3rd Report - Science diplomacy: Sovereignty, strategy, and the global race

Key findings

• UK science diplomacy lacks explicit cross-governmental strategy and coordination; the government's stated position of 'cooperate where we can, compete where we need to, challenge where we must' remains operationally unclear with no defined priority partners, technologies, or intended outcomes.
• ODA spending on R&D faces disproportionate cuts of 44-60%, undermining UK soft power in science, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa where China and Russia are expanding influence; this represents a missed strategic opportunity given US aid reductions.
• Visa costs for skilled researchers are up to 22 times higher than leading science nations' averages; the £54 million Global Talent Fund lacks ambition and scale, attracting only 18 researchers by June 2026 against a target of 60-80.
• The UK-US pharmaceutical agreement obligates spending increases (medicines from 0.3% to 0.6% of GDP by 2036, NHS budget share from 10% to 12%) but appears driven by external trade pressure rather than domestic health priorities; core UK health policy is being determined by trade negotiations.
• Research security framework lacks clarity; despite UK Biobank security failures, an 'actor agnostic' approach has not translated into practical guidance for academics managing intellectual property risks in international collaborations.

Recommendations

• Government should develop and publish a comprehensive international science and technology strategy defining priority partner countries, priority technologies, intended outcomes, and alignment with wider UK objectives, including geographic prioritisation of partnerships.
• Government should restore ODA funding for research and development across departments, given strategic, diplomatic and scientific benefits; set out assessment of impact of ODA cuts on international science collaboration including the International Science Partnership Framework.
• Government should remove structural financial barriers to attracting international science talent by significantly reducing visa costs for researchers and skilled workers, bringing them in line with leading science nations' averages.
• Government should ensure UK medicine policy remains sovereign, transparent, and grounded in domestic health priorities; future trade negotiations should not unduly determine core elements of UK health policy; government should set out how commitments under the UK-US pharmaceutical agreement will deliver benefits for NHS patients and system sustainability.
• Government should strengthen research security framework by providing clear, practical guidance for academics managing international research collaborations and intellectual property risks, moving beyond 'actor agnostic' approach.
• Government should restore cross-departmental coordination by reinstating a science and technology cabinet committee with representation from multiple departments, not limiting core membership to DSIT, Treasury, and Cabinet Office.
• Government should conduct analysis of where global science and tech skills and capabilities are concentrated, track British researchers working overseas by country and field, and assess extent to which UK may inadvertently be incubating other countries' strategic programmes in sensitive areas like quantum.

Key actors

Dame Chi Onwurah, Patrick Vallance, Professor Charlotte Watts, Professor Dame Jenny Harries, Donald Trump, James Black, Royal Society, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology