Welcome to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee and our session on Operation Kenova. I welcome Sir Iain Livingstone and Chief Constable Jon Boutcher. Sir Iain, to what extent are you satisfied with the outcome, achievements and effectiveness of Operation Kenova and its group of cases?

Thank you, Chair, and thanks for the invitation to come here this morning. That is a very complex question, to be candid. Overall, I am satisfied with Kenova’s work, the quality of its work, and the answers and achievements it has given for victims and families, but against that, I am also frustrated. In some ways, I think it could have achieved a lot more, such as the criminal investigation into agent Stakeknife. We fought hard to give that summary of cases in the final report, to make it clear to the public the extent of the inquiries and the work that had been done, so there is an inevitable frustration that those cases were never brought to court and never tested in the public domain—for a variety of reasons. I am not taking issue with those, but there was a level of frustration in terms of the Stakeknife work. But the approach that has been taken, and the achievement that has been done in some of the other instances—not least Operation Turma, on the murder of the three police officers at Kinnego Embankment in 1982—is really significant. We have brought answers to the victims and families, who had not been heard or treated with care and courtesy. They had suffered dreadful and brutal terrorist attacks, and then—as I think I said in the final report—were aggravated at times by a poor state response to some of that trauma. The quality of the work and the progress that has made is really significant. This has been a game-changer in terms of the approach to the troubles and troubles investigations. I hope that it will inform the work of the legacy commission and other matters going forward, but against that, inevitably, there are a number of frustrations that perhaps more could have been achieved—but that’s life.

On the family responses to the outcomes and findings of the final report and investigation, how do they feel?

Overall, the feedback has been very supportive and positive. They were aware of the specific prosecution decisions. For example, in those cases where we had submitted case files, those families were given a bespoke report, which was handed to them—written and documented, explaining the inquiries that were made. With other families who did not necessarily receive a bespoke family report, because of the circumstances of their own case, we have maintained very close relationships, and that continues. That is not something that is going to come to a hard stop. In general terms—I am talking in the generality here, because we dealt with literally hundreds of families—the families remain very supportive. I suppose a little like us in the Kenova team, and as I said in my reply to you earlier, they might be frustrated with some elements of it, but I think they have been reassured of the utter commitment to try to get the truth and try to get answers.

Thank you. Chief Constable?

First, thank you for inviting us, to echo Iain’s comments about being here and having the opportunity to speak to you. You asked about outcomes, achievements and effectiveness. On the outcomes, the findings of the Kenova interim report and the final report from Sir Iain just before Christmas are an accumulation of work that probably at the beginning of this came from a referral from the Director of Public Prosecutions in 2016, as a result of a number of concerns expressed by previous Directors of Public Prosecutions and the public prosecutor at the time. We now have the clarity that has been provided to families about what happened in the Stakeknife investigations; the additional commission of cases with the investigations into Operation Turma, on the three police officers who were murdered in 1982; the Jean Smyth-Campbell case; and the series of cases known as the Glenanne series—Operation Denton. I think the success of how we approached that speaks for itself. The information that those families have been given in family reports by Sir Iain and the team—information that they never had any expectation they would receive—is quite remarkable. The British Government, the Irish Government and victims’ groups have heralded Kenova’s approach, the absolute drive for access to information and the inclusion of victims by listening to them, acknowledging them and trying to give them the information for which they have been asking for many years. As far as an achievement is concerned, we probably did not expect to reach as far as we have. Finally, the effectiveness—I can link that to efficiency—the cost, the number of officers we had and the approach prove that we achieved far more than we probably ever expected when we were first asked to do this. That is in contrast to other inquiries, of which there is never a criticism from me because legacy is so difficult for a number of reasons, which both reports set out. I think most of the stakeholders in legacy would agree with that. Overall, I would have taken where we are now with glee at the beginning, so I think it has been a success. A lot of people are talking about is how it has changed the weather for legacy. It has changed the approach and brought the Government into sharp focus around custom and practice during the troubles. Without in any way being overcritical, we just need to understand why things happened in the way they did. We have shone a torch on that in a way that had not happened before. The last thing I need to say is that when we started Kenova, we went to see all those who had done legacy inquiries before: Lord Stevens, the Judge Cory team—including Judge Pomerance, who was his senior counsel—Judge Smithwick and Sir Desmond de Silva. They really informed and shaped how we did this, because it was through their experiences that we created the model of Kenova. It is an evolution, and the legacy process that we are probably going to talk about today is an evolution from beyond Kenova, I would hope. We have got to make sure that we do not get into the dangerous territory of playing snakes and ladders, whereby we land on the wrong square and slip back down again. We have got to make sure that we land the progress and move forward.

What effect has the UK Government’s refusal to authorise the confirmation of Stakeknife’s identity had on the Kenova objective? You talked about that, Iain, but what about the objective to establish the truth and provide a comprehensive account of Stakeknife’s activity and relationship to the security services in particular?

That is a deep frustration that we have expressed numerous times. Again, as we outline in the final report and as Jon and I articulated when we launched the report, we are not here to undermine the principle of neither confirm nor deny. We recognise its value; we have lived it, breathed it, utilised it, supported it and upheld it for quite literally decades in different elements of policing and law enforcement. But when a principle becomes a rigid dogma that flies in the face of reality and is wholly contrary to what is, in our judgment, the public interest, it undermines that principle and what lies behind it. Where an individual has clearly gone beyond any sense of humanity—far less temporary conditions or the conduct and language that is used—it is about the lack of humanity and the grotesque nature of that criminality. For that individual to continue to take protection undermines the principle itself. When you have a source, you have to say to them, “There are limits on how you can conduct yourself.” There are conditions, and if there is any sense that there is no limit and you will always be protected and have that cover, it is because that is what happened with Stakeknife. My own view, which is one that we have tried to articulate and are always happy to discuss and share with Ministers, officials and others, is that naming Stakeknife would support the principle of NCND, because it would show that it is not an absolute bar. There are a tiny number of extreme and atypical conditions and circumstances where it is in the public interest and there is a greater good to name that individual. If that does not apply in the case of agent Stakeknife, I do not think it will ever apply. There are dangers in that, because sources need to know that there are limits on how you can conduct yourself. Grotesque murdering, terrorist torture and criminality certainly go past those limits.

We are looking at the legacy of an asset who behaved in the way you described, but if there was a similar police informant or asset in any operational theatre who was behaving in the same way—far beyond the remit given to them—and committing acts of criminality, are you confident that lessons have been learned sufficiently so that, without all the baggage of the legacy, MI5 and the state would recognise that such an asset should be named in future or current situations? Or do think that the protection of assets has not yet come to the balance that you talked about in terms of public confidence versus protecting sources?

My view is that they would stop that source acting and would no longer continue to manage, to utilise, to deploy or to task that source. We have always recognised that there was an extremely complex operating environment in the 1980s and 1990s. In terms of source management in policing and other areas, it was prior to the Human Rights Act, which came into force in 2000, and to RIPA, the investigatory powers framework that then came from that. The management and the oversight now would be of such significance that it would never get to that extent. That would certainly be my wish, but it would also be my expectation. Having spoken at length to colleagues in MI5, including the director general, I do not think they would disagree. They recognise that as we sit here today, the conduct of that agent was outrageous. My view is that that would not happen today. That is not to say that there would not be continued issues with agents who have perhaps been deployed over a number of years, because some of those lessons have not necessarily been seen or been learned.

I want to ask about the sterility of what you have said. It is hard to consider these issues in a sterile environment. You have outlined not a guarantee—because you cannot give one—but an expectation that, with the legal framework, the same would not happen again. But is it not true that Stakeknife’s value was found in the role that he had within the IRA? His value as an agent was the fact that he was head of the internal nutting squad, which was there to root out informers. Is it not the case that if he was recruited and had to immediately stop the very thing that made him valuable as an asset, then his value would diminish considerably? That is the complication in all of this: for him to be of value, he would continue doing those crimes, which you are right to say are so heinous.

That conundrum, as you have outlined it, applies to every single source. Sources are only of value if they actually have information and, by definition, most sources are not living an entirely virtuous or crime-free life. People who live such virtuous lives know very little about organised crime or terrorist organisations. That is the information and intelligence that we rightly need as agents of the state seeking to uphold the rule of law. That challenge around source recruitment and management is something that continues to be faced every single day. You have captured the challenge correctly. The issue that we and I would assess with Stakeknife is that it went beyond the limits and parameters that you would naturally set. In my view, this is beyond any statutory framework that now exists; this is just in terms of humanity and looking at his conduct—his behaviours and participation. That is matter of saying, “Stop.” The state can’t sit back and allow people to be tortured, abducted or murdered. It just can’t, and I don’t think it would happen now. The challenge that you present is that, by definition, a really well-placed source has to be close to some of that criminality, and that is a challenge that is faced right across the whole of the United Kingdom and Ireland, in different fields, as we are sitting here today.

But as soon as a murderer whose job is to root out informants and murder his colleagues stops murdering, his colleagues are going to ask questions and his value is going to be greatly diminished. I don’t need to explore it too much further, but I just think it can be quite sterile and academic when you take these issues into a Committee Room or a court, as you have done. It is about what you think the principle should be. The real world—the world in which you guys have operated previously, lawfully, I should add, and the world in which you are trying to police—is not sterile at all.

