Good morning, and welcome to the eighth evidence session in the Committee’s inquiry into MPs’ outside employment and interests. The session is an opportunity to hear from representatives from the Bar Standards Board, the Solicitors Regulation Authority and a law academic on how external interests and conflicts of interest are managed in the judiciary. At the outset, I invite members of the Committee to declare any relevant interests. I will begin by declaring that I am on the roll of solicitors in England and Wales—non-practising—and that I know one of the witnesses, Mr Paul Philip, in a professional capacity. Prior to my election as a Member of Parliament in 2015, I practised as a solicitor and met Mr Philip on a number of occasions in a professional capacity. I have also met him during my term as a Member of Parliament, in his capacity as chief executive of the SRA. Are there any other declarations of interest?

My name is Neil Shastri-Hurst. I am a registered barrister with an active practising certificate, and I am therefore regulated by the Bar Standards Board. I am an associate tenant at No5 Chambers.

Good morning. I am Mehmuda Mian, one of the lay members. I was an employee of the Solicitors Regulation Authority many years ago, and I was a practising solicitor, but I am no longer on the roll and do not have a non-practising certificate.

This has just occurred to me: for belt and braces, I should say that my wife is also an employment judge. Given that we are talking about judicial conduct, it is probably wise that I mention that as well.

Good morning. I am Vicky Smith, one of the lay members. I am a dual-qualified solicitor and barrister. I have been regulated by the BSB, and I am currently regulated by the SRA because I have a current practising certificate. I am also a fee-paid tribunal judge.

Wonderful. Are there any other declarations of interest? If not, that was quite a full declaration of interests. Welcome to the Committee on Standards. Can I invite you to introduce yourselves, beginning with Mr Philip?

Thank you, Chair. Good morning, everyone. I am Paul Philip, and I am presently the chief executive of the Solicitors Regulation Authority. For the minority of you who do not know who we are, given that most of you seem to be lawyers, the SRA is the regulator of solicitors and law firms in England and Wales. At this point in time, we regulate over 200,000 solicitors, 182,000 of whom—the largest number ever—have a practising certificate, and something over 9,300 law firms.

Good morning, I am Mark Neale. I am the director general of the Bar Standards Board. We regulate the 18,500 barristers in England and Wales.

Good morning, I am John Sorabji. I am an academic at UCL. I also have a practising certificate, and I am regulated by the Bar. I used to work for the Judicial Office for England and Wales, but I have not done that for a very significant period of time—five years. Just to be clear, I am not saying anything here today on behalf of the judiciary, and I certainly do not represent them in anything that I am saying.

I should have added that last night I attended a dinner with the Bar Council, sponsored by the Bar Council, where it raised a number of items but not in respect of the regulation of barristers. I will begin with the first question. Can you each explain how outside employment and interests are regulated for barristers, solicitors and judges?

The short answer is that they are not really regulated at all. The regulatory framework for solicitors in England and Wales has a number of different statutory bases. The most important ones are the Solicitors Act 1974 and the Legal Services Act 2007. The Legal Services Act sets out some principles in section 1(3) that have been honed over hundreds of years of practice—of all lawyers in England and Wales—and that are presently codified in section 1(3) of that Act. They talk about things like acting with “independence and integrity”, maintaining confidentiality, providing high standards of work and, perhaps most importantly, upholding the rule of law and the administration of justice as officers of the court. From those broad principles, we produce rules and guidance for the profession that import those principles into particular practice situations. That is the way in which the profession is actually regulated. In relation to your question, the only real issue is about conflicts of interest and whether, when one is engaged in an outside activity, there is a potential, actual or even perceived conflict of interest. Lawyers are trained to recognise conflicts of interest, and we expect them to identify those—particularly own-interest conflicts of interest—and to act accordingly. In relation to an own-interest conflict, our rulebook makes it very clear that there is a complete prohibition on acting for a client where you have an own-interest conflict.

