Welcome to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee session on the operation of the Windsor framework. We have Dr Kirsten Dunbar joining us online. Could you introduce yourself, Kirsten?

Good morning. I am Dr Kirsten Dunbar, and I am currently president of the British Veterinary Association’s Northern Ireland branch.

Thank you. In the absence of an agreed alternative solution, what is your current assessment of the impact of applying EU rules on veterinary medicines in Northern Ireland, and the percentage of medicines at risk?

We have two main issues in relation to bringing medicines into Northern Ireland. They relate to the need for batch testing within the EU, and to the need for the marketing authorisation holder’s address to be located in the EU. For products produced in Great Britain, this means that batch testing in Great Britain, and an MAH address in GB, is not suitable. In addition, the majority of our medicines are produced in the EU. But the traditional route for accessing Northern Ireland is via GB. They would come from the EU to GB, and then warehouse there for further distribution across the UK and to the Republic of Ireland. However, anything that is then being exported from GB to Northern Ireland would need to be re-batch tested within the EU.

What specific effects will its application have on Northern Ireland’s farming and agrifoods industries, and for consumers?

Initially, we thought that up to 50% of the current veterinary medicine could be lost to Northern Ireland. Work has been ongoing, and that estimate has been reduced to around 30%. Recent insights now estimate a figure close to 10%. That is thought to be due to a number of companies now re-routing product from the EU through the Republic of Ireland, rather than through GB. Some alternative products have also been identified to replace those currently used. The problem is not really the percentage; the problem is if there is a critical medicine. It is about the type, the volumes used, and whether it is critical. We had initially thought that some vaccines may have been implicated, for instance, vaccines for salmonella and botulism, which are both essential in the Northern Ireland situation—in salmonella’s case, essential for both animal health and public health. Because of the commercial in confidence nature of the work ongoing, it is indicated that we are not going to have a problem with this, but we have not had that confirmed or made public.

Have you been told when it might be made public?

No. We have been asking for a list, but we still have no list of critical medicines that may be at risk. We have been calling for that list, and for some public stakeholder information.

Is there any reason why that public stakeholder information is not happening? 

Well, I think it still is happening. A lot of business is commercial in confidence. I am not quite sure why we are not being supplied with those lists so that we can make plans.

How is the discontinuation of certain veterinary medicines going to impact on cross-border trade with the Republic of Ireland? You did mention the rerouting of some of them. Do you see it having an impact on the cross-border trade with the Republic of Ireland?

Not so much the loss of the medicines but animal health on the island of Ireland. We are considered to be one epidemiological unit. So, what happens in the north could affect the south. It is about the solutions that are put in place. For example—I think this was the one that was illustrated in the press—a lot of milk is exported from Northern Ireland to the south of Ireland for onward processing and further export to the EU or to any other country. Therefore, the support certification must be delivered by Northern Ireland to the south to say that it complies with EU rules. Without the solutions and the workarounds being put in place to ensure that we can access critical veterinary medicines and comply with EU rules—if the EU is aware and approves of these—then those support certificates may not be able to be completed and therefore that will have an effect on trade. It may also have an effect on trade in Northern Ireland, and on products of animal origin to Great Britain—perhaps for onward export to the EU, or to third countries, or even our own Northern Ireland exports to third countries where a number of certificates will actually have a clause in them saying that the products are produced in compliance with EU veterinary medicine regulations.

Good morning, Dr Dunbar. Business obviously wants to sell its product, and many have demonstrated in recent times considerable agility in meeting the new tests and challenges. Could you talk us through your understanding of the adjustments which have already been made by the pharmaceutical industry itself, to ensure continued supply of veterinary medicines in Northern Ireland next year?

I do believe that several of them have rerouted product, as I said, so no longer delivering to GB for Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, but directly to the Republic of Ireland. I know that there is further work ongoing on how we can access veterinary medicines from outside the EU and GB with special import certificates.

Are you able to give us some indication of percentage? What is your level of concern about certain medicines and treatments from the pharmaceutical sector that will not be or would not be available?

NOAH, the UK’s National Office of Animal Health, estimated in April this year that 10% to 15% of products could be withdrawn from the Northern Ireland market. A percentage of those will then be critical products, which is a product that has no alternative that we can use. It is not so much about the percentage, but if there is one critical product that we need in volume, it could have a huge impact—just one product or one vaccine. For instance, if we could not get the botulism vaccine, it would have a severe impact on animal health within Northern Ireland.

Where are we on access to the usual medicines that a vet will prescribe to a pet owner on a daily basis, in terms of percentages and figures?

I don’t have any specific percentages on that, but I do know that some of the critical products or the products that may not be supplied to Northern Ireland are those for equines and domestic pets, which is of great concern to horse and pet owners.

Yes, indeed. Is it your assessment that there is no other legitimate route—I underscore the word “legitimate”—to secure access to these treatments?

There may be through special import certificates, but, again, we do not have that list of products—the critical list. We cannot really say anything at this point as to that. That would be for perhaps VMD or DEFRA to answer.

Would responsibility for that certificate rest with the veterinary surgeon to secure or with the producer in the pharmaceutical sector?

There are requirements for both the veterinary surgeon and the wholesaler—or the people who actually do the importation. This is where it gets a little complicated because the VMD—the Veterinary Medicines Directorate—is responsible for the administration of the SICs in the UK. However, I believe that that will not be allowed in EU terms and that we will need to have a kind of SIC system set up for Northern Ireland.

Is it your assessment that there is an appetite for and preparedness to work towards a regime between producer and end user—the vet—in order to minimise disruption to supply, notwithstanding the fact that there may be some degree of onerousness with regard to applying for the certificate?

Absolutely. Anything that includes extra time and effort, including for the pharmaceutical companies, could add cost to veterinary medicines in Northern Ireland.

Is it your assessment, on the basis of where there’s a will there’s a way, that if there is a need for a product, whatever the product might be, it would be available should need be there, as long as the certificate requirements are met?

Certainly, but again we have to be cognisant of the fact that the EU would have to approve it. Whatever system we have in place would have to be recognised by the EU and still comply with EU regulations in terms of product of animal origin and export.

Good morning, Dr Dunbar. Thank you for joining us this morning. You are not a member of the veterinary medicines working group—is that right?

We are, yes.

You are a member?

The British Veterinary Association’s Northern Ireland branch has a member at that meeting. I attended the last meeting on 4 March.

Reflecting on what you have said this morning, are you outlining that you do not have information gleaned from that veterinary medicines working group, or that you are not in a position to share that information this morning?

We have some information gleaned, but we are under a confidentiality agreement on that. We do have some information gleaned, but I personally have not seen a list of critical medicines at this stage.

Okay. If I put some things to you, would you tell me if they sound wildly inaccurate?

I can try.

Would it be right to say that there are 14 products now considered high risk?

I could not put an actual figure on that; I am sorry, I don’t have that recall.

Would I be right to say that about 60 products would be considered at medium risk?

Again, there are a small number of high-risk products. There are medium-risk products, although we have been informed that for the majority of those, an alternative could be used.

Yes. Are you aware of discussion around two potential options, one categorised as a critical products list, which would receive the necessary animal health and welfare certificates from the Veterinary Medicines Directorate, and a second alternative solution that is described as a cascade model? Does that make any sense to you?

