is not subject to political will, so I think we need to start with a recognition that the advisory opinion speaks about legal obligations, including the obligation to co-operate. It is not just a question of political appreciation; it is a question of exercising legal duties. If this is the normative starting point, then I think we can have a more sensible political conversation about what needs to be done. A lot of it is outside the remit of humanitarians, but I think we can contribute to precision and accuracy in legal reading and fact-based analysis of what enables Israeli wrongdoing, including the expansion of settlements or the forcible transfer of Palestinians. We are happy to contribute, including through this Committee, but ultimately I think we need to treat this as obligations—obligations that have not yet been met.

Finally, and briefly, as we must wrap up, Allegra, is there more that the UK could do to uphold international law?

Very briefly, Itay mentioned restitution, so I want to bring in the fact that Israel has demolished donor-funded aid, including aid that the UK has supported. I hope it was sent around about the school in Ras Ein al-Auja that was supported by about €81,000 of donor-funded aid—these are modest schools, as you might see in the video. After the community was forced out by settler violence, the settlers came in and vandalised the school significantly and then had the audacity to put up a sign, a graffiti, to say to other Israelis, “Don’t vandalise—this belongs to the outpost.” Again, that is just a small example. We have basically three categories: aid demolished by the Israeli authorities, aid demolished by settlers, and aid that has been abandoned or left behind by the communities. I think there are ways to challenge Israel for compensation and, of course, for return of these communities. Two more small things. In terms of the settlers who have been sanctioned, Israel has not taken any steps, as far as I know, to remove those settlers from the scene of the crime, from the outposts where they launched the attacks, or from entering the Palestinian communities. That would simply take—I am being facetious with the word “simply”, but a military order could have the settlers, who Israel even claim do not live in the West Bank as they are all from Tel Aviv or Petah Tikva, removed from the scene of the crime. That small ask, not on the macro level but on the micro, is not only Europeans and the UK sanctioning settlers, but then the follow-up of removing them from the scene of the crime until their rights are adjudicated, there is due process, and it is investigated whether they are indeed involved in that violence. Finally, Israelis—Israeli Jews—are banned from areas A and B by the military. They are not allowed to enter the Palestinian-populated areas. There are signs there. It is Israeli citizens, but it is generally enforced against Jewish citizens. But in area C, the biggest area of the West Bank, where the settlers are but where Palestinians are attacked daily, Israelis are allowed to roam free. As Ori mentioned, they roam into these communities with their livestock, or they just walk in. It is very easy to issue a ban on Israelis entering Palestinian residential areas. Those are on the small level of simple things that show that there is politics behind this, and we need to address the political forces that should give the green light for these kinds of procedures to be in place to protect Palestinians.

Apologies—we are running out of time. I will go to Brian very briefly for a final word from the other panellists.

Ori, you hinted that we all understood what could be used to make Israel understand. Can you be bit clearer with us about what tools the UK Government should be using?

I apologise. On the issue of specific tools, I am happy to discuss and think about that, but we believe that the tools are all known, and we will not comment on specific ones.

Okay. Perhaps you can give us that in writing.

Thank you very much. Itay, any final words from you on this last matter?

I think that a lot of these things are both uncontroversial and precedented. All you have to do is read through the articles on state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts as a manual of what is both legally permissible and effective. It outlines the whole toolbox, in terms of what can be done. We need to start by rightly diagnosing this as a grave and serious breach of international law and act accordingly, and from that everything flows. This is my final comment. We also have to treat this with a sense of urgency. That is what is often lacking. The West Bank is teetering on the verge of a violent explosion. Gaza may very well descend back to violence and open hostilities, and we have to treat these things with the urgency that they command.

Thank you, Itay. That is a very clear and devastating picture. I thank each of the panellists. Itay, Allegra and Ori, thank you very much for your time. Examination of witness Witness: Ben Majekodunmi.

I thank our second panellist for joining us online. Ben, would you briefly introduce yourself?

