This is the International Development Committee’s session on Sudan. We are very fortunate to be joined by Dave Philips, the deputy director of international projects at Samaritan’s Purse. Dave, we have asked you here because we know that you have literally just come back from Sudan. Could you tell us a little bit about your organisation and the role that you are playing in Sudan? Specifically, I know you are doing work on combating malnutrition, so could you talk a little about that, please?

Thank you, Chair, and thank you, members of the Committee, for having me here today. It is a real honour, and I am looking forward to the discussion. Samaritan’s Purse has been working in Sudan for more than 30 years. We are evangelical Christians, and we want people to know that God loves them and has not forgotten about them in the midst of the pain and the suffering. But, as you well know, Sudan is now the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. It is worse than the situation in Gaza and Ukraine combined. I have just returned from an area near the frontlines in the Kordofan region, where I saw the horrors of this war up front and personal. The numbers really are so overwhelming: 21 million people are in severe hunger, the highest number ever recorded in a single country, and three famines have been declared in the last 18 months. In the history of the famine-declaration mechanism, there have been only seven globally, and three of them have been in Sudan in the last year and a half.

And all three of those are man-made?

All three of them are man-made. That is a very good point. This is not a climate crisis; this is not something that is driven by poverty; these are man-made famines. Some 12 million people—something like the entire population of London and Manchester—were forced to flee from their homes, many of them with nothing but the things they could carry in their own hands. Samaritan’s Purse has more than 500 staff on the ground. We are providing food, water and medicine; we are running hospitals and doing nutrition programming, to help the people. Since the crisis started in April 2023, we have distributed 45,000 metric tonnes of food, which is a huge number. It’s like a meal for 90 million people or, if it was in lorries—you say lorries here; I think in trucks—there would be, from this building, a convoy of 1,800 lorries, stretching past Heathrow airport. As important as all this humanitarian assistance is—we at Samaritan’s Purse are locked in on providing lifesaving assistance—it is urgent and important to say that humanitarian assistance cannot solve the war. There must be an end to this crisis through the political side and the diplomatic side. We will continue to do all that we can to save lives, but we cannot solve the crisis. To your question, I can share a bit about what happened during my recent visit, if that would be appropriate. I was very near the frontlines; I was near the city of Kadugli. I was in that location when the Sudanese Armed Forces retook the city—well, they did not retake it; they opened the road to the city of Kadugli. The thing that is immediately evident is the ocean of women and children. The surveys that we have conducted show that about 80% of the displaced populations are female-headed households, so it is the women and children who are bearing the brunt of this war and suffering the most. I talked to one woman who told me a brutal story of trying to flee and being stopped at a checkpoint. The men at the checkpoint forced her to sit down on the ground, and they took her cell phones and all her money. She had three daughters with her, and they took one daughter at a time and raped the daughters in front of the mom. She begged them not to rape the youngest, third daughter, and they finally relented and let her go. I spoke to this woman three days after this event happened, and what was so heavy to me is that she will carry that for the rest of her life. In the same camp where I talked to this woman, I saw people walking around without clothes. We inquired as to why they had no clothes, and the answer was that food was available in the markets, but the people had no money to buy food, so they sold their clothes and kitchen utensils to buy food. It was at these two moments that I was struck by how dehumanising this war really is—and, to your point, Chair, these are man-made crises. This is happening because violent men have chosen to use violence rather than political dialogue to resolve the crisis. We have hospitals that we are running in the country. Shall I continue describing—

Yes. Sorry, Dave; I hear a lot of testimony, but yours has really affected me. The level of degradation and the psychological warfare that is going on there against women is hard to bear, but we need to hear it, so please do continue.

Okay. It is overwhelming. Part of the message I want to deliver is that the situation on the ground is actually worse than we think it is. We believe that it is bad, but when you see it on the ground, it is really horrific. I have brought some photos with me. I don’t know whether you can see them, but these are malnourished children who have come to our clinic in Sudan. We measure malnutrition based on a number of different mechanisms, but we are monitoring an approximately 30% global acute malnutrition rate among the children. We were part of collecting the data that was used for submission to the Famine Review Committee for the global acute malnutrition mechanism. There is also severe hunger, which we rate as well. If I can, I want to tell the story of a little girl named Ikram.

Dave, we are actually not allowed to show photos, so if you could just tell us, that would be really helpful.

Okay—thank you. A little girl named Ikram came to our clinic. She is two years old, and at the time of her arrival at our hospital, she weighed 13.8 lb. I looked this up and, at least in my country, a two-year-old is supposed to weigh about 26 lb. She had been diagnosed with severe acute malnutrition. She also had pneumonia and malaria, and after she was admitted to our hospital, she contracted meningitis. So this two-year-old little girl now has four life-threatening diagnoses. As our team were helping to nurse Ikram back to health, a cholera epidemic hit the community. One of the caregivers for the other children in the severe acute malnutrition ward contracted cholera, and little Ikram was affected—she got cholera. Her mother is only 19 years old, and she was devastated when she learned her child had cholera. That is this little girl’s fifth life-threatening diagnosis. We prayed and we asked God for a miracle because, scientifically and from a medical perspective, you cannot get much sicker than that. Ikram was in the cholera ward for about eight days and dropped down to 10 lb. Somehow, miraculously, she was able to fight and get discharged from the cholera treatment ward. She was admitted on 27 July last year and on 29 August she was discharged from the hospital. She is still alive and well today, and I have the photos of her when she came and when she left. If anyone would like to see those, we will share them later.

I hope they are on your website, so people can follow up if they need to. Could I ask an entirely subjective question? You mentioned earlier that most people do not know just how bad it is. Why do you think that is?

It is an important question. When you look at some of the other crises in the world, a lot more media and political attention have been placed on them. Sudan has not received attention commensurate to the scale of the crisis. I do think it is far away from our minds in our countries, but Sudan has also been at war since 1955. The war is not a new component of what is going on here, which is why it is so important for us as humanitarians—I am not a politician, I do not sit at diplomatic tables, I do not have the tools of sanctions—to say that there must be a way for us to stop this war. That is the most important message, and I also think it ties to your question: there is something we can do. We must send humanitarian assistance, but I think for our constituents in the countries where we live—Samaritan’s Purse has its own constituents—we want the war to end. That is also exactly what is needed in the country. It must be tied with a credible political process, but I think that ending the war is something that people can connect to. It makes sense. We have to save lives, but ending the war is the most urgent thing.

Dave, it is good to see you. How does Samaritan’s Purse work alongside displaced people in Sudan? How do you do what you do?

It is good to see you; thank you. The displacement is the crisis. People being forced to flee from their homes means, first of all, that violence has happened. The report we get from our surveys is that the vast majority of people are leaving for two reasons: direct threat of violence and hunger. Those are the two reasons people leave their homes. If you imagine what would force any of us today to leave our home within a matter of hours, it would have to be a drastic situation. The other factor here is that when people are forced to flee their homes they are not able to engage in the livelihood they had when they were at home, whether farming or whatever else they were doing. So what is very important for us at Samaritan’s Purse is that we are in the locations that exist between the armed actors. There are cracks that exist in the conflict itself, where people are able to come. There are millions of people who have fled to, specifically, the SLM areas of Jebel Marra and the SPLM-North areas of South Kordofan. Millions of people have come. Numbers in Sudan are very difficult—it is very hard to get exact numbers—but we know millions have come. When those people come, they need the basic elements of life, which are food, water, medicine and shelter. But in our surveys we are finding that about 95% of displaced people report the number one most urgent need is food. That is what we are getting right now. We are in February. February is historically not yet the hunger gap. Sudan has a rainy season, a dry season, a lean season, and a season in which there is a lot of food available because of the harvest. We have not yet reached the hunger gap and already 95% of the displaced people we are talking to are reporting that food is the most urgent thing. This is another nuance, but it is important to say that the people who are being displaced report that they are getting food from international organisations and also because the host community is sharing their food. That is a beautiful story of the resilience and capacity of the Sudanese to deal with their crisis, but it is also important to note that, if you share your food, you are going to run out of food sooner. We do not know what will happen; the upcoming harvest will be incredibly important, but we now have fewer than 100 days before the rains cut the roads off. Even as early as this morning I have been working with our team to rush food assistance in and to pre-position the little packets of RUTF, which are made by Mana Nutrition and save lives. We have to get these kinds of things into Sudan as urgently as possible so that we can save these lives and alleviate suffering, but the timing to do so is just so short.