I am aware, yes, and the cascade model is an EU model that is currently in place for medicines that are not produced for animals and often used in the pet world.

That would envisage a vet diagnosing a problem, believing that they need a medicine, and understanding that there is no alternative to that medicine. You then cascade through a number of options, and essentially on animal welfare grounds that medicine would be made available to that vet. Does that sound about right?

That is correct. Under a special import certificate.

Yes. Practically, do you as a veterinary association have concerns that in going through all those steps, it may be that the medicine required by the vet is simply not available, or the distributors do not have an ongoing supply because the individual circumstance has not arisen, and therefore the individual medicine has not been made available?

All those things could arise, yes.

What discussion is taking place at the moment—if this is being purported as a solution, how do you get around—

Purported if it is a solution, is that a simplified system is put in place. Instead of having to put a lot of information into your application form, it will be simplified in some way with drop-down menus for the most commonly used products. It is simplifying the system for those applying for those licences, but again, there might be some way we could agree with the EU that suppliers could perhaps store a quantity of that in Northern Ireland itself.

Is that not vital? Otherwise, the animal will be dead before you go through the processes envisaged—

Indeed, there could be a critical issue. Yes.

You mentioned vaccines. My understanding is that the botulism vaccine is not envisaged to be part of this or to be restricted at all. Is that your understanding?

Botulism vaccines are usually imported under special licence from Australia or South Africa. We are doing that at the minute, but again that is through the VMD. We are told that a workaround can be put into place for that, but we haven’t had any details of that workaround, or of whether that would be acceptable to the European Union.

In terms of the reduction in number from half to 20% or 15% of potentially impacted medicines available, it has been suggested that the reason for such a significant reduction is twofold—first, that there are licences in operation, or that have been issued for medicines that are not routinely used, and that that forms part of the inflated initial figure; secondly that some companies hold licences for medicines that have been approved, but they simply have not responded. Does that ring true to you?

There was certainly a delay in some companies responding and taking action. We have been informed that the majority of the decrease is through the rerouting of products: they are not coming from the EU to Great Britain, initially, to come to Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland; they are being rerouted through Ireland. That is bringing a sense of making it readily available, although perhaps not just as readily available—it could take a little longer in the supply chain to get it into Northern Ireland. The other thing is that there are a lot of products that we normally use under certain trade names for which there are alternatives available through EU routes rather than through GB.

You have been candid enough to say that you have not received a critical medicines list, and you do not confirm that the figure sits at 14, but you do not shy away from the 60 at medium risk category. Outside of botulism vaccines, are there any medicines about which you or the Veterinary Association have a significant concern that has yet to be addressed?

As I say, because I do not have a list, I am afraid that I cannot give that detail.

On a therapeutic basis or on the basis of experience, do you know of a product that is routinely used and talked of in your industry? Is there no industry chatter? I do not want to encroach on your confidentiality agreement, but is there no industry chatter?

The general industry chatter at the minute is around the availability of vaccines full stop, and that just seems to be a production issue, but there were certainly issues around some sheep vaccines in the spring. There is no chatter. Among the veterinary profession in Northern Ireland, the pharmaceutical salespeople are saying that there is no issue, and that you are still going to get it. There has been some chat about differing pack sizes: perhaps certain pack sizes would not be authorised, and so there would be smaller pack sizes, which would affect smaller farms in Northern Ireland—you would not want to buy a pack for 500 sheep if you only have 50. That has been the general chat. We are told that there is no issue with the salmonella vaccine. That was a serious one, because salmonella causes abortion in cattle and has public health risks as well.

Gavin has touched on some of the specifics, but could you, if you have not already, give us your overall assessment of the working group’s progress in mitigating the impact, and comment on what, ideally, you would see as an interim measure, absent the wider EU-UK deal that I think we all hope to see?

In the last year, I think VMD and DEFRA have done considerable work in relation to the pharmaceutical companies. Things have firmed up a lot—going from 50% of medicines not being available down to 10% is quite a lot—but again, it is about which ones we are not going to get. On some of the solutions, a veterinary agreement that includes veterinary medicines is obviously the ideal. There could also be something a little simpler around a mutual recognition agreement that facilitates market access and applies to regulated products such as medicines and other supplements, vitamins and so on. That might be simpler to negotiate. That would be just around medicines. I suppose neither of those is likely to be in place for the end of the grace period on 31 December 2025, which is less than eight months away now and creeping ever closer. The rerouting of product via the Republic of Ireland has already been put in place by a number of companies, and that is for EU product. I suppose the GB product is a little more concerning. We are looking at the development of the special import certification scheme for Northern Ireland, so that it can approve the importation of critical medicines to Northern Ireland from GB and/or other places in the world. Importing from outside the EU is allowed under EU rules. Another thing that has been proposed, but may not be as acceptable, is to allow veterinary medicines that are currently used, and therefore aligned with EU rules pre-EU exit, to continue to be used without re-batch testing or changes to marketing authority holder addresses—this is GB product, really. Any new medicines would need to comply fully. What we would like, as with any solution here, is to future-proof it so that we are not just talking about current medicines, but can access new medicines developed in GB without huge additional cost to Northern Ireland compared with the rest of the UK.

Wherever this lands, the reality is that it would have to be within range of the EU’s rules and protocols. Do you have a view on what EU veterinary agreement is most suitable for the UK—mutual recognition or equivalence? As you say, it is not just current medications; it will be future stuff as well.

The British Veterinary Association has produced a position paper on trade deals. We have looked at a couple of models that could be used. The New Zealand model relates to equivalence—the rules are not exactly the same, but there is mutual recognition that they provide the same protection. That does not fully eliminate physical checks. There would still have to be some physical checks and some paperwork, but it would be simplified paperwork. In the Swiss model, we align with product of animal origin rules, but some flexibility could still be built in to allow the UK to require higher standards—say, in animal welfare—than would be considered by other EU member states. So there are some models that we could use, but they are perhaps longer term. It is really about having workaround solutions now that are acceptable to the EU so that our trade can continue.

Thank you very much for your time, Dr Kirsten Dunbar. That is the end of this panel. We will now move on to the second panel.

Thank you for your time and for the invitation. Witnesses: Dr Lisa Claire Whitten, Dr Anthony Soares and Joël Reland.

This panel is hybrid. Dr Lisa Claire Whitten is remote and Joël Reland and Dr Anthony Soares are in the room. Can the witnesses introduce themselves?

My name is Lisa Claire Whitten. I am a research fellow at Queen’s University Belfast and with the Centre for Inclusive Trade Policy.

I am Joël Reland, a research fellow at UK in a Changing Europe.

My name is Anthony Soares. I am the director of the Centre for Cross Border Cooperation.

Thank you for your time today. The Trump Administration’s approach to trade presents specific challenges for Northern Ireland and the operation of the Windsor framework. How resilient are the current arrangements for at-risk goods, given differences in President Trump’s treatment of the EU and UK in their response to US tariffs? I will start with you, Joël.

