This is the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill, and we are taking evidence this morning from the Minister—you are welcome. We have been using first names, so can I take it as read that we can continue on that basis? Thank you very much. Minister, if you and your team can introduce yourselves, we can then get straight on with the questions—we have lots of questions for you.

I am Al Carns, and I am the Minister for the Armed Forces.

David, on housing—we have met before.

Welcome back, David—you are a glutton for punishment. It is good to have you back for the third time.

I am Sarah Houghton, and I am the director of armed forces people policy in the Ministry of Defence.

I am Sam des Forges, and I am the director for conduct, equity and justice.

I am Marc Overton, and I am the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff for reserves and cadets.

Thank you all very much for coming to give evidence to us, and for your service.

Good morning, everyone. I want to start by asking questions on the Armed Forces Covenant. Some of our evidence has noted that the existing Covenant duty is implemented unevenly. How will the Bill address the issue of inconsistent delivery?

The reality is that it is delivered inconsistently across the United Kingdom, and where you live will affect the level of services you get. The Covenant covers several policy areas, and the Bill will now expand that to 12 plus two, which will be pretty significant. It will put due regard on to local councils and those at national level to ensure that they must consider the impact on the armed forces community when they push anything through local or national Government, which will be the first step to making it more consistent. It will perhaps be a different question as we move further on, but the critical component will be how we educate and communicate at the local and national levels to ensure that people are not disadvantaged.

Some of the evidence we have received has said that it is about the interpretation of “due regard”. How can we ensure that more people understand what “due regard” is going to mean?

On due regard, different local areas have different pressures on local government. I always go back to this: from my perspective in the armed forces community, and we must ensure that our veterans and armed forces personnel are never disadvantaged because of their service, but local councils also have some really difficult decisions and choices to make—from housing allocation all the way through to SEND requirements. So yes, the Armed Forces Bill is expanding the policy areas, but particularly important is education and communication on what the armed forces go through, and therefore differentiating how they can be disadvantaged. The reality in society is that we have a bigger gap between the armed forces and our population than ever before in history. We have a job on our hands to educate local councils, and at the national level, on what it is like to be in the armed forces, and therefore some of the difficulties, and what they need to put in place to make sure they are not disadvantaged.

How can we ensure that the public bodies that are going to have this new Covenant are clear about what is actually meant by “due regard”?

There are a couple of things we are looking at, and a couple of things that we have done. First, as this moves forward and the duty expands, there will be Covenant champions in other Government Departments—I will hand over to the team in a minute as they can perhaps provide a bit more detail. Hopefully they will be people with some military experience, or with insight and understanding into military life. Secondly, there is Op VALOUR, which is the £50 million programme that will start to run field officers into local councils. That is primarily focused on veterans to start with, but they will also be the single point of contact to help the armed forces champions, which most councils have, to ensure that all the policy areas adhere to the Covenant legal duty.

I will build on that by saying that we have been developing our statutory guidance relating to those measures in the Bill. We have been working very closely with other Government Departments and engaging with the third sector, who have been giving their comments on the statutory guidance. We will work with the local authorities as well. That will make it very clear and give some good case examples of how we expect the duty to be carried out, while also maintaining that degree of flexibility—because they are all very different organisations, and they will want to apply the Covenant in different ways according to the particular context. We are also rolling out training materials for all the organisations affected by the Covenant duty. That will be on a digital basis. We already have very regular meetings with other Government Departments, devolved Governments and local authorities across the whole UK. We have a Covenant community action group, which meets on a regular basis to talk about best practice and how we can apply the Armed Forces Covenant more consistently across the UK. There are definitely some steps that we are taking in addition to what the Minister said about establishing armed forces champions in other Government Departments. We are also establishing an interministerial group with other Government Departments and having ministerial champions attend that. We have an officials group across Government as well.

What evidence would you need to satisfy yourself that somebody has given “due regard”?

I think the yearly report that we are going to put out will be a good way of holding people to account both at the local and national level. However, it is going to be individuals in the local council who are going to have to champion armed forces requirements. That is what I would like to see. We are in the first stages of it, but I would like to see the field officers and Op VALOUR going out to assess how those councils or local government are implementing the Covenant and whether or not people are disadvantaged because of their service—or indeed through a lack of understanding of the armed forces community and what it is like to be in the armed forces.

Are you happy with the wording “due regard”?

Early on, when I came into this job, I talked about whether we could thicken it. Actually, I think what we need to do is make sure that it is absolutely clear in the statutory guidance. After going around all the different local governments—and indeed devolved Governments, whether that be Northern Ireland, Scotland or England—the pressure that they are under in specific areas is not lost on me. What we have got to do is ensure that they have a well thought through plan on how they are going to support their armed forces. That is an education and communication problem, not necessarily a question of willingness or any type of nefariousness.

In your last couple of responses, you mentioned the armed forces champions in local authorities and other bits of Government. Clearly, that is a bit of a postcode lottery. Some people have really grabbed the role and are very proactive, and then there are others who perhaps do not realise the scope of what they could do. Is there a case for the responsibilities and remit of the armed forces champions being more formalised?

You are absolutely right, Luke, and you are on to something. In my last job, as Minister for Veterans and People, I went around the country and saw different types of armed forces champions. Some are part time, some are full time. Some are employed by the council, some are not. Some have different terms of reference, and some have different measures of effect. There is no unity across the system. That is why the VALOUR field officers were created: to provide an element of standardisation in the level of support that goes into councils alongside those armed forces champions. Unfortunately, whether we like it or not, it was exceptionally difficult to draw upon the data and understand where a lot of the problems sit across the armed forces community. There was no requirement on the armed forces champions, or indeed the councils, to provide any data into the system. That meant that when we were putting money and resource into finding solutions, there was no real data-based evidence.

Minister, when this cropped up in an earlier evidence session, someone asked, “What is your formal, written definition of ‘due regard’?” I think you undertook to get that to the Committee in writing. Have we had that yet?

Yes.

Good. Thank you.

Good morning, Minister. You have mentioned local authorities a number of times in respect of the Covenant. I think we all agree that local authorities play a key role in the delivery of the Covenant with the Ministry of Defence. With the new legislation, that is going to be expanded, but some authorities say that it will add resource challenges. How do you think they are going to cope with the additional budgetary challenges that this legislation may put on them?

We have to be really careful about Whitehall dictating, to local councils and local government, solutions that require local nuance. Northern Ireland, for example, will be very different from England in how veterans are engaged with, or even how we capture data, just because of some of the security concerns and issues there. We have to find council solutions to the problem, with a strong Whitehall or central Government direction. Due regard means that they must consider it. If they have not considered it in their policy, they can be held to account.

Due regard gives them that flexibility to interpret it in the way they think, in context, will best benefit the armed forces. They have already been operating under a duty with regard to healthcare, housing and education, so they are familiar with the context of the duty and are comfortable operating within it. We need to monitor it and see how it goes as we expand the duty to these other areas.

The Royal British Legion has gold, silver and bronze awards for authorities. You will be glad to know that when I was leader of my local authority, we were gold—so there you go. We take it seriously.

Yes.

That is leadership, Paul.

We have mentioned in earlier evidence, Minister, the Government’s estimate of between £307,000 and £1.5 million for training across Whitehall on the requirements in this new legislation. Do you think that is enough?

I think £1.5 million is adequate for central Government, but I remind you that we have also put £50 million into standardising the procedures down into local government. We are seeing the VALOUR centres and field officers roll out now. They are particularly focused on veterans, but you will end up with field officers, who have really good insight into and understanding of the armed forces, sitting in the centre of local government who will be able to help, educate and communicate the requirements in their patch for the armed forces, the veterans and the families of those serving. So it is actually £51.5 million.

You have mentioned VALOUR a few times, Minister. How is that prioritised around the country? Does VALOUR go to the local authorities, or do local authorities draw in the VALOUR teams regionally?