Can I make a few comments on that? I am not disagreeing with anything that Iain said, but there is a legal and moral point about individuals who, on behalf of or with the knowledge of the state, commit serious offences, including serious harm and murder. That would not be allowed to happen today. Going back to the previous question, mechanisms are in place. Governance, oversight, legal frameworks—the checks and balances are there. That does not mean that you can allow for what human beings will do but, as Iain described, anybody showing those behaviours, particularly with regard to the legal frameworks that the police apply, would be identified and dealt with pretty quickly and would be taken off the books. On the issue of what happened during the troubles, the context has to be understood. To answer your question a little, Gavin, in my view, even during that time, what was allowed to happen was wrong. Everybody forgets that other agents from other agencies were being murdered and tortured to protect an agent. That was happening. I think we will never be able to properly appreciate, understand and show our gratitude to the agents who gave information to keep society safe and to the security forces who managed them in that environment, because it was wickedly difficult. But there is a legal and moral framework that we know you do not pass in protecting society. Because of the lack of training, guidance and oversight, those checks and balances did not exist then. In fairness to the security forces, we know, because we took testimony, that people from the security forces were asking for help and for a legal framework, and they didn’t get it. That is set out in the reports. What you have to understand—this relates to the question about the identity of agent Stakeknife—is that you, I and the general public have an assumption that when we apply NCND, we have operated within the rule of law and have conducted ourselves properly. That hasn’t happened here, so that assumption can be put to one side. Arguments have been made to me that the reason we cannot identify agent Stakeknife is that it would lead to an undermining of confidence in our security forces. The approach that has been undertaken all this time has undermined confidence in the security forces. Every family I see says, “Was there collusion involved in this, Jon?” I ask them what they mean by collusion. In everything the security forces did—I think they operated in a way that we will never be able to properly thankful for—overwhelmingly they did a great job, but where we got it wrong, we cannot cover it up; we have to say that we got it wrong. That is not about blaming individuals; this is an institutional issue. One of the previous questions was: have we learned the lessons? I believe we have through legislation, guidance, frameworks and training, but publicly in Northern Ireland there is a significant concern that we haven’t because everything is still behind this curtain of secrecy. The Government talk about being determined to give more information to victims of the troubles. In all the previous inquiries, from those people I spoke to, and if you look at page 144, I think it is, of the interim Kenova report, at what Renée Pomerance says about the security forces, they viewed themselves above the law. John Stevens said, “They covered things up. They didn’t give me intelligence. They didn’t give me information. They wilfully obstructed me.” This constituency read all of that, and then, when we are not making decisions to name this agent, it is seen as a continuance of that position. With the new legislation—we will probably get into it—some of the things that have been put into that legislation around information provision probably reinforce those concerns. We have got to look at this in the round. The public interest point, which Iain made at the beginning of answering the question about Stakeknife, has shifted. These reports have shifted it. In my judgment, it is now in the public interest to name Stakeknife, and I hope that the Secretary of State will listen to those arguments. The last thing I will say about that is that we must not forget those agents who were murdered, because no one is talking about them and their families who suffered, and still suffer, because of the label of having a family member who was accused of being a tout, and a number of them were not. And by the way, the IRA didn’t care. The IRA did all this because it was deterrence. We both, and the Kenova team, had to reframe our understanding of what awful things one human being will do to another. This was about subjugating and controlling that community because of the success of the security forces with agent penetration. What they did was beyond vile—that is the leadership of the IRA and the Internal Security Unit. That should never be forgotten.

Jon, you mentioned about the Secretary of State. Is there anything more that you can do in your capacity as Chief Constable to encourage the Government to name Stakeknife?

I have obviously had conversations with the previous Secretary of State, who I had a great relationship with, and with this Secretary of State. They have such difficult jobs. This is really hard territory. This culture of not revealing information is wired in because of the, I think misplaced, position that it will undermine public confidence. As I have said, I think that is the wrong approach. I had an exchange with the Secretary of State, who I have huge respect for, between Christmas and new year. We are going to have a meeting very early on—my office has emailed his office to have that meeting—about a number of issues. I wrote to him just before Christmas to say that we need to talk about the naming of the agent Stakeknife. That position, of presenting the case to do that, is continued both by Iain and myself. I think Iain used the term in the release of the Kenova report, when we spoke to people: we are not constitutional values; we will apply the rules; we will apply the laws; we will act properly. In this instance, with Stakeknife, people did not act properly. So please, let us now put that right and act properly. That is the argument we are making to the Secretary of State.

Sir Iain, the name of Stakeknife is widely known; it has been mentioned in the Chamber and in this room. The name of Freddie Scappaticci has been mentioned. As I have asked Chief Constable Boutcher, now that Kenova has concluded, do you regard it as also your responsibility to continue pressing the Government to name Stakeknife, because it seems like a farce?

Yes, I do consider it my responsibility. I have a duty on behalf of the work that Kenova carried out and the families who have a strong expectation that Stakeknife would be identified. As we said with that phrase, we are not vandals, we are not here to bring down the structures and the institutions, because we are part of them—we are intrinsically a part of that system. But in some ways, that is why we are so determined, and so committed, for that system to work in an ethical manner that commands public support. The legitimacy of any state agency, whether it is intelligence or law enforcement, can only come from the support of the public, ultimately. Certainly, in Northern Ireland, my observations are that this continues to be a major obstacle to that level of support and legitimacy. I have not spoken to the Secretary of State over the Christmas and new year period, but I have been in touch with his officials. He gave an undertaking, in correspondence with me towards the end of last year, that he would give a determination on our request to name the agent Stakeknife on the conclusion of the Thompson case, which has now concluded. My expectation is that I will have correspondence from the Secretary of State in due course where he will directly address that question. But I offered a number of times, to his officials and in correspondence with him, to come and meet and speak, because I entirely understand that there are numerous organisations, agencies and operating environments that will have interest in this issue. This is not purely a matter that sits within legacy issues in Northern Ireland. Therefore, I wish for him, for the NIO in general, and for others who are considering the matter, to have that sense of knowledge and impetus by naming him. Ultimately, however, it will be a matter for Ministers. I have taken a view that we received information, which is outlined in the final report, on clear conditions that we have to recognise and uphold. It is a matter for Ministers to take that decision, but I think Ministers should take it in the wider public interest and name him. Although the final report has been published, we are not going away in the short term, and we will continue to advocate for the recommendations.

To return to something that Gavin mentioned, given the role of Stakeknife and the awful and terrible contradictions inherent in maintaining his cover, was not the real mistake recruiting him in the first place?

Again, that is a subjective view. My own view is that I do not think there was a mistake in recruiting him. Going back to some of Gavin’s observations, he was an individual who was well placed and close—and he grew within the command structure of the IRA as he became an agent. But his initial recruitment, based on what we know and found out, I think was legitimate. It is thereafter, as he rose through the command structure of PIRA, that there was not enough oversight or checks and balances. Nobody stepped back and said, “Hang on, this guy has now gone beyond any level of decency or proportionality.” But I would struggle to say that his initial recruitment was wrong. I can understand why he was recruited. We come back to how difficult that environment was, and how intelligence was the lifeblood. His initial recruitment was probably legitimate and understandable; I think it is about what happened thereafter. But Jon may have a view as well.

No, I think I accept that. Because of the times, the security forces were desperate to get information to try to protect society. The longer someone is, as we now call them, a covert human intelligence source, the more likely it is that they are going to progress within an organisation, and that is what happened. But in fairness to those members of the security forces who were managing Stakeknife, they did not have the guidance and the oversight that they needed and were asking for, as I alluded to. I have used the terminology in the interim report that they were operating “off the books”, because they were just trying to keep society safe. There are a couple of wider things on the naming of Stakeknife that I want to mention because of the previous question. In Iain’s report there is a section—I think it is section 9—where he sets out when Stakeknife was first referenced, which was in 1999 by Liam Clarke, a journalist. It was Ian Hurst, an ex-member of the FRU—the Force Research Unit—then using a pseudonym, who introduced the idea that there was this agent Stakeknife. We then move forward, and on various occasions Stakeknife has been associated with Freddie Scappaticci, including by members of this Committee. You will recall that Sir John Wilsey, a previous general in command in Northern Ireland, was duped by Hurst. In a recording, he says that Freddie Scappaticci is Stakeknife. We know from our inquiry, according to Iain’s report, that Freddie Scappaticci told his wife that he was Stakeknife. He told a female associate that he was Stakeknife. With all of that, and the issue that we have already discussed about his conduct—morally and legally—and what he did, the argument is compelling. But there is a final reason, which I want to explain, why it is important. The PSNI is going to be recruiting this week. I am desperate for this society to move forward—all communities, not just the two traditional communities. If you look at any of the news outlets in Northern Ireland, a week does not pass by where there is no mention of a legacy case. But because of our approach to this case and others—I was head of covert and undercover policing, and I have never breached NCND; that is why we are answering these questions as we are, and I am not breaching NCND now—the nationalist community see this as a continuation of what has always happened: protection of wrongdoing by the state. I can categorically say that I have explained to the families I have spoken to how much the state did to protect their loved ones. But in this instance, we got it wrong. To help society move forward, to help me get Catholic officers into the PSNI, we need to start making some difficult choices. Each Secretary of State who I have dealt with, and I have dealt with a number now, gets the same advice—it does not matter which Government it is—and they take that advice. I am just asking: please listen to other people who have considerable experience and understanding, and more accountability in policing than in the intelligence agencies. We are in the frontline there day and daily, overtly. To get the support that we need, these decisions have another importance to them as well. By the way, I also want young members of the loyalist Unionist community to join the PSNI, because we have got problems there. But we have to deal with some of these issues, rather than sit and let things just pass by.

Quickly please, Alicia.

Really quickly, is there any risk that naming him would put any active agents or family at risk of repercussions in any way?