A nice easy one to start! The main challenge will be around whether we see reciprocal tariffs from the EU on US imports. At the moment, they have been suspended for 90 days, but in theory a range of higher tariffs could be levied on steel, aluminium, soybeans—those kinds of goods. In theory, Northern Ireland would have to apply that external tariff. It would mean that Northern Irish businesses and consumers would potentially face higher costs on those imports compared with those in GB, which presumably would continue to apply the tariffs that they currently do. I guess that would probably be the biggest challenge. If they are not at risk, you then have questions about moving into the European Union, and whether you can claim the difference back, but there is still an administrative compliance cost in having to claim back the difference in the tariff. I also do not know the extent to which goods subject to the raised tariff would be considered not at risk. From the research that I have looked at, a lot of it would be related to the manufacturing sector, such as machinery and stuff for construction, which I imagine would then link in with the aluminium and steel tariffs. To be honest, I am not a deep enough expert on the mobility of construction goods on the island of Ireland to know the at-risk state of those. That is where I would say more work is needed to understand the specific level of exposure.

I don’t have that much more to add to what Joël has outlined. I would just underline my understanding that the presumption would be that when you have safeguards on goods coming in, they are at risk, so you might not see that much opportunity for claiming back the cost of application of tariffs in the event that we had reciprocal tariffs from the EU. That would apply to goods entering Northern Ireland from GB that have come from the US. In that whole scenario, the risk is about differential arrangements between the UK as a whole and the US, as well as the EU and the US, so that is the area to be looking at as we go forward in relations with the US at the minute.

Joël, you have said that the construction industry is not your area of expertise, but who should be looking at this impact? Is it the UK Government? Is it the EU?

I would say this is one specifically for the UK to understand. However, you would expect that in the current political atmosphere, where there is a desire both to make the Windsor framework work and to deepen UK-EU trade in an unstable geopolitical environment, there is a mutual interest in making this stuff work. There is definitely an ability to work with colleagues in the European Union and Ireland to understand what their perspectives are. I would also add that there are some differences depending on the way in which the tariff is levied. If the EU tariff is levied using—I cannot remember the name of the Act right now—what is basically an EU instrument designed specifically for response to crisis coercion situations, there is potentially a difference in the way that it is applied in Northern Ireland. Having an open conversation with the EU about how it intends to implement its tariffs is important. Obviously, the UK Government must also work with industry to understand the risk that they see themselves exposed to.

We think that the Northern Ireland’s Federation of Small Businesses has appealed to the EU to use an anti-corruption regulation—I can check this, because the name is also slipping my mind, but I believe it is an anti-corruption regulation—that is quite new in the EU that does not technically apply under the Windsor framework in the EU’s response to the US tariffs, if and when they come in after the 90-day period. Again, it is just about raising the importance of clear and ongoing communication between the UK and the EU to strategise their dual responses to the uncertainty coming from the US at this point.

I think the name is anti-coercion.

That’s it—apologies. I was close.

Good morning to you all, and hello Lisa—it is nice to see you. You are right that FSB talked about anti-coercion but it also said that there could be a straight exemption for Northern Ireland from the EU, if it chose. The FSB raised it three weeks ago, and I have spoken on it publicly in support. Do you, as an academic, have any sense whatsoever that there is any actual consideration of this approach within our own UK Government? It certainly did not feature in the joint communication issued by the Joint Committee. Do you believe there is meaningful engagement among our Government, with the EU, to protect Northern Ireland?

I think that line of communication is ongoing, frequent and open. I would be generally positive about the quality of that conversation to protect Northern Ireland in the context of external trade obligations. Within the UK Government, I understand there is cognisance that, as the UK approaches the US for another ongoing discussion about some sort of arrangement, deal or agreement, it would likely be at the level of tariffs rather than any substantive element. There is awareness of the Northern Ireland aspect of that, but I am not in the realm to predict how they will come to a conclusion on costs and benefits, and what they would decide. That is a consideration in the broader picture. I would say this is the most prominent example we have had so far of what is a dynamic of the Windsor Framework and post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland that has perhaps not been very visible—it does have implications for Northern Ireland’s place as part of the UK in its external relations outside its UK-EU ones. We have not really had the chance to bottom out what that means in different circumstances and on a case-by-case basis.

Joël, have you any indication that we are being considered fruitfully?

I think the strongest indication is the fact that the two most significant policy issues being briefed around this 19 May summit are an SPS deal and emissions trading. What links those is that they both have a potentially significant benefit to facilitate the Windsor Framework and GB-NI trade. It is no surprise that the EU is more open to flexibility of increased UK access to its markets and systems, in those areas that are so integrally linked to Northern Ireland. Reading between the lines, both sides are concerned about making the Windsor Framework work as well as possible. Tariffs are obviously more difficult, because they are such a fast-moving picture. No one knows what the White House will do from one day to the next, and this kind of improvised defensive trade policy is new territory for both the UK and the EU. It is inevitably a bit messier and a bit blurrier, but that spirit of trying to make the Windsor Framework work is quite evident.

Stormont has now been back for a full 14 months. That has given us the opportunity to see—and for you to indicate to us—how effective you think democratic scrutiny mechanisms have been over that period.

The restoration of power sharing has been absolutely vital, because it has allowed the Democratic Scrutiny Committee to do its work. Speaking as a researcher who has been looking at this divergence for three or four years now, the establishment of that scrutiny work has been invaluable, for both having a record of EU legislation—which is sort of starting to be applied—and for the level of scrutiny that it allows through evidence sessions that are being held, hearing from lots of experts and producing the qualified assessments about the impact on trade or other aspects of life in Northern Ireland. That has been really valuable. For me, the biggest challenge still is that it is a very reactive process. Legislation arrives and you look at it. The problem with that is that it often leaves quite big gaps when you are going through that scrutiny process. The GI on craft instruments would be a perfect example—a year passed from the triggering of consent mechanisms to the conclusion being made by the UK Government. That is not good for anybody—having a year where you don’t know what will apply. There is more work to be done to get ahead of EU legislation and to understand the stuff coming down the track. The loss of the European Scrutiny Committee in the Commons is significant, because it did very good work on pre-emptive scrutiny.

Lord Murphy’s review is looking at some of the practical outworkings of these mechanisms. The impediments that have come up thus far include a lack of political will on the Committee to explore individual issues in depth, which seems to be borne out of whether you are pro or anti-EU, so there is no effective scrutiny of those mechanisms. Assembly Members have a very constrained timescale to consider issues in depth, and they have to take a decision with a brief indication from the UK Government that they may seek to legislate in the future, which gives no certainty about the prospect or danger of divergence. Do you agree with those, and are there other issues that have arisen over the last 14 months that need to be considered to improve the effectiveness of democratic scrutiny at Stormont?

In all honesty, I would struggle to provide an opinion on the issues you have described because I am just not close enough to the way those processes are working in Stormont. From a slightly more distanced perspective, it is clear that there is still a very political element to how it is being used; you just have to look at the divide over people voting for and against applicability motions and the triggering of the Stormont brake. From that perspective, is it led more by presumptions than by evidence? Maybe it points to that a bit, but I would struggle to provide more comment than that, I am afraid.

I don’t have much to say about the political aspect. Although I agree wholeheartedly that getting the Democratic Scrutiny Committee set up is a positive development and that its work has been very valuable from a scrutiny perspective, we have to recognise that it has an unenviable task. There is a lot of change going on, and it is in a very demanding position. I had a look recently, and there have been 28 notifications from the UK Government about Acts coming forward that will potentially be in scope of the Stormont brake. Nine inquiries have been held, and there have been 17 decisions not to hold an inquiry. If you look at the inquiry process, it takes the Democratic Scrutiny Committee five or six weeks to hold an inquiry, in which it has to demonstrate engagement across the board with the UK Government, Northern Ireland Departments, business and civil society. That burden of work ought not to be underestimated. It is also the case that the focus of the Committee’s scope is on the operation of the Stormont brake, which isn’t actually the full scope of Windsor framework-applicable law. Windsor framework-applicable law also doesn’t in itself capture everything that could be of relevance to Northern Ireland from the perspective of UK-EU divergence, the realities of Northern Ireland’s position, its geographic proximity to Ireland, north-south co-operation and so on. There are other elements that could be relevant to businesses and society in Northern Ireland that are not in scope of the Democratic Scrutiny Committee.

Lisa, have you had an opportunity to consider the Government’s response to the notification of the pulling of the Stormont brake? What does that say or point to in relation to EU alignment and the Government’s intentions in that regard?

Yes. I think the response to the Stormont brake, which was in relation to regulation on chemical classification, labelling and packaging, is indicative of a pattern that we are starting to see from this UK Government. The response is to acknowledge concerns in Northern Ireland, to consult or commit to addressing any issues that would arise and would lead to a new regulatory border between Great Britain and Northern Ireland—that is a positive response—to undertake more in-depth analysis and impact assessments of the nature of the change happening at the EU level, and to seek to mitigate the concerns. I accept that with the commitments we have seen, both in response to the triggering of the Stormont brake and more recently on the decision to add the regulation on geographical indicators for craft and industrial products and critical raw materials, the Government is making commitments along the lines of an awareness of the Northern Ireland position, and the intention that Great Britain, in reviewing the relevant regulation there, will make sure that no new barriers arise. That is a future commitment, and it is contingent on the outcomes of consultations and the development of relevant legislation. It is an emerging approach where this UK Government is much more open to aligning with the EU to avoid new GB-NI frictions and wider UK-EU frictions, but it is going to be an iterative process over time. There is still a bit of contention.

I think they are hellbent on as much alignment as they can get for the entirety of the country, and that is their political raison d’être. You mentioned the response to the Stormont brake being pulled, and the Government's response highlights one of the deficits. The brake was pulled because the Chemical Industries Association was saying that this is £1 billion-worth of industry coming to Northern Ireland, which is going to be fundamentally impacted. There is then a greater period of time when the Government have an unfettered ability to have discussions, do their analysis, work out their workarounds and do what they need to do. Then they turn around and say that there is no problem now. But the Democratic Scrutiny Committee in the Assembly was not privy to that information, did not have the bandwidth to conduct those exercises and certainly did not have the product of the Government’s work before they made a decision—it only comes after. That is also true of geographical indicators. Would you accept that this is a deficit in the process and that the Government is often going way after the fact to try to resolve issues rather than giving the democratically accountable, elected Members of Stormont the information they need at the time to make the decisions?

Yes, I accept that it is a deficit of the process so far. We are still in the early chapters of these processes, and the legal text of the Stormont brake is explicit that it is designed to be a last resort. For it to be a last-resort measure, there must be prior consultation and engagement on the development of EU legislation much further up the track. I am sure we are all aware that EU legislation does not happen quickly. To produce good, in-depth and specific information about how changes could apply in Northern Ireland and the potential implications, you need to be engaging way before an EU Act is published in the Official Journal, which is when the official democratic scrutiny process initiates. It is important to see the Stormont brake procedures in the wider context of new mechanisms for Northern Ireland engagement with the architecture of the withdrawal agreement, the Joint Consultative Working Group and Specialised Committee, as well as direct engagement with the European Commission. That suggests other questions about the capacity, the existing literacy within the Northern Ireland community, and the awareness and desire to engage with Commission consultations to request specific briefings on changes. All of that is adding burdens to our economy and society. At the same time, being able to do that is an opportunity to mitigate against our getting to the point where we have the CIA giving evidence saying that this is going to really impact our economy.

Thank you. Joël, do you have reflections on that discussion about the frailties of the process? Last Thursday, the Government decided to add three new chapters on critical minerals and tariffs emerging from Ukraine and Moldova. They did that without seeking an applicability motion from the Northern Ireland Assembly. So, despite their claims of engagement, seeking consent and encouraging democratic participation, there was none. What are your reflections on that?

I will start with the broader discussion. I essentially agree with Lisa Claire’s analysis. I think that the Stormont brake and the applicability motion process were initially presented as obstructive instruments—vetoes. We are now iterating them into a more constructive form. Rather than being about blocking legislation, they are more about a mutual navigation through the weeds of it. That is fundamentally a product of the change of Government. Under this Labour Government, there is much more willingness to align with EU legislation and therefore, rather than the default position being to block where you have a risk of divergence, there is more thinking about whether there are other ways to navigate the challenge. That is evident in all the responses the Government have given, where they have alluded to looking at ways to implement some kind of whole-UK legislation that would more or less align with what the EU is doing. On the question of the most recently applied pieces of EU legislation, it is important to bear in mind that, although the voices of MLAs are obviously extremely important in this process, there are three key constituents underpinning the Windsor framework: Stormont, Westminster and the EU. The Government are probably cognisant of how this process intersects with their relations with the European Union. If there is a risk that almost every piece of EU legislation is rebuffed or has its process of implementation delayed, the Government may be concerned about the blowback into the EU relationship. If you constantly have to mitigate questions around the application of new legislation in Northern Ireland, that is grit in the machine of the wider EU reset, in which you are trying to build new trading, political and diplomatic links that you hope will benefit everybody, including Northern Ireland, in the longer term. There is possibly some level of qualified risk assessment about what you want to prioritise in the relationship.

On Moldova and Ukraine, there was a tariff agreement that was almost a reiteration of a pre-existing agreement, save that we are now incorporated in EU quotas, which was not the case before. Somebody might say that was inconsequential and that it was almost a roll-over, but is it not the case that this UK Government are now so firmly in pursuit of a wider reset and closer alignment that they were, in those instances, prepared to set aside the democratic participation, inclusion and consent of the democratically elected Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly, who are most impacted by these decisions?

For a Government, I suppose there is always a balanced judgment to be made around that. This is slightly deviating from the point but, as an extreme example, in Switzerland every canton has to approve every piece of legislation that goes through. That does not make for a quick process. Do you want to go to that level of direct democracy when you are trying to move things on a diplomatic level with a key partner? That is a judgment for the Government to make, and I think they have made a judgment.

They clearly don’t.

There is definitely potential for that type of improvement in the system, and for bolstering its resilience. We have already had a seminar with Northern Ireland stakeholders, which was very well attended. It was given by the European Commission on the work programme for 2025. The Commission went through and listed, based on their analysis, the EU Acts, proposals, policy revisions and removals that they feel are relevant to Northern Ireland because they address Windsor framework-applicable law. Although that is quite a high-level approach, it just runs through the different Acts. It allows those initiatives to be flagged to Northern Ireland stakeholders, including businesses, civic actors and officials—I would have to check, but I think there are about 160 attending. Knowing what is coming forward, the wider capacity question for Northern Ireland’s society raises its head. That is around whether those businesses and people in attendance, who are aware of these coming changes, can take it forward by engaging directly with the Commission and the UK Government to ask questions about what the plans will be for relevant policy changes on a case-by-case basis. There is an option for Northern Ireland stakeholders, which is broadly defined in this context, to request specific information sessions from the Commission and additional workshops on upcoming legislative changes, where you would have the opportunity to push back, challenge, raise concerns or present information from a Northern Ireland perspective at that initial stage while the proposal is still in development. Northern Ireland stakeholders can also submit through the normal European consultation processes such as the “Have Your Say” initiatives. There are avenues to allow for earlier engagement and input from a Northern Ireland perspective, but it all comes back to the capacity question; the ability of businesses; what support there is for businesses and civic society to engage directly; and what support there is for Northern Ireland Departments to help facilitate that.

I think it could make sense, given where we are, the novelty of the arrangement and the fact that we are increasingly seeing that Windsor framework-applicable law is applying in Northern Ireland in a way that it does not anywhere else in the EU, which in itself raises questions about its partial nature and how it works together with UK legislation. I would come at it, maybe from an academic posture, to maximise the amount of information available and the resources out there for interested stakeholders, concerned individuals and organisations to engage. An EU office in Northern Ireland could help to facilitate that further.

Sorcha picked up on the Commission having an office, which I think many people would see as a very natural thing—a no-brainer. It was more or less assumed that this would be the case, but it was effectively traded away in one of the mad moments of posturing. Obviously, there are issues, and there is plenty of scope for scanning support and capacity building for the Stormont Committee, because with a new Commission in place, and with recent EU elections, there will be more regulation than they had been dealing with previously. The same question to you, Anthony, about the viability or usefulness of a Commission office in Belfast—and are you aware of any other interesting mechanisms, like observer status? From a party political perspective, my party is part of the Socialists and Democrats group, which has now offered us observer status, acknowledging the completely unique situation of Northern Ireland, where although regulations apply there is not full transparency and scrutiny. Do you think there is logic in at least some form of observer status for representatives from our region?

In my view, any channel that Northern Ireland can have to enable it to be upstream in terms of the development of policy and legislation within the Commission is absolutely vital. To be frank, I feel sorry for the Northern Ireland Assembly’s Windsor democratic scrutiny framework, because of the quantity of work that they have to get through and the time that they are given. By the time it gets to them, it is too late. You need to be upstream in terms of these things. Lisa mentioned the Commission’s presentation of the work programme. This is actually the second time it has happened; they did it for the previous work programme as well. That is a welcome initiative, but it does have that issue around capacity. I am coming from a civic society perspective: the organisations that we work with are civic society organisations in Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain. If someone from an organisation in the community and voluntary sector looks at the list of directives, legislation and proposed directives, they just look at it in bafflement because it is really technical stuff and they are not quite sure—"What does this mean for us?” There is a reliance in terms of that when the Commission presents its work programme to Northern Ireland stakeholders and tries to highlight where it thinks there are directives or proposals that might involve Northern Ireland. There is one directive that we think has an impact on Northern Ireland, but which the Commission did not highlight as being an initiative that it thought was applicable to Northern Ireland. That is the so-called defence of democracy directive, which we see as directly impacting on north-south co-operation, unless it is clarified—unless there is some better wording. But it was not spotted; it was not highlighted by the Commission as something that was of relevance to Northern Ireland. So, we cannot necessarily always rely on the Commission to spot things that are of relevance to Northern Ireland or to the Windsor framework. We all have to be attentive to what is coming out of Brussels. The same thing applies to legislation coming out of this place: we also need to be attentive to what is coming out from here, and what is coming out from Dublin in areas of their own competence, and how that affects relations on either a north-south or an east-west basis. So there is a huge amount of work to do. And yes, there is a huge capacity issue. But going back to the original point, the earlier we get involved—as far upstream as possible—the better it will be for Northern Ireland, because by the time a directive is out it is too late, really.

So, to confirm, you definitely see the logic in a physical Commission presence in Belfast. Do you see that that would be useful for exactly the type of upstream scanning that you are talking about? Can you see potential enhancements of Northern Ireland’s presence and operation in Brussels?

I would encourage any way that Northern Ireland stakeholders, Northern Ireland political representatives, MLAs, local authority representatives, in terms of the Committee of the Regions, can have some kind of status, and can familiarise people in Brussels—all the other member states. Because this is a process. It will not end next week, next month or next year—it is an ongoing process. And people in Brussels—if there is a Commission office in Belfast, we can also speak to them. But it is that continual reminding of member states of the specific circumstances in Northern Ireland—how directives or regulations coming out might impact on Northern Ireland in a way that those who are drawing up that legislation or those directives are not necessarily aware of, unless they have that input from Northern Ireland stakeholders.

I just want to reiterate the point on the challenge that there can be when receiving information from the European Commission. It is somewhat an observation of internal EU politics that the arrangements that Northern Ireland has for consultation directly with the Commission are very unusual. It is very unusual, particularly in the context of EU external relations, to have a substate representation directly engaging with the Commission on upcoming proposals and policies. The consequence of that is that, politically, the Commission officials presenting on the work programme and relevant legislation will hold very tightly to an understanding of what is relevant for Northern Ireland that is based on whether it amends or replaces EU law applicable under the Windsor framework already, or would be perhaps proposed, through article 13(4), as a new EU Act in scope of the objectives. It is quite a narrow definition that the Commission takes of what is Northern Ireland relevant, and it does not really account for, in particular, article 11, but also article 2, concerning north-south co-operation, individual rights and the commitments of the UK Government to uphold the “no diminution” requirements on individual rights under the 1998 agreement. Similar to Anthony, I am being a shameless geek in this area. You can go through the Commission work programme from this year and identify quite a number of Acts—about 20 or 25—that we went through and highlighted would be likely to be relevant to north-south co-operation, based on pre-existing north-south co-operation as it stood just before EU exit. One prominent example is a proposal coming back about seasonally adjusted timings—British summer time changes. That is back on the agenda.

Don’t even go there.

It is those sorts of issues, but there are also a substantial number in environment, which obviously has north-south co-operation implications; transport; and police and judicial co-operation. So I think there is that broader challenge: where does scrutiny take place for issues in areas that are outside the Windsor framework applicable law directly, but which would have very clear implications for Northern Ireland because of the geographic realities of a shared island and the nature of cross-border lives that are lived on the island of Ireland?

Thank you. I will pick up on some of those points later.

Can I add two really quick points? One is that there is obviously a role for UKMis in Brussels, and I think there is still work to be done on exactly what role it plays as a third-country representation or mission. I think, having been used to being inside the institutions, people are still getting to grips with how you navigate and gather intelligence from the outside. There are improvements that can be made there. Secondly, there might be something to be learned from EEA states. Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein have something called the EFTA Surveillance Authority, which engages with the Commission from the early stages of legislative development. Obviously, they are much more integrated into the single market, but nevertheless that surveillance authority has a big shiny building in Brussels that does a lot of work and represents their interests and also raises disputes about whether something is or is not applicable. So some kind of more institutionalised representation is also, I think, worth thinking about.