There are three different bits to VALOUR. These are steps in the right direction to start formalising our support to veterans and the armed forces community. VALOUR has three sections. First, we recognised that there was a lack of data on veterans once they left. There is a national census going out, but there is not a huge amount of centralised data that we can analyse in a really balanced manner. There is a requirement to rebuild that data collection at the centre of Government. To do that, you need to be able to pool the data from local government, and therefore we need field officers in councils to ensure that the data collection and adherence to the Covenant is taking place. We then need to accept that we have a huge number in the charitable sector doing an amazing job across the country. Flat and fast sometimes works far better than the bigger organisations. How do we harness that most effectively and make sure that, in some cases, it is not standardised but flows along the greatest need, which is based on the data? That is about creating VALOUR centres across the country. The money is open now and the bids are in for the first section, and we will see the first VALOUR centres rolling out in the next couple of months.

I have one final question. You recently rolled out the veteran digital ID. Is that something the Government will continue to push, because that seems very sensible? It could link all the different elements for veterans, be it medical, pensions or any support. I have the digital ID, and it was relatively straightforward to get. Is it the plan to roll that out, and will it possibly be mandatory when people become veterans and leave the forces?

Leaving the forces is an interesting one. We might want to come on to it when we get on to the Reserves, because technically a lot of people who leave still have a legal liability for recall. You could argue that they are not necessarily a veteran, but we now give veteran cards as soon as people leave the gates of a military establishment. I would like to see the veteran digital ID card as the baseline and foundation of a far greater programme to collect data on veterans, to start to centralise our ability to manage our veteran cohort, and to communicate more effectively with them. We talked in the past about how we can align a lot of veteran or armed forces benefits, whether it is discounts in local shops all the way through to travel, with the veteran digital ID card to make it a one-stop shop. I am not an expert in any way, shape or form on data, but our lack of data collection on those who have served is amazing. On reserves, if you need to press the red button and mobilise, knowing who is where, what skills they have and how we can pull them back in is exceptionally difficult. We have to rewrite that. This Bill is the first step towards helping us have better data collection and services for veterans, while also helping us to recall people if we need to.

In the 2021 census, there was a question on whether people had served. Should that continue in the census?

Yes, 100%. We have taken it on with the ONS to make sure it is included in the next census. It is worth noting, speaking to different veteran cohorts around the country, that some people want to be recognised as a veteran and some people don’t. We have to leave that option open once people have left. Some people want nothing to do with the military, and some people want to stay connected. We must have that balance in place.

Good morning. The MOD will play a vital role in ensuring cross-departmental collaboration and work so that the Covenant is implemented. Some have said that the MOD does not cover itself in glory on collaboration and collaborative working, even internally. I have two questions. First, is that something that you recognise, and would the MOD itself need to change its cultures before it can promote cultures in other Departments? Secondly, how will the MOD promote collaborative working on this?

The team will have the detail on the engagement that we have at official level; it is actually quite regular. The problem in local government that I mentioned, which is about education and communication with the armed forces, is equally applicable at the Government level in some cases. You will recognise this across various Government Departments: they have their priorities, their budget and their focus, and it is on us in the MOD to represent the veterans community—all the way through from the armed forces and their families to those of the bereaved—to ensure that they are listened to and counted as a cohort. The Covenant spreading its wings into a multitude of policy areas is a really effective way of ensuring that, because they will have to think about the armed forces community as they move policy forward. That will force their engagement with the MOD and the MOD’s engagement with them, which I think is a good thing. Sarah, you may want to discuss further engagement.

I am part of the MOD myself, and I genuinely think that we go out of our way to try to engage with all those key groups. The Minister has talked about the fact that we have now identified Covenant champions in all other Government Departments. We will be establishing an interministerial group, with our Ministers chairing a meeting with champions from other Government Departments. We have regular meetings with other Government Departments at official level, and with devolved Governments and local administrations. We work very closely and have regular meetings with the third sector as well. We have good relationships. I know you have heard evidence from the RBL, Cobseo and Help for Heroes, for example. We engage with them on a regular basis, and they are working with us to comment on the training materials that we are developing to make sure people understand the Covenant duty, and on the statutory guidance. We also have the Armed Forces Covenant annual report, which is a statutory requirement, and we will publish that in Parliament every year. In it, we will be making sure that we chart progress from other Government Departments, the devolved Governments and so on. We also hold an annual Covenant conference, which moves around the country in different locations. That brings in all the key stakeholders who will have to uphold the duty in legislation.

You touched on your work with the devolved Administrations. Is there anything anyone else would like to add on how this will have to work across the devolved Administrations?

Speak to the leads—my opposite numbers in the devolved Governments. I have briefed them, as this Bill has been progressing, on the Covenant, VALOUR and indeed some of the work on the Reserves. We keep that close contact to ensure that we are aligned as much as possible on the implementation of the Covenant and the standardisation of services as we move forward. I reiterate that the standardisation of services will take time. It is not going to happen overnight. This is about education and communication, and it will take time to deliver, but we are moving as fast as we can.

Let us switch to the Reserves, Minister. We acknowledge that you are still a serving reservist. I will start with a very general question. How will the measures in the Bill affect the size and readiness of the Reserves, both now and in 10 years’ time?

It is a really good question. If we step back, at the moment we have a whole multitude of types of Reserves. We have two types of Reserve forces, seven Reserve services and 16 different terms and conditions of service. I am going to be really honest: the thing’s a mess. This Bill is the first step to simplifying that process and making sure that moving from Regular to Reserve and from Reserve to Regular services is far easier. We have 14,900 people leaving a year. By standardising our Strategic Reserve liability, you could argue that, over time, you are increasing the Reserve by 14,900 every year for 18 years, or until people are 65 years old. You will recognise that we have an opt-in and an opt-out requirement within the Bill. Why was I pretty hard over in putting that in place? Once you have left the military, it would be very unfair of us to change the terms of service and say, “While you no longer had a liability to serve, you now have one.” I think that would be unfair if people have left. People who are in can opt out of it, because we are changing the terms and conditions of service.

On the Strategic Reserve, you are right: it is a mess. As of today, how large do you estimate the Strategic Reserve to be?

Ninety-five thousand.

Thank you. That is a very precise answer. How many people do you think will opt out? To be clear, when this comes in, are you liable for recall unless you opt out, or do you have to opt in to be liable? Which way round do you envisage it working, and how many people do you think will opt out?

That is a very good question. I think we will see very few people who are still serving opting out of the increase in Strategic Reserve liability. What does that mean? When you leave the service, you will now have a standardised return of 18 years, from the lowest rank of private to sergeant to warrant officer, all the way to officer. Why is that important? Because at the moment, officers and other ranks have different returns of service. Different services—the Army, Navy and Air Force—have different returns of service. The whole thing is a spaghetti junction. We are now standardising it so that, from a young marine or private to a general, you will now have to give at least 18 years’ return of service once you leave the doors of the military, unless you are medically discharged or there is another reason. I do not think we will see a huge number of people opting out of that who are still serving. People who have already left can opt into it. We have not done an estimate of how many that would be. We would love more people to opt into the process. I do not think it will hugely change the numbers we have. The reality is that from the day this Bill comes in, 14,900 people—pending 100 or 200 for medical discharge or other reasons—will have a return of service for 18 years. That will go for 18 years, so you are adding 14,900 every year.

With simple maths, Minister, after a decade of this, assuming that everybody accepts, we should have a Strategic Reserve that is north of 200,000. That is clearly better than the 95,000 we have today. If you are going to have some people who are required to opt in, how will you encourage them to do so? What campaigns or initiatives will you run to get the people you want to opt in?

We have the communication plan set and ready to go.

Can you give us some idea of what that will look like?

I will pass over to Marc.

First, we have to establish a Strategic Reserve. That is what this is about. The last time we used them was for Granby. We communicate with them, as you know, with an annual letter. That interaction is not modern—it is not real. Only 40% of those people actually engage, so it is not the right way to engage with them. The first thing to do is engage with them. We need awareness and increased communications to those people at a national, local and regional level. We need a digital platform for them to sign up to, so that we can start communicating with them. We are building that as we speak.

In other words, are we going to have a social media campaign?

