Written questions by Mohamed.

Innovation and Technology, when she plans to introduce regulations ensuring generative AI cannot be misused to create extreme sexual abuse material involving children.

The government is committed to tackling the creation of this atrocious material. Creating, possessing, or distributing child sexual abuse material (CSAM), including AI Generated CSAM, is illegal. The Online Safety Act requires services to proactively identify and remove this content.We are taking further action in the Crime and Policing Bill to criminalise CSAM image generators, and to ensure AI developers can directly test for and address vulnerabilities in their models which enable the production of CSAM.The Government is clear: no option is off the table when it comes to protecting the online safety of users in the UK, and we will not hesitate to act where evidence suggests that further action is necessary.

When he plans to launch a public consultation on reform of wedding law in England and Wales.

The Government announced on 2 October that we intend to reform weddings law when parliamentary time allows. The reforms reflect a commitment to making marriage law fairer, simpler and more modern while also protecting the solemnity and dignity of marriage. The next step is to undertake a consultation on reform of wedding law in England and Wales early into this year.

Innovation and Technology, whether the Secretary of State or Ministers in the Department has received representations from AI companies regarding the content or timing of the proposed AI Bill.

The Government engages with a wide range of stakeholders on its approach to regulating Artificial Intelligence, including AI companies, academics, and civil society groups.Details of Ministerial meetings with external organisations are published in the quarterly transparency returns.

Innovation and Technology, what steps the Government is able to take to delay or prohibit the public release of a frontier AI model in instances when the UK AI Security Institute assesses that model as posing a serious risk of assisting users in developing chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.

We are optimistic about how AI will transform the lives of British people for the better, but advanced AI could also lead to serious security risks. The Government believes that AI should be regulated at the point of use, and takes a context-based approach. Sectoral laws give powers to take steps where there are serious risks - for example the Procurement Act 2023 can prevent risky suppliers (including those of AI) from being used in public sector contexts, whilst a range of legislation offers protections against high-risk chemical and biological incidents. This approach is complemented by the work of the AI Security Institute, which works in partnership with AI labs to understand the capabilities and impacts of advanced AI, and develop and test risk mitigations.

Innovation and Technology, whether the Government has established thresholds for dangerous weapons-related capabilities in frontier AI models.

The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) has policy responsibility for promoting responsible AI innovation and uptake. Risks related to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (and other dangerous weapons), including defining thresholds for harm in these domains, are managed by a combination of the Home Office, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Cabinet Office, and the Ministry of Defence. DSIT does not set thresholds for dangerous capabilities in risk domains owned by other departments. The AI Security Institute (AISI), as part of DSIT, focuses on researching emerging AI risks with serious security implications, such as the potential for AI to help users develop chemical and biological weapons. AISI works with a broad range of experts and leading AI companies to understand the capabilities of advanced AI and advise on technical mitigations. AISI’s research supports other government departments in taking evidence-based action to mitigate risks whilst ensuring AI delivers on its potential for growth. AISI’s Frontier AI Trends Report, published in December 2025, outlines how frontier AI risks are expected to develop in the future.

Innovation and Technology, following Google DeepMind's provision of pre-deployment access to the UK AI Security Institute for safety testing of Gemini 3, whether the Institute received equivalent pre-deployment access to the most recent frontier AI models developed by (a) OpenAI, (b) Anthropic, (c) xAI, and (d) Meta prior to their public release.

The Government does not give a running commentary on models being tested or which models we have been granted access to due to commercial and security sensitivities. Where possible, given these sensitivities, the AI Security Institute aims to publish results.

Innovation and Technology, whether the Government has established a defined threshold of dangerous capability in frontier AI models, including capabilities relating to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, which would trigger Government action.

The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) has policy responsibility for promoting responsible AI innovation and uptake. Risks related to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (and other dangerous weapons), including defining thresholds for harm in these domains, are managed by a combination of the Home Office, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Cabinet Office, and the Ministry of Defence. DSIT does not set thresholds for dangerous capabilities in risk domains owned by other departments. The AI Security Institute (AISI), as part of DSIT, focuses on researching emerging AI risks with serious security implications, such as the potential for AI to help users develop chemical and biological weapons. AISI works with a broad range of experts and leading AI companies to understand the capabilities of advanced AI and advise on technical mitigations. AISI’s research supports other government departments in taking evidence-based action to mitigate risks whilst ensuring AI delivers on its potential for growth. AISI’s Frontier AI Trends Report, published in December 2025, outlines how frontier AI risks are expected to develop in the future.

Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what recent conversations he has had with the Indian Government on the release of Jagtar Singh Johal from detention.