On the AI Act, I do not foresee a great trade impact, just in the sense that AI is an international product. Anyone with a digital appliance can consume and procure the thing you are producing, wherever you are, so people are probably going to produce, broadly speaking, to the standards that the EU is demanding. If you are selling something into Northern Ireland, you are probably selling it into Ireland and the rest of the European continent as well. I do not see much of an issue where things will not be permissible in Northern Ireland that GB consumers will have. The bigger challenge will be with compliance and development/innovation over time. By compliance, I mean the fact that there are now things you will have to ensure are taking place in Northern Ireland, such as compliance with due diligence obligations, or that an AI chatbot tells you that it is AI when being used. That all takes people and resource. From the UK Government perspective, who is going to make sure that it is happening in Northern Ireland? There is work and admin costs there. I think it is comparable to the issue with animal welfare standards, which I know has been looked into previously, where there are questions of who is doing what, and how they are doing it. That is really just procedure, which is going to take some work. There is then the innovation cost. I am not an AI expert, but if you speak to AI experts, they would say that the UK is maybe benefiting from having moved a bit more slowly on AI than the EU, which went very early. ChatGPT has evolved significantly since the AI Act was initially developed, so it is potentially somewhat inhibitive of more innovative things that you could do to develop AI in the future. The UK, when it develops its legislation, may look to be more encouraging of early-stage development than is allowed under the EU Act. Potentially, you will attract investment into early-stage AI stuff in the UK and it could become something of a hub. Of course, Northern Ireland would not be able to benefit from that if it is subject to the EU regulations, so you may have AI investment coming into GB that is not going into NI because of the different rulebooks. To address your final point about how it has been looked at so far, I do not really know. I have seen this statement from the UK Government that more scrutiny is needed, but I really do not have any more clarity on where that is going, to be honest.

The only thing I would briefly add is that the proposed application of the EU AI Act to Northern Ireland is the first test case that we have of an initial exchange of views in the Joint Committee under article 13(4), in which the EU has proposed adding the whole of the EU AI Act to the Windsor framework, and the UK Government have said that they do not think that is necessary. I believe they now have six weeks to exchange information, discuss and find a way forward. If they do not find a way forward, there is a provision in there to allow for remedial measures. If we got to that point, because of the timeline on these matters, it would probably be years—that is an estimation—before we ever saw anything, and we must also consider the development of the industries. It is an interesting test case of where the UK Government are not saying, “We will just align with EU standards.” Instead, they are saying, “We want to take this different approach.” Therefore, they are taking a posture towards disagreeing with the EU’s analysis. I think that three articles of the EU AI Act apply under the Windsor framework, because they updated already existing, applicable law, but that is very narrow; it is about safety components that use AI in products. As Joël said, the application of the full Act would have more substantial regulatory impacts down the line, so it will be an interesting one to watch.

Do you agree, Lisa, that there seems to be a number of issues at play here? One is that a lot of people talk of AI and do not really understand what they are talking about. That is true of the UK Government; they know that they will have to legislate or regulate in this area but are not entirely sure how, so they are at a crossroads. There is also the sense that the EU’s proposals are not right, do not fit and will not work. The third aspect, which should be particularly important to this Committee, is that the advancement into this technological area goes far beyond trade. It would be an expansion of the Windsor framework in a way that would be, to my mind, unsustainable. I think those three issues are at play in this wider discussion on AI.

The area in which I particularly have a response to you is the third point around the expansion of the Windsor framework. We are now in the realm of, “This is a framework,” and it could go multiple ways in terms of its scope, the way that it is used in the broader context of the UK-EU relationship and how close or distant that is. As I say, this is a very important first scenario where this UK Government are advocating for a different approach that is more a prioritisation of innovation. I agree with what Joël said—the EU legislated early. That is perhaps unsurprising, but there is still a lot of development in this area to take place. We have not really seen, and it is hard to do, a true impact assessment. That is difficult from a Northern Ireland perspective because we will have to make assessments before we would ideally want to because the information is not there. We recognise that challenge.

My questions are to Mr Reland and Dr Whitten. The Northern Ireland Secretary, as we know, recently reiterated the Government’s manifesto commitment to upholding and protecting the UK internal market and, alongside that, preventing new regulatory barriers between Northern Ireland and the other parts of the UK. We would value your thoughts on to what extent the Product Regulation and Metrology Bill might enable the Government to better deliver on that commitment. I am relaxed as to who has the first bite of that particular cherry.

Well, you are looking at me! The Product Regulation and Metrology Bill is a potentially very significant instrument for maintaining GB-NI alignment, but there are a lot more unknowns than knowns about it at the moment. The first and most obvious question is: how wide is its application? The Government still have not been entirely explicit about that. We know that the environmental effects of a product could be in scope—EU legislation that relates to that—but that is very wide. In an extreme interpretation, the AI Act could fall under that because AI uses an enormous amount of energy and it is a product. In a much narrower interpretation, it is ionic batteries for electric bikes. We do not know exactly how wide it will go. That will affect the extent to which it can be used to, in the Government’s eyes, mitigate GB-NI divergence. There is also the question of what the principles are and what the framework is for thinking about how the Act, if it becomes an Act, will be used. That has not been set out very clearly either. Is there a threshold at which alignment would be pursued? What would that threshold be? Would there be explicit things, similar to the Stormont brake, around particular disruption to GB-NI trade that would have to be met? Would any other set of principles, perhaps to do with UK-EU trade, be looked at? The third question is one of resource and delivery. If done on a wide basis, this is an extremely big piece of work. You are having to systematically monitor EU legislation across a potentially very wide set of areas, conduct impact assessments and, where necessary, implement mirror legislation. That is a large amount of work for any Government to do. Who is going to do it? Will it sit with the Business Secretary and his Department? Will it be the NI Office? I do not know. Will it be set out to every Department that they need to monitor for divergence in their area? Can you trust those Departments to do it? Will they have the people to do it when we are being told that departmental budgets and headcount will be cut and the Government have an awful lot of things on their agenda? I seriously question whether this kind of potential alignment could be done on a widespread basis given the resource challenges that it entails.

Before I bring in Dr Whitten, there seems to be a theme emerging that the domestic processes of evaluation, assessment and response written for a different period of time are potentially not fit for purpose to meet the in-real-time, analysis-response legislating that we may find ourselves facing. Is that a fair assessment that Westminster HMG plc, if you will, should be alert to and give thought to?

The UK is in a unique position as a third country to the EU given its proximity but lack of institutional relationship. You have these EEA/EFTA countries that are much more economically integrated, so they have institutional structures that help them manage that. You have a country like Switzerland, which I would say is partially in the single market, and again now there is an overarching framework agreement to govern that, and it is aligned to EU legislation in those areas. We are in a slightly odd position of looking like we are going to cleave back somewhat but without any of that real institutional structure for monitoring, analysing and implementing. That is a unique function of Brexit and the fact that no country has ever left the European Union before. Could it be done better? Undoubtedly, yes; I think there have been significant failures of scrutiny for the last five years. On the other hand, there would be no perfect system. Even if you had the best intentions in the world, there is always going to be a gap just because of the enormity of the scale of EU legislation.