Because of the background of this particular case, I am firmly of the view: no. What we would always do in these cases—and there are other cases that are worth mentioning: Declan Casey was revealed as an agent; Brian Nelson is the most important one that people know because he was an agent for the Force Research Unit, in a similar way to the agent Stakeknife. Interestingly in that case—and I have read all the papers on these cases—David Cameron came out and praised Paddy Mayhew, because he was under considerable pressure from other Government Departments and Government lawyers—the same pressures that we are seeing now—not to prosecute Brian Nelson. He said, as a lawyer—that legal and moral point—that it was in the public interest to prosecute that individual; and the sky did not fall in, we did not start losing agents, agents did not walk away and we did not find that we could not recruit agents. Very recently, in a case that I was involved with, the Sean Brown inquest, we provided a gist. That gist did not mean that we lost any agents. The Secretary of State, the Government and Government lawyers also have to consider outside elements and international challenges—“Will that have an effect?” I find it hard to believe, though, that internationally, whether it is China, Russia or Iran, people are looking at us naming the agent Stakeknife, and because of this history they are not going to work for the security forces. But I am happy to listen to arguments to the contrary.

You have both said that you have had contact with the Secretary of State. Was that in the light of the Thompson Supreme Court judgment and in relation to the policy of “neither confirm nor deny”?

No, we have not had a chance to do that yet. I wrote to the Secretary of State; we had an exchange of letters relating to the Thompson case. We released a new PII policy in December, and the judgment sets out that I am entitled to do that. I want to sit down—and I am not criticising them, because trying to change hearts, minds and attitudes is a difficult space, but we need to sit down. I would do nothing to damage national security. If I have a difference of opinion with the Secretary of State on his advice from lawyers about an issue that would be related to NCND, he, quite rightly, should go to a court and explain his concerns. The court, as the Thompson case said, should take note of what the Secretary of State said over—in precedence, in a way—what I might say. I don’t disagree with that, I really don’t. But we need to get this policy in place, which by the way we have published so that, again, people from all our communities can see how we are dealing with sensitive information—that openness that we have not previously had in Northern Ireland, which we have elsewhere. But we will be having those conversations, and it is probably only right that we have those conversations before we report back to the Committee.

Sir Iain, are you expecting to have further engagement on this issue?

Yes, absolutely. The Secretary of State intimated that he was almost reserving his position until the Supreme Court had issued its decision in Thompson. That has now been published, so I would expect either to have contacts or communication with the Secretary of State and his office. I have always reiterated—and both of us this morning are stressing—that we are more than happy to come and speak, brief officials and Ministers, talk to them, give them a perspective to add to their awareness and knowledge, recognising the pressures they are under. There is a perspective that comes from Kenova that is not always provided from other places.

Do you think the Supreme Court judgment on Thompson will influence the Government’s position on naming Stakeknife?

Obviously, I am close to it, but the Thompson case is not about naming agents. I know the Secretary of State made statements about waiting for the Thompson case. It was about gisting that was done by a coroner. I initially did not support that coroner because of the nature of the gist, but then I did. That was challenged by the Secretary of State, who often says, “Let the courts decide.” I understand why and I would support that. Obviously under advice, the Secretary of State challenged that decision by the court—that inquest—and coroner. That judicial review went in favour of the coroner. We then went to the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland, and that decision went in favour of the coroner. The Secretary of State sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. I support the Supreme Court decision. The Supreme Court disagreed with the courts in Northern Ireland on some aspects. But that was about gisting; it is not about the naming of an agent. In my humble view, it is very different. It is about the ability of the security forces to provide a gist, but it should have a primacy of decision maker with the Secretary of State. It was not about naming agents.

How did you feel after the Thompson case?

There will be more cases. I have been involved in a number of cases already in law enforcement where we changed the weather, did things differently and the courts have supported us. There are other cases coming before the courts. I think it provides clarity. It shows that the Secretary of State should have this overriding decision-making process towards the court. The courts can still decide to disagree. We are subject to the rule of law in the courts. But it has helped us all have a better understanding and will provide more clarity as we move forward. I am happy to listen to lawyers from the security forces and Government around anything they think we need to change around the public interest immunity policy that we have written. It does not particularly help the Secretary of State around the naming of Stakeknife. If I am candid, this debate probably helps more.

I would briefly add—and there will be greater minds than ours looking at it—that I do not see anything in the Thompson judgment that precludes the Secretary of State taking the decision to name Stakeknife. As Jon outlined, it did not stand on the NCND issue, although it had relevance to it in terms of the gisting and who ultimately had the authority, which was almost a hierarchy. As I read Thompson, there is nothing there that would stop the Minister giving authority to name Stakeknife. That would be my interpretation of the judgment.

When you gentlemen were with us in April, I asked you whether you considered it bizarre that we were having this discussion about naming Freddie Scappaticci as Stakeknife. I think it was you, Sir Iain, who agreed it was bizarre. When you launched your report before Christmas, I think you went as far as you could in saying that Freddie Scappaticci was a person of significant interest to Operation Kenova. Jon has referred to some of the references in the report, and, if somebody wished to get the gist of what was being said, they could. Did you speak to Freddie Scappaticci as part of Operation Kenova investigations?

Yes, we interviewed Freddie Scappaticci on a number of occasions.

How much is that referenced in the report?

I do not think the report goes into the details of what was said. Very little was said in interview—that is the first thing. It was important for the families to know that in cases we were investigating where he was a suspect, as with anybody, he was interviewed under caution in the ordinary fashion, which had not happened before—there have been previous examinations into his offending that have not been dealt with as we would have expected them to be. What we did do is inform the families that he had been arrested because of the openness of the investigation, but we have been very careful, because we have an obligation when we are giving information, to comply with that confidentiality. You know our position. We think it has become a pantomime, farce—call it what you will. I don’t like those words in a way, though, because it is so important for society in Northern Ireland that we revisit this decision and, I think, change it, because of the confidence in the Executive by our different communities. But we can only make the arguments that we can make. My own view is that he will be named formally. My frustration is that we are wasting time unnecessarily and it should already have happened. Forgive me for this; I need to be cautious about what I say. If you look at the interim report, you see that all the people who dealt with previous legacy cases talk about the frustrations of not getting information, being misled and being obstructed. At the moment, the people who are involved in those roles are the ones the Government are listening to. The final thing, on the agent issue, is that when those agents agreed to work for whatever agency—generally, it was the military or the police—if they were at risk, they would have expected for us to do everything we could to protect them. I think that is a reasonable thing. We did not. To stop this individual, Stakeknife, being identified, we allowed people who had put their lives at risk for the state to be harmed and killed.

When you spoke to Mr Scappaticci, on what we have considered his official confirmation or denial, did he accept that he was the agent Stakeknife?

D'o you know what, Gavin, honestly, without having the material in front of me—he went, “No comment,” to most of what was said. I think, from recollection, he did not, but what I have said, which is in the report, is that he told his wife that he was the agent Stakeknife and he told a female associate that he was the agent Stakeknife. I will check that and come back to the Committee, if I may, or ask Iain to, but I do not think he did.

Thank you. Finally, on Thompson, this draws on what the Chair was asking and the implications of it. Denis Bradley is a well-regarded individual in Northern Ireland. He is heavily involved in engaging with the public and paramilitaries as a priest to bring them to peace, and with the wider nationalist community, too. He was the first vice-chair of the Policing Board. He has spoken very powerfully about truth and reconciliation and believes there should be a truth and reconciliation process, save for information around informants, because he believes it will destroy families and set brother against brother, or daughter against father. It will destroy families, neighbours and communities because the truth will be known. Although we are talking about this specific case, is Denis Bradley’s broader point something that you and Sir Iain agree with?

I have huge respect for Denis Bradley. I meet him. I went to see him when I started Operation Kenova. I would always listen with great care to what Denis Bradley says. From what you have described, I would concur with some of those comments. This is a very specific case; we very rarely step away from NCND. I gave you a couple of examples, but I would sympathise with Denis Bradley’s position. That would actually step into the territory of people potentially not agreeing to become agents, so Iain and I would not be able to make the arguments we are making now. From the way you have described that, I would have sympathy with that position.

On the back of the answer you gave to Gavin about interviewing Scappaticci, the report says that “it has not been possible to deal with the full facts surrounding the agent Stakeknife and the late Frederick Scappaticci in as full detail as hoped.” Is that because of NCND, or is there something else there?

If I may—and Iain may want to come in—when we wanted to talk about the investigation, Freddie Scappaticci, as a member of the Internal Security Unit, had been interviewed for offences regarding that. If we want to talk more openly and publicly about that offending, because it was a small unit and there are other cases that are synonymous with the person identified as the agent Stakeknife, we would effectively breach NCND. That is what we would do. We have to walk a bit of a tightrope. It is probably relevant to say that, for reports going through for publication, we wrote a protocol, which is a stepped process before a report is published, so that all of the agencies agree. One of those processes is security checking. The lawyers talked about describing cases in that way. This happened with Iain, and he went through this process. In the report he produced, there is evidence of particular crimes and what was done, and I know there was a lot of legal input in how that was described, so as not to breach the NCND position in regard to the agent Stakeknife.

That was part of the reason, and there are numerous reasons. My ambition to publish this final report—when I came to this Committee before—was probably greater than my ability to do so in the end. Part of that was not only some of the intervening facts and circumstances regarding MI5 material and other issues, but a big part of it was to do with the security checking process. I mentioned in the report that an early piece of learning that Jon took, and that Kenova collectively took from those that had gone before, was that, when the work is concluded, nothing comes into the public domain, by and large. Therefore, the determination that part of the Kenova philosophy—the Kenova ethos—would be to publish public-facing reports and to share as far as possible, notwithstanding any prosecutorial decisions that may or may not have been taken, but to do so in the public interest as a statement of intent was right and very clear, but actually really complex to deliver. That brings me back to my opening point about the frustrations around this. The point you make, Robin, about not being able to tell the full story is precisely because we are constantly saying that this applies to Frederick Scappaticci and that applies to the agent Stakeknife. We can say things about Scappaticci, and we can say things about Stakeknife, but we cannot merge the two, because at this stage we remain precluded from any level of confirmation about the identity of Stakeknife. That is why I included that caveat. People may read the report and, as you have this morning, ask for more information and more detail around it. We have been as open and as full as we can. We have included summaries of the cases that were submitted, and we have included the circumstances of Stakeknife’s management, recruitment and relocation, and so on. All of that was really challenging, dealing with people who had legitimate, but at times alternative perspectives. We always wanted to get as much as possible into the public domain, while recognising legitimate national security challenges. It has been really hard work to do that, and to get as much information into the public domain as we have been able to do.