We are going to have a social media campaign—LinkedIn to talk to the employers, and other social media outlets.

Okay. I will crack on, to save time. On the active Reserve as opposed to the Strategic Reserve, your written evidence, Minister, and that of other witnesses has told us that the Bill’s measures have relatively little impact on the active Reserve, but the SDR says that the Government want to increase the active Reserve by 20%. How are you going to do that? Will there be further measures to that effect in the defence readiness Bill? Without being flippant, when will the defence readiness Bill be ready?

I am here to talk about the Armed Forces Bill.

Yes, but just a hint would help.

I cannot comment on the defence readiness Bill. I am hoping that it will be before the end of this Parliament.

The end of the Parliament? It could be another three and a half years away?

The end of the Parliament. I will not comment on the exact timings or details of a Bill that is outwith this Bill. What I will comment on is the active Reserve. Although some think that the measures will not have a huge impact on the active Reserve, I believe otherwise. I know from having visited many bases, from Brize Norton to Faslane in Scotland, and having spoken to reservists all across the defence enterprise, there is real concern among reservists about having to leave service at 55 years old. A hugely capable 53-year-old air traffic controller with 10 or 15 years’ experience was in dismay that she would have to leave at 55. I have heard that time and again from really skilled, educated individuals with huge amounts of experience, so we have pushed it to 65. We are saying that if you want to extend your service to 65, you absolutely can. That is a great way to retain quality. It also allows us to pool in, should we need to, some of the more experienced people in society who can provide us with huge benefits to defence.

I will go to Luke. I beg your pardon, Paul—did you want to come in?

Yes, just quickly. I am 55 years old; I am a veteran; I have no current Reserve liability. Can I opt in?

That is part of the plan—to allow you to opt in. You can contact us.

Ready to sign up, Paul?

I have not got that far yet.

Sorry, Luke—over to you.

I would not have wanted to deny Paul the chance to volunteer his services to the nation. One of the Bill’s aims is to enhance the ability to recall reservists at pace and scale if there were a time of national need, but that will be highly dependent on improving the identification and tracking system for the Reserves. What progress has been made on implementing a digital system to achieve that? Will it be fully operational by the SDR’s ambition of January 2027? We are not that far away from that date.

This reflects some of the issues we have with our veterans. When you leave, you get a veteran card and a digital ID card. Our ability to track veterans who have a Strategic Reserve liability after the Bill and our ability to keep reservists engaged in the system are continual challenges. We used to be exceptionally good at this during the cold war. We kept really tight records, and the ways of communicating were relatively narrow. It is now far broader; people communicate in different ways. The Department is working up the digital plan to ensure that we can keep our reservists engaged and keep the data of who is where and what skills they have, should we need specific cohorts to sign back up or, indeed, come back for a limited period of time. There is also the ability to unlock HMRC records for pensions, which also have a lot of data, and to take those datasets, cross-pollinate them and get a more holistic view. Within the Strategic Reserve liability, some veterans do not want to stay in contact with Defence—they just don’t. Unless there is a liability for them to do so, I think we have to respect that in some way, shape or form. They may also have medical or other issues that allow them to disengage.

As the Minister says, this is a key cornerstone of how we enable the Strategic Reserve. I was out with the Norwegian defence forces earlier this week talking about how they enable their home guard. They do that through an app that they have recently launched, and they update contact details through the tax office. We have an MOU with HMRC to do that, which has been approved. Starting that engagement in real time with the community will build the dataset. As the Minister said, the fusion of data from across at least seven or eight datasets is a real challenge at the moment. This is going to be the conduit to manage that.

On top of that, remember that we are in a simplification process to make the reservists easier to navigate. We have a multitude of terms and conditions of service. What does that mean? It means things like pensions, how many hours you need to do and what you need to do to continue to serve, all the way down to what types of uniform you wear. It needs to be simplified, and we are in that process now through the Reserves board.

I was going to ask about the relationship with HMRC, but I think you have covered that by explaining that there will be an MOU. Is there a role that industry could play in identifying and tracking reservists, particularly businesses in the defence sector that are very likely to pick up people as staff after they complete their military service?

There is a very clear concern that if we were to mobilise our Reserve, it would take the heart out of the defence industry, because we have so many ex-defence personnel working in it. We need to map and track our reservist base and ensure that industry acknowledges who it has, and indeed some of the liability it has should we have to mobilise, like Granby in the Gulf war. There is a huge amount of work to take place there. Maybe Marc can go into the detail.

As well as being a reservist, I run a UK sovereign defence technology business called Roke. I employ about 1,000 people, and about 20% are in the category of ex-military or serving military. We have identified who they are internally, as best we can, and I am seeing that across other elements of the defence industry—they are doing it proactively. We need to help them with that and, as part of establishing the Strategic Reserve, we need to work with them. Gold award holders in the defence employer recognition scheme are very alive to this, so we are working closely with them.

Do you mind if I elaborate on that? There is a lot of good will out there in the industry with reservists. We have to make sure that having Reserves in your workforce does not become a liability or impact your productivity. That balance of good will needs to be maintained; it cannot flip either way, or it becomes very problematic.

How will you determine progress in that area? The Bill will enhance the ability to bring back reservists, but how will we be able to measure whether it has been effective?

Measurement of effect is going to be critical. The nine measures in the Bill go some way to delivering it. From my perspective, if you were to harmonise the maximum recall liability of all our ORs, we would start to see an increase in the Strategic Reserve numbers. That is the first and easiest way to measure effect. As we move forward over the next three years, you will start to see an increase from UK defence in how we mobilise. We are getting back to home defence. We are getting back to mobilisation exercises on a really broad scale. That will provide us with a really good measure of effect of whether we can mobilise elements of our Strategic Reserve or active Reserve at scale to support anything from homeland defence to overseas operations. That will be a key measure of whether we can deliver this.

Will there be any independent external oversight of that?

I think it will be internal within MOD.

The external scrutiny team has included the Strategic Reserve in its terms of reference.

Minister, I turned 60 last August. For the record, I will opt in now, but all I can say is that if you get to the point where you have to mobilise me, you must really be in trouble. On the costs of these measures, the ruling in the Milroy case said, in essence, that reservists could be entitled to a lot of back pay and potential pension payments. Do you or the General have an estimate of the potential liability that the Milroy case might represent for the MOD? How will you deal with that in the context of all this?

The measures in the Bill are about our ability to use reservists, not the compensation paid to reservists when they are serving. We therefore do not expect a significant impact from the Milroy case. However, we are still examining the impact of the ruling on all employment of reservists.

That was obviously pre-prepared. None the less, what is your estimate of the potential liability?

I think it would be really dangerous to make an estimate. I will wait till the ruling is complete.

All right. That worries me, but if we focus on the Bill itself, what will be the cost of implementing the measures purely as outlined in the Bill?

The cost of the measures will be included in our future programme. I do not think there will be an exceptionally large cost for our Strategic Reserve plan. The costs will be around a communication plan to ensure that our reservists stay engaged in defence. That will come out in the defence investment plan.

When we get it.

I am a member of the Justice Committee, so I am very interested in this: how do the Bill’s measures seek to improve existing support and protection for victims in the service justice system?

We heard from various panel members, specifically yesterday, that they welcome a lot of the measures in place. It is worth stepping back to look at where we have come from. In December 2022, after a couple of high-profile cases that were completely unacceptable, we took a large chunk of the military crime elements and pulled them together in the Defence Serious Crime Command. We launched the zero-tolerance policy and our Raising our Standards programme. We created a tri-service complaints system. What does that really mean? It means pulling the complaints system out from the command chain so that people feel free to complain with no implications for their career or promotion. With the team, we created the violence against women and girls taskforce, which provides independent advice and support to anyone within the system. The Bill ratifies a huge number of changes that will make the service justice system exceptionally effective in dealing with unacceptable sexual behaviour or serious sexual crime. Sam, you may have more detail.