Can I just bring Sam in?

On that point, you describe quite horrific malnutrition, with people selling clothes because they cannot eat. Is it the case that there is simply not enough international assistance coming in, or are there problems with distribution, whether that is the safety of distribution or the road networks? What is stopping the aid from getting to where it is needed?

That is a very important question. I would say that there is no single silver bullet or reason, unless it is stopping the war. Stopping the war would be the silver bullet, and I will give some colour to that. When we deliver assistance, we are trying to target the most vulnerable. We have ways of measuring that, such as IPC levels and household hunger, as well as single parent-headed households, or those with disabled people and elderly people—all those types of criteria. We are trying to address hunger in the three-month gap when there is the least amount of food. It is not as though we deliver food and we give everybody all the food they need for a year—it is far from that. We are providing assistance only in a very short window that is targeted to save lives during that time. In 2024, we had a dramatic situation where we measured malnutrition at 36% in a community. We were able to negotiate with the Sudan armed forces and the SPLM-North to airdrop food, which may be a helpful story to share later in my testimony. What I want to say now is that, when we delivered that assistance, there was a pause in the fighting so that assistance could come in, and people were also able to plant and that community had market access for a brief period. When we then came back and measured the malnutrition, it had dropped to 6%. That is unprecedented; malnutrition does not drop that quickly, although it drops more quickly than household hunger. We need to have a lot of humility as a humanitarian actor: we did not make drop down to 6%. It was a combination of people being able to plant, the market being opened up again and the targeted humanitarian assistance that we brought into the community. The key takeaway is that, no matter how much humanitarian assistance we bring in, we will never be able to resolve the urgent needs of the population. The market and the planting and harvesting season are much more powerful than we are as humanitarians.

I understand that, and I agree that the conflict obviously needs to stop. What I am trying to understand is this: is the situation like Gaza, where there is actually an abundance of aid ready to go in but it cannot do so, or is there simply not enough aid at the doors trying to get in?

It is both those things, depending on the part of the country that you are working in. There are some places where the need is higher and the access constraints are also higher at the same time. There are some places, such as the parts of Sudan where we work, where the need is very high but we have very good relationships with all the actors, and so we have access. In our particular case, the issue is resources—that is, how much can be brought in. In other parts of the country, it is the conflict itself or, beyond just the conflict, the political motivation of the actors that prevents assistance from coming in. It is important for all of us to know that belligerents know our principles and rules better than we do, and food in Sudan has been used as a weapon of war since the first recorded instances of humanitarian assistance in Sudan. They know how to manipulate assistance, so we have to be very careful in how we deliver it. Sorry that I am beating this drum so hard, but that is why we have to stop the conflict, because humanitarian assistance will be manipulated. We do the best we can, and with all the distributions that Samaritan’s Purse conducts, we have our staff making sure that the food gets to the intended recipient, but you raise an important point and there are barriers to the beneficiaries.

Brian, back to you.

This next question has more of a rosy end to it: what programming will be needed to help displaced people reintegrate into society once the conflict ends?

Thank you for that important question. The first thing that comes to my mind is that where people are living now is not where their homes are, so there may need to be assistance to get people back to their homes. At the level of society, accountability for the injustices that happened will be very important for people to reintegrate. There also needs to be security—people need to feel safe to return to wherever they are from. They need not to feel threatened because of their ethnicity, gender or whatever factors they have been targeted for. If there is a peace and security arrangement, that will make the biggest difference. Practically speaking, seeds and tools are huge. I have often thought that, if we can get the cessation of hostilities and get everyone seeds and tools in their hands, then we are going to have a very different food security outcome within a few months, if we are able to time that well. It is about peace and security, and then basic livelihood inputs that will allow people to become productive again. Land security is a huge issue in Sudan, but that is well beyond the topic of this discussion, because people know how to handle that at the local level, as long as there is not the chaos of war.

Thank you, Dave, for everything you and your organisation are doing in Sudan, and for speaking so frankly to the Committee. You have answered part of my question already, but I want to get a sense of how possible it is for people to farm and plant, despite the conflict that is taking place. You have touched on that already, but is there anything more that you can say?

Farming is obviously very important. In the country there is a dynamic of what are called the near farms and the far farms. You will have a community kitchen, with vegetables that can be grown year-round—it is easier to manage them—and that often happens within the plot or in close proximity to where someone lives. There are also far farms in some of the societies of Sudan, where the community will come together and work on a large plot of maybe 100 hectares, which is then harvested for the community and the community will share those resources. There is a concept of shared resources that is hard for us to always wrap our heads around. In fact, in one of our focus group discussions, the community said, “We reject your plates. Your plates have no place here. We want to share all of our food. No one gets an individual plate.” Food, farming and the production of food are deeply cultural issues that are integrated into the societies in ways that do not have a one-for-one connection to the way that we think about food, and the way that food is used in our societies. To your question, the point is that the far farm is particularly vulnerable to conflict dynamics. If you have aerial bombardment, or there is a militia coming through, or the frontline moves, people do not feel safe to be farming out in the open because of the conflict dynamics. Going back to the question raised by Sam Rushworth about how food is used as a weapon of war, the cutting-off of access to far farms has also been a clear dynamic, which is another use of food as a weapon of war.

I want to move on to the impact of the conflict on women and girls. You obviously gave us that horrific, tragic and terrible example. That is one example, but could you give us more insight into what the impact of conflict has been on women and children? We have heard situations and stories, but you have just come back from Sudan, so you have the latest information, which is really helpful.

On my recent visit to Sudan, the thing that struck me walking around the camps for the displaced is that it is women and children in them. I do not think I saw with my own eyes a man of military age. I saw elderly people, very young children, and women. These women are being forced to flee; they are the ones who are forced to flee from their homes when their husbands are pulled to the frontlines and recruited into the military. It is the women who bear the brunt of the war, and the protection concerns are particularly egregious. If women are forced to walk—in the story I told earlier, the woman had to walk for days to get her child to our clinic—just to get assistance for a sick child, it means walking for days, which means sleeping outside and being exposed to sexual assault. Depending on where you are in Sudan—there are pockets where things are peaceful—for women and girls today it is hell on earth. There is very little, if any, accountability for the crimes being committed. When there is chaos in a war setting like this, it is the weakest who are the most exposed to that violence because they have no way to protect themselves.

How regular—it sounds awful—or how often is the sexual violence towards women and girls? What else is that like and how does that present itself?

There is a little bit of a challenge in collecting precise information because of some of the taboos. I personally find it helpful to do small focus group discussions with the people that I am physically with when I am in Sudan. I gathered a group of 10 women together and we did what is called a MUAC, which is a rapid assessment of the upper arm, to see how many of the children were malnourished. Out of the 10 women, three of the children were moderately malnourished and one was severely malnourished. That is four out of 10 children who were malnourished. I asked the women which of them knew someone who had been sexually assaulted. All of them raised their hands. Of the 10, they said all of them know someone who has been sexually assaulted. I asked which of them specifically had been sexually assaulted and none of them said yes. Again, that is about taboos, and it requires specific measurement within a female setting that allows for that to happen. That is not Samaritan’s Purse’s area of expertise. My personal experience is that it is the majority; the majority of women have gone through some type of sexual exploitation because of the war.

Dave, my whole political career has been about trying to prevent violence against women and girls, and I struggle to understand why in recent conflicts women have become a legitimate target. In Sudan, we have met many of the very strong women who are community leaders. Do you think it is conscious targeting by the forces, or do you think it is individual opportunism that is leading to the war on women?

When I consider what I have seen, I think it is both. There is credible information from Sudan’s history that sexual violence is an effective tool when you think about a political, ethnic, military objective. That does not mean that there are not significant amounts of opportunistic sexual violence that are happening because when war happens, all of the ways that society holds itself together are pressed and torn and are in bare threads. I noted at one point that women were walking through an area that was generally considered to be safe and was far from the frontlines, and there were reports of sexual violence because the accountability mechanisms are not present. People are busy trying to survive by fighting a war. In answer to your question, it is, I believe, both. The greater problem is that the opportunism is created because of the vacuum that exists during the conflict.

I strongly believe that most men are good men and are appalled by this. It is just the scale that we are hearing about is beyond any normal imagination, so it does feel more a conscious attack, which is just chilling.

I would say that is a fair general characterisation for the country.

