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Inquiry · 6 March 2025 → 29 April 2026

UK economic security

From: Business and Trade Sub-Committee on Economic Security, Arms and Export Controls

Closed28 documents11 evidence sessions

What this inquiry is asking

This inquiry examined whether the UK has an adequate strategic framework and toolkit to protect its economy from growing threats—including state actors weaponising economic interdependence, cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure, supply chain vulnerabilities, and foreign investment in sensitive sectors. It asked: does Britain have a coherent 'doctrine' for economic security, and if not, what should one look like?

Headline findings

  • Committee concluded the UK's economic security regime is 'not fit for the future' and government machinery is 'disjointed and confusing', rejecting the Government's claim that existing policies already address identified risks.
  • Identified ten distinct threat categories: state coercion, supply chain disruption, critical minerals vulnerability, cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure, ransomware (M&S £300m loss, Co-op attack in April 2025), foreign investment in critical sectors, software liability gaps, illicit finance, emerging tech risks, and people-focused threats.
  • Government accepted only 4 of 25 recommendations. Committee rejected Government's rejection, stating that without a shared strategic framework, private sector cannot align investment and resilience planning with public sector objectives.
  • Witnesses testified that threat actors (China's Volt Typhoon, Scattered Spider, Russian ransomware-as-a-service) are moving faster than UK defences; average time to penetrate organisations has shrunk from 10 hours to under 1 hour in five years.
  • Critical gaps identified: NCSC awareness among businesses is 1%, cyber-crime pay lags private sector by £20-30k annually, no UK regulator has sanctioned firms for cyber-regulation breaches, and formal written definition of 'economic security' remains absent from Government policy.

Why it matters

Economic security underpins national security; Britain's adversaries are weaponising supply chains, technology, and capital flows while allies race to build resilience—without a coherent UK doctrine, British businesses cannot invest confidently and the state cannot defend critical vulnerabilities.

Tone arc

Inquiry opened cooperatively (May evidence sessions on critical minerals, supply chains, technology) but hardened progressively. By July cyber-attack sessions (M&S, Co-op, NCSC testimony), tone shifted critical of fragmented Government response and resource gaps. Final Government Response (January 2026) prompted sharp rejection from Committee, with Chair Liam Byrne stating the Cabinet's refusal to adopt a strategic framework represents a 'fundamental' fault.

Themes

state-coercion-and-economic-weaponisationcyber-resilience-and-critical-infrastructuresupply-chain-vulnerabilitycritical-minerals-and-geopolitical-dependencystrategic-framework-and-coordination-gap

Key witnesses

Pat McFadden MP (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster), Douglas Alexander MP (International Business and Trade Minister), Ciaran Martin (former NCSC Director, RUSI), Archie Norman, Nick Folland, Victoria McKenzie-Gould (Marks & Spencer), Dominic Kendal-Ward, Rob Elsey (Co-op Group), James Babbage (NCSC), Richard Horne (NCA), Andrew Gould (NPCC), Mike King (lithium producer), John Lindberg (critical minerals analyst)

Outcome verdict

Government accepted 4 of 25 recommendations and rejected the Committee's core ask: adoption of a formal strategic framework diagnosing risks, identifying unacceptable dependencies, and coordinating whole-of-society response. Committee explicitly disagreed with Government's position that existing policies suffice.

Outcome

Responding to: 14th Report - Toward a new doctrine for economic security: Government Response

The government partially accepts the committee's concerns about economic security governance. It acknowledges the importance of the issue and accepts the framing around Protect/Promote/Partner principles (aligned with EU and allies), but rejects structural reforms: refuses to create a dedicated Minister or Office of Economic Security, will not publish sovereign capabilities list, rejects an Economic Security Bill, and defends existing departmental structures as appropriately balancing vertical and horizontal coordination. On specific areas, government commits to: more forthright communication via Economic Security Advisory Service; continued supply chain resilience work through new Supply Chain Centre; ambitious Critical Minerals Strategy with specific targets (10% domestic production, 20% recycling, max 60% single-country reliance); and market-led rather than legislated approach to Software Security Code of Practice adoption. Government argues current fiscal and incentive frameworks are adequate and rejects updating Managing Public Money rules.

Read the government’s full response →

Reports & Government Responses

Witness sessions

Written evidence & correspondence

Themes & actors

Topics across publication summaries

cybersecurity ·14economic-security ·9supply-chain ·8critical-infrastructure ·5public-finance ·4business-continuity ·4automotive-industry ·3export-controls ·3manufacturing ·3supply-chain-resilience ·2corporate-finance ·2critical-national-infrastructure ·2ransomware ·2automotive-manufacturing ·2insurance ·2governance-and-institutions ·1export-finance ·1supply-chains ·1government-support ·1business-support ·1

Top organisations & named entities

Source · parliament.uk inquiry record ↗

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