That is absolutely right. There has been a real step change in the last three or four years. You will have heard that from other folk who have spoken to you recently. I am grateful to the Committee for visiting to see what is happening at first hand. I am conscious that sometimes information is shared in the media that is not quite up to date and does not really reflect the support that is available and the way things have changed. Picking up on a question asked earlier about how sometimes defence is seen as operating in isolation, I think the work we are doing on preventing sexual violence, in the service justice system and the cross-Government violence against women and girls strategy, is a terrific example of where defence is leaning out and seeking best practice, whether it is from the Department for Education, the MOJ or the Home Office. Equally, with the service justice system, we have been able to demonstrate over the last couple of years a system that is relatively small and agile, so we have been able to deliver change at a pace that is far more challenging for our colleagues in the civilian justice system. We were fortunate enough to have a visit from Minister Jess Phillips and Minister Alex Davies-Jones recently to say, “Our door is open. Let’s experiment and try some different things in the service justice system, and those pilots can then help inform the broader place.” We are here to talk about the legislative levers in this Bill, but it is part of a bigger story. The levers in the Bill will enable us to better support victims not just at the point of a conviction, as these orders will also help us protect folk earlier in the process—perhaps post-charge, for example. They enable us to have more tools in our toolbox to get after that. We have to look at it in the context of a lot of legislation going through Parliament at the moment led by the Home Office or MOJ, with which we work super closely to make sure that, when they bring in new and innovative approaches, those will impact the service justice system. We might be able to touch on that later. It is not all about legislative levers. There is broader culture change work, communications work, leadership training through raising our standards, and our preventing sexual violence work. This is part of a far broader piece.

My follow-up question is on the closer alignment of the service justice system with the civilian justice system. The Bill will give service courts and police similar powers to prevent sexual harm and domestic abuse. How will you ensure that those two systems—the civilian justice system and the service justice system—work closely together to protect people caught in the middle of the two?

There is a recognition in the Bill whereby some of the orders can flow into the civilian system—if someone leaves, for example. What I have seen over the last couple of years—again, going back to your point about defence sometimes being a bit closed off and siloed—is that, in developing these, we have worked super closely with the civilian justice system to learn where perhaps they have put things in place that have not quite worked as intended, so that we can learn those lessons and also try things out in a slightly different way. That connection is working really well. You will have heard from our colleagues in the various independent parts of the service justice system about where we have got to in the Defence Serious Crime Unit. We have folk with a civilian justice background embedded in the Service Prosecuting Authority. We have folk from public prosecutions, so we have that crossover. It is not only official level policy engagement; it is on the ground as we are delivering this to make sure that happens. Another important element, when we look at the victims code, is making sure that the armed forces victims code, the service justice victims code, really does reflect what is happening in terms of victims code work more broadly in the civilian system. Putting the victims code together will also enable our colleagues in civilian policing—the Home Office policing space—to be better informed, because there will often be occasions where they might be first responders. Some folk will know about the service justice system. Some of those first responders might not know about the service justice system. We can help and educate them about that sort of optionality and the ability to have those conversations. Yesterday, you heard some really clear evidence from Mary Cowe, our Director of Service Prosecutions, about how closely things such as the prosecutors’ protocol work, and about the early intervention and discussions with prosecutors that enable this to happen. I do not think we would ever claim to be perfect, or that we have it all solved, but these powers will enable us to take that real step forward. It is those working relationships, which have really developed, that will help us to deliver it.

On the subject of the service justice system, we have heard evidence that has raised concerns around the decision not to implement some of the recommendations of the Lyons review, specifically around jurisdiction for the more serious offences of murder, manslaughter and rape. Why has the Bill not implemented those recommendations?

It is my firm belief, after speaking to a multitude of people involved in the system, that preference is required. I think we heard evidence yesterday that we need to standardise the information and education given to people before they state a preference. We have taken that away to double-check that it is standardised, and that people get the best information before they state a preference. I would argue that to take away someone’s preference and to force them down a particular avenue is absolutely counterintuitive. It may have been the case in 2021, when some of the Lyons review was being pulled together, that there were no correct or adequate processes in place. But I have to say that what the last Government, from 2021, did and what we have done since then has really improved the service justice system. The statistics, analysis and independent reviews show that.

The Henriques review, which looked at this question a few years later, did not necessarily support the position of the earlier Lyons review. I particularly draw the attention of the Committee to the report of His Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate from November 2024, which is one of the most recent reviews. It covers the as-is, as opposed to the previous position. I will give a couple of quotes from it. The timeliness of victim support in the service justice system was at a level that the authors “would like to see afforded to all victims in all jurisdictions”. They also said, “Given the extent of the delay in the civilian system and the impact this can have on victims of serious sexual offences, we are of the view that the SJS may be the better jurisdiction in many cases.” I think that, particularly when you have gone through such a period of rapid change, looking at recommendations that are relatively historical perhaps does not give the most up-to-date position. I have spoken to a lot of victim-survivors, and to echo the Minister’s point, what is really important to them—again, this goes back to making sure that we give them the information they need to state a clear preference as to where they want their case to sit. I have concerns that there is some misleading information in the public domain, and we want them to have real, fact-based and evidence-based information. Yesterday, you heard from Mary about the work they have done. Actually, folks’ preferences are proving quite important in the determination of where something lands. If we are looking at this through a victim lens, I would be worried just to take away some of that ability to state a preference, and some of that optionality within the systems. There is an inherent risk in looking at a recommendation from a review that looked at a system that is very different from the system today. I am grateful to the Committee for coming to find out more about what the system looks like today.

To follow up on what you just said about the choice made by victims on which jurisdiction they want their case to be heard in, it is obviously good that the Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate has said that the cases it looked at seemed to have landed in the correct jurisdiction. What does the process or system look like currently? If you are a victim, what support do you get to help you make the best possible choice about which jurisdiction to pursue your case in? Is there anything that we could do to improve that?

I think you are absolutely right. I am conscious about the wording of “preference” versus “choice”. If we look at the prosecutors’ protocol, if there is a disagreement on the final decision, it goes to a conversation between the two directors. But one really important point that is often forgotten is that the person who has the final say is the Director of Public Prosecutions. There should not be the sense that Defence marks its own homework, and goes, “No, we’re having that and you don’t get a say,” when actually the final decision is made by the civilian system in the situation where there is a disagreement. Sorry—the joys of brain fog—could you repeat the rest of your question?

It was about the system, and, if you are a victim, who gives you the information and how much do you get told? Could the experience of understanding the options be improved for victims?

Again, this goes to continuous improvement and wanting to push further with transparency and the sharing of information—but the sharing of information grounded in fact and evidence. At the moment, there are a number of ways that folk can get that information. I have spoken to victim-survivors who have simply googled and read media reports. Our Victim Witness Care Unit, which I know many of you have met, provide an outstanding service, and give information on the options and the different routes that folk might want to take. The Bill will help close this gap, as there might be different legislative mechanisms available in the civilian justice system that are not, at this exact point in time, available in the service justice system. Our service police can talk to that. One of our other reflections, which I touched on earlier, was that some of our Home Office police colleagues might not be aware that the service justice system is there as an option as well. The guidance will not only support greater clarity and consistency in the information given by service police colleagues, and colleagues in our welfare space or Victim Witness Care Unit, but enable colleagues in Home Office policing, who might be the first responders, to have more knowledge and understanding at their fingertips. Therefore, however a victim-survivor comes into whichever jurisdiction, they have a consistent understanding of the options and information.

We are zeroing in on an important point here about the standardisation of information before people state a preference for the civilian or the service justice systems. That is something we need to take away, have a look at and ensure is standardised across the entire system, so that people have a clear insight and understanding as to which avenue they are embarking on.

As a follow-up to that, yesterday we had the Centre for Military Justice and the Director of Service Prosecutions both giving powerful evidence, but they contradicted each other when it came to statistics. One of the most important decisions that a victim is going to make is where has the best chance—the civilian or service justice system—of getting the prosecution they seek. We had examples yesterday of “rape flagging”—the horrible term that the civilian justice system uses—distorting their views. But we then talked to Mary, who passionately provided her evidence, and when she broke it down into yearly figures, there was something like 15 rape charges, of which they managed to convict nine. That is quite powerful—that is over 50% with a successful charge. Clearly, it has to be a priority that there is some equalisation between the service justice system and the civilian justice system on something as critical as rape and serious sexual offences.