I do not believe so. The safe places can be created by individual families and communities, but when you think about the whole country, everything is focused on the war. Therefore, the normal accountability mechanisms—even the space that would exist for civil society, civilians in general—are being pushed aside, because the war has dominated everything. That is part of the reason why the political process needs to be brought to the forefront, because that is the counterbalance to the conflict. That leads into the protection of women and girls and into all levels of accountability.

According to some of the conversations I have had with the UN and others, there are conversations with belligerents to let aid access open in order to get food in. Those conversations are also about the application of international humanitarian law. Are you aware of conversations about the rights of women and girls under international humanitarian law? Are any of the INGOs or diplomatic presence there having that conversation with the belligerents?

Certainly from our side, those conversations are happening. We have a policy not to talk about people publicly, but in private we always want to raise those issues with the individual actors. To add a small nuance to the question, there are few groups in Sudan that are monolithic in terms of their ability both politically and on the security or military side to maintain coherence from the top to the bottom. When you are speaking to someone in a position of leadership, they do not always have the ability to pass that policy or decision all the way down to the ranks of the individuals on the ground. When you are thinking about moving a convoy of food assistance, you must have top-level diplomatic approval from the senior person in whatever group you are working through. You also have to negotiate with the individual checkpoints along the road. Those individual checkpoints might be influenced by local politics or by the personality of the senior commander. That senior commander may not be the good guy, as the Chair said, that many men are. You have to think about the different layers of the control mechanisms that exist within the different groups, and then you have to have an understanding of where the lowest level to the ground is. That is in getting humanitarian assistance. When it comes to the protection of women and girls, the same dynamic applies. The monolithic structures that come down from the top are not always effective in ensuring that on the ground things happen the way that they should, even if the leader sincerely wants it to happen that way. They may not be able to control their troops on the ground, which is part of the reason why the chaos of the war is so devastating.

I apologise in advance for asking this question because it is quite uncomfortable. I am interested in what you are seeing presented medically as a result of sexual violence. We know that about 85% of women in Sudan have had FGM. In girls, that often involves infibulation, which would mean that any rape would be torturous and life-threatening. I wonder if you are seeing that presented in clinics, as well as unwanted pregnancies, disease and so on.

Samaritan’s Purse has about 70 clinics and two hospitals. At the two hospitals we run, we do emergency surgeries, but that is limited and only in the case where we are not able to organise some type of a referral pathway for the individuals who need surgery to move. Essentially, we are doing primary care. We do have an emergency field hospital that is able to do surgery, but we can deploy it only in one place at a time. Coming to your question, we do not have that specific type of information, but it is information I could get for you if you need it.

That would be very helpful if you are able to, thank you.

Dave, back in November we heard about the horrors in Al-Fasher. There seemed to be incredible evidence that when the final assault happened, the men and boys were sent in one direction and massacred—killed, all of them—and the women and girls went in another direction, and pretty much what we have been talking about happened. Is there evidence of continuing massacres going on at the moment?

Your question is the question in my mind about the situation in Al-Fasher. It was horrific and crimes were committed, as you have said. But the concern is that another Al-Fasher could happen. As of today, I am monitoring the cities of El Obeid, Dilling and Kadugli. A pocket exists within North and South Kordofan—the urban areas are controlled by the Sudan armed forces and in the periphery are the SPLM-North, the RSF and the TASIS. The types of atrocities that you are talking about are specific couplings of urban areas of high populations with conflict. At the scale you are discussing, this is not a daily occurrence; it is a coupling of specific things that come together when the risk is presented. To answer your question directly, I am not aware that that is happening—I have not heard about such things. But the dynamics of ethnicity exist within the conflict. They are there, and when you combine that with an urban area—we saw this Al-Fasher and Wad Madani—you have a large-scale ethnic targeting. These are crimes; this cannot happen. That is why for me, monitoring the dynamics in the Kordofans, that is where the war is going to be focused in the near term: the Kordofan region. Those urban areas are very concerning and that is why we have to find a way to end this war, so that we avoid something like that happening in the future.

Coming to the bigger picture, does the current UN aid architecture, including the UN’s location in Port Sudan, lend itself to efficacy in this situation?

That is such an important question that I want to take a moment to make sure that I am answering correctly. The UN architecture is currently housed in Port Sudan, which is very important, but the line that exists more or less along the Nile—it runs along the Kordofans into North Darfur—is not just a line of conflict, but a line about the access of humanitarian assistance. It is not just that the belligerents in the conflict do not want humanitarian assistance to cross that line; there are also real considerations for how that assistance can cross the line. There needs to be a more credible review of how cross-border assistance can be developed. The UN’s current posture of being mostly on one side of the conflict does not allow for that to be maximally reviewed. That is my comment on the issue; I think this could be looked at. I do not want to come here and criticise the UN; that is not what I am here to do. But I do think that the dynamics are so free flowing that we need to continually review the structures, particularly around humanitarian access. The key factor is that we must keep the beneficiary in the centre of our view. The women and girls—we must ask what is best for them. Then we must create our architecture to address that. Too often we start with architectures that serve the needs of member states or local government. Those things are there; I am not saying that we don’t need to consider that. But I think that the architecture could be adjusted to be more focused on the beneficiary and the needs of the beneficiary, especially in the periphery.

Thank you; that is really helpful.

It is not that they do not exist; it’s that currently there isn’t space. There is robust civil society. The civilians have been working on this problem in Sudan for much longer than we have. They have incredible resources. They have very sharp thinking. They understand their politics. They understand the ethnic tensions that exist; they understand who has committed crimes. They also have a memory of who has committed crimes over the last 70 years. So the civilians in Sudan are the answer to Sudan. I would say that all of you have seen that very clearly, and I am so grateful to this Committee and this Government in that regard—for seeing how important civilians are as the solution to the crisis. For organisations like Samaritan’s Purse, we want to maintain communication with all the actors. That includes the civilians. It includes the civilian anti-war blocs. It includes the belligerents. We feel it is necessary to be in communication with all those groups because, as humanitarians, we are not political actors, but if we don’t pay attention to the politics we could make mistakes in delivery of humanitarian assistance into these complicated areas. I am not sure if that answers your question, but I would say those groups are there; importantly, we need to find a way to help empower them.

To empower the civilians? The civilians—again, I am a humanitarian, so I have to put the caveat on that. This is not my main area. The position of finding a way to solve this conflict without military solutions is the driver of this. There is clearly no military solution to the conflict in Sudan. Historically, we can say that with firm accuracy. Therefore, stopping the war is empowering the civilians. So I think, more than the relationship between NGOs and civilians, what the civilians need is for a way to be found—call it a cessation of hostilities, call it a humanitarian ceasefire, call it a peace truce—to stop the war and connect that to a credible political process.

To address the atrocities?

I have also considered this issue, because there is so much trauma. When you speak to the Sudanese, all of them have a story of someone who has been killed, a family member who has been attacked. There is just so much pain within the society. It is hard for us, who come from the outside, to come in and try to work through all of that trauma. I think in the short term—I am sorry, I am not trying to be a one-trick pony here—what we need is to end the conflict, because the Sudanese themselves can address the trauma that they have gone through. They have traditional tribal ways to do it. Sudan is very diverse, religiously. There are a lot of different ways that they can address that trauma. Right now that is happening in snatches in capital cities in the region, and with conferences that happen over Zoom. It needs to happen in the places where those atrocities happened, and it needs to happen in an environment of accountability, where we are not just trying to hold one party accountable, or in our thinking putting all the angels on one side and all the demons on the other. That is not how Sudan works. We have to stop all the violence, and then allow the civil society to address the things that you are talking about.

Talking about stopping the violence, what appetite is there in the US for sustained diplomatic pressure and support and humanitarian support?

The friends that we are talking to at the State Department, and on the Hill in the US Congress, are engaged in Sudan. Our colleagues at Samaritan’s Purse were recently testifying before the House Committee on Sudan, in particular. I am encouraged by the Quad, and the initiative that the US has taken in the Quad. I would love to see the Europeans and the Americans—the Troika—play a more central role in what is happening. But from what we are seeing, while there is a change in the budgetary level of assistance going into Sudan, there still is a commitment and an engagement, and we have been encouraged by seeing what is happening from the US side.

Is Sudan not eclipsed by other conflagrations elsewhere? Where does it sit, geopolitically, in the State Department? I am particularly interested in humanitarian aid. Is there any public sentiment towards Sudan in the US?