I agree with what Joël has outlined, and I would also observe that, if you spend any time in Brussels, it is interesting to note the relative size of third country representations vis-à-vis member state representations. Third country representations tend to be proportionately larger and better resourced than member state representations, which is interesting in itself, and indicative of the amount of work and resource that additionally goes in when you are not within the institutions, ongoing committees and discussions internal to the EU, but you have a significant interest in what is said and what comes out of those. I agree that the UK is still, in a sense, in the early stages of understanding, strengthening and creating architecture sufficient to manage the post-EU exit relationship, and how to best scrutinise and address the issues that arise. On the Product Regulation and Metrology Bill, I would draw a parallel with the Scottish Government’s commitment to align with EU law. The provision under the Bill allows for voluntary alignment, which is very important and could be significant from a Northern Ireland perspective to avoid regulatory divergence between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It would mitigate businesses having to follow two different sets of rules in providing goods to Northern Ireland and the EU and the rest of the UK. However, it is also mirror dancing, rather than being recognised from the EU side, so it is not going to mitigate the checks, controls and procedural implications of being outside the EU. What it could indicate, very interestingly, is almost like a preparation for the type of arrangement that this UK Government are pursuing in the relationship with the EU under the TCA. If you did get some sort of formalisation of the mirroring of certain aspects of EU legislation, that would further mitigate the frictions and complexities that come with the specific arrangement in Northern Ireland. That is one of the bigger outstanding questions and also leads to SPS arrangements. While the Product Regulation and Metrology Bill could be significant for avoiding product differences, it does not address a lot of the goods that have seen additional frictions as a consequence of the Windsor framework, because it excludes agrifood, fertiliser, plants, animal origin and the sorts of things that present a challenge.

I want to draw out all three of you on this point, which may help this Committee when it makes recommendations to Government in its report following this inquiry. For too many people, Brexit was seen as an event rather than a process to be implemented over time, with different events that would occur and would need to be responded to after due consideration. An awful lot of people then thought that, unless the conversation between the UK and the EU was short, snarly and finger-jabbing, it was in some way a betrayal and the undermining of a democratic decision that we have all sought to adhere to and uphold. I am guessing here that you would see some considerable merit, in order to address issues that have the potential to affect my Northern Ireland colleagues’ constituents and businesses on the mainland—tying in two points that we have heard from Ms Hanna—in having EU representation direct in Belfast or a beefing up of the UK’s representation in the EU, like those countries we have referenced that are doing more of the day-to-day, behind the scenes conversations of relationship and trust building in order to identify molehills before they become mountains. Neither approach could legitimately be described as a betrayal of the referendum result, or as seeking to undermine or reverse it through the back door. I do not want to put words in any of your mouths, but is that a fairly safe assessment of a beneficial landing spot? A yes or no answer will suffice.

No.

I was not asking you, Mr Robinson.

I will pick up on your term about preventing molehills from becoming mountains; that is exactly what needs to happen, but it goes back to the capacity for doing proper impact assessments and catching things early. From our own engagement with the various mechanisms under the Windsor framework, it seems that, because of its nature and the nature of the mechanisms, which are very restricted, there seems to be an attitude or a process—hopefully it is improving—where they want to hear evidence of problems. We do not want to give them evidence of problems; we want to tell them about something that could potentially be a problem and that we need to address it before it becomes a problem. That is one of the big challenges, and it is not just a challenge for the commission or for the UK, or for the joint UK-EU mechanisms. It is separate and unilateral, in terms of both the commission and UK Government being able to really take on things before they are a problem. We do not want to be giving you evidence of a problem. For example, we now have the electronic travel authorisation, and it is the kind of attitude that says, “Let us see what the impact is actually going to be on tourism and on cross-border tourism.” We were saying, “Well, maybe we should not get to the point where we’re telling you what the impacts have been; maybe we can find a solution that means that we’re not going to have that problem in the first place.” That is a big challenge.

I am still trying to find my yes or no answer.

I will contribute a yes.

You win the prize for shortest answer, which is usually the most well received.

Uncontroversially, more co-operation is a good thing.

Is that a yes or a no?

I cannot remember exactly what you asked in intricate detail but, broadly speaking, yes.

Thank you.

This is an illustrative example of my concern that, while it is really important that all necessary efforts are made to mitigate the impact on business and consumers in Northern Ireland, particularly due to the movement of goods, that risks overlooking some of the non-trade impacts of Brexit, including the many disruptions, interruptions and impacts on north-south issues that I know many of you ably flag and try to mitigate. As a starter for 10—aware that we only have a short window in which the Committee is quorate—Anthony, can you just address whether the necessary conditions have been maintained and protected since the Windsor framework took effect? And in your answer, you might briefly address that concept, what we mean by it, and why it is important.

On maintaining the necessary conditions for north-south co-operation, I go back to that example of the electronic travel authorisation. That has a direct impact on a formal area of co-operation under the North South Ministerial Council. It impacts on the operation of a body set up under strand two of the Good Friday agreement, Tourism Ireland, which is selling the island of Ireland overseas as a tourism destination. Inevitably, there is going to be a direct impact on the operation of a formal area of north-south co-operation. That is particularly worrying. Going back to the conversation around impact assessment, we use the term “border proofing,” which is looking at where policy or legislation is being developed to check on what its potential impacts might be on north-south and/or east-west co-operation and relations, and following this practice, which we have asked UK Government to consider: the Irish Cabinet handbook has a requirement within it that policies brought before the Irish Cabinet must be checked for their potential impacts on north-south and east-west relations. It even goes further to say that, while policies may not immediately seem to be impacting on north-south co-operation or relations, you must look further into it to make sure that what the Irish Government do in the Republic does not impact on Northern Ireland or on all-island co-operation. That is a practice we ask the UK Government to take on as well. In terms of other areas of north-south co-operation—I know we do not want to go back into history but, unfortunately, we are going back into history—during the negotiations for the UK’s departure from the EU, a mapping exercise of north-south co-operation was undertaken, with 140-odd areas of north-south co-operation. The mapping exercise took place in 2017, but the technical notes were published in 2019. The technical notes, which were published by both the UK Government and the European Commission, admitted that informal, local, community-led, north-south co-operation may not have been included in that mapping exercise. When article 11 talks about maintaining the necessary conditions for north-south co-operation, if you have not captured a huge amount of the co-operation that takes place, and it was not in your mapping exercise in the first place, how are you going to maintain the conditions for north-south co-operation if you do not necessarily understand what that co-operation involves in its entirety? In terms of the conditions themselves, we have engaged on that issue. The conditions, in terms of the mapping exercise, were very technical and legalistic, whereas we understand conditions necessary for north-south and east-west co-operation to be political conditions—the political context that can affect north-south co-operation. During the temporary absence of the strand one institutions, the North South Ministerial Council could not operate, which then affected the operation of the implementation bodies and strand two, although all those implementation bodies carried on working, as they have done for the last 26 years—day after day, they have been operating. But the political context has an effect on co-operation. The regulatory context has an effect on co-operation. The material context of access to goods and services also has an effect on co-operation, and the community context—the support that the communities give to north-south and east-west co-operation—is also important. We do not think that that is fully understood. Article 11 itself is very restrictive. It talks about maintaining “the necessary conditions for North-South co-operation,” but in the application and operation of the protocol, and that is where the problem lies. If you look at all the rest of the articles of the protocol, apart from article 1, paragraph 3, nothing else is really to do with north-south co-operation. It is all to do with trade, goods, VAT, all sorts of other issues that are not necessarily about north-south co-operation itself. That is a major challenge in terms of the restrictive nature of article 11 and something that the Joint Committee really does need to address.