Thank you very much for the invitation. My name is Ben Majekodunmi, and I am the chief of staff at UNRWA, where I have been for the last few years. I worked for the UN for just over 30 years in a mixture of roles relating to human rights, humanitarian development and political crises, with a particular focus on human rights, including mitigating genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in a variety of situations. I am now trying to grapple with the crisis that UNRWA is responsible for addressing.

Thank you very much for joining us, and for your patience as we start this next important session.

Could you give us an update on the work of UNRWA in the region?

Thanks, Sam. I hope it is okay if I use first names. I have everybody’s.

Of course.

Let me begin by saying that, as you know, UNRWA is a development agency that is able to use its massive footprint—roughly 30,000 personnel—to also deliver humanitarian work. We ultimately end up playing both a developmental and a humanitarian role. We deliver services—in particular, education services, health services and social services—to the poorest, and we flip our capacity into a humanitarian operation, basically to help anybody in need. We provide shelter, food and cash assistance—a whole variety of assistance—to anybody in need in any of the five fields where we operate: Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan. Four of those fields—all of them except Jordan—have been in various stages of crisis, as you know well, for the last few years. I can elaborate on the kind of services that we do, but as an initial response I would say that the assistance that we provide—services or emergency assistance—could be looked at from different levels, in terms of the specific beneficiaries. If you receive food, you are better off with the food. If you receive education, you are able to continue your development as a child or as a family, even as a humanitarian crisis or a conflict unfolds around you. At a macro level, the services and contribution of the agency are widely perceived by member states including the UK as contributing to stability in all the five fields that we operate, and have been described as such. The stabilising contribution of UNRWA is somewhat different depending on the field but it is widely acknowledged by all member states in the region. That was a very brief summary. I can dive into details if that would be helpful.

I am sure that we can get into more detail. Will you also give us an update on the situation in Lebanon and how UNRWA is responding?

On the macro level, you will know very well the sort of see-saw between peace, conflict, ceasefire, not a ceasefire, and a ceasefire but with continuing conflict. Within the country there are massive population movements of at least 1 million people. In normal times UNRWA’s caseload is specifically Palestine refugees. In abnormal times, such as now, we tend to provide assistance to anybody who walks in the door, with a particular focus on Palestine refugees. We convert our facilities, such as our schools, where needed, into emergency shelters. We translate some of our normal assistance from material assistance into cash assistance that people can use in a more flexible manner. We move our medical facilities so that we can provide medical assistance where it is most needed. We try to backstop, wherever possible, the local facilities and support. We have seen an odd dynamic of Palestine refugees in Lebanon moving into Syria, so part of our Lebanon support is provided in Syria because we have Palestine refugees who hope to get more assistance from UNRWA in Syria, particularly if their homes have been overtaken by the conflict line, and their homes and services have been destroyed, so they are moving. The broad answer would be that as the Government of Lebanon tries to grapple with a very dynamic, complex situation that is related not only to the actual conflict but to longstanding political problems and enormous stress in the socioeconomic situation, UNRWA has an additional municipal-type capacity. It helps to stabilise and to provide for certain members of the population.

Could you give us a sense of the scale of that sort of double displacement of refugees moving on from Lebanon to Syria?

I can give a sense of the scale just of the number of Palestine refugees. There are other refugees who will, once they move, be taken on by UNHCR and by other actors, including the Government of Syria. It is not a very big movement of Palestine refugees. There are a few thousand; I do not have an exact number. Let me give a different response. The impact of the conflict, and to some extent of the displacement, on Palestine refugees in Lebanon is extremely acute because the starting point for Palestine refugees in Lebanon is extremely low. They are very much at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder. They are excluded from most jobs and services, in part because the Government have not been able to cater for them for many years. Their vulnerability from the conflict is extremely acute. Those who make a decision to move to Syria do so in the vague hope that they may be a little more stable and less obliged to keep continually moving, but they lack the means to move.

Ben, this is a big question or a small question: what effect has the ban on UNRWA had on the situation across the West Bank?