The conflict in Sudan is not on the US media. Samaritan’s Purse is 95% funded by private donors here in the UK and around the world, so we see that the level of funding is directly tied to how much the media are paying attention to these issues. In the US, that is very low. When I was there just a few days ago, I took an entire media team with me. We are trying to raise the profile of what is happening in Sudan and draw attention to it, because the crisis is not getting the attention it deserves. It is a concern. My understanding is that here in the UK, there is more awareness at the public level than there is in the US, but even here, it is not a frontline story. People don’t really understand how bad it is, or maybe they don’t know what to do to address the issue, which is why the international community must find a way to say, “We must stop the war.” We cannot just send humanitarian assistance. I am a humanitarian—this is what I do, and I have spent my whole life trying to help people—but that is not going to be the answer; that is not what is going to solve the crisis. Helping people to see, even at the level of our constituencies, that we have to stop this conflict, and then getting the US, the Europeans and you guys together on the same page, so that there is no fragmentation in the international community’s agenda on Sudan is critically important. Interestingly, right now is Lent. It is also Ramadan. It is also national exams in Sudan, which are critically important—they are the future of the children, and the children are the future of the families. The exams happen in April. I believe the UK is now the president of the Security Council, the US will be president next week, and you are the penholder. It seems as though in this season, there is an amazing opportunity to have a push for peace, because there is a confluence of so many things.

Dave, I can’t disagree with anything you are saying. To switch topic slightly, I am assuming that your workers out there are a mix of international and local people.

Yes, ma’am.

I came from a debate this morning about how humanitarian workers and medical workers are increasingly being targeted in conflict. Are you seeing any of that in Sudan, and what support are you able to provide your workers out there?

Thank you for this very important question. There are some historical components, and then there are some very specific, technical components in answer to your question. Historically, Samaritan’s Purse has lost staff. We have over 500 national staff, and we have about 50 international staff, so about 10% of our staff are international and 90% are local staff. The risk to humanitarian workers is very real in the country, both to international staff and to local national staff. The reason for that is that because of where the conflict is and where the displaced are coming from, they cannot move that far away from the frontlines, so in order for us to provide assistance, we have to get close to where the people are. You will know that there were WFP staff killed just before Christmas in 2024. Our staff were the first responders who showed up at that location. Since that time, there has been a change in the types of aerial munitions that are used. Drones are now being used much more frequently in the country. Drones, it is important to say, are an anonymous airstrike—that is what drones mean in Sudan—so even if a drone strikes a convoy, how are we to know which side struck the convoy? How are we to know that the side you wouldn’t think it was didn’t strike it for their own political reasons? This kind of stuff happens in Sudan. Drones increase the sophistication and the level of precision of the attacks. As humanitarians, when you have precision-level drones and almost no accountability in that space, it becomes very concerning. For us, we have to move at certain times of the day—movement at night, movement when we believe it will be the most safe. I also want to note that it is not that there has been a decrease in the number of civilians and humanitarians targeted, because you don’t always know who is being targeted and for what reason; but the precision nature of the drones in the last few months, based on my observation, has decreased the number of civilians and the number of humanitarians that are being targeted. I am not saying it is not happening, but the precision level of the munitions is changing the conflict. It is also decreasing the accountability. We used to know, because of the type of weapons in the country, exactly who had them. Now that is impossible; it is impossible to know who made the drone strike.

Wow. May I just say thank you for what all your workers are doing? It is remarkable work and we are incredibly grateful that they do it. We hope that they have all protections in such a difficult situation. Thank you for being such an open and great witness; we genuinely appreciate it.

We have one virtual witness, and two witnesses in the room. Thank you both for coming; it is appreciated. While we wait for Rosalind to join us virtually, perhaps I can start with you, Kholood. Thank you for coming back to the Committee. I wonder if you could introduce us to the organisation that you founded and run.

My name is Kholood Khair and I run a very small think-tank called Confluence Advisory. I set it up in Khartoum before the war, and we look at three policy areas: peace and security, governance and the economy.

Professor de Waal, I wonder if you could introduce yourself and the organisation that you work with.

My name is Alex de Waal. I head an organisation called the World Peace Foundation, which is based in Boston, Massachusetts. I have been, in various guises, engaged in Sudan for over 40 years now. Thirty years ago I was collecting testimonies, in exactly the same area of the Nuba mountains as the previous witness, of women and girls who had been subject to the most appalling sexual violence; it is so appalling that this cycle continues generation after generation.

Rosalind, are you are able to speak to us, so that we can see if we have you now?

I have been unmuted. I can now join in.

Brilliant. We are very fortunate today that we have Fleur Anderson, who is guesting from the Foreign Affairs Committee. Whatever we do, we try to cross over and share our expertise. Fleur, could you open the questioning, please?

Thank you, Chair, and thank you for having me in the Committee today. Rosalind, I will start with you, and then I will come back to our other guests. Could you outline the current peace initiatives and give us your assessment of whether they are realistically capable of delivering progress? Where are we in the peace process?

Since the war started, there have been a series of not very successful peace initiatives driven by the African Union; IGAD, the sub-regional organisation; the Egyptians; and the US and the Saudis in 2023. But the current main peace initiative is the US-led Quad initiative, which was really launched on 12 September last year, with a statement by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. That called for a three-month humanitarian truce to allow the delivery of emergency aid to all areas, followed by a permanent ceasefire and a political process to establish an independent, civilian-led Government. Importantly, among its key provisions was an agreement that there could be no military solution, that none of the warring parties should control the transition, and that Sudan’s future could not be dictated by the Muslim Brotherhood or related extremist groups. That was, in many ways, an important diplomatic breakthrough because, for the first time, the main regional backers of the two warring sides had agreed on a road map to ending the war that put civilians, not generals, at the centre of the post-conflict transition. That had not proved possible to achieve at the London conference on Sudan last April. Then, in November, President Trump said he was going to get personally engaged, following an appeal by the Saudi Crown Prince during a visit to Washington. That was seen by some people as potentially a positive development that could energise the Quad process, which is being spearheaded by the Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, and particularly by President Trump’s adviser on Africa, Massad Boulos, and President Trump’s personal engagement would obviously give the whole initiative more weight. However, nearly six months on from the launch, there has been little impact on the ground. Clearly, the United States, the Quad and other international partners were unable to prevent the Rapid Support Forces from committing mass atrocities in Al-Fasher, despite warnings that this would lead to a bloodbath. Nevertheless, Boulos has continued to press for an immediate humanitarian truce without preconditions. He has indicated that that might involve the withdrawal of fighters from Al-Fasher and other sensitive areas, supported by a UN mechanism, although it is not clear what the SAF might be expected to do in return. It is fairly obvious that further substantial pressure on both parties will be required from their external backers and other international actors to get them to agree. It is interesting that the tone of American statements now seems to be hardening: when he spoke to the UN Security Council last week, Massad Boulos made it very clear that there are no good actors in this war, that both sides are responsible for prolonging it and committing atrocities, and that Sudan’s future must be shaped by civilians. He also revealed that the US and its partners are working closely with the UN to establish a UN implementation and monitoring mechanism for the truce. Despite Boulos’s optimistic remarks, it is very clear that the truce still faces a lot of roadblocks and challenges, and I will quickly mention four. The first is that both warring parties still seem determined—

Rosalind, rather than going through that now, because we do have other witnesses we want to hear from, could you introduce yourself? The Committee knows who you are and the experience you have that brings you to those conclusions, but could you introduce yourself for the record?

Sure. I am Rosalind Marsden, and I am an associate fellow attached to the Africa programme at Chatham House. On my Sudan experience, I was the British ambassador in Khartoum from 2007 to 2010. That was followed by being appointed as the European Union special envoy on Sudan and South Sudan. More recently, I spent a couple of years in Khartoum as a consultant with the UNITAMS—the UN mission to support the transition.

Lovely. Let me take you back to Fleur, who has got the next question.

We will be coming back to you, Rosalind, to expand more on that. Kholood, what is your assessment of where the peace process is now? Specifically, what is the UK position within the peace process? The UK is currently the penholder of the Sudan file at the UN Security Council. What is your analysis of the UK’s current role, and what more could it be doing to bring about the end of the conflict?