My reply would be very similar to Paul’s. The great majority of barristers—around 80%—are self-employed and consequently have a great deal of discretion about the time they devote to their practice. When they are practising, we expect them to adhere to our code of conduct and rules, particularly as those rules apply to their duties to the court and their clients. In the case of the duty to the client, we obviously expect barristers to adhere to our conflict of interest rules, which involve acknowledging any personal interest that would bring the barrister into conflict with a potential client.

It is slightly different, I think. The starting point would be that judges are not regulated. We have two regulators here for the profession, but judges do not have a regulator—they are independent. That being said, there are at least five different ways in which conflicts of interest, outside interests and so on are governed, shall we say, for judges. The first is statutory prohibitions on what they can do. For instance, for full-time salaried judges or full-time fee-paid judges, there is a statutory prohibition on engaging in legal practice while they are a serving judge. There are also statutory prohibitions on certain salaried judges, such as court judges, sitting as Members of Parliament. Similarly, as a consequence, judges also cannot stand as police and crime commissioners, so there are statutory prohibitions on engaging in political activities in that respect. Equally, peers cannot sit and vote in the House of Lords while they are also serving judges. You then have constitutional conventions or principles that govern what judges can do, the most obvious being the prohibition on political activity by serving judges. You then come to the common law. When judges are sitting in court deciding cases, there are common law rules against acting in cases where you are your own judge, or a judge in your own cause, which is against interests. We also have the rule against bias and perception of bias. Common law rules supplement the statutory provisions and principles. In addition, you also have the terms and conditions of appointment, which are issued by the Lord Chancellor on appointment, and they set out a variety of rules for what judges should and should not do. That is supplemented by quite detailed guidance in the judicial code of conduct, which is issued by the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals under their statutory powers to provide guidance to the judiciary—the tribunals judiciary and the courts judiciary respectively. I think it is a combination of five different things.

That is very helpful—thank you, gentlemen.

My question has been slightly undermined by your initial answers. It was going to be: what secondary activities are regulated? However, based on the first two answers, it sounds like the answer is “not much.” I have a couple of supplementary questions. Are any forms of outside interest or employment prohibited? Where conflicts do arise, how is that managed?

The short answer is that solicitors, in the way in which the profession has grown up, have been upstanding and respected members of the community. They are well trained, and the real issue goes to the points that were made a second ago about potential conflicts. Most of the social policy underlying those points is about whether there is a perceived, actual or potential conflict. Our rules are very clear that, in relation to a conflict, you must both identify and act accordingly. They mainly pertain to the fiduciary relationship between the client and the solicitor. In extremis, if you were to do something that potentially caused some sort of conflict—for example, you go off and become a non-executive of a company that was owned by another client you were acting for—you could see that potential conflicts could arise. We deal with that by making sure that lawyers are properly trained and understand what conflicts are, and that they then recognise them, which we expect them to. Where they do not, they would probably suffer the consequences of our disciplinary process.

The straight answer to your question is that, no, we do not prohibit any specific outside activity, but we make it clear to barristers in guidance that many of our core duties apply not just to practice but to conduct generally. We issue guidance on conduct in non-professional life, which we keep under continuing review.

How are those conflicts managed, if there are conflicts?

It is for the barrister to identify whether there is a conflict between their personal interests and the interests of a prospective client, and obviously to act in the light of that. If a barrister were thought not to have identified a conflict where one existed, we would expect a report to be made to us, and we would assess and investigate if necessary.

The starting point for the judiciary is that judges are appointed from the profession, so they will have had a career already where they were managing, and learning how to manage, conflicts of interest. Upon appointment, though, the way in which I would envisage it happening is, first, if a potential conflict arose—or a situation with outside activity, such as a gift or hospitality—and the judge did not know what to do with it, the obvious starting point would be the code of conduct. If, having looked through the code of conduct, there was still a doubt in their mind, they could seek guidance from a leadership judge, who is a more senior judge. They could also ultimately seek guidance from a head of division, such as the President of the King’s Bench Division, the Lady Chief Justice or the Senior President of Tribunals. Again, that head of division could seek advice from the Judicial Office, from the lawyers who advise them, or from members of their private office on how to assist and help the judge. Ultimately, however, the management is a matter for the individual judge. No one can tell an individual judge what to do. In that sense, it is very much their responsibility, and their interpretation and application of the guidance. That being said, in situations where they are dealing with cases and proceedings in court, if the judge became aware of a potential conflict of interest, and there is a reasonable apprehension of it resulting in, say, bias or perception of bias, they would need to raise that with the parties. Equally, if parties to proceedings perceive an issue of conflict or bias, they could make an application to the judge to make a ruling on it. Ultimately, the decisions could be appealed to an appellate court. Finally, I suppose, the ultimate backstop is that if a complaint is made about a judge’s conduct, there could be an investigation through the independent Judicial Conduct Investigations Office, which could lead to warnings, guidance or, ultimately, dismissal, depending on the gravity of the matter.

Dr Sorabji, you have touched on salaried judges. Are the rules any different for fee-paid judges?

There are differences. The most obvious one is the difference in the prohibition on carrying out legal practice, because large numbers of fee-paid judges—in fact, possibly most fee-paid judges—are part time, so being a judge is their secondary form of work. Most will still be practitioners, for example. In those circumstances, you could not prohibit them from carrying on practice. As a consequence, they are also not prohibited from being MPs or from sitting in the House of Lords under the statutory prohibitions either. There is that difference. In terms of political activity, I would have thought that the guidance and the constitutional convention remain the same, whether you are fee-paid or salaried. In particular, you can see that where Government Ministers are concerned—I understand that Robert Buckland had to resign from a fee-paid position when he became Lord Chancellor, and Lord Hermer, on his appointment as Attorney General and a Member of the House of Lords, resigned as a deputy judge of the High Court. There are still those applications of the convention against political activity. There are other differences, such as the use of titles, for instance. Fee-paid judges should use their title as a judge only when they sit judicially, whereas salaried judges can refer to their status and title when they are not sitting, but they should do so consistently with the principles set out in the judicial code of conduct. Those principles are that they should always act with integrity, maintaining independence and the impartiality of the judiciary. There are differences. Probably the widest difference is with respect to the engagement that judges can have with the wider community, depending on whether they are salaried or fee-paid. It is accepted that judges are part of the wider community and can take part in it, but there is a slight difference in the flexibility in what fee-paid judges can do, compared with salaried judges. The application of the rules may be viewed as slightly stricter for salaried, rather than fee-paid, but always bear in mind that both have to act so as not to undermine public confidence in the judiciary.

My question is for all three of you. I think we touched on this a little in previous questions, but I will ask for the sake of completeness. Do any specific rules govern how much time barristers, judges and solicitors can spend on outside employment, or how they divide their time between outside interests in their private lives and their professional capacity?

The short answer, as I have already said, is no. Again, in extremis, where a practising solicitor was engaged in so much activity that it impacted on their practice as a solicitor, one can see, theoretically at least, that it could come to the attention of the regulator. I am not aware of that situation ever actually happening.

The same answer. There are no specific rules, although we clearly expect practising barristers to maintain their professional competence and fulfil their continuing professional development requirements. But there are no specific rules on hours.

There is no specific rule on hours. However, there is guidance in the judicial code of conduct that makes it clear, in terms of outside activities, that judges should ensure that they do not take on anything that is so onerous or time-consuming that it would detract from their ability to carry out their judicial functions. But that is it.

It is lovely to see you, gentlemen. I have a question for all three of you. You might say no again, but are there any rules or guidance against using your professional status as a means to secure additional work?

I suppose that means additional unrelated legal work.

Yes, outside work.

I am considering that question. Not that I am aware of, actually, no.

We do have rules that bear on barristers misusing their titles in non-professional contexts in order to exert pressure on others. I am not aware of any examples of barristers using their title to, as it were, solicit work on other grounds.

In terms of the judiciary, I think that the code of conduct is fairly clear that judges cannot use their professional titles for their own benefit—to gain additional work and so on. They cannot exploit their titles or status.

The English legal profession has been very successful in the world of international arbitration. How do members of the judiciary take instructions, post leaving the judiciary, in roles as international arbitrators? Can they undertake international arbitration work during their time as judges in certain roles?

I should give the caveat that all my answers refer to England and Wales, not to the Scottish judiciary or the Northern Irish judiciary. There are two answers to the question. Serving judges are part of the statutory prohibition in terms of legal practice. That means that serving judges cannot carry out arbitrations or take instructions in arbitrations for a fee. They could do it pro bono, I suppose, but that is part of the statutory prohibition. That being said, they can be instructed as arbitrators under a provision in the Arbitration Act, with the permission of a more senior judge. But again, any fee for that does not go to them; it goes to the court service, if I remember correctly. In terms of post-retirement instructions, there are no restrictions on that, so they would just get instructions if they were lucky enough to do so—and many of them do.

Thank you. Gill Furniss is going to turn to the issue of rules versus principles.

What are the benefits of a rules-based approach to regulating outside interests?

I can only talk about solicitors. We moved from a rules-based arrangement in the regulation of solicitors to a principles-based arrangement just over 10 years ago. From our perspective, rules are subject to the quality of the drafting, and anyone who has been engaged in legislation, as Committee members have, knows that there can often be unintended consequences of drafting, and that the drafting needs to be very specific. It can lead to the wrong outcome; it can sometimes be gamed. But it is fair to say that lawyers like it—there is no doubt about it. They love certainty. Solicitors love rules. There was, from the profession, a disappointment, to put it mildly, when we moved towards a principled approach. We moved towards a principled approach because, in our view, it looks more towards what situations might arise, and it does not try to create a rule for every single situation. It is definitely a more holistic way of looking at the spirit of what was intended, rather than the specifics of a rule that is written down. Ultimately, that means that the reasonableness of the conduct in the context of the guidance that has been provided and the expectation of a solicitor is always looked at retrospectively. I can understand why people do not like that, but those are the reasons why we moved to a principles-based approach. The other issue is that, from a solicitor’s perspective, the rules-based approach started to produce a sort of industry of courses to go on in order to interpret rules. Solicitors started to pay lots of money to consultancies to be trained on what the rules meant, as it were. We felt that that was probably a regulatory burden too far, so we moved to a principles approach.

As I said in response to an earlier question, some of our core duties apply to both professional and non-professional life. Quite a good example would be the duty to act with honesty and integrity. That is a principle, and I think it is appropriate, because the circumstances that arise in non-professional life can be so many and varied as to make it virtually impossible to write sensible rules. I think that principles-based approach is the right one.

I think similarly, I am afraid. Apart from the statutory prohibitions and the common law rules, the guidance in the code of conduct is principle based. There are three principles—integrity, independence and impartiality—and they inform the more specific guidance on the issues, which are dealt with in the guidance itself and the code. I would suggest that the advantage of the principles-based approach for the judiciary is that it ensures that judges, who are the primary decision makers in terms of managing their conflicts, are able to apply a pervasive principle to all the situations that could potentially arise, whereas the risk of a rules-based approach for judges is that, because there are so many areas where conflicts might arise in principle, unless you draft an extremely detailed code, you are going to run the risk of missing something out. Equally, with a detailed rules-based approach, you will not necessarily be able to deal with novel situations as and when they arise, whereas a principles-based approach enables you to do that. It also helps to build and maintain a culture of compliance and commitment to the principles. A rules-based approach might not necessarily do that as effectively, because rules may engender a tick-box-type culture—a legalistic culture. We are talking about lawyers and judges, who are skilled in looking for loopholes and for particular interpretations. I am not saying—and I would not—that judges do that, because of course they do not, but building in that type of rules-based approach lends itself to the potential development of a tick-box-type culture, whereas a pervasive principles-based approach does not. You could say that it is a more effective approach in that sense.

Mr Philip, in the move away from the rules-based approach to a principles-based one, I wonder whether the authority has seen fewer cases before it because of the more holistic approach. Do you have any evidence, or can you not say?

I do not have any evidence at my fingertips. I doubt that moving from a rules-based to a principles-based approach created any difference in the level. I have been in role for quite a time—about 11 and a half years. When I joined the organisation, I seem to recall that we were receiving about 12,000 complaints about solicitors every year. Interestingly, up until about six months ago, that would have been a constant. Our running rate is now about 15,000 complaints about solicitors a year, for reasons that I have to say we do not have any evidence to support, but I do not think it has anything to do with the move.

As I said at the beginning, we start with the statutes and the ethical obligations and principles that we expect of solicitors. We codify that in our standards and regulations—essentially what used to be called the handbook. Those of you who were around at the time will know that the handbook was constantly growing, so we slimmed it down very significantly. Of course, there is always a call for the application of principles in practice, and therefore we produce quite a quantum of guidance in relation to different aspects of a solicitor’s practice. We still have lots of rules on really important things like how to deal with client money. From my point of view—although I presume that lots of solicitors will disagree—it seems to work reasonably well. We review the balance on an ongoing basis, so we think it is probably as good as it can be at the moment. Different scenarios come up all the time, and therefore the need for further guidance in relation to particular aspects of a solicitor’s practice arises. The amount of guidance we have is growing and growing, but the rules remain a reasonable size.

No, not that I am aware of. As Mark said, the principles are things like acting with integrity and honesty, and maintaining confidentiality. Those types of principles should be understandable to anyone, and the rules are written to try to make sure that, in a particular context—if you were dealing with client money, for example—the principles will be complied with.

Good morning. I am very interested in how we make sure that people have a deep awareness of rules, principles and codes of conduct, and an appreciation of both how important they are and what they practically mean. I would be interested to hear of any approaches you take, whether at the beginning of somebody’s career, throughout their career in a particular role, or when rules change. How do you make sure there is that awareness and that appreciation of their importance, as well as a deep understanding so that they can apply them practically?

Obviously, it is trained at the beginning of the career. Basically, people are expected to understand the ethical principles of practising as a lawyer. As a matter of fact, we are looking again at the ways in which people qualify, and we are thinking hard about whether more ethical content is required. In terms of ongoing practice, solicitors are usually organised in firms. Most of the major, larger and medium-sized firms will do their own training, because from their perspective—and indeed from ours—it really is all about trust and confidence in the profession and making sure that people do the right thing. The question is: what is the right thing in practice? We provide lots and lots of guidance. We put it on our website, and we email solicitors on a regular basis to highlight when there are changes. But you should not detract from what the law firms do themselves—they do an awful lot of in-house training on this type of thing. Ultimately, there is also a deterrent, which is that when people derogate from the guidance, the rules or the ethical principles, they are seen to be dealt with in a way that sends a clear message to the rest of the profession.

Is there a lot of onus on solicitors to keep themselves up to date?

There is an absolute onus on solicitors to keep themselves up to date, but we try our best to support them with materials—as does the Law Society of England and Wales. I know that firms do a lot themselves.

Our position is very similar. Ethical competence is clearly absolutely key to qualification as a barrister, so students are assessed on their ethical competence as part of the vocational Bar training. We then set central examinations in ethics as part of pupillage, which is the year that precedes obtaining a full practising certificate. We expect new practitioners to spend a certain amount of their CPD time on ethical issues and, as with solicitors, we and the Bar Council provide guidance and support. The Bar Council, for example, runs a very well thought of ethics hotline for barristers who are seeking guidance on ethical issues.

A safe harbour, if you like.

Well, it is not run by the regulator. It is run by the Bar Council.

The judiciary—

Yes, is there anything you would call out that you think could be of interest to us or help guide us?

The first point is that, as I said earlier, they build on what they have learned in practice. In terms of the approach, all judges are made aware of the guidance in the code of conduct. They will be informed when it is amended or revised through the judicial intranet, and they will all be aware of and be able to seek guidance from more senior judges. Those are generally the ways in which it would be done for the judiciary.

Dr Sorabji, you have touched on this already, but the guidance on judicial conduct contains principles and guidance rather than rules, as its title suggests. I wonder if you could expand a little on the merits of that approach, and particularly whether there are any principles from the guidance that might usefully be applied to our work as Members of Parliament.

In terms of the merits of it, I think I have already answered that in the previous question. However, on what could be transferred over or usefully considered in relation to MPs, my starting point would be that the code of conduct has a passage that makes the point quite clearly: judges should be aware that they are primarily accountable to the law. One thing that might be considered for MPs, perhaps, is whether any principles-based guidance should include a reference to the fact that MPs are primarily accountable to the electorate—to the democratic system—and that this should inform how they approach conflicts, outside interests, hospitality, gifts and so on. I think that would be an interesting one to consider. Equally, of the three principles that guide the code of conduct, integrity seems to be the most appropriate to apply to MPs. However, also exercising their independent judgment in what they are considering—debates, political issues and so on—might be helpful. It is the application of those principles, though, that might be interesting for you. For instance, the non-exploitation of titles. I do not know whether this will be covered later, as we have not yet touched on gifts, but the application of the principles on gifts makes it quite clear that judges can accept them, but only if they are of very low, de minimis value—so, a bottle of wine rather than three cases of Château Margaux, and things like that. You could have guidance along those lines in terms of applying the principles, and obviously ensuring that whatever you do does not bring Parliament into disrepute—just as judges are supposed to ensure they act in ways that do not bring the judiciary into disrepute.

We are not looking today at the paid advocacy rule, which concerns an acceptance of gifts and hospitality, but that is a very helpful comment—we may well come back to you for some further evidence on that separate point. I would now like to turn to the final set of questions, which relate to enforcement, and invite my colleague David to ask this question.

I am David Stirling, another of the lay members of the Committee, and I have no connection with the law whatsoever. Mr Philip and Mr Neale, you have both described a situation in which there is no real restriction on solicitors or barristers engaging in outside employment. However, Mr Philip, you touched on the hypothetical situation where someone might be so busy with other activities that it becomes a problem in delivering their core responsibilities to their clients. Do you have any system of monitoring how much external activity is going on with an individual or is it dependent on waiting on a complaint?

We do not have any system of monitoring outside interests or outside activity. In many ways, it is how it manifests itself in client care and any competency issues reported to us. In that theoretical situation—as I say, I am not aware of it happening in practice—when you look at the nature of the individual’s conduct and ask yourself, “Why is that happening?”, all I was saying was that you might get into the territory of not paying enough attention to things such as continuous professional development, attending to your practice and dealing with client care, as Mark says. That is the way in which I can see that it might happen, but I have never seen it in practice.

I would give exactly the same answer. We expect practising barristers to maintain their competence.

Dr Sorabji, is there any form of monitoring of the outside interests of the judiciary?

In a sense, no. There is no register of interests, for instance. The Supreme Court declined to introduce a register of interests a couple of years ago, primarily on the basis that it would be too difficult to capture everything—although, interestingly, you could compare that with the United States, where there are registers of interests. In terms of monitoring, you would be looking for complaints from individuals who believed that a conflict had arisen, for instance. In court cases, if one of the parties to proceedings believed that a judge had been biased or enacted in a case where they had an interest, you would have an appeal or they would raise it before you even got to that stage. In court work, monitoring rests on parties, if the judge does not raise it themself. But otherwise, there is no monitoring system.

Thank you for being with us today. You have said that outside interests are not regulated and that there is very little monitoring—although you touched on potential complaints, Dr Sorabji—but are solicitors, barristers and judges required to document information on outside interests, hours worked and level of earnings? If so, would you, as regulators, be eligible to see any documentation, such as contracts of employment?

That is a good question. The answer is that, although we do not mandate it, a number of law firms, particularly the larger ones, hold registers of interests themselves—that type of thing. Law Society guidance and compliance with this ethical principle suggests that is a good idea. In terms of the amount of money paid, and so on, unless it is germane to a particular allegation that the individual was acting inappropriately, I cannot imagine a situation where the regulator would have access to that type of information. You are quite right to say that very little is mandated in terms of what solicitors do outside their private practice unless it has an implication for their private practice. The most obvious one, which I mentioned at the very beginning, is potential conflict. But failing that, that is the extent of the regime.

No, we do not maintain any information about the non-professional interests of barristers. We discover what barristers are earning because they have to make a declaration on their income when they renew their practising certificate as it has a bearing on how much they pay for it. But that is the limit of the information we hold.

Would that ever be defined and drilled down to earnings from their barrister role?

It is only their earnings from their barrister role.

So they would not be required to register anything else?

No.

Okay. Dr Sorabji?

In respect of the judiciary, they are not required to document. I imagine that the only way contracts of employment or appointment documents might be disclosed would be if an individual judge were thinking of taking up an appointment—for example, as a university trustee or chancellor. In such circumstances, they might seek guidance from a leadership judge. I do not know whether this has ever happened, but it may be that in those circumstances they would disclose the nature of the appointment to the leadership judge, so that they could get effective guidance. I think that would be the only way that documentary evidence or materials would be disclosed. I do not think that there is any mechanism to mandate or require that disclosure.

Thank you. That is really helpful.

I have a follow-up question. I have been really struck in this discussion by the fact that in the legal profession—tell me if I have this wrong—an integral part of your training is on things such as conflicts of interest, ethics and propriety, so it is almost as if, once lawyers set off into their professional world, the regulation is relatively light-touch because it is assumed that understanding is fundamental to being a solicitor or barrister. I am interested in the contrast between that and being an MP, for which there is no training—you become an MP on day one and are expected to get going—and for which there is therefore possibly more regulation of this stuff, which might be new to many MPs. Do the panel have any comments on the balance between assuming people will behave well in the first place, and needing to regulate them?

The point that struck me when thinking about this issue for this session is that solicitors have traditionally been held in quite high regard from the public perspective. Solicitors are aware that trust and confidence are really important. Our training, and our assessment before we join, are not just on the application of the law but, as Mark says, on ethical principles. One of those principles is making sure that you understand what a conflict is, and that you do not act where you have a conflict. Most solicitors will still be graduates, and they may well do a transition course if they have not done a law degree. They will then usually do a year of training leading to the solicitors qualifying examination. They will then have two years’ worth of supervised clinical practice. Throughout that period, that principle is reinforced, and in the vast majority of law firms it is also reinforced in their actual practice. That is very different from the electoral process, from being elected an MP, and from the type of skillset and knowledge base one needs to exercise in order to not find yourself in hot water.

That is a very good point, because of the centrality of ethics to practising as a barrister. On day one, a barrister has had inculcated a range of ethical principles. That is, I think, a bit different from becoming a Member of Parliament.

I would echo that, regarding the judiciary. I will piggyback off the fact that judges have been lawyers beforehand, so have had this throughout their career, but there is obviously also a very clear culture within the judiciary, which starts with the judicial oath to decide cases “without fear or favour”. From the very start, you are embedding into judicial offices a culture of and commitment to ethical principles, acting with integrity and acting with independence. One other practical consideration is that judicial office is very much a vocation. Particularly as a salaried judge, you sign up and that is your job for life, effectively. That is different from MPs, because of the electoral cycle. It comes within the different culture that is created by the differential nature of the two roles within the constitution. I think there are fundamental differences.

If there are no further questions from other members of the Committee, I will ask the final question. For clarity, many thousands of solicitors and barristers, and the judiciary exclusively, are paid for by the British taxpayer—is that correct, if they are working in public bodies or Government Departments?

Yes.

Thank you. Would any of the panel like to add any further comments before I conclude proceedings?

On the question asked about whether the practice of law completely analogous to the situation of MPs: it obviously is not.

Gentlemen, thank you very much for the evidence that you have given. It was fairly straightforward and simple, but that by no means diminishes its importance; if anything, it makes it easier for the Committee to digest. I am grateful to all three of you for appearing. I record my particular gratitude to Dr Sorabji for attending as a witness at such short notice.