On the ban on UNRWA—to flesh it out somewhat—the Israeli Parliament has adopted legislation that provides for a no-contact policy between any official of the state of Israel and the agency, and also provides that UNRWA cannot operate in any way—and nobody can operate on its behalf—within the sovereign state of Israel, which is defined by the legislation as including occupied East Jerusalem. Then there is a more recent piece of legislation that prohibits the provision of electricity or water to any UNRWA premises within that sovereign territory as defined by the Government of Israel. Those restrictions have a massive impact on our operations, particularly because, in order for us to access our field of operations in the West Bank and in Gaza, almost everything, including international staff, needs to pass through the territory of Israel and/or engage with officials of the state of Israel. In normal times, pre-7 October—or actually pre-January 2025—UNRWA had extremely good engagement with the state of Israel; it had long-standing, very close, constant contacts, with hundreds of contacts every year co-ordinating movements, co-ordinating on security issues and co-ordinating on neutrality issues. Of course, we would bring in fuel, vehicles and international staff, and we had operations based in East Jerusalem; I had an office in East Jerusalem. Taking away that contact—taking away the essential support of a member state—creates an enormous handicap for any UN operation. UN operations can only really function with the support of member states, including from a protection and safety point of view. Just to give an example, pre-January 2025—in Gaza, not in the West Bank, although comparable examples exist in the West Bank—we would co-ordinate with Israeli security forces for the movement of specific UNRWA staff to try to get them to safety when they were under attack. Therefore, the broad answer is that the restrictions go counter to the normal relationship that UNRWA had with the state of Israel for many years, which was very collaborative and followed the pattern of normal UN relationships with member states, and was absolutely vital to the safe conduct, neutrality and protection of UN operations.

Thank you, Ben. A number of us actually visited your former headquarters, so we can appreciate what you have lost. Can you just outline how you have adapted to these circumstances?

We have had to adapt on multiple levels. For example, on procurement, we have had to find other ways to purchase supplies that we need—to go through third parties who are not acting on our behalf, but might just bring goods into the West Bank and put them on the market, and we then purchase those from the market. That means that goods are often more expensive since we would get preferential rates from vendors in the past. So there are procurement issues. There is also the issue of the presence of international staff. None of our international staff are able to operate within the West Bank or Gaza. Visas have been withdrawn or denied. That limits the extent of international oversight and the proximity of international staff to our operations, which is not desirable. Then there are issues of security and general co-ordination with the Israeli authorities; we had really crucial mechanisms to co-ordinate with them. For example, if there was an Israeli military operation in the West Bank, normally there would be co-ordination with those authorities to ensure that UNRWA facilities were not caught in the crossfire. Militants may have been in or around—not in, but in the vicinity of—UNRWA premises. The Israeli operations needed to continue, so we would try to co-ordinate, for example, the exit from those premises of UNRWA schoolchildren or the movement of staff. Therefore, normal co-ordination, which would indeed help the state of Israel to meet its legal obligations and enable UNRWA operations to continue, is interrupted. Taking procurement as an example, we have some basic operational issues, we have oversight issues with international staff, and we have safety, security and legal issues. As a whole, our operations are now greatly hampered by not being able to function with the normal day-to-day and essential collaboration with the most prominent member state authority in the occupied territory, by virtue of being the occupying power and controlling the entries and exits to these territories.

What is UNRWA’s role in the wider efforts to bring peace in Gaza? How key is UNRWA to that process?