Thank you both for coming back. I want to look at information sharing and the various protocols. Like you, I have spent my entire working life in public services, so I understand the practicalities of how information gets siloed. I worked in medical records in the ’80s, so I also know the challenges of paper-based records. Were there any constraints on the information and intelligence-sharing arrangements that you had in place with the PSNI, MI5 and MOD?

I began the investigation, and I think at the beginning, everyone was very nervous about sharing information. I mentioned that I had gone to see people who had led previous legacy investigations. They all said that there was always a problem getting the information. One of our colleagues who sat on one of our oversight groups, John Miller, who was the deputy commissioner of the New York Police Department, said, “If there’s a problem getting the information, it’s because there’s a problem with the information.” There is something to what John said. Because of what I was told would need to be a critical success factor in getting the information, we did not get to it straight away, because there was no model and no legislation. We built Kenova on the backs and experiences of others. I was as confident as I could be that we had unfettered access to all the information. With the PSNI, we got that pretty quickly, because the Chief Constable, Sir George Hamilton, had commissioned this, so he was very supportive. There were concerns about Kenova from some of the PSNI, in terms of the oversight groups and the access to information, but they were understandable, and we had to show that we would handle the information properly. The MOD had information in so many different places. It was not audited, and it was not catalogued. It was mainly in analogue form. As I describe in my report, we had some real challenges with the Security Service, but we had a memorandum of understanding and an information-handling protocol with them, which I agreed with the now director general, Ken McCallum, and I thought we got to a really good position. I have to mention, though, that schedule 8 to the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023 talked about the new proposition that every document that was provided to the ICRIR would have to go through an assessment process about classification of sensitivity and prejudice. I have only ever been a detective, and I have never seen that provision in any legislation anywhere. I talk about snakes and ladders in investigations. As we were making progress, I felt that something was being put in the way of the ICRIR getting unfettered access to all that information. We can then correlate that with the comments by those people who had previously led legacy investigations about not getting access to information. This is not about the security forces, by the way; it is about the legal approach. The security forces were remarkable. That is something I had not previously seen. I made representations about that, because I am worried about the future; I am worried about the success of the legacy framework going forward. In the latest Northern Ireland Troubles Bill, schedule 4 mirrors, from what I can see, schedule 8. This is about trust and confidence for all the communities in Northern Ireland. I do not want to get in the way of that information as the PSNI Chief Constable. I want to be able to say to all those communities, “The keys for all of that information have been given to the legacy commission, who’ve got commissioners in charge. The ex-Lord Chief Justice is the chief commissioner for the ICRIR. Who better to manage sensitive material?” I am happy for them to defer to us if they are going to put something in the public domain to say, “We intend to do this,” like we did with the Kenova protocol—the security checking. But those determinations will delay the process, and they are costly; we are not funded in the PSNI for legacy, which is a whole separate issue. That will slow things down. I wonder if there is a collateral reason for that, but importantly, they risk suggesting to families and victims that there is another hurdle in the way and that the police, who they potentially did not trust, are now making determinations about information. I do not understand it, and I think it risks the success of legacy moving forward.

I think you are right to highlight the importance of information sharing. As you say, in many elements of public life over many years, including in child protection cases and domestic violence cases, subsequent reviews have pointed out that, actually, the information was held somewhere and just was not shared in the right place. This takes you back to Sir Michael Bichard and other inquiries; the health sector has seen similar issues arise. So in terms of stepping back and taking some of the learning and experiences from Kenova about what should, hopefully, be set out in legislation going forward, I think those issues around information sharing are critical. In section 8 of the final report— “Accessing information”—we go through each of the agencies. In paragraph 8.7, we give an example of a database called MACER: you ask for information, and people, acting in good faith, then give what information they think they have, but actually there is more information than that. You had the HET who, although they were distinct, were still part of the PSNI, and they were not provided with all the information that the PSNI held. The HET were populated by extremely experienced detectives from different forces across the United Kingdom, who had gone in as an independent unit. But they did not receive all the materials; it was only when the Kenova team came in. Again, we outline that it was by accessing information, and having that direct ability to interrogate systems, that Kenova were able to obtain that information. As Jon outlined, I think that one of the challenges, as I read the Bill compared to Kenova, is this sense that the person or organisation you make the request of still has to do that assessment process on sensitivity, when actually the investigating agency give them the authority. They are the ones who know what they are looking for; they are the ones who know best. Section 8, although some of the issues in it are relatively dry compared to some of the other sections, is really important in terms of the lessons learned from Kenova going forward. I think that access of information is crucial if the reformed legacy commission is to make progress.

Within section 8, you also make reference to the difficulty in processing evidence from the MOD. What improvements should be made to the way it manages and catalogues its documents?

On the MOD, in your opening question, Katrina, you rightly said that there were paper records, records over many decades, and records over many units, agencies, regiments, structures, entities and whatnot. I think—legitimately—that colleagues in MOD benefited from Kenova coming in. Kenova came in and said, “Actually, we can assist here.” I think I said that I do not know how the MOD have taken it forward, but we all know that all agencies in public life are faced with this challenge of moving from paper, and moving from analogue into digital. Again, it was a consequence of that. That was one of the reasons that—in fairness to MI5—they ended up discovering some new materials, because, as they outlined to us, they were in the process of doing this digitalisation. I think all organisations are challenged by it. But, again, I think Kenova has been a driver for some of these improvements.

Picking up on the MI5 references, former PSNI Chief Constable Sir George Hamilton recently suggested that there should be an independent judicial review of the sharing of MI5’s intelligence with Kenova investigators. Do you agree with that?

I am not sure; I do not know, to be candid. As I recall, George gave an interview, I think, the day after we published the final report. It was on a discussion programme, and he was asked to assess its implications. What I would interpret as his intent behind what he said is that we cannot just nod and move on from it; we need to make sure we have learned from it. My judgment, in terms of the approach of the director general and the current leadership of MI5 is that they would not support that resistance at all. When this material came to light, they were as shocked as anyone. Again, if you were very cynical, if there were a real need to suppress the information, they would never have told us in the first place. Who would ever have known that they had found new material, had the current individuals within MI5 not presented it, knowing the organisational embarrassment and criticism that that would bring? There needs to be a recognition that they did that and that the director general put resources into establishing that material. I have absolutely no doubt, as I said, that as we move towards digitalised records and whatnot, a lot of the approaches will have changed. It is also important to recognise that MI5 had far, far greater knowledge of Stakeknife than it told us. It was involved in tasking, strategic and tactical, in my judgment, at quite an early stage, but he was not an MI5 asset; he was a military asset. He was an Army agent, but the MI5 role in it was far greater than we had been told initially. This new material was really quite significant but, as I say, it was MI5 themselves that brought it to our attention.

Chair, can I mention one point on MACER? Iain describes it in his report—it is in the interim report. I do not think that there was any malign intent there, I have to tell you. We identified that because we got the keys for the MACER database, and there were codes to access it as Operation Kenova. We understood that the MOD had passed over the MACER database when they withdrew from Northern Ireland on 31 July 2007, leaving responsibility for the database with the PSNI. We then realised that the MOD had a set of keys to the MACER database that they would use for their civil cases and litigation, so we got their keys. If I describe it as a five-drawer filing cabinet, the PSNI keys opened the first four drawers; the MOD keys opened all five. We had to point that out to the PSNI, and the Chief Constable of the day had to write to the presiding coroner and others to say, “When you’ve asked us for information, there is a bit of a problem because we didn’t realise that there is information we, potentially, have not provided you with.” With legacy, moving forward, because of this element of schedule 4, we cannot get this wrong; we cannot have people mistrust or distrust. There is a distrust in the police from some people. So give them absolute, direct, unsupervised access; they are the people best placed to decide any prejudice and to decide the sensitivity of those documents, because they will see them in the round—it is not the PSNI, years later. That is a really important point around legacy succeeding moving forward. At the moment, there is a deaf ear to the points that we are making.

Just picking up on that point, it is absolutely critical to the success of the proposed legacy commission. Any work on legacy going forward needs confidence across the entirety of Northern Ireland that we have actually dealt with things—that we have the answers as far as we need. What is your assessment of MI5’s approach to legacy cases in Northern Ireland, and does it need to change?