As far as I know, the UK is not playing an active role to bring about an end to the conflict. That is because, while Sudan has a Troika, a Quad and a Quintet, the role of the Troika, which the UK is a member of, is very limited in this day and age. Partially, I think the change in Foreign Secretary did not help with continuity. The UK’s position on the Sudan file now vis-à-vis western actors, but also the primacy of Gulf actors today, means that the UK has struggled to find its niche. As Ros has said, there is a lot of optimism emanating from Washington DC about the prospect of a humanitarian truce. But I would like to remind everyone that the dry and rainy seasons in Sudan very much determine the appetite for a ceasefire. Right now, we are bang smack in the middle of the dry season, with four months left to go, and I do not see, realistically, that either the SAF or the RSF would be in a position to forgo the fighting that could take place and the advantages they could seek in the next four months, in order to commit to a truce that, frankly, has not been very well articulated. The UK has a special role as the penholder, but we have seen great reticence from the UK to enact the role fully since the veto of its resolution in November 2024, when David Lammy was presiding over the UN Security Council during the UK’s presidency. We have not seen much movement by the UK, despite calls from civil society and many Sudanese rights groups to centre the international community’s response on the protection of civilians—something that the UK is also a penholder on at the UN Security Council. There is a lot that the UK can do if it works with experts in the field within UK civil society and the broader civil society working on Sudan, but also if it engages with the diaspora to figure out what the primary priorities of Sudanese civilians are. Right now, the majority of international attention is focused on a ceasefire; in other words, it is focused on the men with the guns. There is not sufficient attention on those who will be keeping the peace—the civilians—and those who will be putting in place the kind of investment that will stop the war restarting. The UK has a really big role to play, particularly with the Foreign Secretary’s focus on women and girls and the role of women in peacemaking and peace agreements, which it is, frankly, not fully investing in.

What would it take for the two forces to come to the table?

The SAF and the RSF? Several things. First, there needs to be serious leverage on the table. They will not just come if asked. We have seen, for example, that if there is serious leverage in relation to consequences around the continuation of the war, that could potentially bring about the conditions for a ceasefire. For example, when I was in Khartoum when the war started, there were only three or so instances when the guns fell silent. Those were when the Egyptian soldiers were being evacuated out of the country, when the Americans were evacuating their embassy, and when the UN was evacuating the international community, especially the humanitarians and development actors. It is my understanding that that was because there were some serious threats made—“If you fire on any part of those convoys, you will see serious consequences.” That is, frankly, the only language that they understood, and I think that that remains the case today. Materially, the war is economically very lucrative for the SAF and the RSF. Gold exports have gone through the roof; most of it goes to the United Arab Emirates. We have also seen many militias that are part of either the SAF or RSF camp enrich themselves and recruit many more troops to eke out an advantage vis-à-vis other militias and armed groups, the number of which has mushroomed since the start of the war. Curbing the extent to which the war economy provides incentive structures for armed actors is a major issue. Of course, weapons supplies are a huge area where we can look at curtailing the ability of armed actors to enact as much violence as they are doing. Unfortunately, we have not seen much by way of the international community’s commitment to, for example, the Darfur arms embargo, which has been in place for more than 20 years, or any political will to expand that arms embargo to the rest of the country. As Rosalind highlighted, it is also about the role that the Quad members have definitely zeroed in on: the role of the Islamists. Two years ago—in March 2024—in the capital of Bahrain, the Manama agreement for a nominal truce was signed by the deputies of both the SAF and RSF. As soon as the deputy of the Sudanese Armed Forces went back to Port Sudan, that was completely disavowed, and it is my understanding that the Islamists, who are very much animating many senior leadership figures in the Sudanese Armed Forces, disavowed that agreement as soon as he touched down in Port Sudan. Unless those actors—not just the armed actors, but the Islamists who are trying to make a comeback after being unseated in the revolution of 2018-19—are taken as part and parcel of this conflict, treated as a belligerent party and incentivised to give up the pursuit of power through this conflict, I do not think we will get very far.

Thank you. Alex, we have a history of failed agreements and negotiations. What is your assessment of the UK’s role now, and of what it could be? Also, what is the role of the US and the board of peace? Will the board play any role alongside the UN, and does the comprehensive peace plan have a role to play?

Let me start with what I think could be the most important role the UK could play: the UK has a depth of experience, expertise and research on Sudan, on humanitarian issues—which I will not go into—and on peacemaking. The UK was very closely involved—I was involved—in the peace efforts that led to the comprehensive peace agreement more than 20 years ago, and the Darfur agreement, which regrettably did not work. I was also involved with the African Union high-level panel, which oversaw the separation of South Sudan and various peace efforts, which was principally funded and supported by the UK, with a lot of UK expertise. Many of those involved in peacemaking internationally are reinventing a wheel that is already very well measured and documented here in London. I really want to emphasise the point that the UK has a lot of expertise that can be drawn upon. Some of the lessons from those things bear on what is happening now. In terms of some of the key lessons that emerge from past experiences, the first step is to ensure that there is international co-ordination—that you do not have spoilers. The key first step when the current war broke out was that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates either had to agree, or agree to step back. We have seen positive things in recent statements, and particularly that of Massad Boulos at the UN Security Council last week, who had quite clearly squared what he was saying with both of them. That is positive and can be built upon. A second element that is absolutely crucial for any peace to be workable is the economic element, and there are two parts to that. One is the public finance, because it is on the public finance—the peace dividend that will be delivered to the people and the funds that will make for a workable and functional state—that the peace will rise or fall. After the popular uprising and revolution, when we had that moment of optimism about democracy, there was a failure to put money in the hands of the civilian Government. The military still controlled over 70% of the budget, and the Gulf actors were putting their money into the military. Actors in Sudan and in the west, including the UK, the US and other OECD countries, were not lifting sanctions or putting money in the hands of the civilian Government; that was what condemned it to death. Unless that issue is addressed, I do not believe that we will have a lasting peace. There must also be some incentivisation, and what Kholood described in terms of the war economy is absolutely correct. Currently, the incentives are for that, and it is remarkably difficult to scale it back, particularly when the belligerents are dealing in gold. There is really no way that gold can be effectively sanctioned; there is no way that one can put sanctions on the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia. There can be a reputational cost, but they are not going to be subject to financial pressure. There is a possibility that they will recognise that their joint interests are served by moving on this peace. The last thing, which relates to what I was saying earlier about expertise, is that you need proper implementation mechanisms and so on. There is a lot of experience of peacekeeping, monitoring and providing political accompaniment. After the comprehensive peace agreement, there was an assessment and evaluation commission that worked closely with the parties. The organisation I worked for under President Thabo Mbeki worked very closely with the parties as they implemented commitments at the time of South Sudan’s independence. I do not see that depth of expertise, commitment and patience with the US-led mechanism. They may be able to put on the drama—the show—that is the handshake that allows for something to be announced, but sustaining that is going to require something that we have not seen from the Trump Administration and that I do not see in the board of peace.

This is a good point to pick up on that question. It is quite disgusting to hear the recurring point about incentives, amid all the chaos and horrors of this war—the fact that people are ultimately getting rich out of the war, or at the end of it. What steps are being taken, or could be taken, to curtail some of the illegal mining activity? Although some of them may be small scale, these sites are surely visible and can be addressed on a site level. Is any work going on in that realm?

I know that there is work on monitoring. Kholood, do you know more about this than I do?

Here is the problem: neither side in the Sudanese conflict wants to meaningfully attack the other side’s ways of making money, because they are under the impression that, at some point, they might be able to make money from those same things. We saw that very clearly, for example, with the oilfields in South Kordofan, which were previously controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces and then the RSF came in and controlled the area. It is interesting that there is now a wealth-sharing agreement, in wartime, between the SAF, the RSF and the Government of South Sudan around how they will, effectively, divvy up the oil revenues. That could be looked at as a potential model for wealth sharing in a future peace agreement, but as we know from Sudan’s many, many previous failed peace agreements, that kind of set-up does not work long term; all it does is incentivise other actors to pick up a gun and get a slice of the action. What we are seeing now is that artisanal mining, which is the main mode of mining in Sudan, is sucking up a lot of people who do not have other livelihoods. Farmers, doctors, nurses—whoever it is—who are unable to continue in their usual livelihoods are being pulled into the artisanal mining sector, which is extremely harmful and dangerous because of the cyanide, mercury and other toxic products used. But that industry is really the only remaining means of livelihood for a lot of people, because there is not enough security for farming, or products such as fuel, seeds and fertilisers, whereas everything—facilities and resources—is being made available for gold. We must not forget the role of external actors. We have seen a lot of people getting rich off this gold, in particular the United Arab Emirates, but also the Russians and other actors, and it is not in their interests to push for any kind of meaningful constraints on that industry.