I think Mary’s evidence yesterday was really powerful. When she took away the inability to compare thousands of cases with 20 to 30 cases, and gave you the bare facts, it was really clear that the service justice system has an exceptionally good record of moving through to conviction rates, and indeed a lack of withdrawals as well, with timely and effective management of those cases moving through. That is not necessarily replicated in some ways in the civilian justice system.

With my background as a forensic accountant, this is one issue that I get quite passionate about. As a Government, as you will understand, we have to abide by a lot of rules around statistics and analysis, and we have to be super-clear about where we get our numbers from. We have to publish the numbers transparently. Fundamentally—exactly as the Minister said—if you are comparing about 20 cases with thousands of cases, then as Mary said yesterday, two or three cases will look like a massive difference. It is just that our professional analytical colleagues have said to us, “Fundamentally, you just can’t compare these.” Therefore, if you are also throwing in things such as looking at different populations, some of the case profiles might be different. Case profiles in the service justice system are the vast majority, and it is very rare for them to involve strangers. It is also very rare to have them reliant on forensic evidence; it is far more in the consent space. That is certainly a big chunk of the civilian system as well, but stranger pieces are extremely rare in the service justice system. Our fundamental position is that it is not just comparing apples with oranges; it is comparing apples with giraffes, or something like that. That is the challenge. One of the things that was perhaps misunderstood by some of the folk giving evidence yesterday was this point about rape flagging. Historically, we have seen some things quoted in the media where people were comparing cases that, as Mary explained, had been flagged as a potential rape but the conviction was for another offence. Nevertheless, that was being marked as a rape conviction, whereas in the service justice system, our annual stats, which I think will come out in the next month or so, relate to a conviction for the offence of rape. I think that it was in January that we put out some transparency data; we will make sure that you have copies of that as well. Transparency data, in Government and analytical speak, is not official stats; it is a level below. I think that of the six pages, two or three explained why you cannot use this data, because—again—we are really keen to make sure that the data we share does not mislead. But what we really wanted to do with that is to say, “If we were to look through the lens of this rape-flagged approach, it really makes a significant difference, in comparison to our official stats.” In saying that, we are not saying that you should necessarily compare that rape-flagged data with the data that is coming through the MOJ or the CPS. We are just saying, “If you look at it differently, gosh, it makes quite a big difference.” We put that out because we wanted to help folk to understand the challenges of this comparison. The only other element that I wanted to touch on was another point raised by His Majesty’s Inspectorate, which said: “Furthermore, we have learnt from significant experience of the civilian CJS in relation to sexual offences, that conviction rates are not a reliable indicator of the performance of a prosecution authority as in some circumstances a high conviction rate may suggest an over cautious approach to charging such cases.” Again, I think there is more recent independent analysis by folk who understand both systems. So I think that comparison of conviction rates risks folk perhaps making preference decisions that might not be based on sound evidence, and that is our worry bead.

Under clause 25, what guidance would be given to victims about making decisions?

We have an obligation to consult with the various folk that you will have spoken to recently, and we want to be able to give them the best data; we want to give them evidence-based data. We want to give them data that we know, from talking to them, is the information that they are interested in. We find some things when we talk to victim-survivors. Timeliness can often be dismissed, but if someone has experienced something tremendously traumatic, the ability for them to get some form of closure and start their journey moving forward is one important element to think about. The withdrawal rates are an interesting, almost proxy indicator of how well supported folk might be feeling. If they are perhaps feeling more alone, less supported or less comfortable with the jurisdiction that they are operating in, they are more likely to withdraw and step away. Again, we are seeing far lower levels of withdrawal. We would consider how to talk to victims about conviction rates, but we would make sure they are looking at it with open eyes. The victim support that Defence has invested in—some of you had the opportunity to meet some of those folk recently—is a real plus. That comes in at a point that is perhaps even before folk might wish to make a report, to give them understanding and optionality. These decisions are very personal, and we will have to go in with empathy and understanding, and provide some facts and evidence-based information to assist them. I suspect that as we do many of these things, a victim might ask for another piece of information that we might not have thought of. We can then bring that in, so it will be a continuous improvement process.

For many victims, this will be a very traumatic time.

Indeed.

And at that time, they are being asked to weigh up two different jurisdictions, which adds to the complexity of the situation that they are in. Does that cause you any concern?

Absolutely. We have also put in the ability to go back to them at a slightly later time. This is again about being trauma-informed and looking at this through a victim lens. Everyone is different: in that moment, they may be able to give a really clear preference and view, but after some reflection, or after talking to friends, family or other support networks, they might change their mind. We have to be careful about the window of opportunity for them to change their mind, because if it happens too late, there is the counter-risk that if the case moves to a different jurisdiction, it might almost have to be reinvestigated, which can in itself be a traumatic experience. There is a really nuanced balance here, and being victim-led in how we do that will be key.

Clause 25 will ensure that victims are properly supported as they go through that choice of preference, but I go back to the requirement for a preference. They have to have the ability to choose; I do not think it is right for us to be forcing upon them which avenue they want to take. But we have to make sure that the information they get about stating that preference is suited, balanced, proportionate, clear and concise. That is what clause 25 gets after.

I will stick to the issue of supporting victims, but looking at it through a slightly wider lens. Can you set out the extent to which the Bill delivers the cultural change needed in the Ministry of Defence to support victims of service offences? How will you seek to make sure that fewer people are victimised through their service in the first instance?

I will lead off and then hand over to Sam for some of the detail. When I joined the military, there was still an LGBT ban on people joining. The military has come a long way, but it has a long way to go, and we continually need to move as fast as we possibly can to ensure that Defence is the most accepting and welcoming place to work, regardless of who you are, where you come from, your religion or your sex. After the 2021 incident, we saw some significant change over three to four years of the last Government. We have taken that on and continued to move it forward at pace. Since coming into government, we have really gripped this and delivered two key programmes. One is the violence against women and girls taskforce. I was a young marine when I joined. I always say this, but imagine if you are a female at the bottom of the rank structure and you have a complaint—where do you go? Do you go to your training corporal, who is in charge of whether or not you pass training? Do you go to the sergeant, or to the officer? They are all in your command chain. The second bit is creating a tri-service complaints system, so there is an alternative avenue where you can step outside and air your concerns, and make sure they are dealt with in an appropriate manner all the way through the process, that does not affect your promotion or even whether you pass training. The system is quite closed, so what we are doing through the violence against women and girls taskforce is creating an avenue for people to come out to the side and make a complaint, or seek advice, without the fear that it will impact their career. The tri-service complaints system also takes certain complaints out of the command chain. When you combine that with zero tolerance, raising our standards, and the Defence Serious Crime Command, we are starting to move the culture faster towards being a welcoming and harmonious place to work.