I do think there is an issue, I have to say. I think it is a cultural issue. I am the biggest advocate for MI5. I have worked really closely with them in tackling international terrorism. I spent years working closely with them. I have huge respect for the director general; he is a personal friend, and we have talked about these issues. I am now the Chief Constable of the PSNI, and some of the things I have said today would not be under his consideration, because he has a different role. We are the police. As I explained earlier, we are far more outwardly accountable, which is right. Coming out of conflict, as we are in Northern Ireland, we have to work doubly hard to be human rights-based, open and transparent. We have to make sure we have really robust accountability measures. Intelligence agencies do not work in that same way. Even recently, there was a proposal in legislation about having a duty of candour for public services, which I support in general, but the intelligence agencies are concerned about that. There is a difference. So I understand why they would be reticent and hesitant, but they have not listened to the arguments we have presented, looked at the history of the reports mentioned in the Kenova interim report and necessarily understood the importance of moving society in Northern Ireland forward, because they have much broader and wider issues to be responsible for. I think that this session, Sir Iain’s report and the conversations we have with Sir Ken, are all moving the dial. But understand that they have a very different role and function from the PSNI, and one which I respect—they have a wickedly difficult job. We have to find the right sweet spot, but I do think they need to change their approach around information disclosure in helping us with legacy in the future. Q24        Gavin Robinson: The word “conspiracy” has been used already in this session. Very often, you will hear people in Northern Ireland talk about the quest for truth and justice. One of the things you have both highlighted as a benefit of Operation Kenova is the personal relationships you have built with families. That sometimes involves indicating to a family that their truth is not “the” truth and that the assumptions they had are not borne out through evidence. Therefore, they may be left in a position where the truth does not lead to the justice that they seek, and there is a level of disappointment. As you will know, there has been disappointment for some of the families around Operation Denton and the finding you have reached that there was no systemic collusion with loyalists involved with the attacks associated with the Glenanne gang. How do you wrestle with that, and how do you conceptualise the disappointment for the families? Are they right to be disappointed, or is the fraught nature of legacy simply that, when somebody has a truth that is not borne out by “the” truth, there is inherently going to be disappointment?

I am sure Jon will add to this. My experience of that, Gavin—I am grateful for the question—has been that it is enormously challenging. When we have sat down with families or a group of families and look them in the eye, having heard about their trauma and the fact that someone lost a parent when they were young, or a spouse or a loved one, and those families have had a view or developed a view, or others have presented them with a view or a perspective on what happened, and they have held to that for years, if not decades, what we have done, and had to do, is explain the process—the steps we took, the lengths we went to and the depths we drove down to. It is important to explain to families that we have gone beyond previous inquiries, taken steps, spoken to and challenged individuals, and looked for perspective and information that was not necessarily available previously, and that this is our legitimate finding. Take the family of Jean Smyth-Campbell and our Operation Mizzenmast. Jean was tragically murdered in 1972 in west Belfast. There was not a full investigation at the time, for all sorts of reasons—that particular time in 1972 west Belfast was probably one of the busiest weeks or fortnights; the troubles were absolutely horrendous and the challenge for police and law enforcement was really significant. Jean’s family have always said that Jean had been murdered by the British Army. That was the hypothesis that they held to and felt was right—so much so that, as you know, they successfully progressed a judicial review, instructing the PSNI to reinvestigate the case. That was one of the other additional cases that came over to Kenova, which was then under Jon’s leadership. As I said in my preface to the report, the integrity and legitimacy that Kenova had established is why it grew and took on those additional responsibilities. The Kenova detectives—again, I absolutely have to reassure the Committee that they are people of the highest calibre in terms of their quality and experience—went through the reinvestigation process. In terms of our finding, we cannot get it to a criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt, but from everything that we have found and investigated, we are confident that, on the balance of probabilities, Jean was shot and murdered by the IRA. There are all sorts of circumstantial reasons, ballistic reasons and evidential reasons that align with that. Jean’s family still do not accept that, and we recognise that. We recognise how difficult that can be, but our job and our responsibility is to present the facts and circumstances as we have found them and to at least say to the family, “This is what we have done. We have done something that has never been done before. The outcome and the answer might not be what you had thought.” Again, that is why, even in Jon’s interim report, he makes it clear how damaging speculation can be. Often, the speculation and alternative hypotheses are presented almost for the interest of the person doing it, as opposed to in the interest of the family. Similarly, we had meetings with the families of those slaughtered during the horrendous Dublin and Monaghan attacks in 1974. We have not seen any involvement of state agencies in those attacks, and that ran contrary to views that people had held for many, many years. We have been open and transparent. We have been physically there with families. We have met them. We have developed relationships. We have explained the steps that we have taken. We have explained that there are gaps and that it is not definitive—there are always gaps when you are looking over decades—but that this is our professional view and that, in all honesty and integrity, we need to do the right thing by the families and victims, and to tell them what our findings are, even if they do not align with what they previously felt. You are absolutely right to highlight how challenging and difficult that is.

Whoever shot Jean—on the assessment of the Kenova investigation, it was more likely to have been an IRA gunman than a member of the security forces—did not mean to shoot Jean Smyth-Campbell. She was an innocent woman and a young mum, living her life and doing nothing wrong. It is that adage that she was in the wrong place at the right time. I like to say she was in the right place at the right time; the gunman and those people perpetrating these crimes were in the wrong place, and they should not have been there. She had done nothing wrong. I would like to slightly illuminate that story with the family, who are an incredible family. We had probably the most experienced pathologist in the United Kingdom look at all of that case. He actually commented to the family that it was the most comprehensive review of a cold case, if you like, that he had seen. We had photography experts, because there was a concern—you used the word “conspiracy”, which is why I want to make this point—that the security forces had doctored and altered evidence deliberately to ensure that wrongdoing by the security forces was covered up. We were able to show that what the family saw as suspicious actually was not suspicious. We gave them an actual practical demonstration of what had happened to cause them to believe that. We also had the finest ballistics expert in the UK talk about—it was obviously very challenging—what had actually happened on the day, to show that another theory the family had about multiple gunmen and the nature of how Jean died was wrong. It is important to say that the family accept and understand the rigour that has gone into this, but they still have a contrary view. That is why, at the time, we agreed not to say too much about the case, when Iain released the report just before Christmas.

Fair enough. Thank you for that added information. To go back to the exchange you had with Ms Murray around MI5 and intelligence sharing, there were some reports before Christmas indicating that MI5 were in a position of ending the sharing of information with PSNI because of their concerns as to how it is handled. It is accurate that that was reported, but is it accurate that that is their position?

No, it is complete nonsense. It is one of those things that you look at and you worry for a second, of course, but we have a really strong relationship with MI5. I have worked with them so closely. I have explained my relationship with the director general; we are extremely close friends, and I have great regard for him, his integrity, the way he conducts himself and the way he is trying to run that organisation. There is no issue with PSNI and MI5 and the exchanging of information. As ever in Northern Ireland, you often get stories that are just not based on any fact, and this I can absolutely categorically say is wrong.

I am quite glad I asked that the way I did then, otherwise it would have been quite embarrassing. How do you now view the decision during Denton to share the names of alleged paramilitaries with victims’ families, given some of the issues that have arisen and, I understand, been before the courts?

Again, that is a very pertinent and relevant question. I am restricted slightly, Gavin, because, as you say, there are live challenges that have come in, seeking judicial reviews—challenges that are against both myself as the head of Operation Denton, which is part of the Kenova suite, and Chief Constable Boutcher, because ultimately, he has responsibility for Kenova. There was a hearing in Belfast on Monday, and, because of the issues involved, a number of agencies, I think, have become involved—ex parte is a phrase I would be familiar with, butI do not know what the specific term would be. At the moment, we have published the conclusions—strategic findings—in the final report. That itself was subject to a challenge; the weekend before we published on the 9th, there was an application for an injunction to prevent that publication. In the section on Denton, as you will see, we outlined the approach, the background and the amount of information that was researched to inform the work that was carried out, and we then give our findings, a number of which have been mentioned already today. But no individuals are named within that, and thankfully, that allowed us to get that information up to the deadline on the Sunday and Monday before we published on the 9th.

That was confirmation given to the court. In the light of that confirmation that you would not name, then the judge decided not to—

At that stage, in terms of interim relief, but the substantive issue now—coming back to what we said at the outset, and I have already alluded to it—is that through Jon’s determination and initiative, which is something I absolutely agree with and have sought to implement and continue, we want to put as much information in the public domain as we can. The full Denton report runs to over 150,000 words—it is a significant piece of work. The victims and individuals of the cases that had been reviewed are memorialised, and the issues that have arisen—the specific attacks and the linkages—are analysed, and a narrative is provided. I think it would be a really significant document of the history of the troubles, not least the work that had been done. Within that, inevitably there are individuals who are named. We are going through a process at the moment around representation, and that broader point of Maxwellisation, as they talk about, if we are criticised. It is very complex in this instance because of the amount of work involved, and we are still facing some of the legal challenges to try to prevent publication. Our starting point is that we want to publish as much as we can, and until we are told not to, we are going to continue to try to progress that, because ultimately, we think it is in the public interest to do that. There was a sense of relief that we were at least allowed to get the strategic findings into the final report, so we have been able to discuss them, just as you have talked about today, in terms of the fact that we saw horrendous elements of collusion among state actors. But as I would describe it, that was at an operational level—it was not at a strategic or a political level—and a lot of those instances had already been established before Denton was initiated.

We have had a discussion about the sharing of information and a rebuke to the notion that published before Christmas, that MI5 was concerned about the provision of information. We have had a lengthy discussion about the neither confirm nor deny policy, and whether that should stand in every circumstance or whether it should not be used to cover significant failings, and how there should be consequences for people acting outside the scope of their engagement. We have heard all of that, and rightly you have outlined your position. However, the story that was planted in December and some of the talk around these issues suggests or gives the impression that there is concern about whether the PSNI and/or Operation Kenova—created back in George Hamilton’s day—can be trusted with this information. You have responded fairly to those issues in how you have outlined the rationale for your position—so this is not a challenge to you. However, the question to you both is: if there were restriction on the sharing of information, what impact would that have on our ability to deal with legacy more generally, on your ability to complete the work that you have been tasked with, or even our ability to extend beyond that—if it was MI5 one day, could it be MOD the next? I am reassured by the response that you have given around the relationships and how there is no truth to it. That is why I am reframing the question to ask, what impact would it have on our societal ability to deal with legacy if there were to be circumstances where a reluctance to share information crept in?