I have a final couple of questions, one about a likely peacekeeping force and one about the further role that the UK could have. We have talked about expertise and about the potential for more credibility. The Foreign Secretary gave a very strong statement in the House of Commons two weeks ago, saying that she is using all her diplomatic forces, but you are questioning that, Kholood, so I would like to hear a bit more about what more the UK could do. First, though, Alex, who would be the likely peacekeeping forces?

I understand that the United States has been talking to the African Union about this, so there is possibly an option of African peacekeeping forces on the table. More critical than the identity of the troops is how they are mandated, who they report to, what their monitoring mechanisms are, and so on. If there were to be an African Union force, it would be very important that it is constituted in accordance with the appropriate procedures, standards and so on, which the UN, and indeed the African Union at its best, would follow, rather than being—this could be an option—directly contracted on a sort of commercial basis and answering to the Quad or the board of peace. I do not think that would be very attractive.

Rosalind, on what is going to end the war, it is being fuelled by arms, by gold sales—by all these different things. What more could the UK do to end the conflict, and how important is it to have UK diplomats back on the ground in Sudan?

To be frank, I think it would be bit premature at the moment, in terms of political signalling, given that a legitimate Government has not been restored following the October 2021 coup. Of course, Sudan remains suspended from the African Union on the grounds of an unconstitutional change of Government. The current de facto Government, which has now moved from Port Sudan back to Khartoum, is controlled by the army, which is also under some considerable influence from the Islamists. The time to return might rather be when an inclusive, civilian-led political process agrees on establishing an independent, civilian transitional Government. Meanwhile, the UK has a special representative for Sudan, based in Addis Ababa, who of course can continue to play an important role by engaging with both sides in support of the Quad’s efforts to achieve a humanitarian truce. We have seen the Foreign Secretary indicating clearly that she regards Sudan as a high priority. That has been reflected in her recent trip to the Adré transit camp, in her decision to personally chair the UN Security Council, and in the decision to co-host another conference on Sudan in Berlin in April, although obviously it will be crucial that that comes up with some concrete results and includes an element to bring civilians into the discussion. That is the area where, in my view, the UK, and perhaps Norway as well, can play a really important role, in helping civilians in the pro-democracy anti-war camp to coalesce—not in one organisation, but in a broad movement—behind a set of principles and positions to end the war. So far, the civilian voices have been largely sidelined from the mediation process, and as the Foreign Secretary, Massad Boulos and others have emphasised, the future of Sudan must be determined by the Sudanese civilians and not by the generals. The UK is already doing some useful things in this respect, but it is important that it continues to support civil society groups to build the capacity of young people and women to take part in the future political process and to continue to support Sudan’s civilian political leaders who are calling for a democratic, decentralised Sudan based on equal citizenship and for a national professional army. Those are some of the areas where the UK can play a role. Also, of course, it needs to give more support to the emergency response rooms and local mutual aid groups, which are the frontline responders in humanitarian terms.

Rosalind, if I am not mistaken, there is a multibillion-dollar gold trade between the UK and the UAE. Would that not be a good place for the UK to start exploring in terms of potential diplomatic pressure to resolve the conflict in Sudan?

As others have mentioned, trying to take effective action on the gold trade is very difficult. The economic networks and some of the companies trading in conflict gold have already been subject to sanctions by the Americans, the European Union and the UK. Collective sanctioning of individuals and companies involved in the smuggling and laundering of conflict gold could be increased to try to disrupt the trade, but over time, those affected have proved able to adapt. Another option is to intensify dialogue with the United Arab Emirates on international standard setting and encourage the UAE to be more involved in frameworks to close some of the regulatory and enforcement loopholes, including through ensuring better oversight over some of the transactions in Dubai’s gold souk, having a third-party audit of gold refiners in the UAE and perhaps going more to address gaps in the anti-money laundering financing frameworks. These are all areas that could be pursued, but I think it is recognised that addressing the problem of conflict gold is much more difficult than it was in the case of conflict diamonds.

Rosalind, we have heard here in the UK Parliament from different civilian groups. How authoritatively can we assess how representative they are? Surely, it is a challenge for you to ensure that the groups and individuals participating in your civilian engagement are actually representative of the population.

Absolutely. There was a recent visit to London by the civilian coalition Somoud, which is the Arabic word for resilience, led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok.

Yes, we met them.

I believe they met a number of Members of Parliament. They are considered to be possibly the widest coalition of political and civil society actors in what one might call the pro-democracy movement, but they acknowledge that they by no means represent all Sudanese. Within the “no to war” camp, there are a number of other civilian groups, and of course there are a large number of grassroots organisations, including youth networks and women’s networks on the ground as well as professional associations and trade unions. Some of those groups have links with Somoud; others lie outside it. I think that it is widely recognised that it is not necessarily going to be possible to bring everyone together in one organisation. Sudanese civilians, like civilians in any country, have their differences, but at a time of such grave national emergency, the civilian leaders are stressing the importance of forming a broad anti-war front, based on at least minimum principles, to bring the war to an end, so that there can then be space for a wider civilian dialogue in preparation for a political process in which a much wider group can be involved, which is not so easy at the moment, in war conditions. As I think a previous speaker pointed out, there is no real civic space on the ground at the moment, so I think it is important for the UK to continue to provide support to the Somoud group, but also to other civil society groups, as I think it is trying to do, and to encourage them, as I said, to coalesce behind the top priority, which is to end the war.

Thank you.

Kholood, I feel I ought to bring you in at this point. As the only Sudanese on our panel and a younger woman, what are your thoughts? We hear from lots of different groups. Who should we be hearing from?

Ideally everyone, because as Ros said, it is a very broad civilian landscape in Sudan. Sudan has a very rich, very old civil society. It has some of the oldest political parties in both Africa and the middle east region. It would be ridiculous to think that all these civilians could unite behind one simple message, but I think that there is room for, and the UK has previously been very good at, speaking to a variety of civil society members and getting a sense of all the different agendas in civil society. I feel that the UK has lost this, and it has to be said that this coincided with the merger between DFID and the FCO. I am talking in relation to not just the loss of funding, but the loss of capacity and intentionality around focusing on civilians. Right now, as we look at the way Sudan is being dealt with on the international stage, civilians are relegated to being a “nice to have”, “nice to engage with” constituency, rather than the main actor that will see through any kind of peace agreement or peace deal and, more importantly, will keep the peace. The UK is very well positioned, especially with the Foreign Secretary’s focus on women and girls, to eke out a niche that is about engaging some of the groups that are not being engaged, particularly those that are organised on the ground—secretly, of course, to evade detection, detention and so on. Those pockets do exist, and I think the UK should be putting a lot more investment into trying to engage with these groups.

This Committee first became aware of the brewing conflict when we were doing an inquiry into the CSSF: the fund for conflict, security and—I can’t remember what the other S is for.

Stability, I believe.

Thank you. Have you seen or been aware of cuts from the FCDO—previously DFID—to civilian society?

As far as I know, yes, but I couldn’t give you any exact figures on those. I have to say, as someone who follows Sudan quite closely, that my engagement with the FCDO is quite minimal. I have a much better sense of what is going on in the American programming, as minimal as it is today, or in some of the European programming and so on. That is in large part because the FCDO have sort of closed ranks. They do not really engage with the Sudanese diaspora or Sudanese civil society, or civil society writ large anyway, to a meaningful or significant level, such that we do not actually have much transparency as to what they are doing, so we are not able to either engage in and support what they are doing or feed into some of those processes in any meaningful way.

That seems very short-sighted.

Can I just follow up on that? As I understand it, aid, via the FDCO, to Sudan was £131 million in 2024 and £74 million in 2025. Humanitarian aid is increasingly being prioritised and, from the previous evidence that we heard, we understand why, but that is to the detriment of support for peacebuilding processes. I wonder whether you or other witnesses have seen that for yourselves.