As I think I touched on previously, there is a far more holistic approach to this and a number of levers that are super important within this Bill seen through those perspectives. Other legislation is going through that gives us additional levers in that space. If I think about the cross‑Government VAWG strategy, which Defence is leaning into—arguably for the first time—15 of the key initiatives are Defence ones. It looks through three lenses, which is a helpful way of reflecting on it: the lens of enforcement, which is where a lot of what we are talking about here is focused; the lens of victim support as well—some of the things we are looking to do around SARCs, and you will all have heard about our independent legal advocacy piece, where we have worked really closely with some of the folk who have tried that in other areas. Ours goes a step further, because it is not just for victims of rape but for broader sexual offences as well, so again, we are leading the way in piloting that approach. The Victim Witness Care Unit is a terrific strength. You also heard from Aurora New Dawn, and we have been supporting the expansion of its work more broadly. The really interesting opportunity, which is not legislative in nature, is the violence against women and girls taskforce, as the Minister mentioned. In terms of locations, on your visit you will have seen a lot of the work that the Defence Serious Crime Unit and the Victim Witness Care Unit are engaging in, which has helped us to identify hotspot areas. Those are where our pilots of the taskforce are going to be focused: Catterick and the surrounding area; Devonport and the surrounding area; and then, in phase 2, Halton and the surrounding area, and Cyprus as well, so we cover areas from each of the services as well as that overseas dynamic, which is quite unique. The taskforce is pivoting towards prevention and recognising as well, as it is often forgotten, that we have a number of men who experience sexual violence, so we must ensure that we are delivering to them as well. That taskforce is looking at everything from early education interventions, so the work that DFE is doing, to some of the work the Home Office is doing in strategic and behavioural-change communications. That is a key part of it. We can step back and look at Raising our Standards, which has five key pillars: improving trust and leadership; our approach to Leadership Edge, which is a five-year, peer-reviewed programme to almost redefine what we mean by leadership in the armed forces; tackling unacceptable behaviours, which I have touched on; improving the training and education right the way through the career structures; and data-driven accountability. For any colleagues who have worked closely with Defence, getting a single picture of data can sometimes be a challenge, so it is about bringing that data together and driving assurance through the process. I would say that we have a far more comprehensive programme. The legislative pieces that we are talking about here are key to that. It is very difficult to legislate for culture, but I think particularly that clause—I forget the number—where we are looking at commanding officers expanding their duty to report beyond matters just within their direct chain will have a massive cultural impact on ownership and stepping in. Given the allegations about the risk of things often being brushed under the carpet, having the duty and subsequently holding people to account for it will have a cultural impact as well. That is to reassure you that the work is far broader than the legislative levers in this particular Bill.

I want to put a couple of things on the record from our visit last week. Forgive me if they were covered in previous sessions. A number of us were interested in the court martial process and the way in which eligibility to serve on a court martial panel or board was determined. I think the Committee might like to return to that at some point. Secondly, you mentioned Cyprus, which is something I was interested in last week. Again, I think I am right in saying that the Committee is keen that the reforms mooted in the Bill should be applicable across our international military footprint and all our sovereign base areas. I just wanted to put that on the record.

To take the Cyprus point first, the power of the service justice system is that it is not confined just to the UK, and it recognises that there are places where we have a more permanent footprint. Our armed forces colleagues are also in locations that are perhaps—shall we say—less regular, in terms of where one might expect them to be. That is a fundamentally important part of service justice, and at the end of the day, service justice is key to operational effectiveness. Again, we in the service justice system are fortunate, as a smaller, tighter and more agile organisation, in developing what we are doing in the violence against women and girls taskforce and the preventing sexual violence work. We identified Cyprus as an area of particular concern, and therefore it is part of our second wave. We will take Catterick and Devonport first, try things out and learn from them, and then we will apply them in those slightly different locations. Absolutely, Cyprus is very much one of our areas of focus. Apologies again, I’ve forgotten the first question.

I was putting it on the record that we had a discussion about the courts martial, but it was not in a formal setting, so I just wanted it to be captured. That was all.

Among our reflections, I do not think we have seen evidence that we are seeing a problem with those court martial boards. Again, anecdotally, talking to victims and survivors, they have felt far more assured when looking at a mixed board, as opposed to a scenario in which, for example—making it up, because I do not want to cast aspersions on any particular service—there was an alleged perpetrator or defendant from the Navy, with potentially a civilian or someone from the Army as the alleged victim-survivor. If that survivor were facing an entirely Navy board, it might not feel comfortable. Having a mixed board has really helped bring in that difference. Again, earlier changes made sure that we have at least one man and at least one woman as well.

I think it was the question of rank that we raised.

The question of rank—

OR-7, the equivalent to staff sergeant—we raised this yesterday—is the lowest rank allowed on the board, whereas in the civilian system, a very young individual could be on a serious fraud or murder case. We discussed whether the rank is set at the right level.

Again, we have not seen evidence that it is causing us issues at this point in time. With all these things, we will continue to consider and observe the changes. One of the nuances in service justice that we need to be aware of is that it is also an element of the discipline of the chain of command. I think there is also an interesting nuance and challenge: we do not want a court martial board to have folk who might feel slightly intimidated about giving their true view because there is a louder senior voice, so there are probably a lot of challenges that would need unpicking and thinking about on that front. At the moment, we have not seen evidence that there is a problem to fix, but I think it is a really interesting question that we can look into.

I would like to take us on to defence housing. I think there is widespread acceptance that the standard of defence housing under the last Government reached a pretty woeful level. I have family members who were serving until recently, and I have seen the state of some of it. We also had record levels of complaints from service families only very recently. I want to start by asking about the landmark deal to reacquire 36,000 service family homes that were sold to Annington Homes under the Major Government, in what is now considered a pretty disastrous privatisation. What difference do you think this deal will make? How will the Bill build on that momentum?

This is a huge deal for the armed forces. I have lived in the accommodation—I am sure you and others in Parliament have—and the reality is that the deal with Annington was probably one of the worst deals of all time. We sold off our housing and had to pay for the rent and upkeep of it. It actually reduced our freedom to rebuild, knock down and refurbish, which was a significant issue. After Annington, putting the new housing deal in place—buying back 36,000 homes and saving £600,000 a day, or £200 million a year, in rental payments—puts us back in the driving seat of Defence single living accommodation, which is absolutely critical. We have guaranteed £9 billion, and that funding commitment was costed and detailed during the defence housing strategy. We have consulted with the Treasury, so that is an absolute commitment we have made, and we will deliver on it. It puts us in the best possible position—a once-in-a-generation moment—to really make the change. We have already done the first 1,000 houses, and we are moving out on a full rebuild and refurbishment programme. I think it is going to change the lives of so many families in Defence, which is a fantastic thing. It will take time, but we are moving on it as fast as we possibly can.

What difference do you think this strategy, and the £9 billion investment into homes that are being improved, will make to recruitment and retention in the armed forces?

It will be huge. One of the biggest problems we have with retention, in particular, is the right to a family life. The least we can do is provide people—who sometimes have to move 10 times in 20 years—a safe, warm, dry and secure home. We have failed to do that for the last 14 to 20 years, but we are now on the road to ensuring that that is the case. I have already been to some of the houses that have been completely refurbished, and the standard is really high. We are going to move out across the whole defence housing estate. It is a huge change for the armed forces, but it is the least we can do to have a safe foundation for people to operate out of and to commit to the armed forces.

There is a question about the independence of the new Defence Housing Service. It is good that it is an arm’s length body, but the Secretary of State still controls the budget. What message or reassurance can you give the Committee that, as the housing budget competes against other priorities in the MOD, it will be ringfenced?

The £9 billion has been ringfenced; it has absolutely been secured for defence housing. Nothing in the DIP process will stop us getting on with the job of making these improvements and getting the job done. We have made that commitment to not just the armed forces community but the nation. We have said it in the House, and we will see it through. On reflection, this is one of the biggest things that we have done for the armed forces, and retention will be fantastic. The guarantee on the money allows us to carefully plan and proportion the resources on a continuous basis. The stop-start we have had in the past, with bungs of money halfway through the year not being enough, or just enough, has resulted in inefficiencies all the way across the system. If I may, I have one last point, and David may then want to jump in. I think it is right and proper that the Secretary of State still has an ability to ensure that the arm’s length body has its priorities in the right place. We do not want to end up in another Annington situation, where it is so independent that Defence loses complete control over its own destiny. The second bit is, if we were to step back, one of the reasons our estate has been under-invested in is because DIO has been under extreme pressure across quite an aged estate, ranging from bases to single living accommodation and service family accommodation. By separating this out and professionalising it in an arm’s length body, you relieve the capacity and capability in DIO to focus on our basing and strategic facilities.

Last week, on our visit to Hampshire, we saw before and after examples of houses on the same street. Some looked like the decor had not really been changed since the 1980s. There were examples of nice 1980s interior design and the improved, done-up version with the kitchens, bathrooms and windows improved—I think there were some energy efficiency changes as well. My understanding is that about 1,000 houses were improved like that last year and 250 will have been done by spring this year. With the Defence Housing Service coming into being, how will that impact those numbers? What does the future pipeline for the number that can be improved look like?