I will come back to you on other practical implications if time allows, but do you think the Joint Committee and others have had sufficient interest and focus on this? Has there been sufficient engagement with civil society organisations and others mapping and following all of this?

I can tell you that from about 2019-20 the centre itself, and then the ad hoc group for north-south and east-west co-operation that it convenes, as well as other groups, have been asking for those channels of engagement. We now have those channels for engagement, in terms of civic society having channels for engagement with the mechanisms under the Windsor framework. The Specialised Committee meets with Northern Ireland stakeholders, including civic society stakeholders. We would take part in those meetings and put forward the views and issues in relation to north-south co-operation. Obviously, article 11 of the Windsor framework is about just north-south co-operation, not east-west. We raised those issues with a Specialised Committee, but whether they get up to the Joint Committee is a different issue. It comes back to the restrictive nature of article 11 and the Specialised Committee’s remit. The Committee follows its remit, but that is not to say that it is not interested or does not pay attention to what is being said. All sides value that engagement. It is a process that I can see has improved. But I am not convinced that the challenges facing north-south co-operation are necessarily feeding into the Joint Committee. We can see that the joint communiqués that are released after Joint Committee meetings do not refer to north-south co-operation. The last one referred to avoidance of a hard border, which we are pretty confident about, and the internal market. There was no reference to north-south co-operation at all.

Is there a reason for that—one that you want to share—and are you making any recommendations, including to Lord Murphy’s review?

We are engaging with the independent review, and we will be putting forth those views on how that process of engagement can be improved. It is not just a process of engagement with the UK and EU joint mechanisms; there also has to be an improvement on the UK side unilaterally and on the Commission side. They are all parties to this, and they all have a responsibility to live up to the commitments made in the Windsor framework. In our engagement with the independent review, we will be putting forth those views again. But it is about coming back to that issue of border proofing and looking at things as they have developed, in terms of checking to see what this means for our relations on a north-south and east-west basis. It is also about engaging with stakeholders. I have one further point on that engagement with the EU and UK joint mechanisms. When we are talking about north-south co-operation, for instance, and you want to speak to people who are directly involved and can speak from experience on what it is like and what the conditions are for north-south co-operation, we have repeatedly said that it is not enough to talk to Northern Ireland stakeholders. In those engagements, stakeholders from the other end of the north-south co-operation pole should also be there to express their views on and experience of that north-south co-operation. I could even see, especially for the business side of things, GB stakeholders being present in those conversations, rather than just Northern Ireland businesses. It is a two-way operation here, and both sides have to be present in order to really reflect the experience of north-south co-operation, and of NI-GB and GB-NI trade.

Thank you. Lisa Claire, I will put the same set of questions to you. Do you think there are other practical, specific impacts or divergences that highlight some of the gaps; what is your assessment of maintenance of the necessary conditions and engagement; and what are your recommendations, including to Lord Murphy’s review?

On necessary conditions, I agree that there is an internal contradiction in the Windsor framework in the objective being to maintain necessary conditions, because when you scratch the surface of article 11 and the broader framework, those EU law and policy frameworks that were shared across the island pre-Brexit, and facilitating north-south co-operation, are not comprehensively covered in the Windsor framework. Article 11 is internally referenced; it is a referent. It says that the Windsor framework ought to be “implemented and applied so as to maintain the necessary conditions,” but the necessary conditions that existed prior to Brexit are not in scope. Just to put a little bit of substance on that, I think that 142 or 152 areas were identified in the mapping exercise; of those, 96 were said to be fully or partially reliant on shared EU law and policy frameworks. Those 96 essentially break down into three parts—I cannot remember exactly, but it is pretty much even thirds. One third are fully in scope of the Windsor framework: addressing co-operation in relation to movement of goods, and some elements of transport and energy, with a single electricity market. A third are partially covered: a selection of those EU laws that previously facilitated north-south co-operation are in the scope of the framework; others are not. Then a third are not covered at all. Of those that are not covered—it puts more substance on the challenges where we see these arising—environmental policy is a big area. The EU regulates a lot in the field of the environment, and in that space we have started to see changes because EU law has evolved. Again, the timelines mean that the change is not immediate; it is more going to be a scenario in which an opportunity is lost across a space of years. We have challenges in environmental regulation, such as nitrates—Lough Neagh has been the dramatic example there. In that field, we have already had a change to the EU water framework directive, and we might see some Northern Ireland mirroring of that for the purpose of managing cross-border elements, but that would not be a requirement. That is from some information I have heard from DAERA. There are also more proposals to change directives around the water framework, groundwater pollution and water quality directives. There is also the proposed soil monitoring and resilience directive, which is likely to come forward in the mandate of this Commission. There is also an amendment to the directive on waste, as well as around managing inland waterways. All those things very obviously have implications for an all-Ireland shared biogeographical unit. For Northern Ireland, the risk is primarily that, if the regulation in the south is higher than in the north, you could start to see dumping and degradation, which is not what you want to see for a green Ireland.

I am going to come back to your recommendations, but can I pull out that Lough Neagh example? It is a very visible, lurid green and terrifying example of what is going wrong. What are its practical impacts?

I am not ducking the question, but I have been involved in a comprehensive report for the OEP on regulatory divergence around nitrates management and mineral management across the island of Ireland. That is due to come out soon, and it will address the issue more comprehensively. It looks east-west and north-south at what is being done and at the gaps and discrepancies in regulation. That also feeds into the absence of the institutions for a prolonged period. We did not have an updated nitrates strategy, so that regulation was lost and we bore the consequences. In both north and south, there have been challenges in managing this area of policy. Again, because of Northern Ireland’s history and periods of institutional stasis, what the EU has done historically over the last few decades has been disproportionately important for the management of the environment in Northern Ireland. In a sense, it pulled Northern Ireland along when there was not a lot of local regulation activity. We are in a space now where there is a risk that we fall behind quite quickly if we do not address that. In this space, monitoring is a challenge. There is awareness across the likes of Northern Ireland Environment Link and Environmental Justice Northern Ireland of the need to look at that, but it comes back to capacity challenges. In terms of other areas of north-south co-operation that were previously facilitated and are not now, police and judicial co-operation is a big one. We are currently relying on the TCA framework and pre-existing north-south co-operation between PSNI and An Garda Síochána. In that area, one of the main potential challenges and things that you may want to consider for risk avoidance is data adequacy. That might seem a bit tangential, but it links to other elements. If the EU ultimately decides at the end of this year not to renew the data adequacy agreements it has for the UK, that could really call into question the capacity for services in the north and south to share information of relevance to judicial co-operation, policing and crime prevention. That then affects child protection, healthcare co-operation—anything that would involve personal data transfer. I could keep going.

I know you could. We are no longer quorate—I appreciate the Chair trying to keep us moving—but what you said illustrates the point exactly. The arrangements were frozen in time around a political mood a year ago—and an obsession with sausages, feelings and all that—and stewardship of our most vital environmental resource and other issues are caught in the crossfire. That is a frustration. In our closing seconds, Joël, do you have anything that you think it is important to add?

On the cross-border aspect specifically?

Yes.

No.

I thank Joël Reland, Dr Anthony Soares and Dr Lisa Claire Whitten. If you feel that there is anything else that you would like to send us in writing, we would welcome it.