If I may give you a couple of sentences on the history, as you may know, UNRWA was established some 77 years ago really as a temporary agency. The political thinking was, “The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a problem that has to be solved now. We are going to set up some political processes to win us a bit of time, whether it is two, three, four or five years. We will set up this humanitarian agency to meet people’s basic humanitarian needs.” As that political track slowed and showed that it was not making fast progress, the humanitarian vocation of UNRWA gradually transformed into the development one that we see today, and it is now development/humanitarian. Clearly, there is no political solution, as yet, on the table. Coming closer to your question, over the years UNRWA has unfortunately—regrettably, I would argue—become imbued with a political purpose. We did not have a political mandate, and we do not undertake political activities, yet the agency has become intrinsic to any political solution going forward. The agency lies astride issues that are absolutely essential to the final status issues—land and the return of refugees to that land. In the absence of adequate political processes, UNRWA’s very existence has become a symbol or manifestation of a political hold on all hopes for a future political solution that meets international standards and international law. That is one part of the answer, and the fact that the agency is so heavily imbued with this political purpose creates an enormous burden for the agency to carry. Many different parties—not only the Government of Israel but other parties on other sides—seek to gain or change a political dynamic by influencing the status and stature of the agency, whether that is by diminishing it, weakening it or moving it in different directions. In fact, UNRWA was never intended for this purpose, and it is not designed for this purpose. It should not have this purpose, as it should really be carried out by an adequately designed political process. The second answer I would give is that, notwithstanding the first answer, UNRWA has some 14,000-15,000 personnel and civil servants in the West Bank and Gaza, most of whom are in Gaza. If you want to be successful in delivering and implementing a political solution that meets international standards for the OPT as a whole, particularly in Gaza, you need to have a few basic things. Beyond something like a stabilisation force, and beyond creating a new economy, you need to have education, healthcare and a civil service that is Palestinian in character. You need it immediately, and it needs to be high quality. We in the international community are incredibly fortunate to have, in UNRWA, 14,000 international civil servants spread across the OPT who are bringing high-quality, low-cost education, and who—according to an independent survey last year—have a 75% level of trust among Palestinians. I will end with this: if one is determined to achieve a peaceful Gaza with a political solution that meets international standards—that is, it matches the stated goals of Security Council resolution 2803 and the broader peace—UNRWA is an enormous asset to achieve that. It is possible that it may be the only asset that can achieve that, as there is no immediate substitute for it. That is unfortunate, as I think it would be desirable if there was another person or actor who could play that role. Ideally, UNRWA would transition out of such a role as fast as possible, and transition its capacity into a future Palestinian entity, but for the moment it is an incontrovertible asset. I say this also from my own background, primarily in conflict situations and peacekeeping situations where the UN struggles to establish peace. Most critiques of stalled efforts to establish peace focus on the macro political, which is very important, but actually no less important is the fact that in most instances on the ground you lack a really good civil service that can deliver the kinds of services that will help to stabilise the situation. In the Gaza situation, we had that in UNRWA, but the agency needs to be enabled, permitted and protected to deliver.

Finally, in which ways could the UK better further UNRWA’s efforts in the region?

The UK has been providing financial support to UNRWA for a long time, and that financial support continues. It is somewhat reduced given the wider financial context, not specific to UNRWA. I do not want to focus so much on the funding. We are in enormous financial crisis, but even more important than the funding is political support for the agency. To pick up on Janet’s question and my response to it, we—the international community, the UN system, member states within the UN system, the UK—have an enormous responsibility, which is what has led you all to discuss this issue, to deliver peace based on international law and on human rights for Palestinians and for Israelis. The opportunity to deliver that peace has been eroding for decades; arguably, it is eroding far quicker today. We have a few ingredients to try to hold on to it. UNRWA is one of those ingredients. It may be an absolutely essential one, along with others. The PA is another essential one—the Palestinian Authority. In terms of UK support, the topmost thing is to deliver a political solution based on international law as urgently as possible. Underneath that overall heading, to the extent that UNRWA is a tremendous asset for delivering such a solution, including as part of a transition to a Palestinian entity, I would appeal for the strongest possible political support for UNRWA to be able to play its role fully, in partnership with all member states including the state of Israel, so that the agency can deliver its role, help to support a political solution, and eventually, as quickly as possible, phase out and transition into a Palestinian-led entity—so political support for the agency to be protected and enabled to play its role.

I am sure that those Committee members who have seen the agency’s work at first hand can continue to make that case. I am sure that those of us who recognise the uniqueness of the nature of its role and its importance in the broader international system can continue to make that case as well. Thank you very much for coming to today’s session and providing your evidence. If there is any further detail that you would like to follow up on, you would be very welcome to write to us. Thank you for joining, and thanks to the Members present.