Thank you, everyone, for joining the International Development Committee’s one-off session on the impact of Hurricane Melissa on Jamaica and the UK’s response to it. We will be broadening the session to look at what the Government could be doing when it comes to obligations and duties specific to small-island developing states. Hurricane Melissa hit land, I think, on 28 October last year. We watched with horror the devastation that it wrecked on your country. It is also chilling to see the long-lasting impact, particularly on infrastructure, homes, the economic future, and the cost of what you are going to have to deal with. Thank you for joining us today. Could we start, panellists, with you introducing yourselves? UnaMay, could I ask you to introduce yourself and your organisation please?

Thank you, Chair and Committee, for the opportunity to talk here before you. I am UnaMay Gordon. I previously served as the Principal Director of Climate Change in the Government of Jamaica. I am involved in the climate change negotiations and the international climate action at the level of the COP. I am currently a Senior Associate of the IIED, which is based in the UK. I do quite a bit of work with the national Governments across the region. Previously, I was the Chair of the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre. I currently serve as the Co-Chair of the Caribbean Climate-Smart Accelerator. I am working on a lot of the governance issues at the time and the finance issues within the wider climate change sphere. I will leave it there and ask the Committee to Google “UnaMay Gordon”.

Thank you, UnaMay. Dr Rodriguez-Moodie, could I ask you to introduce yourself and your organisation?

Thank you, Chair. I am Theresa Rodriguez-Moodie. I am the CEO for the Jamaica Environment Trust, which is a not-for-profit environmental non-government organisation based in Kingston, Jamaica. Our mission is very broad, but it is to protect Jamaica’s natural resources. We do this using education, advocacy, and the law to influence individual and organisational behaviour and public policy and practice. I will say confidently that there is no other organisation like JET in terms of the work that we do and we are also considered the environmental watchdogs for Jamaica.

Thank you. Dr Brown, you wear many hats. Which one are you wearing for us today?

Thank you, Chair, thank you Committee, for inviting us here today. Thank you so much. My name is Dr Andrew Brown. I am Chief Executive of the Croydon BME Forum. The Croydon BME Forum is a local charity based in Croydon, but that delivers many different services in London, especially in the south-west London region, including services for mental health and issues around cancer, but all for the global majority of people within the south-west London areas. As you said, we do wear many different hats, but today I am here representing the community in Croydon, London, and the UK on things that have happened over the last three months.

Thank you very much. UnaMay, could I start with you? What impact, both economic and to society, has the hurricane had on Jamaica?

Let me begin, Sarah, by taking the opportunity to thank you all—individually and collectively—for the outpouring of support, solidarity, and response to the people of Jamaica during and after Melissa. That needs to be said by citizens like us. What you saw on TV as you watched—on the ground it seems much worse. As for what Melissa showed us, let me start with the impact because I think that is where we need to start, and then we can go from there. No matter how prepared we were, the wrath of Hurricane Melissa would have been felt anywhere. I like to say that Melissa was a system on steroids, if you understand that, and therefore we can only dream of lessening impact by preparing for it. Just saying that, what Melissa showed us is that it ticked all the boxes of what we have been talking about in the climate science arena, but also in the climate change discourse. There was unprecedented destruction across the impacted communities. The rapid intensification that we speak about under the exceptionally favourable Caribbean sea conditions had a direct impact, with a direct hit on communities. The hurricane-force winds and the excess rainfall, and therefore the results, were economically and socially catastrophic. I like to say that every single Jamaican now knows the word catastrophic, in the true sense. Therefore, what Melissa really showed us was that the systemic challenges in the planning and recovery framework and the long-standing vulnerabilities that we talk about were laid bare and they remain really naked as we speak and as I speak to the Committee today.

UnaMay, I will pause you there because although everything you are saying is very powerful, I need less of the academic and more about on the ground. What are you left with now? Do people have electricity? Is the water system impacted? Are the schools working?

Okay, let’s go there. In terms of context, the reason we are left bare is that the housing stock in communities was completely destroyed. Some communities are left without electricity as we speak. Most of the water system is back but we still have communities that are completely cut off because of the infrastructure, the roads. The financial and fiscal impact is devastating. Therefore, how do we recover? Let’s pause there and see.

Presumably, your sources of income have been hugely compromised. I am thinking about farming exports and tourism, for instance.

Take agriculture. St Elizabeth is the breadbasket of Jamaica and agriculture in St Elizabeth is completely wiped out. There was a panic in the communities and across Jamaica when after Melissa there was just no food and still there are no vegetables for the entire population. That is still the case. Tourism, which is one of the economic pillars, has been completely impacted. Hotels have closed, are completely wiped out and so, therefore, are livelihoods. Hotels and chains are still closed in Westmoreland and in Montego Bay. They were closed initially because they were damaged, there was no electricity or water and because the labour for the hotels could not get to work and those people are also impacted. People were left homeless—if I can go there.

Thank you. Dr Brown, do you want to come in?

I agree with everything UnaMay is saying but could I ask the Committee to maybe just close your eyes for 10 seconds and picture this? Picture the road that you live on. Picture that when you went to sleep on Monday night, there were 100 houses on your road. You have now woken up and there are only two houses. That is how it is in St Elizabeth. That is how it is in Black River. When I went there in January, that is what I was faced with. I went there with a with a team of five. We were taken to one lady’s house and wondered why we were taken to that particular house. She called the people in the community to come round, and it was only afterwards when we looked around and said, “Wait, this is the only house still standing”. She was rebuilding the house, which was made of concrete. All the other houses in the area were made of wood or other very flimsy material, and they were all wiped down. That is why everyone in that community was hanging around that particular area. It was the only house in the whole area that had the internet. When we were driving into Black River, within the first eight minutes, people on the bus who were from the UK and from Kingston were complaining that they could not get their WhatsApp messages anymore. Imagine living in Black River for the last eight weeks with no internet service, no WhatsApp, no football scores, and so on. That is what they were living with in St Elizabeth. That is the practicality of how it is. You have woken up where you would have had your schools and your library all washed away. You mentioned something about income as well. We met a guy called Michael. I had never met him before. After talking to us he said, “Dr Brown, I need some help”. We said, “Okay, cool. What do you need?” He said, “Listen, my children’s school has been blown away. My workplace has been blown away. My house has been blown away”. He needed some income so that he could provide for his family. That is just a practical example of how it was on that day, but remember that we went eight to nine weeks after the event. Can you imagine the first eight weeks? Michael was lucky enough. He had managed to find a friend in the UK who set up a GoFundMe page. He is now working on the GoFundMe page to try to get income so he can rebuild his house. We sent £50 to him on Saturday so he can buy 50 more bricks for his house. Yet you know, when we went there, not even one person asked us for money, which is very interesting. Everybody asks for torches, lamps, sanitary towels for ladies, and bricks and anything just to rebuild, so that they could start rebuilding. Not one person asked for any money directly.

Dr Rodriguez-Moodie, could I turn to you and ask specifically about the community and the impact at community level? What have you seen going on?

Thank you so much, and thank you for the responses that we have heard from UnaMay Gordon and Dr Brown. It is important to say that we cannot talk about Hurricane Melissa without using the word trauma.

Exactly.

I lived through it, as I know many Jamaicans did. I was not in St Elizabeth. I was not in some of the most affected communities, but I cannot watch a video or see an image and not be completely traumatised by that day. I have been to several of the hardest-hit communities, Black River for one, for example. While I did see several communities with several houses still standing, inside these homes have been gutted. I have heard stories of children being ripped away. In one case, a child was ripped from his grandfather’s arm and has not been seen since. A lot of people in communities still have big questions. They say, “We are surviving, we are living but we do not know what’s coming next. What’s happening in my town? What’s happening? What is the Government planning to do?” While they are trying to rebuild, there is this big question mark over whether they should rebuild. I had many questions. People own their land, but they are in areas that have been completely devastated so their big question is: what do they do? Many people are trying to earn an income and to rebuild. We have also been working in the eastern part of Jamaica, which has not received a lot of attention. Many farmers lost their farms. Roads have been completely obliterated. Last week, I drove on a road that community members themselves redid on a very steep hillside. It was scary to drive on but the community had taken matters into their own hands because they were not receiving much attention and care and they needed access to their farms. They needed to be able to replant to be able to earn an income. On the ground, in the communities, people are trying to cope with trauma any time it rains or breeze blows. Since Hurricane Melissa, we have had a lot of extremes. We have had extremely cold weather, which for you in the UK may not be extreme, but for us is extreme. We have had some heavy rainfall. We have had some strong winds, which have caused the trauma to come back again, again and again. Then, while people are trying to figure out what to do with their lives and with their homes, they are also trying to earn an income. In many of these communities, there was nothing left. In Black River, for example—and I have written about this—the Black River market, which was all steel, looked like a giant had sat on top of it and squashed it. It has been traumatising experience. As Dr Brown said, even months later, driving through communities that look a whole lot better than they did in the immediate aftermath is still traumatic.

When we were doing our SIDS inquiry, the Committee went to Dominica and met a lot of people who were financially unable to rebuild. Is that situation likely to be the same for Jamaicans? Did people have insurance? Was the insurance good enough? How are people going to rebuild? Another thing that we saw in Dominica was that after the disaster, of course, the prices of materials went through the roof, and it became impossible to buy a brick or a bag of cement.

That is a very good question. The section of Jamaica that was impacted would have been rural Jamaica, with a mix of different types of homes. Some properties would have had some insurance but the vast majority of homes that were impacted would have been uninsured. We have heard, for example, where the Government have said, “Okay, we are going to restore light to the main roads”, for example. This is just one utility. But we cannot get the electricians to come in because many of the homes were flooded and everything will need to be rewired, and that is just the homes that are still standing. However, we have seen the private sector come forward. The private sector, NGOs, other groups and sometimes just individuals that have money to do it have just gifted homes. Some of them are temporary homes, which has caused a lot of concern for many of the people in the engineering community because that is exactly why we have this issue of homes being destroyed. Many of these homes had land-tenure issues, meaning that much of the land that many people had their homes built on, they did not own and, therefore, it was difficult for them to build permanent homes. When we are going to rebuild, we need to rebuild in a way that does not continue the legacy issues that we have been facing. We must build back better. Many people have been talking about the issue of land tenure and about how we rebuild. We know that people need to immediate shelter, but we must be careful that this immediate shelter does not become permanent.

Let me bring in Dr Brown and then go to UnaMay.

We asked what worked. Churches, the faith leaders, really came through. We were able to visit six churches. Even though they were devastated, they brought in their members to distribute the food and the love in different parts of the country. That was really good, local community groups and organisations in the UK. Just talking about our own organisation, we managed to end up with two 40-foot containers worth of material, which we were able to send down. People in the UK showed their love and I am not just talking about Croydon; I am talking about London too and we had people from Newcastle going as well.

Even Newcastle.

Even Newcastle; someone from there emailed me yesterday. That is why I remember it. She wanted to know how it all went. She had sent some funds and some products to us. The alumni associations—people who used to go to schools—we noticed that the schools asked people who used to go to their schools could they now start helping to send stuff back into their country. So we were now working with people from 30 or 40, 50-year-olds saying, “I used to go to Manning school; I used to go to this school” and they started to send equipment and money.

Was that largely the Jamaican diaspora?

Exactly, definitely, yes, and NGOs. We were lucky enough to work in partnership with the Jamaican Coconut Industry Board, which looked after the UK group when we went there. Without them looking after us, we would have just been walking into a country without no guidance and support, but they managed to look after us and make sure that everywhere we went was safe and protected. Business owners helped. We had to buy food when we were in Jamaica, but they gave us a big discount. They knew what we were there for so instead of charging us the normal prices, they charged less. Social media organisations wanted to follow us. They wanted us to be kept up to date and doing that meant that more money was donated to us, which we could give out when we reached out into Jamaica. As you mentioned, the UK and the Jamaican diaspora was involved.

Let me pause you there. UnaMay, was there anything you wanted to add?

Yes, I wanted to pick up on something that Dr Brown said about the churches. I just came out of Black River two weeks ago and I did a drive through of all the areas as well. A lot of 300-year-old church buildings, which are cultural assets, were destroyed, but the churches are the faith leaders. These churches are part of the national asset, but the buildings were all flattened. You can understand what that means. Churches were where people were able to gather and practice their faith, but they were gone. Theresa mentioned the trauma that you can still see. Disaster trauma is one of the things that we do not pay much attention to. People are still traumatised. I visited five health centres a couple of weeks ago. One nurse spoke to me about the uptick in the number of people coming in for medication. They need donations now for medication because they do not have enough. That is where it is still at and we are three, four months in. That kind of trauma and the psychosocial impact of this hurricane is still there. Also, let us remember that we are now four months away from the next season. People are already jittery and talking about it. On the ground now, things are almost the same as they were three weeks ago when Dr Brown came. I visited two weeks ago, and I visited three weeks after. At Black River, the rubble is still on the side of the road. The people are still looking up through the ceilings. Some of the tarpaulins that were provided in the aftermath are completely gone now because of their quality. It is just complete devastation.

I will pause you there and bring James Naish in to ask some more questions about that sort of thing.

Thank you for the question. I have lived through many hurricanes, including Ivan and Gilbert. As always in any disaster, the response from the international community has been tremendous but there are challenges. We will come to the challenges afterwards but there is no question that the response from the international community, especially in Jamaica, has been overwhelming—people just came in—and it was not only the international community. The response from philanthropies, the private sector and—as Theresa mentioned—private individuals who live and work in a bubble here in Kingston has been tremendous. There is no question about that and people on the ground at the time felt as if they were seen and noticed.

Yes, I agree. Jamaica holds a heartstring for many people around the world. We have influenced many places. We have touched the lives of many people through our music or culture. It was overwhelming for all of us to see the level of generosity that was shown. I know of many who wanted to do something immediately but held back a little bit so as to come when the immediate, international outpouring of generosity would have scaled back because it is needed in phases, right? That has shown up where we have had issues. I think about how the international NGOs organised themselves, setting up shop here in Jamaica, feeding people; I heard from folks in Parottee, St Elizabeth, who said, “We are not hungry. We have been fed. They come around every day. We get three meals a day”. Somebody in Black River said, “If it was not for KFC in those first couple of days, we would all be starving”. They got KFC for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. The private sector and the international NGO community in particular, rallied around many of the communities in the west. Unfortunately, a lot of the folks in the east who were also damaged—primarily by heavy rainfall, not so much by the winds or storm surge—felt that not enough attention was placed on them. They felt a little bit forgotten, which is why some organisations like ours try to focus our efforts there, where we could with whatever little funding that we had.

You did not ask me the question, I am going to tell you a little bit about it now. I agree with what UnaMay and Theresa say but there is also a different side. Being so far away, we felt a little bit lost. We felt that we could not help as much as we wanted to. We were watching on TV about how the Americans were able to get planes in and what the Canadians were able to do, and India was there, but we were not hearing anything from the UK. Because of my position, I could speak to people who said, “No, there is stuff happening. There is a warship coming down here. There is this and this and that” but people in the UK did not feel there was enough stuff happening from the UK, even though I am sure people in this room knew there was stuff happening—somebody is laughing, so maybe not—but local people did not know that there was stuff happening. That may be something that needs to change, the speed of the UK. Can we do things more quickly rather than watching America and all the famous people getting planes in? We were saying, “We are doing all these donations but then when we speak to the shipping companies, they say it is not going to get to Jamaica until 1 December or 1 January”. We were doing collections in October and November, so we are talking about a six-week gap’s difference.

That emergency humanitarian thing.

That emergency thing. It did work out, though, because when we started to do our distribution in January, one of the communities said, “Thank you, you are here” because one of the groups had stopped doing deliveries from 31 December and we turned up at the beginning of January so it kind of worked out but I know that the UK people themselves felt that they wanted us to do more. They were happy to go onto planes. They were happy to do whatever was needed to get to Jamaica, but we could not do it.

Let me appease Dr Brown and say that probably it was a good thing that you did not get in straightaway.

I have been involved in so many responses across the region and people fall over each other. We needed that phase-out. The people who could not get in early enough were better off in serving the affected population. So let me appease you on that.

Thank you, UnaMay.

Let me go back to James Naish’s question. I am speaking from a position of knowledge. I think that the UK was probably one of the first countries that said, “Okay, we will put X amount”. I cannot even remember the figure, but Jamaicans were very annoyed with you about that figure that you announced at the time.

Exactly, and people were very annoyed with you at the time, so let me put that on the table, but the response came. Part of the challenge is that when you are so far away, immediate emergency response takes time, and budgeting takes time. It is people like us who go into the community who have to say, “But no, the UK did this or the UK did that”. When the ship came into Falmouth, that was absolutely necessary at the time.

UnaMay, when did it get in? Do you remember the date?

It got in, I think, three weeks after. I can check. I was in Falmouth when the ship came in. I think it came in three weeks after. It was dispatched immediately. I think part of the challenge here is that people look for money; immediate response means money. Theresa spoke of the trauma, the health challenges, and the combined response that came from the UK. For me, the greatest one was when the ship, the soldiers and the Navy came in. That, bringing some stability, for me as a disaster person, was really, really very good.

What practical skills did they bring?

The ship came in with a number of Army personnel. Right after the ship came in, it was able to assist with the co-ordination on the ground. Health issues were also part of it. I wrote a note to the Ministry at the time about what that meant for the disaster recovery and I can send that to you. I cannot even remember what my note said at the time.

If it is appropriate to share that note with us later, that would be most welcome.

Yes, I can do that because I did actually look at what was being provided by each humanitarian agency. The humanitarian help that came from the UK, the different facets—the cash, the infrastructure the ship—were absolutely fantastic because that was what was needed at the time. The ship came into Falmouth and help was dispatched right across the country at the time. For me, that was absolutely great at the time.

The ship came in on 4 November, I think.

As UnaMay said, I think the initial response, when we heard the £2.5 million, everybody, I remember—and I think even the reporter covering it, he was a bit in shock. Since then, the UK Government have raised it. UnaMay speaks about the vessel, and I think they also supported fixing the Falmouth hospital. There were some issues.

That is true.

I think they also deployed a medical team. I would love to see what comes out about the issue of the impact on health. We have not heard about that. We heard about the initial death toll of 45, and 16 missing. We have not heard about the medical issues that have since emerged due to lack of medication or getting treatment because of blocked roads and so forth. I am not sure—maybe UnaMay can tell us—but the UK medical team might have been one of the first to arrive.

It was one of the first and it did two things. They came with engineers and there were repairs to the hospital, which was extremely important at the time. Everything was flat. I think they came with a set of engineers if my memory serves me right. They did some work on Falmouth hospital and they were repairing some of the shelters. Some schools were being used as shelters and shelters were also completely destroyed. I remember going into one of the communities and seeing the British flag on some of the hygiene kits for children that were being given out. I think it was UNICEF or one of those agencies. They came in as well.

We have the Minister coming in shortly and we can get into the details then. I am also very aware that that means we only have you for another 23 minutes and we have loads of questions, so I am going to ask you to be quite succinct and direct with your answers if that is okay.

No.

No. UnaMay Gordon: No. Q24 James Naish: You are all saying no. Dr Rodriguez-Moodie, if you can just succinctly explain why you would say no, that would be helpful.

There was a lot of confusion. There was not much co-ordination. There were too many questions being asked and too many people trying to do their own things. Too late, we saw some co-ordination trying to take place. It made reaching out extremely challenging to navigate in those initial periods, the first couple of weeks. I believe that it still needs fixing. I will let someone else come in.

I would say yes. In the UK at the time, leadership was needed. I must give props to the High Commission of Jamaica in the UK. The commission contacted me the day after the event and asked if we would be happy to be one of the local groups to receive all of the goods. So straightaway, they had about 12 organisations around the UK receiving goods. From then, we could get communications out to the UK saying that we were happy to take donations. It was so surprising that donations came from not just black people or local people. I am talking about schools that decided to run mufti days and also wanted to donate money. One of the quickest things that they could do was say that if every child brings £1 to school, and there are 10,000 children, £10,000 can be shipped to Jamaica. We also had all the youth groups helping. Everybody in the UK wanted to do something. We are talking about comedy, dancing, all sorts of things. I would say that the volunteers were led by the local trusted organisations and Croydon BME Forum was lucky enough to be one of those local trusted organisations, but that leadership came from higher above, from the High Commission. If they had not done that, I think there would have been a lot of confusion about who was doing what.

Yes.

I have a quick question. My understanding from what you have said so far is that there are different stages to a humanitarian response. There is that sort of immediate response when people need to just be fed, sheltered and medicine needs to be made available. Then there is the longer-term rebuild, which we have not really covered. Very briefly, where are we up to with that? Do you feel you are adequately resourced?

I am happy to kick off. We are classing the rebuild as phase 3. We have started to have conversations with a local engineering company in the UK that wants to fund a 40-foot container of building material to be sent to Jamaica and they would like to start that as soon as possible. Therefore, yes, we have done the first two stages of making sure that everyone is fed and that buildings are up and the internet is back and running. We know that we need to be building houses.

You are talking about the UK diaspora?

The UK diaspora, yes. As for what help we need, we need help getting the stuff over there as quickly as possible.

I am looking for one-sentence answers. Theresa and UnaMay, do you feel that the rebuild is happening at sufficient pace and is adequately resourced?

No. I can say no. The DaLA was just presented on Tuesday last week and I was at the presentation. No. From the information and what came out of it, there is absolutely no way that it is adequately resourced.

Not adequately resourced.

And the timing is still completely off. People are still suffering.

Again I am looking for a short answer. Theresa, what is your view? Is it the same?

Yes. It is not adequately resourced. We do have money that I think will be channelled through the National Reconstruction and Resilience Authority. But please remember that much of this money is not going to people to help them to rebuild their homes. It will be going to infrastructure-related projects—schools, bridges that have been destroyed and so forth. There is this gap and we do not even know how the NARA authority will operate. It advertised for a CEO just a couple of weeks ago. There are no documents. There is no real plan—not as far as I have seen—for how this reconstruction will take place.

Thank you for that. It helps me because I shared James Naish’s surprise at your earlier answers about the overwhelming response, because it did not marry up with what Jamaicans I have spoken to have told me. I have a dear Jamaican friend who put it to me this way—and this is to frame a question to you, Dr Brown. My friend put it to me as, “We grew up being taught that we were British and that Britain is the motherland, and then this crisis hit and we discovered we are not British.” They felt that the response was not good enough. You have talked about the diaspora in the UK. Could you maybe describe to me about what you feel the UK Government’s response has been and the level of communication and support that you have received from the UK Government?

It is about communication—the UK Government did not communicate what they were doing. If I were not sitting in my position, I would not have known about the warship coming in. We all knew about the £2.5 million because we were all upset about it, but the additional money was sent about seven days later. But that is what I was told. That is policy, though. The initial response is this—

Are you suggesting the UK Government’s response was better than what we have told people?

I would not say that. I would just say that it is about communicating that message to people on the ground so that people like your friend do not think that nothing is happening. That is what happens if you are not tied in. All you see is tragedy and trauma. You do not hear about the rest of it, all the other things that are happening.

What about the adequacy of the response in terms of meeting unmet need? I am not suggesting that it is on the UK Government to meet all of the unmet need, because there is an international community and there is a Jamaican community. From your experience, what would you like to see from the UK, if you have not seen everything that you would like to see?

From the UK Government?

Yes.

I have my wants, as well, which I will mention at the end—

I would suggest mentioning them now.

Okay. I would say, coming from the community side, having funding but not just giving funding out to anybody but trusted local organisations that can receive funding and get that funding out to other groups that are doing the work in Jamaica straightaway. We have done that with six local churches. We managed to raise £20,000 and we were able to release £33,000 to six churches straightaway because the need was there and they were trusted. We did not just give them the money. We had a conversation with them first and knew that they were reputable, that they had the charity status and all of that stuff. Let’s have organisations like Croydon BME Forum and other trusted organisation who can look after that money and go and do the work because I am telling you that, just like Dr Theresa said, money comes in but just gets lost in a cloud and does not get to the bottom.

We have already heard some examples but beginning with you, UnaMay, what lessons can the UK draw from its response to Hurricane Melissa to help prepare responses for future crises?

Broadly, there are two lessons. Preparedness has to go at different levels. Often we prepare with Governments, and I am sure Theresa will agree with me that we have to start to disaggregate the preparedness framework. We have to go to the communities where the impact is felt. I know that bilateral arrangements are complicated but there has to be a decision that preparedness does not just lie with Governments. That is one lesson. The second lesson is that we must start to think about how the UK Government can support this co-ordination with the international community. What we saw on the ground, from where we sat, was a lot of competition. I agree with Dr Brown that it was the persons who communicated the loudest about what they were doing who got the kudos. Behind the scenes, there was a lot of support from the UK Government. I could not leave without giving a shout out to the High Commissioner, who had just landed in Jamaica, I think, a couple of months before but then got it. Those are the two lessons that you can learn. You have to take a harder role and have a harder focus on how the international community co-ordinates and there are some lessons from a number of other areas and so on.

Very quickly, UnaMay, on that point, before the next hurricane arrives, who would you have expected to lead the response?

I think the response must be led from Government.

Which Government—your Government?

Yes, our Government, but since the support comes from the international community, the international community has a role in itself to have this honest discussion.

Who within the international community would you have expected to be leading?

Should I say that?

Yes.

Yes.

We broad-brush this “international community” as being everybody and so nobody takes responsibility. That what is happening. We say “the international community” but there is really no ownership and no responsibility. Therefore, how do we regain some autonomy in ourselves without losing the sovereignty of Jamaica on the one hand but also lose our national influence? When I say “national”, I am talking about the UK Government, and the US Government. The international community also involves the agencies, the financial agencies. Who takes charge and how do we have a collective discussion about who will support Jamaica? The international community must take that kind of responsibility and have that honest discussion.

UnaMay, I must stop you there, but I will say that there are, I think, about 200 UN organisations, so we will have a dig around and see if we can find the answer to your question. Can I go to Janet Daby now, please?

Thank you so much for all of your contribution so far. I want to just share a little bit of information with you before I ask my question. I am sorry about the situation you found yourself in in Jamaica. It was a climate catastrophe. Climate change is a global responsibility and what happened should not have happened to Jamaica or any of the small islands. Things need to be put in place to prevent all of this and also make sure that the right emergency support is in place for islands such as Jamaica when these awful situations come about. I represent a diverse community. Probably most Caribbean people in London are in my borough in south-east London. It is good to meet you in person, Dr Brown. I have spoken to you before and in my own community, many Jamaicans met with me publicly. They were very frustrated, very annoyed, very worried about their family members and the situation around Hurricane Melissa, and they continue to be worried and concerned. I also have a Jamaican background on my mother’s side. My question is very much about what asks you now have of the UK Government. What do you think the UK Government should be doing now? If I am correct, Jamaica remains a constitutional monarchy with King Charles as the head of state. It would be helpful for us to hear how seriously you are taking this and also to know what you ask of the UK Government, the NGOs, and the British Jamaican diaspora community. I take from what I have read that there is much more to be done. I am aware that 450 schools, 100 health centres and 150 roads were destroyed, that water is not restored everywhere and there are major issues to do with medicines and airborne diseases, so the situation is serious. What you tell us now will help inform us, the Government, the NGOs and the diaspora about what support you need and what you are asking for. Dr Rodriguez-Moodie?

Thank you for a very good question. I might answer in two parts. Looking at the humanitarian aid aspect, we have already answered the question in that it needs to be feasible, in phases and scalable. We are looking at disasters that are going to be more and more at the catastrophic level and so, therefore, there has to be some kind of mechanism to allow humanitarian aid to be more adaptable and flexible to meet the needs. We have received about $6.7 billion in international support, but the scale of the damage has been estimated at about 8.8 billion, 41% of our GDP, and most of the relief package, although it is blended, is in the form of loans. We talk about loss and damage. Last year Jamaica had been recording really great economic growth gains and then we had a disaster that will set us back for many decades before we can start all over again. We are getting funding, yes, to try to rebuild, but most of it is in the form of loans that we now have to find a way to repay. We need more grants, not loans, essentially. Those grants are going to be very important for adaptation projects to help Jamaicans to bounce back even faster after a disaster like Hurricane Melissa.

Continuing on from what Theresa said, we are in a state of damage, total loss and damage, and the sectors that we want to focus on first are agriculture and tourism. However, I also want to go back to say something about the institutions, which is where the UK Government can be the strongest. We heard about the chaotic nature of the response. How do we strengthen some of the institutions at different levels, at the national level but at the local level too, to be able to manage this response when it is needed most? If I have to put one thing on the table, we do not invest enough in institutions. I am talking about CDEMA, the Caribbean Disaster Management Agency, or the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management. It is no secret what happened there. The response from the institutions that were tasked with co-ordinating this response was just not there. How do we use the institutions that are set up, that are credible at national level and local level to support this response? That is what I would put on the table.

Would you say that one area of need is for co-ordination and strategy? It sounds quite overwhelming. Dr Brown, what would you say?

I would say that what I found out in the last three to four months is that we have to use the expertise we have among the diaspora in the UK. We need to use that expertise more. Not everything is about money, money, money but is about using the contacts that we have and bringing them in. How can we get the diaspora to do more in the UK as well as in Jamaica and other parts of the Caribbean? We have to be real. The hurricane season is coming up soon. The next one might not be in Jamaica; it might be in another country. How do we support the smaller countries in the Caribbean? How do we embed diaspora expertise into the UK system so that we can do things more quickly next time so that, with all due respect, we do not always have to rely on the Government. Can our UK people themselves do some things more quickly?

There is a view that the Government still do have a responsibility. Even if you are using people’s expertise, there is still a cost that comes with it and I think a level of realism is very much needed in all of that interpretation. Thank you.

UnaMay, you started to get to this question already with your comment about institutions, but what developmental and environmental challenges are Jamaica facing in the long term? Can you briefly add anything to what you said earlier?

We are a small island developing state and this is a cyclical issue. We have a hurricane almost every year. That impacts the development trajectory of any country and there is no question about that. That is the challenge that we face and, therefore, the fiscal risk that comes with that. We are financially challenged because we have to borrow ourselves out of another hurricane. As Theresa said, despite the magnitude of resources that came in, we still have to borrow to meet some of the fiscal needs. It is cyclical. There is no question about that. I think we have spoken about this, about what we borrow for and how much more debt this Hurricane Melissa will put on a Jamaican economy that was on a growth trajectory. That is really the question. We have been integrating climate risk into our development planning for a long time, and the UK has supported that, but what else?

And Dr Rodriguez, would you add anything to that?

Yes. I would add that one of the challenges that we now face, as we enter an era of more loans to finance that debt, is that we tend to need development that creates foreign exchange, but those kinds of industries are very extractive and destructive to the environment. This is the bind that small island states like us are constantly faced with: the very destructive extractive industries that are important for servicing loans and debts, because it generates foreign exchange are the very same industries that we are advocating to be phased out because they are so destructive, not just to the natural environment but to public health.

Which industries?

We are looking at our bauxite-alumina industry. We have other aspects of mining as well. Tourism can also be considered extractive depending on how you look at it.

It would certainly be very interesting to review some of our climate resilience asks from the FCDO side on that industry. How can international partners, such as the FCDO, support Jamaica in effectively addressing a few of those challenges that you mentioned, UnaMay?

As I said, we have to strengthen the delivery capability of our institution, and I go back there. We also have to strengthen the capacity and education of not only our citizens—Dr Brown spoke about the diaspora and embedding the diaspora expertise—but there is so much expertise that exists across the region. How do we strengthen the diaspora? How do we strengthen this capacity to be able to respond in one way? Then, the education of our policymakers, I make no apologies about that. It is nice to have, but it is a climate priority at this time, because one wrong decision can stifle progress for years and years and years. I think those are some of the asks: a standing roster of Caribbean expertise could be one simple ask that we can draw on—as you say, Dr Brown, not only from the diaspora, but from the Caribbean—that could aid the response at this time. I come back again to the institutions, a lot of the shelters and the hospitals, so that we can respond to the health crisis, the education crisis that exists, and this whole role of co-ordination that I spoke about earlier.

Thank you. I said at the beginning that we are very fortunate that we have the Special Envoy for Small Island Developing States. The Government have just released their strategy for them for 2026 to 2030, which this Committee welcomes very much, and I think we will go into a bit more detail with the next set of panellists. Can I pass to David?

Can I ask you first, UnaMay, given the decisions the UK Government have made in terms of how they will prioritise their funding, which areas of focus should the Government seek to prioritise in their work with Jamaica and other small island developing states?

Thank you for the question. I go back to—and I cannot stress enough, based on what I see—the institutional strengthening to include that accountability framework, which we really see lacking now in some of the response, would be one area with the limited funding that you already have experience in supporting. Institutions like the CREF and the CDEMA, which you have already supported, would strengthen and deepen those institutional mechanisms that, as I said, with an adequate accountability framework. Secondly, I think we have to concentrate on what was damaged, but we also have to look at what was not damaged and why. Sometimes we forget that there were things that stood up and we should look at why and continue to invest there. I can give one example from the UK. When we were working on the smart hospitals project—and I think if you look back on it, that was a UK initiative. That hospital—or that smart health centre, I cannot remember—stood up. I followed that because I did quite a bit of work when we were doing the J-SRAT. So you need to look at what was not damaged and, therefore, what have you invested in in the past that was not damaged and strengthen that and build that out.

I do agree with UnaMay, and I think that this whole aspect of institutional strengthening at the local level is also necessary. She spoke about at the Caribbean level with steam and so forth, and in other areas. Definitely at the local level, we saw some serious challenges arise with our Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management. From what I could see, that hindered a lot of the response. There were a lot of movements in terms of where it was placed in government and so forth. You speak in your strategy about early warning and extreme weather events, investing in those early warning systems, and I recommend that that preparedness must include that response capability as well, as part of the early warning system.

I totally agree with Dr Rodriguez-Moodie and UnaMay with regard to the red tape. There is a lot of red tape. At times like this, we do not want to see the red tape. The transportation of goods around Jamaica could easily be cut down. One of the biggest things that came out in Jamaica when we went over there was that there are a lot of tolls in Jamaica, and the tolls are quite expensive. To go from St Mary all the way over to St Elizabeth, you have to pay tolls, and the tolls are about £40 a time, each way.

They did not raise those tolls in a national—

No, they did not. The tolls are so expensive, and if you are driving—and UnaMay is laughing, so she knows exactly what we are talking about—

It is the Chinese road?

Yes, it is. They should have potentially paused that for three months. People who were not affected were getting the trucks and getting transport to go over, but if every time you do it, it is costing you £40 one way and £40 coming back, that really hurt a lot of the Jamaicans as well. Doing something simple like that would really, really help. Once again, just the red tape of sending stuff back and forth would really help as well.

As they say, you have it on the record.

Thank you so much.

Thank you so much. You have a lot on the record. Thank you all very, very much. You do have our love, our solidarity and our support. We wanted this session because we wanted people to have a better understanding of what you are dealing with, but also what is working and the strength of solidarity that this country has. Thank you. We will now move to our second panel, and we will speak to the Minister and his team about some of the ways that, hopefully, we can move forward using some of the good examples that you have given to us. Thank you all very much. You are very welcome to stay, but you will not be able to speak for this session. Witnesses: Chris Elmore MP, Ms Alicia Herbert OBE and Tim Hemmings.

Thank you all very much for coming. Our apologies for running a little over. However, when we have such strong witnesses, I think it is only right to let them have the floor. Thank you for bearing with us. Minister, welcome back. This is becoming a regular pleasure.

Thank you, Chair. Bi-monthly, I think.

Please introduce your remit and the team that you have brought with you.

For the record, I am the Minister for the Caribbean. Within that context, I am also the Minister for Hurricane Response, something I was not expecting when I joined the Foreign Office in September last year. To my right is Tim Hemmings, who is our Special Envoy for SIDS, Small Island Developing States, and Alicia Herbert, OBE, is the High Commissioner to Jamaica from the United Kingdom.

Thank you very much. High Commissioner and Minister, you both arrived around a month before Hurricane Melissa, so it has been a steep learning curve for you as well. We want to dig a little bit into the Government’s preparedness, what you found and what support you were able to give when the hurricane hit. One thing I am curious about: I think probably 10 years ago, when I was last in Jamaica and talking to the previous High Commissioner, the UK would have a vessel in the region, because it is hurricane season, something is going to go wrong, and we have a moral duty and a willingness to support Caribbean nations. What plans were in place, and where was the Royal Navy vessel when Melissa struck?

Thank you, Chair, and thanks to the Committee. It is nice to be back, and always very strange to be on this side of the evidence session than on that side of the room. If HMS Trent is what you want me to focus on, I am very happy to answer questions on wider preparedness ahead of Melissa. The Committee will be aware that hurricane paths are complex at best. This was the extreme, extreme end of a category 5. I was in Jamaica in December, and I wonder if we should have recategorisation of hurricanes, given what is happening in terms of climate change and weather systems. Trent was deployed around Turks and Caicos. For those members who are not aware, we have legal obligations around overseas territories. First of all, Hurricane Melissa sat to the side of Jamaica for longer than we were anticipating. We expected landfall on one day. However, several hours later, it was still sitting there gaining power. The course of Hurricane Melissa then moved across the island, but not to the entire island. By the time it got to Turks and Caicos, it actually had moved, and therefore the threat in relation to the islands was limited and had passed. HMS Trent was deployed on 2 November, four days after Melissa struck the island, and arrived on the 4th. We always have a vessel within the Caribbean region. We have legal obligations linked to the OTs, and then we obviously have broader ethical and moral obligations in terms of the wider Caribbean.

Was there an OT that you still thought might be at risk, which is why there was that a pause of six days?

No. It was 2 November when Trent was deployed. The hurricane hit on 28 October and made landfall for at least a day. Within four days, the threat to Turks and Caicos was much more limited. Trent was deployed within four days and arrived two days after that. That is purely a logistical issue of just travelling to get to Jamaica.

Do you think it was adequate? Would you do anything different?

In terms of Trent?

That first initial deployment of Trent.

The wider issue that we have to accept is that we had already sent a number of nurses, doctors, midwives, engineers, and hurricane response specialists, who were already in Miami. Through preparedness conversations—long before Melissa even struck—we were already making sure that we had supplies and people in positions, including in Miami, Antigua and Barbuda. We already had all this preparedness work done long before Melissa actually struck. This was not so much about Melissa; it is about having the resources in the Caribbean.

Is that a standard thing that we do?

I am more than happy to go into detail, but the preparedness takes place constantly around hurricane response, so that the UK Government are able to respond to any country that has that scale of hit, or a lower category. Whatever the response may be, we have that preparedness work going on. The team was sent over. We had people—and I am sure the High Commissioner will remind me—on the ground within about 24 hours, because we had flown people to Miami in preparedness to get them to Jamaica. The delay, frankly, was the inability to open airports. Obviously, I have an obligation, and High Commissioner Tim has an obligation, around our own teams. I did not in any way live it in the way the Jamaicans did, but I can assure the Committee I was in the crisis centre before, during and after the response in London and was the first Minister globally to be in Jamaica at the beginning of December to see the response. I take my responsibilities seriously, as I hope the Committee will appreciate. Part of that is also the High Commissioner’s obligations and my obligations within the Department to our staff on the ground. We obviously had staff that quite literally lived through the hurricane in Kingston. Therefore, we had to make sure that that infrastructure was in place while the High Commissioner was WhatsApping Ministers. It should be a lesson in WhatsApp diplomacy, as she had been in the country for only four weeks, which is quite a quick way to have to engage with Ministers when you get such a terrible event happening there. The initial delay was partly logistics, partly the weather, and partly getting airports open.

Minister, because I had been there and met previous High Commissioners, I knew about this amazing facility that we have and are able to deploy at very short notice. I go to Dr Brown’s point, which is that the UK does not communicate that to the UK, and also from our witnesses, it does not sound as though that got communicated around Jamaica. I think the only thing that really got communicated was the £2.5 million—which was then seen as poor, for the scale of the problem—but what you are saying is we do have this ground team that were there within 24 hours. Is there something that needs to be looked at about how we communicate what the UK does and what the UK does well?

There are a couple of points in that. The £2.5 million was on 29 October. On 31 October, there was an extra £5 million announced. On 10 November—

That is all on record. What I am saying is—

I think the point about the funding that was suggested previously was that there was just this one lump sum, which actually was responding to the needs in Jamaica.

I am trying to throw you a line here, Minister. What I am saying is our response was good. Within 24 hours, we had people on the ground. We had people, nurses, and medical staff waiting in Miami in case something like this happened, but that was not communicated either to the UK or Jamaica. Is that something you need to work on?

I am happy to say that we should look at communication in the UK, but having been there and met people who have benefited from the UK funding, whether that is in physical signs of the Union flag running alongside organisations or using Instagram, Facebook, and so on, other platforms are available. I met people in Jamaica, who actually knew we had given this support. Ms Daby and I had a number of surgeries in this case for members of Parliament with Jamaican diaspora across London, Birmingham, and Watford. I forget the other parts of the UK, forgive me. What we need to do—and I actually did this in a couple of cases—was share things via WhatsApp, which seems to be people’s chosen tool of communication. One of the lessons learned, that I want to look at for any other response, is this type of internal communication within the UK context of how people communicate. I can recall a conversation with a colleague who said, “Well, you have put absolutely nothing out on social media”, and I sent them a link to every platform that I and the FCDO have, and that the Foreign Secretary has, and they said, “I don’t follow any of these”. There were five different platforms being used. So, in some ways, I am more than happy to learn a lesson around communications internally within the UK, particularly WhatsApp. That is definitely something where we need to share unedited videos, the bare videos, so people can share it on their own platforms. When I was told, “Well, I don’t follow Instagram, Facebook, X, Bluesky”—and there was another—I said, “Well, I am not quite sure what else you would like me to do”. We could only put so much out. We were very clear with British nationals and Jamaican nationals in Jamaica about the support we were providing. We put out what I would consider more human-interest stories to try to explain the support that we were offering, but also that we can provide, so that people actually understood if they wanted to reach out to us—and bear in mind, we did receive thousands of calls through the consular service—that they could come to us with anything. However, I completely accept that the internal conversation was the challenge.

All of that was after Melissa hit land. What I am saying is, do you think you should be doing more upstream to make both the British people and the Jamaican people, in this instance, more aware? Because I have had three witnesses in front of me, who are all pretty expert in this, all saying—aside from the money—“We did not know what the UK was doing”. Afterwards, after a lag, they did. There is a gap there. We are not selling ourselves, Minister.

In the context of not selling ourselves and the work that we do, one of the interesting stats is that there is £350 million of funding that goes into and around climate resilience in the Caribbean, and £50 million of it goes to Jamaica. I have seen, while being there, the climate resilience funding that is actually spent on the ground. If we need to do more in the context of saying we are spending it, or we are advising on something, or we are pushing something, I am more than happy to look at that as a broader piece of work. I obviously think that this is about more than just Jamaica, which I know you would agree with. We obviously have legal obligations with our OTs, and there are 15 independent Caribbean nations, all of whom we would want to help if, God forbid, another Melissa, or a lesser storm—I hope we never get a worse one—hits another Caribbean nation.

In short, Mr Naish, they were, yes. We sent them around the storm. I can recall a rather surreal conversation about how we get people in and down, so that they were there waiting. I do have the list. We sent three GPs, three nurses and two midwives so they could run mobile special clinics. We also sent hurricane relief engineers, engineers who have abilities in reconstruction. We also had those on Trent, but these were people who were waiting to travel south. We were able to have people, not in country, but as near as we could get them that was safe. We also had to think about sending people out and making sure they are not going to get caught in the hurricane.

You are testing my memory, but I hope the High Commissioner will come in because I have not stopped talking yet, which, as you all know, is a constant problem. From memory, my first significant briefing—if I can put it like that—on Melissa was on the Friday before the storm struck. We had the weekend, and the storm struck the following week. Our advice changed on that Friday-Saturday. There was some confusion, from memory, about a flight landing, which turned out to be incorrect, as actually the airlines had taken our advice. I think there had been some social media noise that said, “Why was a flight landing in Jamaica after advice?” My understanding is that no flights left Gatwick—or any other airport, but Gatwick is one of the main airports to Jamaica—once the advice had been changed. We had very good engagement with TUI, Virgin and BA. In fact, when the Foreign Secretary queried this, we were given absolute assurance that the airlines had engaged as quickly as possible and were equally looking at how they could work with the High Commissioner and her team on when it would be safe to evacuate as well.

Absolutely, I support what you were saying there. You could imagine, even so, the hurricane hit on the following Tuesday, on 28 October. There were already people on holiday who had had just a few days of their holiday. Some of them had already had a good two weeks of their holiday. Therefore, when I met them, as well as the rapid response team, on the ground, there were varying degrees of people having spent a holiday in Jamaica. Some were towards the end of it, and some were very much at the beginning of it as well.

I think we would say so. We were following the pattern of the storm, which, as the Minister said, was very unpredictable. There were times when we felt she was going to swerve away from Jamaica. There were other times we felt that she was coming to hit Kingston, and there were other times she moved, and eventually she moved westwards. I think we were very much on top of the weather system, and on top of what Melissa was doing, which was very unpredictable in itself. I would think that, on balance, we got it right in terms of the travel advice.

It probably should be noted that between 22 October and 2 November, we issued 11 individual pieces of travel advice. We did try to get ahead of what the storm was doing. As the Commissioner mentioned, there was a point, not just where we thought the hurricane would bypass, but that it would hit more of Kingston. It then moved west, and then it hit two parts of Jamaica very severely. Again, it is obviously an extreme weather system, so we were also trying to manage that element of it. It is not an excuse. It is just that you cannot control the weather in that sense.

It was quite surreal, the way it behaved.

Yes, including sitting in the bay, which—having talked to many hurricane experts now, Chair—would appear to not be a common element of how hurricanes behave.

That is extraordinary.

Thank you, Minister, for speaking to me on other occasions, and on this one as well. I very much appreciate that. Obviously, you have mentioned that Jamaica received £50 million for climate resilience. How often is that? I want to put it in context. From what we heard from the speakers, in terms of the damage that was done, it is a bill of £8.8 billion. I am trying to put that in context in terms of the catastrophe that Hurricane Melissa caused to the island. Many people lived through that, but the worrying concern is that babies, children, and families lived through that. They are talking about the ongoing trauma in terms of what they are experiencing, and they will need ongoing support. The Chair mentioned already the £2.5 million that came at the beginning, which then amounted to £7.5 million. If we look at that in terms of being the equivalent to what Canada pledged, it seems rather small considering the vast need that was there then, and the remaining need. I want to understand, with Jamaica being a Commonwealth member, should the UK Government have done more financially? Are the UK Government thinking of doing more financially? What are the UK Government currently doing to support Jamaica’s recovery?

There is a lot in that, Chair, so forgive me if I—

I can remind you.

No, I probably do not need you to remind me. It was more to apologise to the Chair in advance.

No, but do bring colleagues in.

The key thing to say is that we were the second-highest donor in response to Hurricane Melissa, so the Canadian funding was nowhere near our level of funding. The only country that gave more funding in response was the United States.

We thought we matched Canada. We thought we both—

No, we were £8.5 million altogether, and that was higher than the Canadians. The only country that was higher was the United States. On the broader response, to give the Committee an example, the UK had done a lot of preparedness work, which enabled us to draw down on the additional funding that was being given for recovery, so insurances, in essence. Of that, the package is now worth $6.7 billion, which in total is a quarter of the GDP of the whole country. Of the estimated costs of losses and damage, which is a total of 8.8 billion—I know that is not quite the whole losses, but it is a significant chunk of it—and the UK, in advance and then after, has remained a significant player in working with multiple agencies. It should also be noted that the MD of the IMF is the former Jamaican Finance Minister, so we obviously have very good relationships in this space, so—

Minister, I am sorry to pause you. Are they loans or grants?

It is a mixture.

It is a mix in terms of the $6.7 billion. The UK’s role in a lot of that is not only technical but over a number of years we have been lobbying with countries across the Caribbean to have a more flexible approach to the instruments used by the international financial institutions. What you see happening in Jamaica is a new way in which this is being done, about delaying repayments, for example, having a lot more flex in current or existing loan agreements.

What about reduced interest rates?

Yes, those sorts of changes being made to the tools that are used by the IMF are hugely important. The UK has been very much at the forefront advocating with countries across the Caribbean and other states, other vulnerable countries, for a change in the way in which the debt is treated. Our advocacy role in there is hugely important.

Is that having an impact?

Yes, because I think that is what is generating the $6.7 billion, which we can talk about, which will be used for reconstruction and part of NARA, the National Reconstruction and Resilience Authority.

If that is a loan rather than a grant, isn’t that saddling the country with more debt?

The terms in which this would happen would be worked out between the country and the international financial institutions, with a lot of vigilance on not necessarily burdening countries with that. Some of this would be existing loans, which would then have a flex within it. Some of this is debt that would have been taken on by many of these countries. I will not get into the technical detail of it, because I will get to the limit of my knowledge very quickly, but they are also looking at debt swaps and other ways. It is a balance between indebtedness and flex.

You are raising red flags when you talk to me about debt swaps but also I am very concerned, as the Minister for Development is, about loans and debt and how that is managed. Could I urge you, Minister, and High Commissioner, to keep a close eye on that? We have seen all around the world that is not working, also we heard earlier about the Chinese road. China is sweeping through small island developing nations and offering what seem to be very competitive loans, and then the reality of them tends to bite quite hard when a crisis like this happens. It is somewhere the Committee keeps coming to but at the moment the international monetary system does not seem to be working for countries like Jamaica.

Let me reassure you, Chair, on the point about the road that the toll was indeed waivered to such an extent that the Chinese Government were annoyed by the Jamaican decision, so that was done. I don’t mean it was just done in the following weeks. I was there in December, and it was still waivered. This was some weeks after the hurricane, but it was waivered and, having been to Black River, it was complicated partially because some roads were blocked and the only access points were by using machetes, so that was a challenge.

It is annoying that the Jamaican Government had to step in and do that. One would imagine that a good loaner would have done that automatically.

Yes, I was going to come in on that point. I heard that some of the roads did not survive that China has built as well.

I want to bring Tim in on the loan structure, but I would like to come back to the UKEF part because you asked what else we are doing.

Tim, would you like to come in?

I don’t want to move the discussion away from Jamaica and the Minister, but absolutely to note the point you are making about the multilateral development banks, including the regional banks. I think I am right that all of them have special strategies for precisely recognising those points that, first, they tend to get forgotten about when it comes to decisions because they are small and, secondly, because the impacts on them are so much greater, particularly in events like this. Each of these strategies is different—the World Bank launched its last year—but they all in some way refer in their grants and loans mechanism to the need to get relief at the right moment and how decisions are made on emergency funding being paid out. I am not saying they are perfect, but they at least recognise some of the issues you are raising.

Do you see that as a space that the UK can step into more?

I think that with our roles on these banks we are influential. From the conversations I have had in my role so far when I was at the World Bank annual meetings last year, absolutely we are seen as one of the drivers. I think we were the only donor country to speak at the Forum of Small States at the World Bank last year. The main thing is you go and listen to the small islands and what they need but the fact we were seen as being out there was viewed positively.

Chris, would you like to come back?

I am happy to come back on UKEF, yes. On infrastructure, bridges in particular, we have £134 million of UKEF funding ready and available to go on bridge reconstruction. That could be expanded to include more reconstruction work. The Prime Minister of Jamaica made a statement last week, so I am not saying anything that he has not said. The people didn’t vote for paperwork; they voted for action. Part of our challenge, having had the meetings with ministerial colleagues when I was in Kingston, is some of the bureaucracy and the red tape. The hope is that NARA will form part of this work. The UKEF team here is ready to go. We even have British contract work. We are very good at building bridges in this country with world-leading engineers. The reconstruction work is ready to go and would form part of the work that we want to do for continuing support. In the same vein, through UKEF, they are also looking at rebuilding the national stadium, which is something that the Jamaican Government want to do. Again, we want to be part of that work.

In addition to the national stadium, as well as the work on the bridges, with respect to NARA, the new agency that is being set up, we are very much involved in the conversations, drawing on our experience in Peru. After a devastating earthquake there, the UK played a hugely important role in the reconstruction effort, the governance of that and how such an agency does its work. We are very much in conversation and supporting and helping in the design of this new agency. As the previous witness said, it has not yet been opened.

That all sounds really positive and I imagine, Minister, your counterparts are very aware of this and the officials and everyone else who needs to know within the Government of Jamaica is aware and good communication.

I promise you that that is the case. I promise.

On medics and engineering, obviously loads of help is needed in Jamaica. Are the UK Government looking to continue support in any other areas as well as those you have mentioned?

I think someone said earlier that there are different phases to humanitarian response. We are there in the very early stages with relief items, lifesaving support: emergency medical teams embedded within the Jamaican medical system, engineers and linesmen who we brought from across the Caribbean to get electricity back up and running, food parcels and so on. We are moving into a stage now where we are monitoring the investment and the support that we have given over that time. On the ongoing support, the real prize comes from the work that we have done with respect to disaster risk financing. The Jamaican Government received financing from their investment in these insurance products globally, and they are making the decisions about how that is spent going forward. When we look at disaster relief going forward, we know that immediate support and critical items are required. If we are now in a space of genuine partnership—of putting Government in the driving seat to assess what their needs are and to work with us with any additional support they might need, to determine what is required going forward and how to implement it—the disaster risk financing mechanisms that we have been so much involved in setting up with the Jamaican Government are the place to go. That will be going on going forward because they have millions of pounds on that, plus the money for the reconstruction.

I am not sure, Minister, if you heard all of UnaMay’s evidence but she talked about building institutional capacity and accountability. Is the UK working with NARA on this?

The short answer is yes. We are trying to use our expertise in this space, including quite literally at a ministerial level. When I was there in December we had conversations about the birth of NARA and how we can learn lessons from each other. The challenge was rightly put to me by Jamaican Ministers about how the UK Government can challenge the change in some of the bureaucracy and red tape so that we can get the UKEF funding in, which we have taken on board. Alicia and her team are now working on the ground with the Government there to make sure that we have the specialism. It goes to a broader point about our role globally in the development space, that when we have expertise we should be using it, one facet of the work.

We have heard calls for a temporary scheme for humanitarian visas or fee waivers to facilitate children or elderly who have lost their homes travelling to the UK for a short time to stay with relatives here. What conversations has the FCDO had with the Home Office about this scheme?

I hope I am stating the obvious, but it is always worth saying. I don’t in any way not recognise the huge concerns and fears of the Jamaican diaspora in the UK for people living in Jamaica. Members of Parliament were talking about their own family members being there. I also held an event with Foreign Office staff, because there is a huge Jamaican diaspora in the Foreign Office and I want to acknowledge it. Our immediate response was on British nationals. That was part of it. Jamaica is clearly a tourism hub, mecca, whatever you want to call it, and we wanted to play our part in making sure that people could be evacuated. We assisted with repatriation flights, and we then supported the people more broadly. The visa issue, Mr Rushworth, is very much a decision that is kept under review by the Home Office. There were conversations but fundamentally it is a decision for Ministers within the Department. I am not trying to plead ignorance. It is simply the levels of where government works. I should put on record that the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary agreed the flight response, but it is very much part of the Home Office’s decisions on visa review. They did agree—from memory so I will check before I say it—that members of the Windrush generation with indefinite leave to remain in the UK would also be eligible for the support. There was some flex shown, but fundamentally the decision on visa access is for the Home Office.

The FCDO had conversations with the Home Office but ultimately the Home Office has made the decisions?

I think the FCDO response is on the natural disaster, response in-country and response in advance, but I can recall at least some conversations about explaining particular visa cases that I will not go into because that would not be fair. On that level, of course there was cross-Government working and equally there was MOD response within the crisis centre, not just Trent but the broader engineering response. We have a crisis centre in the Foreign Office that is very multifaceted, and part of that team will be the Home Office, consular, MOD and so on. All those conversations take place in the context of crisis.

Was there a tension between what the FCDO would have recommended in looking at our relationship with Jamaica and the diaspora and recognising the humanitarian needs and what the Home Office was willing to do, granted that the Government have prioritised keeping migration as low as possible?

I cannot recall there being any tension, quite genuinely not. I think our response from the weekend before the hurricane hit, to the horrors of the Monday when the hurricane was just sitting there, to the hit and then after, was very much focused on British nationals. I have the figures that I am more than happy to share with the Committee. We supported 3,747 people, of whom 3,088 were British nationals. There was a limited number of cases, from what I can recall, but I don’t recall there being any difficulty in those conversations. There is an acceptance that the focus is on British nationals being in Jamaica, how we evacuate and run a repatriation flight, and then working with British nationals on when there were commercial flights available and where they could go. I can recall some very interesting routes of returning back to the UK, but we were trying to make sure that support was offered. There was no challenge in that regard. It was simply trying to understand how we can build the puzzle as quickly and as carefully as possible in getting people home.

I appreciate that with evacuations and getting people home quickly, but I am more talking about the ongoing situation that homes have not been rebuilt and there are many people who are homeless are vulnerable, who have family members in the UK, who would like to be able to bring them to the UK temporarily.

I assume that the Home Office would investigate all of them as and when they come through. I don’t even know how many there are, in truth, because it has not come as a significant figure if it has come at all. I am not saying there are not any; I am not trying to pretend either way. I am just saying it is not something that has come across my desk.

Minister, this Committee published its report into SIDS in 2024. I have to say the inquiry shocked me, meeting the people who did not know if their island was going to be there any longer. There were so many unintended consequences that were not considered, like are you a refugee if your island disappears, who has the territorial waters, all of those issues. It was very much our report looking at how to get ahead of those and what the UK could be doing either directly or in its convening role. We are pleased with the appointment of your special adviser. We are very pleased with your report that came out, was it last week?

Yes, 13 January. I could not remember either, to be fair, Chair. I had to ask Tim.

Thank you. As you are the SIDS Minister, can we turn to look at lessons learned from Jamaica but more broadly looking at the whole SIDS family and what we can do? A lot of this session has been focused on the consequences, but it would be helpful to get upstream of that and look at what we can do with early intervention and prevention. The first question on that is from David.

It is, but I want to ask you a more general question first about the perception and influence of the UK in the Caribbean and also your role as Minister for the Commonwealth. I was at the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association conference in Barbados, and an undercurrent there was the increased influence of the United States within the Caribbean. We saw the intervention in Venezuela. We have heard in the evidence you have given the perception of the UK response in Jamaica, and you have set out the factual nature. How do you think that plays into that and is there a competition of influence between the UK and the US in the Caribbean, and particularly in the Commonwealth states?

I don’t think there is competition. I think that we are seen by many Caribbean partners as a reliable, dependable friend and ally, in the multilateral space and the bilateral conversation. That can be seen, to go to the Chair’s point, with SIDS. If we take Jamaica—and it was mentioned in the evidence session from the witnesses—we have hospitals still standing where they have been struck by not one but two hurricanes in the last 18 months, to such an extent there was success on the climate resilience funding for the hospitals but the only things that collapsed were a water butt that fell over and a bit of sheeting that came off a corner of one of the roofs. There was no water ingress at all. Not only was the hospital functioning on the day the hurricane struck, but it was also taking patients the following day. I don’t think it is about competition; it is about us being a dependable partner. Obviously, I am not responsible for any other Government’s position, but there is undoubtedly an expectation—a pressure from the US—about the Caribbean. A number of Caribbean nations have been concerned about the ongoing issues with Venezuela, including the extraction of President Maduro, but equally the broader challenges of President Trump’s set conditions on dealing with narcotics and the boats and blockading and sending in SS Ford and those challenges. In my experience, I was in New York last week for the United Nations Security Council meeting. I hosted a SIDS reception with permanent representatives in New York, and it was quite striking that a number of permanent representatives—and they are diplomats, so they are extremely professional civil servants—were praising the UK for not just the funding of SIDS but that they had been to Wilton Park for the SIDS conference in January and that we were a “solid player”—by one country that shall remain nameless—in the external lobbying on finance that Tim spoke about. The United States is our closest partner in many things, and we want to see the best outcomes for Caribbean nations, and if we can do that together, all the better. Look at the funding for Jamaica, the US was the highest donor, and the UK was the second highest donor. We work very well collaboratively, and the Foreign Secretary and Secretary Rubio have a very positive and strong relationship, as you would expect, but I don’t think it is competition. It is just a healthy engagement in making sure we get the best outcomes for Caribbean nations. I can sense Tim wants to come in.

I just wanted to give a couple of examples to back that up, Minister. You briefly mentioned the Wilton Park event we hosted for all SIDS, and it was very well attended by the Caribbean. I think someone called it the Davos for SIDS because it is something we have done quite frequently. That may be overstating it slightly, but the idea is that we have an opportunity to listen to SIDS. The other thing we will be doing on a more formal basis is the UK-Caribbean Forum that we will be hosting in London, which brings together all of those countries to precisely discuss the breadth and depth of our collaboration.

That is in three weeks, I think.

It is 10 March.

Thank you. Yes, it is very soon.

Since the US does not allow a mention of climate change in any diplomatic discussions, that assuredly is an advantage for the UK.

It was the main theme at the Wilton Park discussion. Melissa was on everyone’s mind but there were islands from the Pacific as well that have experienced the existential events, as you mentioned, Chair, of sea level rise. The ability to have a frank conversation but also to listen, because the answers are not one size fits all, was really appreciated.

We really want to be in a place where we are listening to what countries need, not telling them what we think they need. We will fail as an Administration if we simply dictate the terms of what a country does or does not need. That is a key point from Melissa and SIDS more broadly. Working with the Jamaican Government, we were responding to need and other countries were also providing support, so it was an important conversation to have through Alicia’s office to make sure that we could understand that on the ground.

It is interesting to hear that. In 2023 the previous Government launched the UK Small Islands Developing States Strategy 2022-26. How satisfied are you with the progress on the six areas highlighted in the strategy in the period to date?

In the letter that we sent to the Committee when we published our strategy, we gave an update on the specific issues that were raised in the strategy and, therefore, the issues that the Committee then raised. On the one hand, our assessment of the vulnerabilities and the needs of SIDS has not changed. SIDS are vulnerable and some of those issues are huge global issues that need to be responded to. The fact we have a second SIDS strategy, which takes us up to 2030, is recognition of the fact that some of those issues have not gone away. They are particularly focused on climate vulnerability, but also on the way the international financial system works and capacity issues within the SIDS. There is a recognition that those issues cannot be solved by any one country. It needs a global effort. There are marks of progress, though. I was not doing the job back then but the conversation we were having about the insurance policies that helped alleviate the issues in Jamaica were a long way back then. Not every country had those policies, and some suffered much worse from previous hurricanes as result, so there definitely is progress. I also point to the fact that with the global system I mentioned earlier, I am pretty sure every global and regional development bank has a SIDS strategy now. They are not all perfect, they come at things in slightly different ways, but they recognise a bespoke approach is needed and if you just leave it to the system SIDS will be forgotten. There definitely has been progress but the issues facing SIDS will not be resolved until the global financial system works in their favour and climate risks have gone away, and that is clearly a very big ask.

I will follow on from the question that was posed by the last panel: of the international community, who steps up and helps with the co-ordination, the skills and the accountability? SIDS are, by their nature, small. They cannot particularly throw their weight around like some other countries can. They are very rarely at the top table. Who do you think within the international system is looking out for them?

I think that SIDS are much better at having a global voice. AOSIS is a formidable organisation if you are at the COP discussions. They have very different perspectives on things, but they are very good at presenting a united front, and I am very proud that we support AOSIS to bring that about. At the Wilton Park event, which was brought together by the UK, there was a SIDS envoy from the European Union. The Irish are very strong on this and have a SIDS strategy. New Zealand and Australia are very strong with a particular focus on the Pacific. We need to harmonise in some ways and pull together a global approach.

Could that be the role of the UK?

Absolutely. I think the convening power we showed at Wilton Park and also the event that the Minister hosted in New York are exactly examples of that.

Minister, do you plan to go further on that?

Yes. One of the things that was interesting last week was some of the very smallest SIDS talking about the structure of their civil service, their academia and their civil society. It is not their fault that they may have a population of only 25,000 but, of course, if you live in the United Kingdom—are we 70 million now—you obviously have larger civil societies that can lobby or larger civil services that are specialist. We were talking about how we can offer more support to help with the technical advice to get funding, engineering support, training. Those things are very much at the forefront of my mind because it goes back to the point on the conversation about Melissa that, where we have the technical expertise, I want the UK to be at the forefront of that work. What came across from the SIDS meeting, and from the feedback from Wilton Park as well, is that the UK is a leader in this space, and we are accepted as being a leader. Talking to the New Zealanders, the Australians and the Irish last week, they also see us as being a really important part of this engine of driving forward the agenda on SIDS. I think we have a good story to tell; there is good work going on now. We can and will do more in this space on all sorts of things but also on technical assistance and where we can offer that support.

With your Commonwealth hat on, there is a huge amount that the Commonwealth and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association can do in that field. There was a very good debate at the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association conference about climate change but also about the SIDS looking for exactly the sort of support you have identified, Minister.

I think you are absolutely right. I don’t hold this to memory; I am reading it from a sheet: 45% of the Commonwealth are SIDS. That is a huge figure. We must not forget that we have six British overseas territories that have links within the SIDS family. They have a separate status, but they sit within it. Another point is that 11 of His Majesty’s 14 realms are also SIDS. We have a direct connection, and we should never underestimate how much the King cares about the environment, nature, the seas, oceans and so on. You will be aware on Commonwealth Day at the beginning of March we have the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers meeting. Then we have CHOGM, which is literally in a SID in Antigua and Barbuda. Part of the work that I am doing with my Commonwealth hat on is how we support the Secretary General of the Commonwealth’s reform. One of her tiers of work and multifaceted three pillars, tiers and so on, is on climate and growth and making sure that we can work in this space. There is an important piece of work to be done in the Commonwealth sphere as well.

Minister, do the ongoing restructurings within FCDO throw a spanner in the works of delivering on the goals of the strategy at all?

The decisions on SIDS 2030 are ongoing. The reason for the strategy being published is because the work on SIDS within Tim’s team is going on right now. We see it as being an important part of the Foreign Secretary’s priorities, one of which is on climate. I think there is a real prioritisation within the Department in this space, because it is also something that we can do at a multilateral level all the time. We are able to have a convening power and lobby in this space, whether it is on reform of accessing finance or insurances. Mr Law, I cannot know for sure, but I am hoping it won’t because the work is very much still the focus. Tim’s role as an envoy gives it the priority that means that he can access this space as a senior civil servant but also as an envoy, which gives that status. There are no plans to remove the envoy role to make sure that we carry on that work. It is too important.

More broadly on staffing, are you saying that we should not be worried about staffing cuts and how that might impact on some of the technical expertise we can bring to the table, some of the convening, some of the capacity building requirements that we have heard so much about?

I think, first of all, it would be peculiar for the International Development Committee to not want to challenge Ministers on any FCDO 2030 changes. The Chair, rightly, has made her opinions extremely clear and that is absolutely right and proper. The broader piece of work being led by Sir Olly Robbins is on trying to be more flexible, to have more specialists where we need them, not to have duplication, which is a challenge. In my five months in the Department, sometimes you can have the same conversation with three people. That is not a slight on civil servants. It is just the nature of how some Departments work. Once we get through the next FCDO 2030, clearly it is for the Committee to scrutinise decisions of the Permanent Under-Secretary but also of Ministers, but I cannot sit here and say there definitely will be a problem, and I cannot say there definitely won’t be a problem. I am trying to work through making sure that we have teams in place that deliver the programme and the priorities of the Foreign Secretary, which include in my sphere the SIDS strategy and that is what I will keep working on.

Thank you. High Commissioner, are you confident that the funding will be sufficient to fund the bilateral elements of your programmes and give you sufficient visibility of multiyear spending decisions?

We have not had it yet.

Sorry, it was a bit of rhetorical question, I suppose.

I think you probably know the answer. We have not had the award allocation yet, so we have to wait for that announcement.

Okay, but would you say you are concerned, given some of the mood music around it?

No, I cannot say that. I genuinely do not know where we will end up on it. That is for Ministers to decide and then we will work with whatever allocation we have to progress the strategic priorities in the region.

Thank you all very much. It is an area that this Committee really cares about and it was heartening to hear the long-term commitment to SIDS but also to climate finance, which is an ongoing inquiry for us as well. One of the things that keeps coming up is involving the diaspora. I hope, Minister, that you heard and will continue doing the good work that you are doing.

Just for the record, Chair, I am nodding, so I will just say yes for the record. You always get picked up when a witness is nodding.

Nodding is always the safest approach. We have incredibly talented people here who really care and in almost every country in the world we have people who are fantastic advocates. It seems foolish not to lean into them when the offer is there to help. Thank you very much for what you are doing. I know it will be a long piece of work to get Jamaica back, but we really want to see her back as soon as we possibly can. Thank you all.