By the end of this Parliament, the majority of homes will have seen some form of improvement, because as well as the full refurbishments that you saw in Portsmouth, we are improving the standard of preparation at move-in. Some 10,000 homes each year will be getting a higher quality of preparation. Later, we will be announcing our detailed plan for the numbers of homes to be refurbished up to that standard in the coming year. The 10-year programme provides for all our houses to be brought up to an appropriate standard, some of them by major refurbishment, and we estimate that about 15,000 entirely new homes will also be provided.

David, this is probably a question for you. There is a lot of money being invested in improving these houses, so how are you determining whether you are getting value for money from your contractors? They may say, “Oh, it’s the Government; they’ve got loads of money,” so how are you determining that it is good value for money in comparison to the civilian contracts that they work on?

The commitment of £9.2 billion over 10 years sets the organisation up for success in a way that has never been the case before. It allows us to work with suppliers on a long-term basis, and to plan the work to make sure that we are doing it in sensible packages and in a sensible order. All that work will be competitively tendered, and we will be working differently with suppliers. As we talked about last time, we will also be strengthening our organisation to make sure that we have professional people overseeing the work. There are huge changes there. One example is that in 2023, we were given an extra £180 million to spend on improvements for forces families. We got the authorisation to spend that money at the end of August on the condition that it was all spent within the next seven months. That is in stark contrast to the position that we are in today of being set up with this long-term commitment so that we can plan and deliver more effectively.

That is a prime example of how not to manage a huge estate. We are the third biggest owner of property in the UK. When I came into the seat, I asked for a breakdown of costs from some of the contractors for veterans and people in single living housing, because I have had experience in the past of electric showers costing above and beyond what they should. I was pleasantly surprised to see the improvement in holding contractors to account on good value for money on simple things from a tap or a plunger to a full refit of the electrical system in a house. In November 2022, we had 4,200 complaints. On 22 February 2026, we had 400. It is worth noting that satisfaction with repairs went from 23% in January 2023 to 66% by the end of 2025. That is the point about ensuring that we hold contractors to account and do not throw fast money late in a financial year because it has to be spent in a timeline. That results in abuse of the system or an inability to manage it effectively. We are taking a long-term, strategic, programmatic look at housing, and we are getting after it in a really effective way.

I accept everything you say, but my experience of local government is that quite often when contractors are used, because it is local government it seems they add a premium on what they charge. We were quoted a figure of £80,000 for one property to be fully refurbished. That is a lot of money, and it cannot be far off the unit cost of building a house. It is important to focus on the area of value for money. If we have not done it already, the Committee will write to you to ask for a breakdown of those sorts of costs.

We should absolutely get that; it will be really interesting to see. I would also be interested, but I think that includes asbestos and a complete rebuild in the centre. We will get back to you with the details, and then we can scrutinise it.

It is good to hear about the advantages of moving to an arm’s length body, away from DIO. What other changes, apart from the structural changes and reforms in the Bill, will be necessary to ensure that we have the best standard of housing for our servicepeople moving forward?

There are naturally a variety of things that we have done outside of the Bill and outside legislative requirements, such as the consumer charter, which ensures that each housing association has an officer that they can go to. It sets standards for move-in, it allows people more freedom on how they can decorate their house, and in some cases it increases the speed of services and repairs for those individuals. That shows in some of the statistics that we have seen change in a positive way.

The defence housing strategy, which was developed with proper input from a wide range of experts, has set out all of the things that we believe we need to do to drive that transformation and experience for service families. It is a mixture of setting the organisation up to operate more effectively, and being clear on the work that needs to be done to improve the systems, performance and estate.

Minister, if this is going to be an arm’s length body, for clarity, will the Defence Housing Service report directly to Ministers independent of the DIO, or will it report to the Minister via the DIO? In other words, is it still under the DIO, or is it a completely separate reporting chain?

It will report in conjunction with the DIO.

Via the DIO?

It will not work under the DIO. David, correct me if I am wrong.

With respect, Sir, what is the difference?

It is an organisation that will have a sponsor—who is yet to be determined—inside the Department at the official level. It is not part of the DIO, and it is not reporting through the DIO. Our working assumption is that it will be part of the National Armaments Director group and accountable directly to them.

The reason I said “in conjunction with the DIO” is because the DIO will own the broader estate. Some of those houses sit inside the broader estate, and therefore making sure that the DIO is aware of the reporting system that is coming up and through will be critical to ensuring that interdependencies are understood.

We have just heard from David that it is actually going to report up as part of the NAD group.

It is our working assumption, but the sponsorship is yet to be agreed inside the Department.

So, the day-to-day management of SFA will be under armaments?

The day-to-day management of the estate will be in the Defence Housing Service, which is operationally controlled by its own independent board. The independent board will include family representation, but it is answerable to Defence Ministers and—

Via the NAD?

It is answerable to Defence Ministers directly, and it is also part of the National Armaments Director group. It is also accountable directly to Parliament. We will report on performance to Parliament. Most importantly, the difference here is that it is accountable to families.

We presume that our new NAD is beavering away behind the scenes. He is not exactly underpaid, and so far he is completely invisible. That might be because he is just getting his feet under the desk, and I accept that, but hardly anyone has heard anything from him for months.

If I can defend the National Armaments Director, I think he is doing an excellent job. He is a professional from industry who understands the scale of project management required to deliver major projects, whether they be across armaments or through to major infrastructure. I think he is doing a fantastic job, and domain expertise in the system is critical when it has perhaps been lacking in the past.

What does he know about housing, Minister?

He knows a lot about leadership and major project development. You will know that team leadership is about surrounding yourself with the very best people.

Time will tell.

I think we should avoid discussing an individual who is not here to defend himself.

Going directly back to housing, I have two more questions. Service personnel in long-term relationships have been waiting a long time to become entitled to service family accommodation. I remember us changing that policy when I was in the Department. If someone was in a long-term relationship, they would qualify for a married quarter if one became available, even if they were not married. From memory, I think the working definition of a long-term relationship is that they have been cohabiting for a year or more. I might be rusty on that. Have we now fully implemented that change? Where have we got to on that specific policy?

I will lead and then hand over to David. We have done a lot of work on this. I know this has been on the books and off the books for a long time.

It has indeed, Minister.

The reality is that, when we look across the estate, a huge amount of it is the wrong shape and size, and in the wrong place, for our current armed forces. In some cases, for more than 10 years now, we have been struggling to provide the right type of housing for our armed forces—just for the current commitment, not any expanded commitment. As we have moved forward, we have brought out a couple of new initiatives to ensure that we can try to bridge the gap and, where capacity allows, enable those broader commitments to be dealt with.

The policy, as you described it, is implemented. Where there is surplus housing available, it is available to couples in long-term relationships or to single parents with long-term childcare experience. We have committed, in the housing strategy, to a bricks-and-mortar approach to rolling it out to all those couples in long-term relationships. But clearly, we need to make sure that we have the right homes in the right locations to be able to do that. We touched on the Annington deal earlier, and one of the issues with the Annington deal is that we fixed the footprint of the estate in 1996. Obviously, the location, demands and needs of the military have changed over that time, and we do not have the right homes in the right locations to be able to provide housing for all the people who—

So, to save time, it is still a work in progress. I think that is what you are telling me.

We are working on it.

Right. This is my last question. Subject to discussions through the usual channels, we are likely, as I understand it, to be debating housing before we rise for the Easter recess—so before Thursday 26 March. That is also the date when purdah kicks in for the Scottish Parliament elections. Given that the DIP, which will fund this, will involve a lot of spending in Scotland at Faslane, Rosyth and such places, if it is not out by then, we will not see it until mid-May. Minister, can we be confident that, because the funding for housing is in the DIP, as we have heard repeatedly, the DIP will be published before we debate this on 26 March—next Thursday?