We would come full circle, because information was not shared about people—some of whom were agents and some of whom were not—who were going to be abducted, tortured, and killed; so they were abducted, tortured and killed. That is what happened—that is the finding of the Stakeknife investigation. In the interim report I say that those families would have thought they were going mad. They were not going mad; this was happening, and it should not have happened. I again underscore my experience. A United Nations report found that the RUC was the most dangerous police service in the world to be a member of in the 1980s. I think of what they endured. There is not a week that goes by where there is not a memorial for a member of the security force. Often, those victims are forgotten. I was at an event on Sunday for Royal Irish Constabulary officers murdered by terrorism before the creation of the RUC. If we are not going to share information and intelligence, we are going backwards, not forwards. We see what is happening globally in geopolitics and relationships at the moment, and I want to assure you and underscore that the relationships are really strong. There is clearly a concern, which I alluded to, about giving this information out and wrongdoing being found within the security forces—which in my experience was rare, but where it happened, we need to call it out—so that we can get public confidence and trust, especially in a society emerging from conflict. We should not use NCND to prevent that from being socialised and examined. There is an argument regularly given to me that the reason that Stakeknife has not been named is to prevent the accountability of Government and the security forces, and not to protect agents. I do not believe that that is correct, but I can understand why people from certain communities say that. That is why it is important that I am seen to press what I genuinely believe in: where—it is vanishingly rare—we might need to step away from it. I gave a couple of examples earlier where there was not any collateral loss of coverage and intelligence and we collectively, by agreement with the Secretary of State, step away from it, and not go off unilaterally and away from the corporate position. As I say, I have applied NCND more than anyone I know, and I have done more public interest immunity than anyone I know, because of my particular background, so I am a fierce advocate for it. It is just that, in the legacy space—this goes to the recommendations of the Kenova report—my suggestion was that the Cabinet Office, a Government institution, looks at NCND in the context of Northern Ireland, and looks to review, re-codify and re-examine it. Have we applied it in a way that has actually worked against the public interest? At the moment, I think we have now reached a position that it is in the public interest to name Stakeknife, but it is not for me to do that as the chief constable of the PSNI. I think that it is for the Cabinet Office and Government to do, in the light of what we have learned. We are trying to play corporately, fairly and properly—I promise you that.

Thank you for the question. Coming back to my first response to the Chair about frustrations, you have outlined very clearly the whole series of potential charges that may have come from the investigation. We felt, and we continue to feel, that strong evidential cases were presented. I included within the final report a summary of each case—again, candidly, we had to fight quite hard to have that included—because I thought it was important that the public had a clear understanding of what work had been done. To balance that, and in recognition of some of the issues that the DPP and his team raised, we included a number of things about evidential challenges that you will see within that. For what we consider to meet an evidential threshold for prosecution, it is about the ability to take that into court and establish that, and a number of tests might have to be applied in that regard. I know you were probably talking about the Stakeknife issues, but I think it is important to say that we have been successful with Operation Turma. Martin McCauley is facing murder charges in that regard, which is a really significant achievement that only the Kenova team were able to do and progress. Under the old legacy Act, that was facing quite a hard stop back in April. In fairness to the DPP and the PSNI, they moved really quickly and took a prosecution decision, after which, with a lot of support from judicial authorities and Garda Síochána, the extradition process moved really quickly. I had a fear, or an expectation, that it would be dragged out, but it moved quickly. Obviously, we cannot go into the specifics and detail of that, but we hope that it will come into the court domain, and that there will be an element of public justice. Inevitably, there were frustrations. It is the life of a police officer or a detective that often there is frustration when something is not taken forward in a prosecution.

There is a process, as you know, to appeal no-prosecution decisions and so on. My understanding is that in appropriate circumstances there is an element of independent mutual support. They might ask people from the PPS in England and Wales or the Procurator Fiscal Service in Scotland. I know from my own experience that that does occur at times. Within the network of public prosecutors across the United Kingdom and Ireland, there are processes where at times they will provide an element of review and inspection, but I don’t know what has been done in regard to those specific cases.

I cannot comment on Denis Donaldson. I have seen the media coverage, but I do not have any specific information about that. There is no doubt that agent Stakeknife was given a lot of support. This goes back to an interim report and the sense at the time that he was the golden goose, the jewel in the crown or whatever analogy or language one wishes to use. But we found out—it was important to try and share this publicly as well—how financially and circumstantially supported agent Stakeknife was when he was moved. How that compares with other agents can be quite stark, but I could not comment on why. I don’t know why that would be.

I certainly think it is a significant issue of public interest. On what Kenova found out about how Stakeknife was handled and the circumstances around it, I think inevitably there would be implications for other agents. I do not have any personal knowledge or information regarding some of these other nominals.

One of my recommendations in Kenova was to review and reform the resourcing and operating practices of the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland in connection with Northern Ireland legacy cases. My experience, which I set out in the interim report, of dealing with complex and international cases in London—terrorist cases—was of an incredibly intimate, close working relationship with a dedicated counter-terrorism unit or, in an organised crime case, a dedicated organised crime Crown Prosecution unit, and direct access to counsel that were advising on the cases. You would be constantly looking at how you can, for instance, get evidence from overseas—Pakistan, Afghanistan—into a court in London. Legacy is incredibly challenging and complex. Because cases are so old, evidentially they are really difficult. There are issues around hearsay, continuity and loss of original documents. You need to have a rhythm, while being respectful of the independent functions of the investigators, the public prosecutor and counsel, in which those people work together to make sure, for the victims, that they create the best opportunity for evidence to be determined to reach the threshold for prosecution. Because of resourcing, funding and other reasons that I set out in the interim report, that did not happen on Operation Kenova, so I suggested an independent review to say, “What could we do better?” Having an independent review means people coming in to say, “Look, there’s no monopoly on good ideas.” Legacy seemed to go to the back of the queue, because of contemporary risks that the Public Prosecution Service have to deal with—real risks now. We would not get responses on legacy cases for years, and that still has not been addressed independently. I know that there are all sorts of challenges to it for the Public Prosecution Service, but I wish that they could put their mind to that. I have an interest: I have met Denis Donaldson’s daughter Jane. The jurisdiction of that offence was obviously the Republic of Ireland. It was actually after the date that is captured by the legacy legislation—the troubles Bill as it is now, with this Government. It is an investigation for An Garda Síochána. I think it highlights the importance of a joined-up approach to legacy between the two Governments. It also highlights, I think—I have examples of this and have written to the Secretary of State on it—another challenge to the current legislation. Where offending has occurred during the window to 1998 that is captured by the troubles Bill, those same perpetrators have continued offending. For instance, in the PSNI we are looking at post-the-1998-date troubles-related cases to 2004. We have 126 murders that are troubles-related. Some of those individuals were committing murders and atrocities during the period of time, ’68 to ’98, that is captured by the legacy legislation. You cannot have two separate investigations; there should be a single truth. I think, in the Garda Síochána case, Jane is due to meet the Commissioner, or certainly has asked to. She deserves a fulsome investigation. To understand how somebody died, you need to understand how they lived, and we should be compliant with regard to any information that An Garda Síochána want about the death of her father.

I don’t know enough about the information—this isn’t me fudging it—but it feels to me that it would have to be at least considered whether this is a troubles-related case, so I would say yes, a determination would need to be made on that on the circumstances. But there is something that the Secretary of State, the new legislation and the Irish Government need to be alive to, which is about making sure that where there is this continuum of offending, by either groups or individuals, that goes beyond the 1998 date, we do not have—I recently got some legal advice—the ridiculous situation where we have to set up a separate independent investigation. That could not be by the PSNI, because we would be conflicted. It would have to be something like Kenova, and we don’t have the money for that. You have the institutions, the resources and the expertise in what will be the Legacy Commission to deal with those cases that go beyond ’98 and that have a nexus from before ’98. So there needs to be an adjustment to the legislation around that as well.

I want to build slightly on what Claire has brought out there. It is so difficult to have these conversations. There is not a single unaffected family anywhere across these islands—not just Northern Ireland. We have to remember that the troubles spanned not just these islands, the UK and Ireland, but continental, mainland Europe. It is an absolutely huge undertaking. What I have taken from this session so far—we also had a brief discussion about amendments to the troubles Bill prior to it—is that it really does feel that there is an awfully long way still to go in terms of how we learn from Kenova and the wider societal conversations. Kenova has garnered a reputation—this is probably a view I share—for being very good with families. That is a positive thing. Obviously there was some—“criticism” is maybe a strong word, but there was criticism, for want of a better word, about the results, findings, final report or whatever you want to call it. Were there any families who did not engage with you through the course of that—and Turma as well, I suppose? Were there any families who walked away, were not happy or just did not want to get involved?

I have to say that I cannot think of any. In advance of Christmas, I emailed all the families, as I do every year. I try to contact them on anniversaries and stuff; I often fail, but I try. That is families from Kenova, Denton and Turma, and more widely—there are lots of overlaps here—the families of the police officers and military families. For all the criticism—and you get a lot—their responses make it all worthwhile for the team, because we have changed their lives with our engagement. We have listened to them, acknowledged what they have been through and, where we can, told them what we have found, even when—as discussed in this session—that was not what they expected to hear and they did not want to hear it. It is how you deliver that. We met such challenging families—I think we had every possible type of challenge that we could have in a troubles-related case—but I cannot think of one family that has gone rogue, or to the media to say, “This is a disgrace and a waste of money,” or whatever. Commentators have done that, and you will get that. Some people do not believe that we should have any legislation for the troubles and think we should draw a line under them—the Malone House Group would say, “Don’t do anything now. Stop it.” You have to listen to all those views, in my opinion, but I cannot think of one family—I will probably get lots of messages now to suggest that there are, but I cannot think of any.