Absolutely. In the last IDC hearing on Sudan, just after the fall of Al-Fasher, you had a few panellists who were working with documenters around atrocity prevention and then, afterwards, means of accountability. It is those groups that have actually lost the most funding. I am talking about those who are doing accountability work on the ground, those who are doing any kind of follow-up, any kind of documentation, independent media, youth groups and civil society actors that look at, effectively, keeping the infrastructure of civil society alive during this conflict, which is important not just for today but, of course, for the day after. All those have lost upwards of 80% of their funding, in large part because the UK was such a reliable donor on that front and this is now no longer the case. That, coupled with the USAID shutdown, is having a multi-level effect on those groups. They are trying to maintain what they can do as much as possible, but that has proven quite difficult. On the humanitarian side, some groups are able to access, for example, philanthropy funding in order to carry out work, in particular the mutual aid work, but that is not yet an option that is open to some of these civil society organisations, documenters and so on. What the UK Government have decided to do in support of the emergency response rooms is fund them, not through civil society, which would also help to buoy up civil society capacity, but through private donors. I guess that is welcome if you want to make sure that the money gets there pretty fast, but there has to be a much broader way of inputting that money into emergency response rooms through other means that will also have the multiplier effect of keeping some of that civil society infrastructure going.

Rosalind, Kholood mentioned the UK’s presidency of the UN Security Council and asked whether we are doing enough. How do you feel the UK could best use its presidency to further civilian protection?

As penholder, the UK tried twice in 2024 to get resolutions adopted calling for civilian protection. They succeeded twice—in March, getting a resolution adopted calling for a Ramadan ceasefire, and again in June, calling for the RSF to lift its siege on Al-Fasher and putting pressure on all parties to do more to protect civilians—but as we know, neither of those resolutions had any real impact on the ground because there were no consequences for non-compliance. Then, in November 2024, when the UK and Sierra Leone put forward another resolution, calling on the UN to come up with options for a monitoring mechanism, it was vetoed by the Russians. The paralysis in the Security Council has made it really difficult for the UK to use its role as penholder to get resolutions, although it has had more success with press statements. In the current situation, where we have seen Yvette Cooper commending US efforts with the Quad initiative, it seems likely that the UK would be ready to use its role as a penholder to try to get another resolution adopted in support of the Quad initiative when the timing is right. That is what the UK could do. The fact that Yvette Cooper decided to travel to New York and to chair the meeting on Sudan, as opposed, possibly, to meetings on other issues, sends a very strong signal that the UK has been trying to put the spotlight back on this subject. As was mentioned, with the US presidency following next month, there could still be an opportunity to help to push through a resolution.

I would like to bring in another angle. One of the greatest perils that Sudan faces in the coming months is the possibility of a war in Ethiopia, which, should that happen, would get entangled in the Sudanese war. To give a word of background, sabres are being rattled in Addis Ababa, and it seems likely that preparations are well advanced for a conflict, which could be with Eritrea or could take the form of a new war inside Tigray. There are already some entanglements between Ethiopia and Sudan. There are very well documented reports that the Ethiopians have opened a training camp for RSF forces in western Ethiopia, and there is a division of Ethiopian Tigrayan troops—former UN peacekeepers who did not go home—who are fighting in Sudan alongside SAF. There are various other entanglements, including the disputed border and the unresolved issues over the Nile waters between Ethiopia and Egypt; it is a real entanglement there. It is remarkably difficult to get any high-level diplomatic attention to this, but it ought to be an issue for the Quad, because the same players in the Quad who are backing different sides in Sudan are backing different sides in Ethiopia and Eritrea, which is one of the reasons why, if there were to be a war in Ethiopia, it would become a regional war. I have been discussing what might be an option for raising this at, say, the UN. The one opening that has not been discounted—let me put it that way—is resolution 2417, which is on armed conflict and hunger, a generic thematic resolution passed in 2018, which requires that, when armed conflict threatens widespread food insecurity or famine, the UN Security Council should be alerted. That does not have a good track record of being invoked. Clearly it is applicable in the case of Sudan. It is a bit redundant because Sudan is already before the Security Council. Ethiopia is not. However, there is no doubt that, if there were to be a conflict, Ethiopia’s food security, and especially the food security in Tigray, where there is already widespread starvation, would be tipped over the edge. It would very much be worth rattling that cage within the Quad and the UN Security Council, because things could get a lot worse if that scenario were to develop.

Thank you; that is useful. I am sure that will be noted in the report. I have to say, we have listened to quite harrowing testimony already today and one of the questions that is always on my mind in these circumstances is: are we really saying there is nothing more that the world could have done to prevent this, or are we saying that there is something we can do that we are not willing to do?

The latter.

What do you think that thing we are not willing to do is?

No one is really interested in looking at the external forces in this war. I have to say at the outset that this war is taking place at three levels. It is taking place at the regional level, and we are seeing this increasingly, especially between Gulf actors. It is taking place at the national level between SAF, RSF and their many allies, armed and unarmed. It is also happening at the hyper-local and local levels. To get a resolution to this war, you need to work at all three levels simultaneously. The one that is probably the hardest to crack, but currently has the most publicity, is the regional and international level, which is where we see the Quad, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. If we look at the dynamics within the Quad, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, they are all providing weapons for this conflict to continue. Egypt is currently running drone strikes in parts of Darfur using Turkish drones on behalf of the Sudanese Armed Forces. The United Arab Emirates has been supporting the RSF with weapons since the start of the conflict in 2023. That has been well documented by the United Nations. The Saudis recently bankrolled a $1.5 billion deal for the Sudanese Armed Forces with the Pakistanis to get weaponry. We must have the kinds of conversations that will actually get us somewhere, rather than pretend that these are countries that necessarily want a swift end to the war, and want to see exactly the kind of thing that would end all wars in Sudan, which is a civilian democratic dispensation, which they do not. Unless we start thinking about other actors that are also allies of the west, such as Turkey and Israel, which are also invested in this war and its outcomes, and to some degree in its continuation, we are not having the right conversation. We are consistently talking about how terrible things are. No one really cares—not the SAF, not the RSF, and certainly not those who are bankrolling the war from the outside. We are constantly talking about how difficult it is to move things forward in a polarised UN Security Council. From conversations with UN Security Council members, there is some level of despair, but not enough to move things along. No one wants to talk about what it would actually take: sanctions, weapons controls, or banning, for example, weapons sales from the United Kingdom or the United States to some of these Arab countries—in particular, the United Arab Emirates. That is not going to happen. We are not going to see sanctions on these countries, and we are not going to see weapons being stopped from going to them. I am more than happy to come and have conversations at Committees like this, but what is it for? By the time this Committee session ends and I leave this room, nothing will have fundamentally changed. That goes double for everyone else, particularly those who are in Sudan and consistently have to come out of the country to tell the same story that ends up getting nowhere.

We have heard from Rosalind about the challenge of getting a UN Security Council resolution on this. Are you suggesting that the UK goes it alone in tackling these difficult relationships with the Quad? Then I want to bring Rosalind back in, to get her take on that.

We need to see some backbone somewhere. The UK would do well to lead, but I think others will have to follow. The problem is that we have a very mercantile foreign policy emanating from the United States, which will be very difficult to counter, and we have very rapacious Arab states in the region, particularly the Gulf states, which see the horn of Africa as their strategic depth—as their playground. We have seen that not just in Sudan, but as Alex said, between Ethiopia and Eritrea, between the different federal member states of Somalia, in Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, and in Yemen at the start of the year. All of that points to a sizeable and significant shift that is not being very well countenanced in this part of the world.

I want to reinforce the point that the war in Sudan has become increasingly intertwined with the wider geopolitics of the region. There are increasing signs of a consolidation of competing regional axes aligned with Sudan’s conflict parties. Broadly speaking, Saudi Araba is aligned with Egypt, Turkey, Eritrea and Somalia, and on the other side, the Emirates is linked—with some under-the-radar support from Israel, because they have signed the Abraham accords—with, because of its investment in the wider region, Chad, eastern Libya, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and so forth. We are therefore seeing what is happening in Sudan influenced by wider developments in the middle east and the horn of Africa. Alex has mentioned the mounting tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, but what is also very noticeable is a more assertive Saudi effort to curtail UAE influence, after the rupture of their relations caused by recent events in Yemen. Also, Israeli recognition of Somaliland has drawn Somalia closer into the orbit of the Saudi-led alliance. These alliances seem to be consolidating, and are having an impact on the Sudan war. Although the Quad Arab partners have all said that external military support must stop, there is no sign of that happening. The Arab countries in the Quad have the greatest potential leverage to press the conflict parties to stop fighting, but at the same time, they are also the ones responsible for propping up those parties so that they can continue fighting. President Trump is probably the only western actor with sufficient clout to put real pressure on these regional actors if he really wanted to do so, given that they are all close US allies, but at the same time, he will not want to sacrifice his relations with any of them. This is an area where the UK and other international partners could add to pressure. The point is that these regional interests cannot be wished away, but at the same time, it is increasingly clear that the long-term strategic interests of Egypt, the Emirates and Saudi Arabia in Sudan and the broader horn and Red sea region will not benefit from Sudan’s fragmentation. This long-term vision of what will really serve their interests, which is stability in Sudan, should not be obscured by a short-term scramble for profit or influence. These are arguments that the US, the UK and other partners need to continue to press with these countries.

I warn everyone that we are running out of time. I ask Committee members to be aware of that and I ask witnesses to give short, punchy answers. I also put it on record that the Committee invited the ambassador for the UAE to come to this session. They were unable to make it, but they have given us a written response, which we will be publishing this week, and have offered to answer additional questions. That is something that Committee members might want to think about.

I have a short question for Rosalind and Alex about the African Union, which has not been referenced yet. In the Foreign Secretary’s statement, she made a great deal about seeking to engage with the African Union. How realistic is that and what is its likely contribution? One of the things that has been suggested previously is that if it was involved more, it would be more difficult, for example, for Russia to veto Security Council resolutions. How credible is that? How credible is the African Union’s involvement, is there anything that it would add, or is it just that its members are conflicted as well?

There are obviously some conflicts within the African Union. As we have seen recently, there has been pressure from, for example, Egypt to try to lift Sudan’s suspension from the African Union, which was met with resistance from a number of other members, and in the end it was not agreed. At the same time, the African Union, while saying that there is no military solution to the conflict, commended the peace plan put forward by the army’s civilian Prime Minister, Kamil Idris, which essentially said that they would not agree to a humanitarian truce or ceasefire unless the RSF surrendered, so there was somewhat of a contradiction there. The African Union could play a role in two areas. There does not seem to be much appetite for another UN peacekeeping force; UN peacekeeping missions in Africa tend to be closing, or reducing in size, rather than new ones being created. Probably the most likely source of troops for a future peacekeeping and monitoring mission would come from the Africans. This is an area, as Alex mentioned, where there needs to be engagement. The other area is around an inclusive political process. The African Union has made several attempts, so far ineffectively, to convene different groups of Sudanese civilians. This is an area where the UK, Norway and the European Union can perhaps play a more active role in helping to prepare the ground to make that process more credible.

I do not have anything to add.

I have not really looked at that in detail, so I cannot comment. Maybe Kholood can?

A very short answer: yes.

First, there needs to be a proper investigation, and it needs to be very transparent. We have not seen what these findings are—

What I mean by transparent is that it needs to be publicly transparent. People need to know what the data said, with as much as possible being divulged to the public. But it is not just the UK: Sweden, Germany, Canada and Australia have all had weapons parts that they sold to the United Arab Emirates turn up in Sudan. Those are all, for want of a better word, allies; they need to sit down and really look at some of their procurement procedures, and at their end user agreements, and start to make sure that the message lands in Abu Dhabi that there will be zero tolerance for western weapons—in this case UK-made weapons—ending up not just in RSF hands but also, in the future, in the hands of some very inauspicious characters. My sense is that the Emiratis are not very concerned, because there does not seem to be much pressure emanating from Whitehall or from anywhere else. Rather than a decrease after the peak in international attention following Al-Fasher, we have actually seen an increase in weapons going to the RSF after Al-Fasher. That, to me, shows that we are witnessing global impunity at a massive scale. That definitely needs to be engaged with.

I think that the evidence speaks for itself.

I am not really in a position to question that. So far, I think, the material mentioned in the Guardian article turned out not to be of a lethal nature. Obviously, we have seen the Foreign Secretary’s very strong statement at the Munich security conference that the 2,000 licences were reviewed and that it has been found that there is no foundation for the claim. I cannot really add anything more to that.

Can I come back to the difficult questions that the UK should be asking of allies? I take Rosalind’s point that this expands beyond the UAE to all the proxies or to all the regional actors. I understand that we should push the conversation towards the long-term security of the region, and that that would be better for all those actors than this short-term gain, but there does not seem to be much jeopardy in that for them. It seems to me—as you pointed out, Rosalind—that the only actor that can really make a difference is the US. I am interested in pursuing how the US sees this conflict and how it can intervene in it. What is the role of the board of peace in this? Is it likely to get involved?

Let me have a stab at answering that. During the first Trump Administration, the US essentially delegated its policy for the entire horn of Africa region to its key allies in the region: Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Biden Administration made only minor efforts to reverse that. The Trump Administration sees the region through the lens of its key allies—their security, geopolitical and commercial interests—and I do not think the US has really risen above that, although it is modulated by humanitarian concern. If the board of peace were to play a role by having an event at which the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia and the President of the UAE were to make a common statement, come together and take a common position that they want peace in Sudan, and then handed it off to the established mechanisms under the UN, ruled by international law and so on, with all that that entails, then I think the board of peace would play a positive role. If this process were entrusted to the board of peace, I would be extremely worried by what that would entail.

The difference with the case of Gaza is that the Saudis and Emiratis fundamentally want the same thing in Gaza; they do not have the same endgame in Sudan. In Gaza they want to see a Gaza free of Hamas, even if they do not have the same position vis-à-vis Israel. In Sudan they back entirely different, opposite sides. Unless you can come to some kind of configuration where both the SAF and the RSF retreat from the political landscape or come to some kind of agreement, you are not going to get the Arabs to support them to agree. Right now we are not seeing enough diplomatic heavy lifting to get the Arabs to come to a similar page not just on Sudan, but on the entire region, and we are not seeing enough engagement with the SAF or the RSF to also get them to come to the same page.

One thing that is completely missing is a vision of what this region should look like. What should the Red sea region—the Red sea arena—look like? Are we taking it for granted, as a fact of life, that it is going to be subject to these types of rivalries? Or is the international community—the UK and the United Nations—going to say, “This is not the way international business should be transacted”? If we continue to transact it in these ways, we should remember that this region has had most of the famines in recent years—in fact, every declared famine in the last 15 years has been in this region. It is generating huge numbers of refugees. The conflicts are not being resolved and they are metastasising. Are we just going to take it as a fact of life that middle power interests and great power interests have condemned this whole region, on both sides of the Red sea, to this future of unending turmoil? Or are we going to say, “Let’s raise our ambitions from dealing with the diplomatic push and pull. This is a very important part of the world. Tens of millions of people live there. They are entitled to a better life”? It matters for everybody, because we all are invested in maritime trade, apart from anything else. Let’s have a vision for this.

Let me stop you there. Sam has more questions on this.

I have just one more, which looks more towards civilian protection, but do you want to go to justice and accountability, Chair, given where we are?

We literally have four minutes.

In that case, this is for you, Alex. What does justice and accountability look like for the people of Sudan?

The ICC has a mandate and should be supported. Justice goes well beyond bringing a handful—sadly, it would only be a handful—of perpetrators to court. It would extend to reparations, rehabilitation and dealing with the aftermath of the trauma, particularly the trauma suffered by women and girls who have suffered sexual and gender-based violence. This is all part of our justice agenda.

Is the ICC capable of delivering that justice?

The ICC can put it on the table, but it is not going to deliver very much.

Let me give the last word to Kholood.

We are where we are because of a culture of impunity. This war has been very easy to not just start, but to continue, precisely because there has been no significant accountability for anyone who has been part of Sudan’s wars for the past 70 years. Justice and accountability need to be integral to how the war is resolved and not just a “nice to have” that is talked about during the political or peace process and then relegated further down the line, as we have seen before. What we need to see, integrally, is not just ICC, international justice, but all the other levels of justice, including truth and reconciliation commissions, local courts, national hybrid courts and customary courts. There is a whole menu of items here. We should not just look at the ICC, which has unfortunately been massively under-empowered, let us say, by several states.

Do you see the international community recognising the need to support the courts and justice at all the levels you have described?

The United States used to be the biggest supporter of the ICC in Sudan, and of course that is now a completely different story. We have seen the UK give support, for example, to the fact-finding mission out of the Human Rights Council in Geneva, but we have not seen much intentionality from the UK in regard to pursuing justice as a sine qua non of the peace in Sudan, not just as a “nice to have” piece of the general peace.

Rosalind, I am going to have to end it there. If you want to write to us, that would be most appreciated. Thank you all for coming and sharing your thoughts, experience and knowledge. We do appreciate it. This is not a topic that we are stepping away from. You have enabled us to put more pressure on the Government to try and do what is within its power, whatever that might be.

Thank you all for all you are doing to keep Sudan at the heart of what the Government is trying to do.