We remain committed to pushing the Government of India for faster progress in resolving Jagtar Singh Johal's case. The UK Government has raised Mr Johal's case on multiple occasions with the Government of India, including regarding Mr Johal's allegations of torture. The Foreign Secretary raised Mr Johal's case with her Indian counterpart on 11 November, and the Prime Minister raised Mr Johal's case with Prime Minister Modi on 9 October. Consular staff regularly visit Mr Johal to check on his welfare, most recently on 21 November.

When his Department will respond to the letter from the hon. Member for Dewsbury and Batley dated 17 September 2025.

I replied to the Hon. Member’s correspondence on 19 November.

Commonwealth and Development Affairs, when her Department will respond to the letter from the hon. Member for Dewsbury and Batley dated 1 October 2025.

I apologise to the Hon member for the delay. I can confirm that a response will be returned in the coming days.

If he will meet with representatives of the Women Against State Pension Inequality campaign.

The previous Minister for Pensions met with representatives from the WASPI campaign group.She did so to hear their experiences directly and was the first Minister to do so in eight years.

What assessment he has made of the potential merits of placing (a) transparency, (b) testing and (c) accountability requirements on private defence contracts for the development of AI systems.

The principal policy framework governing the Ministry of Defence's (MOD) safe and responsible adoption of AI is our published Joint Service Publication Dependable AI JSP 936 which sets out directives on AI safety, ethics, and governance. JSP 936 requires that externally acquired AI systems meet the same standards and give the same level of assurance as AI systems developed within the MOD. Under this framework, and in line with the National Security Strategy, we will look to leverage the UK's vibrant third-party assurance market to enable breadth, scale, and learning from other sectors.

What ethical frameworks are in place to guide the (a) development and (b) deployment of AI technologies in defence.

We have a duty to use the best technologies to protect the UK’s interests, and we also have a duty to use these technologies in line with our legal obligations and the values of the public we serve. All development and deployment of AI in Defence must be legal and responsible. We have set out our Responsible AI policy framework in the Dependable AI JSP 936. This mandates that all AI use cases address specific AI safety, ethical and legal considerations, in line with our five AI ethical principles published in the ‘Ambitious, Safe, Responsible’ policy paper in June 2022.

What safeguards are in place to ensure that patient data managed by Palantir under the Federated Data Platform contract cannot be (a) accessed, (b) used and (c) transferred for purposes unrelated to NHS (i) care and (ii) administration.

NHS England ran a rigorous independent and transparent procurement exercise for the NHS Federated Data Platform (NHS FDP), in line with public contract regulations. The selection was made by multiple assessors against clear criteria following an open tender process where any supplier could respond with their solution. Potential suppliers were required to demonstrate their financial, commercial, security, and technical capability to meet contractual requirements. The plans for an NHS FDP followed a consultation with trusts and integrated care boards to gather insight in order to understand what their common issues and challenges were in relation to data. The programme is supported by a Data Governance Group, made up of information governance professionals. The programme is also supported by the Health and Social Care Data Public Panel, a group consisting of patient, public, and professional representatives with an interest in patient data, including the Office of the National Data Guardian. Privacy by design is a core principle of the NHS FDP, with robust security measures to safeguard patient information. Access to data must have an explicit aim to benefit patients and/or the NHS in England. Palantir provides the software platform, Foundry, that underpins the NHS FDP. NHS England remains the data controller at all times for the national instance. Each NHS organisation is the data controller for their local NHS FDP instance and decides how their local data is used.Palantir operates strictly under the instruction of the NHS. They do not own or control NHS data. The NHS FDP is built with robust security and privacy controls, including Privacy Enhancing Technologies procured separately from Palantir. Data access is tightly governed. Only authorised users can access data for approved purposes, and all access is logged and auditable.

What assessment his Department has made of potential alternative suppliers to Palantir for the Federated Data Platform contract; and whether that assessment included consideration of levels of alignment with NHS principles of (a) universality, (b) transparency and (c) patient trust.

NHS England ran a rigorous independent and transparent procurement exercise for the NHS Federated Data Platform (NHS FDP), in line with public contract regulations. The selection was made by multiple assessors against clear criteria following an open tender process where any supplier could respond with their solution. Potential suppliers were required to demonstrate their financial, commercial, security, and technical capability to meet contractual requirements. The plans for an NHS FDP followed a consultation with trusts and integrated care boards to gather insight in order to understand what their common issues and challenges were in relation to data. The programme is supported by a Data Governance Group, made up of information governance professionals. The programme is also supported by the Health and Social Care Data Public Panel, a group consisting of patient, public, and professional representatives with an interest in patient data, including the Office of the National Data Guardian. Privacy by design is a core principle of the NHS FDP, with robust security measures to safeguard patient information. Access to data must have an explicit aim to benefit patients and/or the NHS in England. Palantir provides the software platform, Foundry, that underpins the NHS FDP. NHS England remains the data controller at all times for the national instance. Each NHS organisation is the data controller for their local NHS FDP instance and decides how their local data is used.Palantir operates strictly under the instruction of the NHS. They do not own or control NHS data. The NHS FDP is built with robust security and privacy controls, including Privacy Enhancing Technologies procured separately from Palantir. Data access is tightly governed. Only authorised users can access data for approved purposes, and all access is logged and auditable.