Likewise. Again, before the final report was published, we ensured—I ensured—that the message went to all families. They were given prior access to it, along with the Committee and others, so they had the ability to read and see it before it started to be discussed publicly. Even within families, we might have worked at times with two or three different levels of engagement, because families are complex. In particular, we might have had a group of siblings, and one sibling did not want to pursue a matter of progress, which maybe the majority of the siblings wished to do. We need to recognise that. I do think that that is one of the lessons of Kenova and something that needs to be taken forward, and I think there is an attempt to do so. It was touched on even, I think, in the Committee’s report, that one size does not fit all for victims and families. Some families and individual victims might really seek a full investigation, with a criminal justice outcome, while other families do not. Other families just want to get some information, and there is everything across the spectrum between that. That is very important. With anything that is built, you almost have to have a process. Whether it is through the information and reconciliation entity, which is different from the Legacy Commission, or in how the two work together, you are giving options to victims and families as to how they wish matters to be progressed. You get other victims and families who say, “Look, we wish you well, but just give us an update when you have one. We just want to live our lives.” Because of the sensitivity and confidentiality of it, it is difficult to go into detail on the feedback and testimony that we have heard from families, but some of it was really deeply moving. There were two sisters who had moved out to North America; their father had been a victim of the Glenanne series. They had built lives over the years and were living separately. Our officers went to tell them something that was different from what they had thought we were going to tell them—to go back to what Gavin said—but, a week later, they came back to say, “Look, we now have peace. That is something we have waited decades for, and our children”—because this is intergenerational, even though they have families in North America who have never set foot in Northern Ireland, the UK or Ireland—“have felt that impact.” That goes back to the earlier point about how wide the impact can be. The fact that we had carried out our inquiry and shared the outcome, albeit it was not what they thought it would be, meant that they had a resolution that they had never had for decades. It was genuinely a very moving thing to read.

I want to come back briefly to something that you said earlier, Chief Constable, about policing families. I am very proud of the service of the RUC and the people who were close to me that served and still do the job now. I think it was important that you said what you said today, because there has been a feeling, certainly within the policing family, that there has been an attempt to rewrite history wholesale and completely discredit all service. They themselves would be the first people to say, “Listen, where there was wrongdoing, absolutely let a light be shone upon it.” I think what you have in Turma is an example of where so many families wanted to have a similar conclusion themselves. Do you agree that it really is important that we do not leave policing families behind in this? They have taken it as read that they are now discarded, and for 30 or 40-odd years they have consigned themselves to the fact that they will never get any conclusion, answers or closure as to what happened. Do you think it is important that we remember those families too, whenever we have these discussions?

Certainly—100%. That is why I mentioned them at the beginning of this session. I go to services all the time—I think you know that. I have actually brought families—we have an incredible memorial garden at headquarters at the Police Service of Northern Ireland. A number of policing families did not know that we have that memorial garden. We have a great organisation—the Royal Ulster Constabulary George Cross Foundation—who look after the gardens so that people can come and remember their loved ones. We must not forget, either, the number of people who suffered life-changing injuries and psychological injuries that they have to live with every day. I have not met anybody in the police service who served during the troubles who has not been significantly impacted by it. It changed people, without a doubt. I have said within the PSNI that we will absolutely memorialise, remember and respect the sacrifices that each of them made. This is such a complex thing. When I came into the PSNI—and I have said this to the organisation—people often would not speak about the RUC, because they felt that they were not allowed to. That has changed. When I say that we got things wrong in the security services during the troubles—surely, we were going to. It was impossible. Nobody could have dealt with it. If you made a decision to go this way, there would be a life lost over there; if you went over there, there would be a life lost over here. My point about Kenova is this. Where we got things wrong institutionally—and I say again that we did not give them the tools, the legal framework, the guidance or the training to do the job, and they were asking the Government for them. The sacrifice, and the fact that, by and large, they did such an incredible job, the like of which none of us could understand, do not mean that we do not say, when we got it wrong, “We got it wrong.” That is about public trust and confidence. I think we have got the decisions not to make the determination that Stakeknife will be named and, on occasions, not to reveal information—not breach NCND, but reveal information—where we know there has been wrongdoing so that it can be properly examined and learned from, and families can understand better what happened—because that is what the Stakeknife investigation is. I think that still holds us back, and we need to change that.

I will answer that one first, if that is all right. When I did the interim report and set out those 10 recommendations, my hope and expectation was that I would engage with Government, and there would be a Government apology—because that is in there—around what has happened, some of which we have aired today, and a Government-led response to the recommendations, re-codifying within the Northern Ireland context the “neither confirm nor deny” policy and establishing 21 June as the day for victims to be remembered. Those reports have various owners. The PSNI own a number, because they were commissioned by the Chief Constable. I have instigated a piece of work to do a security review of those documents, because that has not happened from a Government perspective. That work is under way. My intention is to then go to partners in the security agencies, the Secretary of State, the Northern Ireland Office and our other partners, and say, “These documents were commissioned by the PSNI/RUC. I think, having done the security checking, that these documents can now be put in the public domain. There is no risk to anybody. We don’t breach NCND, we don’t impact negatively on any security issues, no one is put at risk and no methodology is released. How do you feel about that? You do your own exercise.” I am going to do that process, because it has not happened following the release of the interim report on 8 March 2024. I know that Iain has been pursuing through the Cabinet Office a mechanism for those recommendations to be delivered upon. If it helps, that includes the Morton report—that is on the list of reports.

As I said in the update on the final report, that recommendation has not made the progress that we would have wished, because, as Jon outlined, of the multiple interests and multiple inputs into a number of reports. Ultimately, there will be one designated owner, but to get that co-ordination, our view in discussions—Jon touched on it in regard to another issue—was that the natural place for that to sit would be the Cabinet Office, which could provide oversight and the link into the security services and back into the other Departments of Government, and others. That has not made progress. The update that we received from the Secretary of State regarding the recommendation of a public apology was, “That’s on hold because of civil litigation and a number of other issues.” We have published our final report and had the updates, but there is far more that could and should be done. Clearly, we are expecting an update on the recommendation regarding the identification of Stakeknife, and within that, another of our 10 recommendations was regarding the need to review the application of NCND within the context of Northern Ireland. The declassification of the reports is something else that has not been progressed, perhaps because there has been legislative change and other issues dominating the NIO’s agenda. But those recommendations stand, and, to my eyes, they still have not been fully addressed. Jon mentioned the state apology as well.

We welcome Robin Swann.

Thank you. Iain, with regard to the 10 recommendations that were in the interim report, where are they sitting at the minute, and where do you see the urgency in moving them forward? Kenova was commissioned by the Chief Constable of the PSNI, so at times I have a concern that maybe the Cabinet Office and Government, because of the commissioning source, do not take the recommendations with the clout or seriousness that they actually do come with given the work that has been done. Can you give me a feel of where those 10 recommendations sit in terms of urgency and delivery?

Thanks for the question, because it is a concern of mine that, ultimately, with the troubles Bill ongoing, the Legacy Commission and the fact that Kenova has to come to an end, there is no ongoing monitoring group—other than this Committee, perhaps—to which I can say, “Here are 10 recommendations. You have now got them.” I know that the activism and knowledge of the Committee will keep that level of interest or pressure—whatever one wants to call it—on the Government and other agencies. Although we have published the final report, I still have a number of issues to resolve, not least of all to get that update from the Secretary of State on the specific issue that he wished to defer until the Thompson judgment on the naming of Stakeknife. You will see that a number of the other recommendations have been, you could say, discharged—there is a structure, or a framework; we now have the troubles Bill, and we have RIPA and other existing provisions—and then there are a number of issues that have simply been unaddressed. Other than me asking again, through the NIO, for updates, I do not have anything more in mind, Robin, other than the authority of this Committee, to keep those recommendations under review.

Jon, as the current Chief Constable, where is your concern regarding the piece of work that has been done, and the recommendations that, as Sir Iain said, are sitting there with no ownership or accountability once the final piece of work is done?

To be honest, this was always going to be a challenge. When I did that research, speaking to people who had done previous legacy work, John Stevens said, “You need to get agreement that you can get a report out, Jon,” because that was my biggest challenge. You will know his reports have still not been fully published. They were written by John with the intention of being published, and we both speak to him very regularly because of his experience in this area. All I can say is that, while I am Chief Constable, at the end of Kenova each of those recommendations will not disappear from my mindset. I will be lobbying to do what I think is right, properly and under the auspices of corporate agreement—I am not going to go rogue. I have read all these reports—I say “all”, but there are so many. I listed a number of reports in the interim Kenova report, and I have read all of those. Some of them are very voluminous. By and large, the conclusions and executive summaries do not touch on any specifics that I think attract national security concerns. But I would want colleagues in other agencies to agree that, and I think it goes to the point—Claire acknowledged this—of, again, trying to change the atmosphere towards the establishment in all communities. That would be quite an iconic moment to release a number of reports. I think a lot of people would be quite disappointed because, although they clearly say that we got things wrong, they are also quite positive about stuff that was done. They are not as dramatic as people think; they are actually very sensible reports. I do not understand why we have kept some of them locked behind a wall of secrecy. For me, at least, I think I can advance that one. On a Government apology—if the naming of Stakeknife were undertaken—I would see that as connected quite strongly to saying, “Look, institutionally, members of the security forces were asking for help; they were asking for a legal framework.” I would see them as connected, because the Government have been silent on that—the previous Government and this Government. I know they say it is because there is ongoing legal activity. As I said at the launch of the Kenova report, I have never seen such a litigious society as Northern Ireland. There is legal activity everywhere, and I am sure—I can’t speak from actual knowledge, but I am sure—there was legal activity with regard to Bloody Sunday and the Saville inquiry when the Government apology was made. I am sure there was lots of legal activity, so it would just be good to do the right thing. I promise you that I will continue to lobby for it, but in a sensible and responsible way.

There is a lot to ponder, for sure. I am going to stick to my question on legislative change, if that is okay. This individual threatened to string people up, threatened to skin them alive, to force confessions from them. He then did it anyway and played those confessions to the victims’ families. He ended up with a house in my neck of the woods, with a season ticket at my football club, living the life of Riley, as we would say in Ireland. It is very difficult to comprehend. I probably rubbed shoulders with him at Maine Road or the Etihad stadium. It is quite painful for Mancunians this week, because yesterday, as you alluded to, the Government pulled legislation on the Hillsborough law because MI5 does not want to have a duty of candour, which is to be truthful, transparent and proactive. They are rightly coming back to the legislation, and I am not criticising the Government or MI5 on that. When the arena attack happened in 2017, the failures were rightly looked at in the Kerslake report. The police, ambulance service and fire brigade all had full investigations, but the families, like those in item 5 of the Kenova report, feel that MI5 gave false and misleading information that was passed to families. That is how they feel, and we cannot get away from that—you have alluded to the way you have worked with families. We also know that MI5 gave American intelligence services the name of Salman Abedi before GMP wanted to release it. The problem for politicians is that we had a full investigation of your services, but we cannot get to the bottom of the answers for these families on the intelligence failures, if there were intelligence failures—I am not saying that there were, but we just do not know. There is no mechanism to do it. What would be your counsel on the duty of candour when it comes to the intelligence services? What would you counsel the Government to do?

First, because you have mentioned stepping aside from NCND, we gave a number of examples in the interim report of where that has happened; where, because it suited the Government to do it, we have done it. I talk about the public interest test, particularly in the Scappaticci case—in this case—and what they are going to do. I would say that the duty of candour came from Hillsborough. I remember Bishop Jones coming to see us all at the National Police Chiefs’ Council, and I was surprised by the hesitancy around it, because it sounds like a no-brainer for public institutions to be honest on what occurred when there has been a specific critical incident. Again, the lawyers were talking about culpability, responsibility and liability. I have met all these families, and a lot of them have legal cases against the PSNI, the MOD or the NIO. The lawyers say you cannot go to meet them, but you can meet them, talk to them and give them information without affecting those legal cases. I was frustrated by the initial resistance of policing to the duty of candour. Policing is now in the right place on that, and I can tell you that the PSNI is producing a new code of ethics and is wholly supportive of the duty of candour. As I said earlier, I think the security services have a completely different function and role from the police. Whatever their arguments are on stepping aside from, or having some protections from, the duty of candour, I always believe we should listen to them. I looked at the Manchester Arena inquiry—I followed it very closely, and some friends of mine were involved in it from a legal perspective—and MI5 said that they welcomed scrutiny through that process, which was a counsel comment from MI5. I think the director general welcomes scrutiny but, institutionally and culturally, it is quite difficult for intelligence agencies to display that in a more open, public way. I think we need to achieve that in the ways we currently do, with intelligence agencies. I think they need to change. There are other recent cases too, but they are very different from the police and our accountability measures, and they should not be considered in the same way. It is a difficult space. A well-functioning democracy is based on lots of different things, but key among them are how we protect our citizens and how we respond to legitimate accusations of wrongdoing against the Government and security forces. We do not want to be judged in the same way as the states that we criticise. We want to be more open and transparent, and we want to have independent processes. I think there is territory to move the dial with regard to how that has happened with the intelligence agencies, and that particularly needs to change in Northern Ireland. I am very open about trying to do that, but in a sensible, measured way and with agreement by lobbying my partners in other agencies and the Secretary of State.

Thank you, Chief Constable and Sir Iain. You have been very open and insightful in your comments. This is the last question, unless anyone wants to follow up. You have answered some of the questions I would have otherwise asked, but I am interested in what you were both saying about how Kenova continues to live on—what is its future? There may be various ways in which that can happen, but one of the obvious things is how it impacts the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill. I want to give you carte blanche: if you could change anything in the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill, so that the lessons learned from Kenova can really embed themselves in how this country deals with the legacy of the past in Northern Ireland, what would it be?

We support the Bill in general and the framework, but the one point I would highlight is on information sharing and who makes the determination of what is provided. As I read the Bill at the moment, the obligation to assess sensitive material rests with the organisation that holds the information and is being asked for it. I touched on chapter 8 of the final Kenova report, which is probably one of the drier chapters, and it is about putting the onus on the investigative body—in other words, the legacy commission. Jon talked about handing them the keys, so that they go in, take the material and carry out an assessment. Clearly, if there is an issue of national security, there is a process for that. I know this Committee recognises that, ultimately, the Secretary of State is probably the best office to carry out that moderation role. It is about information sharing and who takes the decision on who gets what. It was only when Kenova went into the PSNI, into the MOD and got close to MI5 that they were able to make sure that all the material was obtained, whereas at the moment, there is a duty—it is a burden as well—on organisations such as the PSNI to carry out that assessment of sensitivity. That is the one thing I would focus on.

I need to mention the 10 recommendations from Kenova. I genuinely think this Secretary of State is incredibly well intentioned and is working really hard to move things forward. I very much welcomed the wording of the troubles Bill to succeed the legacy Bill in what he is trying to do—more transparency and more independent oversight. I am sure Iain would agree with me that the independent groups that helped Kenova—the support, the expertise, the credibility and the scrutiny they provided—have significantly helped us to get to this position with these reports. That is the oversight group; the independent steering group, which is subject experts and senior police officers who have done all sorts of difficult stuff all over the world; and the victim focus group. The victim focus group did an independent report on Kenova, which is the independent scrutiny that we talk about. As a platform and a beginning for this new journey on legacy, the Secretary of State should look at those recommendations, because they will have long-term positive impacts on the Bill. Iain has alluded to schedule 4. I really worry, both as somebody who has led a legacy investigation and as the Chief Constable, about its collateral implications for families thinking that the PSNI are in some way categorising information on sensitivity, which we would not, and providing a determination around its prejudice because there is a legal burden on us to do that. I do not think we should do that. From an investigative perspective, I do not see any grounds for it. I do not see any grounds for it from a national security perspective, and certainly with regard to trust and confidence of communities—some of whom do not trust the PSNI because of some of the cases we have talked about today—it will add to their concern about this process. The Secretary of State is well intentioned, so I hope he sees that there is a need to reset that. It will also cost the PSNI significant resource. When the Patten commission created the PSNI almost 25 years ago, the structures, the accountability, the make-up of the organisation with regard to recruitment, and the oversight with regard to the Policing Board were all put in place. Nothing was put in place around legacy. I do not think Lord Patten would have had any expectation that we would be having these conversations 25 years later. It was probably too difficult to deal with at the time, but we are desperately short on resources. Being associated with doing this work is a double whammy against the organisation. At the moment, it is costing us £24 million a year just to manage. This will increase the volume of our work significantly, and we have no money in the Executive to provide the PSNI to do that. There will be delays and mistakes, which will reinforce the narrative that the police are not to be trusted, when actually we are doing our best. That particular issue has quite significant consequences; if we could just change that and provide funding for what we need to do, because that has never been considered. I get sent by the Secretary of State to the Executive, and by the Executive to the Secretary of State. The Executive will say, “This is Westminster-related” and Westminster will say, “We give a significant grant to the Executive. It is for them to pay for this.” I am caught between the two, but it is so serious and so important for the PSNI and for society in Northern Ireland. We need to resolve that, as well as the funding for the PSNI around legacy issues. On the outstanding legacy issues, I talked about 197 cases. Seventy-one of the cases we are examining, reviewing and investigating were during the troubles period, but they are not troubles-related. The others are ’98 to 2004, which is a significant commitment that we are not funded for. It is £60 million, but because of civil litigation and compensation, we think it could go towards £1 billion over the next 10 years. That is £1 billion we do not have. Unless we come up with a framework to deal with that, the PSNI will still have this anchor holding us back from moving forward. Let’s focus on the legacy commission and what we can do to get the structures right, but there are wider implications. Colleagues in the PPS and the Department of Justice would say, “Think about us more widely.” It is a wider conversation than just getting the legal framework right for the commission.

I need to bring in Sorcha Eastwood, and then we will wrap up.

Thank you, Chair. I am really glad that you raised that, Chief Constable. When I spoke about this on the Floor of the House just before Christmas, one of my major concerns was that, if we do get a troubles Bill that the parties are broadly prepared to accept, we would have hamstrung the PSNI from the off, because we know, rightly, that there are not the funds there to do it—and you are in the dock yet again. You are quite right to say that there is a double whammy. First, there is the community reputation piece around legacy and how that is still damaging relations to this day. Secondly, we in the House would have gone out publicly and said, “We’ve agreed this, but actually there is no money for you to do it.” You would yet again be in a situation where you are struggling to meet discovery requests, counsel requests and whatever else. I think there is a very clear argument for saying to Westminster, “Actually, you need to resource this adequately.” I have tabled a number of amendments, and it is difficult to get things drawn up in terms of resource. Would you agree that there is very much a case to be made that, if we are to legislate on this, Westminster needs to make sure it is adequately resourced?

These cases were during direct rule. There is an obvious, sensible argument here, in the same way that the Government are funding the ICRIR and the legacy commission. A response from the Secretary of State to this Committee shows they have already spent £50 million, as of September, out of £250 million. The resourcing and construction of this are really difficult, but do not leave us out on our own, because it will fail. It will be a single point of failure, and not because of a lack of willingness. I think you will see that my organisation is determined to get this right, but we cannot do it if we do not have the resources or if you put additional legal burdens on us, as Iain described around schedule 4.

I thank you for your work on Kenova and your time today. It has been quite a big session.