Nothing in the DIP process is preventing us from getting on with the job. We are making improvements for service families now and preparing for the launch of the Defence Housing Service. The DIP will be published in due course.

With respect, Minister, that is not what I asked you. I said, “Will it be published by next Thursday, or not?”

The DIP will be published in due course.

So no?

Can I guarantee to you when the DIP will be published? No.

Well, because it is eight months late, that is rather disappointing.

I apologise for disappointing you.

There we are. Thank you, Minister.

I very much welcome the focus on family housing, and it was wonderful to see the renovated housing last week. Single living accommodation is also very important. Can you very quickly talk us through how the Bill, or how the Defence Housing Service, will improve single living accommodation, and in what timescale?

The Defence Housing Service’s scope is family housing. Apart from very occasional instances, this organisation will not be responsible for supporting single living accommodation. You may be aware that we have announced a review—similar to that which generated the defence housing strategy—of single living accommodation, which will also be chaired by Natalie Elphicke Ross. We will be developing that same thought process and approach.

Family accommodation was the focus of this strategy. Single living accommodation will be done after that. The reality is that for the last 14 years we have categorically under-invested in defence housing. We have left our families in a state of disarray, and our estate is dilapidated because of a lack of consistent funding, proper leadership and correct management.

Minister, you will be glad to know that my question is not about the DIP; it is about drones. Clause 4 gives Defence new powers to counter drone activity around defence sites. It is something that the Committee has not discussed much at all—or received much evidence on. Do you expect these powers to significantly deter drone activity around MOD bases? Are the clause and legislation going to be wide enough, because the drones of last week are completely different from the drones of this week. Are you planning to work in conjunction with people such as the Ministry of Justice, which also has a significant issue with drones around some of its prison sites?

I am always pushing on drones, whether that is getting drones into the military or defending against what is becoming a ubiquitous capability. We have had significant incidents across Defence of drones in and around the defence estate. These measures put in place the correct protections to allow defence personnel and defence police to defeat drones, should they pose a threat to our infrastructure, people or organisations.

I completely agree. Drones are a pervasive threat, and we need to be able to defend against them. At the moment, that responsibility sits with the police. They do not have the resources to cover it. We need to own that and make sure it is properly addressed by properly trained individuals equipped with the proper counter-UAS solutions.

Am I right in saying that it is any MOD-operated site globally—not just in the UK? Major General Overton indicated assent.[1]

Minister, it is an open secret that you think that we—the armed forces—should be doing more to develop drones and their capabilities. My boss feels exactly the same, so there is cross-party support on that. Given your enthusiasm, which I share, do you think the powers in the Bill go far enough? Would you have liked to see them go a little further?

Those are two separate issues. My enthusiasm for uncrewed systems is matched by my boss as well. We have £4 billion in the SDR moving towards uncrewed systems, the uncrewed centre of excellence and a targeting web that is critical in the management of the data that the drones will collect, along with the required AI machine learning that sits behind them. This is the first step to ensuring that we can protect our bases against uncrewed systems. There is also a big chunk of work on the security of bases when it comes to physical protection against drones, which we are looking into. I think the Bill goes the correct distance to enable our armed forces to protect themselves and the infrastructure that supports them.

On maritime uncrewed systems, which are very topical, do we have an uncrewed mine countermeasures capability yet, or is it all still in test?

I used to be the chief of staff of the carrier strike force. Within that, I was responsible for the validation of our mine countermeasures unit, which sits in Bahrain. They have an uncrewed mine-hunting capability that has been tested and trialled for several years now. It is capable, and we are looking into it for various options as we move forward in any crisis that may present itself.

I want to check that I have understood why we need the changes around the protection of MOD sites from drones. Am I correct in my view of the current scenario, before this legislative change, that if military personnel, sitting in a sensitive military base, who see a drone overhead that they think is filming—potentially on behalf of a hostile foreign power—they are not allowed to use a jamming device or something to bring it down, and that they have to ring the local police station and ask them to sort it out? Is that the kind of scenario we are currently facing?

Luke, that is exactly the case. It is utterly ridiculous in this day and age, given how drones have developed, that we can have drones flying over the most sensitive sites and we are able to do nothing outside of the police powers. Clause 4 will broaden those powers to ensure that defence, police and personnel can use the capabilities to defeat that system and prevent a hostile state, or anyone else, from gathering sensitive information or indeed threatening our infrastructure.

The strategic defence review says that the MOD should consider developing a new Reserve to protect critical national infrastructure. How is that progressing?

I will hand over to Marc in a second. We are progressing at the moment with simplifying the current Reserve system and investigating what the shape and size of it would look like when we talk about homeland defence. We are in the very early stages of formulating the requirements around that force, what size it would need to be and how it would be managed.

How does it relate to the Bill?

It is an SDR study and will be picked up in a future Bill, because that study is going on at the moment. At the heart of it is redefining what is critical national infrastructure. What do we need as a society to keep operating in the event of crisis? I spent a lot of time with the Finns, and they define how they keep society going around critical national infrastructure: energy, communications and food. Understanding what that requirement is will allow us to generate a response to that. It may not be physical human beings. A lot of it is cyber and data. It is a systematic approach to what we need to defend our country.

Clauses 38 and 39 will remove the existing statutory requirements for Parliament to formally approve armed forces numbers. Why is that loss of parliamentary control necessary?

I will hand over to Marc who has the detail. That is a really important part of the Bill. One of the analogies that I have been using to describe it is that, at the moment, under the current Votes A system, we are not only fielding the football team, but we are telling you exactly how to divide that football team up into forwards, midfielders and defenders. What Defence needs is the flexibility to design its own team under the right shape to make sure that it is fit for purpose to defend against the threats that we face. It will still allow parliamentary oversight and scrutiny; it will just allow more flexibility in the division of reserves to allow us to apportion the right resources in the right place for the right threats that we face.

Absolutely. What we are seeing is that the tribal delineations between Regular Reserve and Strategic Reserve, between no time, spare time, part time and full time, are blurring. What we are looking at is the active component at any one stage. That is what we are going to report to Parliament—how that is made up. Given the flexible working and agile working policies that we are putting in place, we need the flexibility to enable that fluidity.

As we simplify our Reserve force, we would like to see a position in the future where an individual can leave full-time service, join the Reserves, do anything from two days a week to two days a month and then rejoin with the minimum amount of bureaucracy or administration. That does not exist at the moment because, unfortunately, if you serve full time in the armed forces, you have to leave full-time service to join the Reserve, and then leave to rejoin. It creates an administrative burden, and it is not in keeping with the requirements of today’s society for full-time and part-time work.

In a previous session, Minister, we raised with you whether the new tri-service recruiting contract actually allows for that to happen as expeditiously as possible. You undertook to go away and have a look at that. Does it? Or are you going to have to amend the contract to achieve the objective that you just laid out, which I am sure everyone on this Committee shares?

The contract does not need amendment because it is an administrative process. As the Bill moves forward with its clauses, it will remove the legal requirement to leave the Regular force to join the Reserve force. Therefore, it will become an administrative move in whichever service you are in, and also to come back in. The question is over the period of time that you have left—two to three years—and then you want to join the Reserves, which will be into the Reserve pool through the new recruitment contract.

For clarity, the contract will not be an impediment to doing it?

Correct.

Do any members of the Committee have any more questions? No? Do you have anything that you want to say that we have not covered in our questioning?

I would just like to say that we are on a journey. We are moving as fast as we can. It is about simplification and modelling the Reserve system and our armed forces system on today’s society to make sure we have the methods in place. The service justice system is moving forward well, and it is welcomed both by previous victims and individuals within the system. If you look holistically, housing is about taking housing off DIO and professionalising it, allowing DIO to look at strategic basing. From my perspective, the Bill is moving in the right direction to deliver a better deal for our armed forces, who deserve it.

Thank you very much for your evidence and for your service.   [1] Clarification from witness/Ministry of Defence 20/03/26: Clause 4 only applies in the UK, including territorial waters. In other Countries, the MOD works with Partners / Host Nations to protect Defence interests, but we cannot legislate for these countries.