What consultation NHS England carried out with (a) patients, (b) healthcare staff and (c) data governance experts prior to awarding the Federated Data Platform contract to Palantir.

NHS England ran a rigorous independent and transparent procurement exercise for the NHS Federated Data Platform (NHS FDP), in line with public contract regulations. The selection was made by multiple assessors against clear criteria following an open tender process where any supplier could respond with their solution. Potential suppliers were required to demonstrate their financial, commercial, security, and technical capability to meet contractual requirements. The plans for an NHS FDP followed a consultation with trusts and integrated care boards to gather insight in order to understand what their common issues and challenges were in relation to data. The programme is supported by a Data Governance Group, made up of information governance professionals. The programme is also supported by the Health and Social Care Data Public Panel, a group consisting of patient, public, and professional representatives with an interest in patient data, including the Office of the National Data Guardian. Privacy by design is a core principle of the NHS FDP, with robust security measures to safeguard patient information. Access to data must have an explicit aim to benefit patients and/or the NHS in England. Palantir provides the software platform, Foundry, that underpins the NHS FDP. NHS England remains the data controller at all times for the national instance. Each NHS organisation is the data controller for their local NHS FDP instance and decides how their local data is used.Palantir operates strictly under the instruction of the NHS. They do not own or control NHS data. The NHS FDP is built with robust security and privacy controls, including Privacy Enhancing Technologies procured separately from Palantir. Data access is tightly governed. Only authorised users can access data for approved purposes, and all access is logged and auditable.

To as the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, whether his Department provides guidance to businesses on the potential impact of AI systems on employment.

We want to ensure that people have access to good, meaningful work. AI is already transforming workplaces, demanding new skills, and augmenting existing ones. Government is working to harness its benefits to boost growth, productivity, living standards, and worker wellbeing, while mitigating the risks.The Department for Education published an analysis in 2023 outlining The impact of AI on UK jobs and training. We are currently considering our approach to updating this analysis.Further to this, the Get Britain Working White Paper outlines how government will address labour market challenges and spread opportunity and economic prosperity that AI presents to the British public. This includes launching Skills England to create a shared national plan to boost the nation’s skills, creating more good jobs through our modern Industrial Strategy, and strengthening employment rights through DBT’s Plan to Make Work Pay.DSIT has also published guidance for businesses adopting AI, focusing on good practice AI assurance when procuring and deploying AI systems. AI assurance could significantly manage risks and build trust, supporting business to assess and mitigate the potential impacts of AI adoption.

Commonwealth and Development Affairs, what steps she is taking to help uphold international maritime law against Freedom Flotilla ships docking with aid in Gaza.

We remain in close contact with our Israeli counterparts over the status of vessels seeking to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza, and as the Prime Minister said on 21 September, the UK continues to demand that the Israeli Government permits the full and unhindered resumption of aid into Gaza immediately. By far the most effective way to meet the desperate needs of the Gazan people at the speed and scale that is needed is via overland routes, and we reiterate that Israel must immediately allow the UN and other agencies to deliver lifesaving aid to those in Gaza who so desperately need it.

If she will make it her policy to introduce (a) fiscal and (b) regulatory measures to mitigate the potential impact of the adoption of AI on employment.

The Government is implementing all the recommendations from the AI Opportunities Action Plan to ensure we shape AI to deliver productivity gains, rising living standards, and improved worker wellbeing, while mitigating the risks. By becoming the best place in Europe to start and grow a tech company—powered by our leadership in AI—we are unlocking new opportunities for innovation, investment, and workforce development. This means helping people build world-class skills and rewarding careers in a thriving, future-facing economy. As part of this, we have secured a partnership with leading tech firms to deliver AI skills training to 7.5 million UK workers by 2030, to help workers transition into new roles created by AI and automation.

How much his Department has spent on the (a) development and (b) procurement of AI-enabled defence systems in each of the last three years.

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) does not hold specific figures on the development and procurement of AI-enabled defence systems. AI is not a standalone capability, but an enabling technology embedded across projects in both defence systems and in the business space across the Ministry. Over the last three financial years (FY) spending within the Chief Scientific Adviser's research portfolio on AI has been: · FY2022-23 - £46.20 million· FY2023-24 - £52.13 million· FY2024-25 - £37.44 million Procurement costs are not separately recorded and are integrated within wider programme budgets. In August the MOD announced a procurement plan worth up to £180 million for digital decision capabilities to enable scalable operations involving autonomy, including using AI and machine learning to speed up decision making. Further detail on MOD's plans for investment in AI-enabled capabilities will be set out in the Defence Investment Plan.